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War Comes to Long An, Updated and Expanded: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province
This landmark study of the Vietnamese conflict, examined through the lens of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements in the rural province of Long An up until American intervention in the area, offers a human, balanced, penetrating account of war. Two new forewords by Robert K. Brigham of Vassar College and Jeffrey Record of the Air War College explore the book's enduring influence. A new end chapter offers previously unpublished scholarship on the conflict.
368 pages, Paperback
First published March 1, 1972
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February 25, 2022
I disagree with this book's claim that Ngo Dinh Diem and his regime failed to do well in the strategic hamlet program in Long An.
It was in the summer of 1963 that the Viet Cong intensified their attacks against strategic hamlets in the Mekong Delta, targeting Long An, Dinh Tuong, Vinh Binh, and Kien Hoa most intensely. These provinces were auspicious for the Communists because their proximity to Saigon made them easily accessible to Western journalists and because they lay within the operational zone of the ARVN 7th Division, which had been much derided for alleged incompetence by American journalists in the past. During this period, these four provinces experienced more Viet Cong attacks than South Vietnam’s other thirty-seven provinces combined. Because of the favorable terrain, Communist units succeeded in overrunning a significant number of the strategic hamlets in two of the target provinces, Long An and Dinh Tuong. Typically, they tore down the hamlet fence, delivered propaganda lectures, and, if possible, took weapons from the inadequately organized hamlet militia.
Nevertheless, prior to Diem's overthrow, the strategic hamlets in most parts of the delta were gaining strength. At the beginning of September 1963, reporting on a just-completed tour of all the delta provinces, the British advisory mission concluded: “Generally, steady progress has been made in these provinces over the last six months in the strategic hamlet program and in the restoration of roads and bridges, with the result that Government authority is being gradually restored over large areas of the country and an increasing degree of security is being provided for greater numbers of the population.” That report was issued at the same time as a report from CIA operative Rufus Phillips and the other American advisers to the strategic hamlet program, which stated that the strategic hamlets were constantly growing more effective across the three corps areas to the north of the Mekong Delta and as in the delta provinces of Vinh Binh and Kien Hoa – two of the four provinces targeted by the Viet Cong’s offensive – as well as other provinces. Furthermore, Communist sources would reveal that even in Long An the strategic hamlets had not been hurt as badly as the Americans thought. The central Communist leadership organ in South Vietnam credited the Saigon government with creating 5,000 strategic hamlets nationwide so far. “The enemy has been able to grab control of population and land from us, and he has drawn away for his own use our sources of resources and manpower,” the Communist appraisal stated. “We have not yet been able to stop them. On the contrary, from an overall perspective, the enemy is still pushing his program forward into our areas.”
Thus, contrary to Jeffrey Race's thesis, the strategic hamlet program sustained very little damage during Diem's rule. The overthrow of Diem and the subsequent chaos among the South Vietnamese militia forces allowed the Viet Cong to seriously harm the strategic hamlet program for the first time. Within a few months, the Communists destroyed forty percent of the region’s strategic hamlets. The strategic hamlet program continued to suffer losses throughout 1964 and the first half of 1965. Nevertheless, many of the most geographically important hamlets did not fall under Communist domination until the Communists’ summer offensive of 1965.
Even in Long An and Dinh Tuong, the two provinces where the Viet Cong had inflicted substantial damage on the strategic hamlets prior to the coup, the program suffered much greater damage after Diem's overthrow than before. The official Communist history of Long An province stated that September 1963 was the “period when the province faced its greatest difficulties. Enemy strategic hamlets and military outposts practically covered the entire rural area of the province. Most of the civilians had been moved into the hamlets.” The Viet Cong’s mobile company in the province had been so weakened in recent battles that neither it nor the district and village forces could destroy any strategic hamlets completely. Whenever Viet Cong forces damaged a strategic hamlet, the government came back the next day to repair the damage. Of the 273 strategic hamlets established in the province under Diem, only 20 had been put out of order before the coup. In the six months after the coup, “virtually all the strategic hamlets throughout Long An province were destroyed.”
WAR COMES TO LONG AN is a relatively accurate account of the development of the strategic hamlet program in Long An that draws inaccurate conclusions from it, though. Having read various sources that oppose Race's thesis and disprove his arguments, I concluded that this book can be misleading. I do not recommend it.
It was in the summer of 1963 that the Viet Cong intensified their attacks against strategic hamlets in the Mekong Delta, targeting Long An, Dinh Tuong, Vinh Binh, and Kien Hoa most intensely. These provinces were auspicious for the Communists because their proximity to Saigon made them easily accessible to Western journalists and because they lay within the operational zone of the ARVN 7th Division, which had been much derided for alleged incompetence by American journalists in the past. During this period, these four provinces experienced more Viet Cong attacks than South Vietnam’s other thirty-seven provinces combined. Because of the favorable terrain, Communist units succeeded in overrunning a significant number of the strategic hamlets in two of the target provinces, Long An and Dinh Tuong. Typically, they tore down the hamlet fence, delivered propaganda lectures, and, if possible, took weapons from the inadequately organized hamlet militia.
Nevertheless, prior to Diem's overthrow, the strategic hamlets in most parts of the delta were gaining strength. At the beginning of September 1963, reporting on a just-completed tour of all the delta provinces, the British advisory mission concluded: “Generally, steady progress has been made in these provinces over the last six months in the strategic hamlet program and in the restoration of roads and bridges, with the result that Government authority is being gradually restored over large areas of the country and an increasing degree of security is being provided for greater numbers of the population.” That report was issued at the same time as a report from CIA operative Rufus Phillips and the other American advisers to the strategic hamlet program, which stated that the strategic hamlets were constantly growing more effective across the three corps areas to the north of the Mekong Delta and as in the delta provinces of Vinh Binh and Kien Hoa – two of the four provinces targeted by the Viet Cong’s offensive – as well as other provinces. Furthermore, Communist sources would reveal that even in Long An the strategic hamlets had not been hurt as badly as the Americans thought. The central Communist leadership organ in South Vietnam credited the Saigon government with creating 5,000 strategic hamlets nationwide so far. “The enemy has been able to grab control of population and land from us, and he has drawn away for his own use our sources of resources and manpower,” the Communist appraisal stated. “We have not yet been able to stop them. On the contrary, from an overall perspective, the enemy is still pushing his program forward into our areas.”
Thus, contrary to Jeffrey Race's thesis, the strategic hamlet program sustained very little damage during Diem's rule. The overthrow of Diem and the subsequent chaos among the South Vietnamese militia forces allowed the Viet Cong to seriously harm the strategic hamlet program for the first time. Within a few months, the Communists destroyed forty percent of the region’s strategic hamlets. The strategic hamlet program continued to suffer losses throughout 1964 and the first half of 1965. Nevertheless, many of the most geographically important hamlets did not fall under Communist domination until the Communists’ summer offensive of 1965.
Even in Long An and Dinh Tuong, the two provinces where the Viet Cong had inflicted substantial damage on the strategic hamlets prior to the coup, the program suffered much greater damage after Diem's overthrow than before. The official Communist history of Long An province stated that September 1963 was the “period when the province faced its greatest difficulties. Enemy strategic hamlets and military outposts practically covered the entire rural area of the province. Most of the civilians had been moved into the hamlets.” The Viet Cong’s mobile company in the province had been so weakened in recent battles that neither it nor the district and village forces could destroy any strategic hamlets completely. Whenever Viet Cong forces damaged a strategic hamlet, the government came back the next day to repair the damage. Of the 273 strategic hamlets established in the province under Diem, only 20 had been put out of order before the coup. In the six months after the coup, “virtually all the strategic hamlets throughout Long An province were destroyed.”
WAR COMES TO LONG AN is a relatively accurate account of the development of the strategic hamlet program in Long An that draws inaccurate conclusions from it, though. Having read various sources that oppose Race's thesis and disprove his arguments, I concluded that this book can be misleading. I do not recommend it.
October 5, 2010
Long winded, sometimes meandering, and ending with a rather whimpering conclusion, this book reads like the dense dissertation it is, meant more to be skimmed by a handful of unfortunate committee members than published for a wide audience. But the details are often very interesting, and the analysis of the situation in one small but pivotal province in 1960s Vietnam is very thoughtful.
Rush made a great effort to dissect the political and security situation in 1960s Long An by interviewing countless figures of all backgrounds and ideologies to create this work, and what makes it worthwhile in the end is that his interpretation goes well beyond a simple notion that the U.S. mission in southeast Asia failed because of the anti-imperialist preferences of the population there. Government officials he interviewed bemoaned the fact that "the communists are inhumane and bound by no moral demands, hence they can terrorize at will; the government cannot terrorize for humane reasons." But Rush discounts this argument, instead saying that the wholesale cooperation of the peasant class could not be a consequence of fear alone.
He concludes instead that the Diem government (and the U.S.) failed in Long An because they failed to gain the support of the population (and what he calls existing "social conditions"). Better land reform measures, more concessions and programs that favor the poor, and more democracy would have helped their cause if not turned the war. Instead, the Vietminh stoked the cause of class resistance and brought an antifeudal revolution. And his evidence bears this conclusion.
In the first paragraph of his preface, Rush writes "the reader will find few evil or incompetent characters in this book," a statement that offers insight in two respects. First, it shows why he was so successful gaining an audience with such a wide range of parties in his research. But more importantly, he hints at the failure of the South Vietnamese government and its treatment of both the rural population as well as its adversaries.
I don't want to discount too strongly the reality that terrorism and fear can be powerful weapons. I suspect that much of the population of Long An that was complicit in the undoing of the government in Long An were, in fact, fearful of the communist insurgents there. But it is too easy to demonize the enemy without recognizing that they might be offering more positive incentives to sway public opinion as well.
At the very least, Rush offers analysis that demonstrates well that the policies and actions of the Diem government were unpopular, undemocratic and inept at best, and corrupt, authoritarian, and oppressive at worst. In other words, war is the continuation of politics by other means.
Rush made a great effort to dissect the political and security situation in 1960s Long An by interviewing countless figures of all backgrounds and ideologies to create this work, and what makes it worthwhile in the end is that his interpretation goes well beyond a simple notion that the U.S. mission in southeast Asia failed because of the anti-imperialist preferences of the population there. Government officials he interviewed bemoaned the fact that "the communists are inhumane and bound by no moral demands, hence they can terrorize at will; the government cannot terrorize for humane reasons." But Rush discounts this argument, instead saying that the wholesale cooperation of the peasant class could not be a consequence of fear alone.
He concludes instead that the Diem government (and the U.S.) failed in Long An because they failed to gain the support of the population (and what he calls existing "social conditions"). Better land reform measures, more concessions and programs that favor the poor, and more democracy would have helped their cause if not turned the war. Instead, the Vietminh stoked the cause of class resistance and brought an antifeudal revolution. And his evidence bears this conclusion.
In the first paragraph of his preface, Rush writes "the reader will find few evil or incompetent characters in this book," a statement that offers insight in two respects. First, it shows why he was so successful gaining an audience with such a wide range of parties in his research. But more importantly, he hints at the failure of the South Vietnamese government and its treatment of both the rural population as well as its adversaries.
I don't want to discount too strongly the reality that terrorism and fear can be powerful weapons. I suspect that much of the population of Long An that was complicit in the undoing of the government in Long An were, in fact, fearful of the communist insurgents there. But it is too easy to demonize the enemy without recognizing that they might be offering more positive incentives to sway public opinion as well.
At the very least, Rush offers analysis that demonstrates well that the policies and actions of the Diem government were unpopular, undemocratic and inept at best, and corrupt, authoritarian, and oppressive at worst. In other words, war is the continuation of politics by other means.
January 29, 2017
War Comes to Long An is prototype district study in the counter-insurgency literature; a cognizant and powerful case study of the loss of a key district in the Vietnam War over fifteen years. Long An province stretched from the border with Cambodia to the outskirts of Saigon. In hundreds of hours of interviews with government figures and Vietcong defectors, and thousands of pages of primary source analysis, Race describes how the revolutionary movement of the Vietcong out-strategized and overpowered the urban elites of the Saigon government.
Race describes the Vietnam War as a social struggle between Saigon and the revolutionary movement for the loyalty of various components of Vietnamese society. The key 'terrain' in this agrarian nation was the village, the level of governance that ordinary people encountered most often, and the key issues were land redistribution and promotion within society.
Land reform is, and always has been the key issue in Vietnamese society. The land system that the Saigon regime inherited was tilted towards large landlords and plantations, with landless farmers serving as an easily exploitable labor pool for French commercial interests. Prior to 1954, Long An had been a liberated district, with the Viet Minh allocating land to the tillers. After the Geneva Treaty, the landlords and government returned and demanded nine years of back rent and taxes! Way to start off on the right foot, guys. The fitfully implemented land reform law only kicked in for plots over 100 hectares and required peasants to pay for land transferred to them. The forced dislocations of the agroville and strategic hamlet programs were the final insults to anyone who considered themselves an apolitical farmer. By contrast, the revolutionary movement separated Vietnamese society into five classes: landless laborer, renter, self-sufficient farmer, rich farmer, and landlord, and organized the first four against the last, with an effective land redistribution scheme.
Promotion and prestige are key elements to any human being. The revolutionary movement promoted within the echelon. A person would sign up as a village guerrilla, and effective people would rise to the district, province, region, and finally central levels. By contrast, the most effective pro-Saigon Village Councillor would remain at the village level indefinitely. Officials at the District and above level were dispatched from Saigon, from the educated classes, and they did not understand the needs of farmers. Village-level communists had a great deal of discretion and power. Village level officials in the government had almost none.
As such, the revolutionary movement was able to mobilize far greater numbers of people, and get supplies, intelligence, and loyalty. A relatively sparing use of violence, 80 assassinations in 1960, was enough to complete cripple the government, while lavish use of artillery, airpower, and foreign troops, with the commensurate loss of thousands of civilians lives, could not break the revolutionary movement. The security strategy of the government, which involved isolating the population from the revolution, could not succeed with any reasonable level of troops. The revolutionary movement was nearly completely decimated in 1959 and in 1968, and managed to return to some semblance of strength both times.
I have two quibbles with War Comes to Long An: First, this is very much a dissertation and it sometimes descends into turgid 60s organizational sociology, to the detriment of actually making a point. Second, for all its clear diagnosis of the failures of the Saigon government, their immense cognitive blind spot which meant that the more efficient and active they were, the more they recruited for the revolution, Race offers no diagnosis of how a guerrilla movement might be defeated. There has to be some power to being a legitimate government, with courts and police and all that, as well as the ability to call on nearly limitless American aid, but it seems the best thing to do is hide in the jungle eating rice and conducting revolutionary self-criticism sessions.
Race describes the Vietnam War as a social struggle between Saigon and the revolutionary movement for the loyalty of various components of Vietnamese society. The key 'terrain' in this agrarian nation was the village, the level of governance that ordinary people encountered most often, and the key issues were land redistribution and promotion within society.
Land reform is, and always has been the key issue in Vietnamese society. The land system that the Saigon regime inherited was tilted towards large landlords and plantations, with landless farmers serving as an easily exploitable labor pool for French commercial interests. Prior to 1954, Long An had been a liberated district, with the Viet Minh allocating land to the tillers. After the Geneva Treaty, the landlords and government returned and demanded nine years of back rent and taxes! Way to start off on the right foot, guys. The fitfully implemented land reform law only kicked in for plots over 100 hectares and required peasants to pay for land transferred to them. The forced dislocations of the agroville and strategic hamlet programs were the final insults to anyone who considered themselves an apolitical farmer. By contrast, the revolutionary movement separated Vietnamese society into five classes: landless laborer, renter, self-sufficient farmer, rich farmer, and landlord, and organized the first four against the last, with an effective land redistribution scheme.
Promotion and prestige are key elements to any human being. The revolutionary movement promoted within the echelon. A person would sign up as a village guerrilla, and effective people would rise to the district, province, region, and finally central levels. By contrast, the most effective pro-Saigon Village Councillor would remain at the village level indefinitely. Officials at the District and above level were dispatched from Saigon, from the educated classes, and they did not understand the needs of farmers. Village-level communists had a great deal of discretion and power. Village level officials in the government had almost none.
As such, the revolutionary movement was able to mobilize far greater numbers of people, and get supplies, intelligence, and loyalty. A relatively sparing use of violence, 80 assassinations in 1960, was enough to complete cripple the government, while lavish use of artillery, airpower, and foreign troops, with the commensurate loss of thousands of civilians lives, could not break the revolutionary movement. The security strategy of the government, which involved isolating the population from the revolution, could not succeed with any reasonable level of troops. The revolutionary movement was nearly completely decimated in 1959 and in 1968, and managed to return to some semblance of strength both times.
I have two quibbles with War Comes to Long An: First, this is very much a dissertation and it sometimes descends into turgid 60s organizational sociology, to the detriment of actually making a point. Second, for all its clear diagnosis of the failures of the Saigon government, their immense cognitive blind spot which meant that the more efficient and active they were, the more they recruited for the revolution, Race offers no diagnosis of how a guerrilla movement might be defeated. There has to be some power to being a legitimate government, with courts and police and all that, as well as the ability to call on nearly limitless American aid, but it seems the best thing to do is hide in the jungle eating rice and conducting revolutionary self-criticism sessions.
March 11, 2020
Race examines the push and pull of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements in the rural province of Long An up until American intervention in the area in the late 1960s. He interviewed Vietnamese on both sides of the conflict, government officials and American soldiers. He points out the very framework that the American and South Vietnamese government used to understand the conflict prevented them from seeing the benefits, costs and consequences of supporting the communists or the government.
Why I started this book: Another Professional Reading title that I found on Audible. And I do so much better with listening to nonfiction that reading it.
Why I finished it: This book is a master class in understanding and looking for the consequences of political decisions up and down the economic hierarchy. The South Vietnamese government was trying to maintain the status quo, the very social status quo that so many had fought against to kick out the colonial French. Government officials had centralized decision processes that favored the elite and the city dwellers. Communists favored the poor and lived with the people. They took pains to divide the land up to the small farmers, while the government returned after years of war seeking back taxes. Communists also made efforts to position themselves as just reacting to the governments' unfair land management, taxes and social advancement. Like Afghanistan, the Sharia courts might be strict and repressive, but they are local and quick, not plagued by distance, demands for bribes and backlog of cases making the process drag on for years. Besides the easy answer of terror and fear, this book challenges the reader to question why communists or the Taliban would seem like a better solution that a "corrupt, distant, ruling elite" promising democratic values in the future when the people have matured politically.
Why I started this book: Another Professional Reading title that I found on Audible. And I do so much better with listening to nonfiction that reading it.
Why I finished it: This book is a master class in understanding and looking for the consequences of political decisions up and down the economic hierarchy. The South Vietnamese government was trying to maintain the status quo, the very social status quo that so many had fought against to kick out the colonial French. Government officials had centralized decision processes that favored the elite and the city dwellers. Communists favored the poor and lived with the people. They took pains to divide the land up to the small farmers, while the government returned after years of war seeking back taxes. Communists also made efforts to position themselves as just reacting to the governments' unfair land management, taxes and social advancement. Like Afghanistan, the Sharia courts might be strict and repressive, but they are local and quick, not plagued by distance, demands for bribes and backlog of cases making the process drag on for years. Besides the easy answer of terror and fear, this book challenges the reader to question why communists or the Taliban would seem like a better solution that a "corrupt, distant, ruling elite" promising democratic values in the future when the people have matured politically.
July 14, 2020
An interesting read, 50 years on.
October 21, 2023
In-depth comparison of how the party and government fought the war in Vietnam at the hamlet/village level. A great reference and read for studying limited warfare. Still, one must be careful to understand the basic nature of Vietnam was revolutionary/social warfare and not falter by making connections to other types of limited warfare.
October 17, 2021
By focusing on a single province during the VN war, Race pulls apart the impact and failure of the US approaches and strategies during the confict.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews