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Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control since the Sixteenth Century
Commanders at sea struggle not only with the unpredictability of natural elements, but also with a shroud of uncertainty often referred to as the "fog of war." Over the centuries most admirals yielded to the natural temptation to find in new technologies a means to assert centralized control over their forces. But other commanders have recognized the fog for what it a constant level of uncertainty resistant to mere technological solution.
In this grand history of naval warfare, Michael Palmer observes five centuries of dramatic encounters under sail and steam. From reliance on signal flags in the seventeenth century to satellite communications in the twenty-first, admirals looked to the next advance in technology as the one that would allow them to control their forces. But while abilities to communicate improved, Palmer shows how other technologies simultaneously shrank admirals' windows of decision. The result was simple, if not naval commanders have never had sufficient means or time to direct subordinates in battle.
Successful commanders as distant as Horatio Nelson (1758-1805) and Arleigh Burke (1901-1996) accepted this reality. They sought solutions to the dilemmas of command in the personal indoctrination of subordinates through discussion, comradeship, and displays of trust and confidence. Such leaders created a commonality of vision and fostered a high degree of individual initiative. Their decentralized approach to command resulted in a resiliency that so often provided the key to success in battle.
Palmer's exciting and enlightening history reveals the myriad efforts of naval commanders to navigate the fog of war.
In this grand history of naval warfare, Michael Palmer observes five centuries of dramatic encounters under sail and steam. From reliance on signal flags in the seventeenth century to satellite communications in the twenty-first, admirals looked to the next advance in technology as the one that would allow them to control their forces. But while abilities to communicate improved, Palmer shows how other technologies simultaneously shrank admirals' windows of decision. The result was simple, if not naval commanders have never had sufficient means or time to direct subordinates in battle.
Successful commanders as distant as Horatio Nelson (1758-1805) and Arleigh Burke (1901-1996) accepted this reality. They sought solutions to the dilemmas of command in the personal indoctrination of subordinates through discussion, comradeship, and displays of trust and confidence. Such leaders created a commonality of vision and fostered a high degree of individual initiative. Their decentralized approach to command resulted in a resiliency that so often provided the key to success in battle.
Palmer's exciting and enlightening history reveals the myriad efforts of naval commanders to navigate the fog of war.
400 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1997
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About the author
Michael A. Palmer
16 books4 followersMichael A. Palmer is a professor of History and Maritime Studies at East Carolina University.
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
January 25, 2009
It's hard for naval warfare to get as much shelf space as land warfare in any library devoted to military history. We live on the land, so it is no surprise that much is written about generals, armies, battles and campaigns. Naval warfare has its share of "battle books" as well, but the burden is on the reader to analyze and understand how fleets worked at fighting each other.
This is where "Command at Sea" by Michael Palmer fills the gap. The book is a history of naval command and control dating from the 1600s to the present. Palmer's premise is beguiling and simple, but actually complex and profound in its implications. Centralized command does not work as effectively as decentralized command. However, the decentralized form can only gain victory provided captains are well schooled in doctrine and know the plan and their commander's intent, as well as commanding well-trained crews running well-maintained ships.
Palmer illustrates the struggle between centralized and decentralized command in a succint, focused review of British and American naval history, keeping an eye on how those fleets fought, what style of command was used and the outcomes of various battles.
The Royal Navy started with generals in command of ships, trying to extend the precepts of land warfare to the sea. They found out the hard way that it did not work. Thus the RN, like navies everywhere, evolved into a form that suited its need. Line-ahead became the most efficient formation to bring cannon fire to bear. Signal flags eventually brought centralized command and control to bear on fleets, but the speed and efficiency of command and response was slow and variable. Admirals of the day, even with improved signals books, could not bring force to bear more quickly than the appearance of opportunities in battle.
British admirals who signalled "general chase" ceded command of the fleet, placing reliance upon aggressive captains and well-trained crews. Only Nelson took this as far as developing something like a "doctrine" that embodied his thinking and making sure his captains understood it. Proof was seen at The Nile, Copenhagen and Trafalgar, where deliberate reliance on chaos gained decisive victory.
Palmer shows decentralization codified in the doctrine of the United States Navy as early as 1913. Come WWII, an entire generation of flag officers well-versed in decentralized command brought victory after victory over the Japanese Navy. Palmer also points out decentralization's downside as well at Leyte Gulf, when Halsey left uncovered the US invasion fleet that could have been wiped out by the Japanese, had they been more aggressive in the face of uncertainty.
Radio communications and later nuclear weapons command and control made greater centralization possible, sometimes to ill-effect for the USN. The case study Palmer offers is the Tanker War in the Persian Gulf, back in 1987-88. Restrictive rules of engagement coming from the White House forced the Navy to fight with one hand tied behind its back, that is until the Iranians were stupid enough to attack. One day was all the time needed to wipe out half the Iranian navy, but even then restrictive ROE and the need to radio Washington DC for permission allowed several opportunities to slip away.
Palmer's writing style is clear and his recounting of naval history is fascinating, adding details to blank spaces we assumed were filled. The entire complexion of naval history changes once viewed through the prism of command, and the challenges in exercising it in the heat of battle. Armies and air forces have it easy, attacking targets that don't move. They operate with a measure of centralization as a result, Palmer points out, while the Navy must always maintain a flexible outlook as it confronts forces that move and could be anywhere at any time. Hence the need for decentralized command.
This is where "Command at Sea" by Michael Palmer fills the gap. The book is a history of naval command and control dating from the 1600s to the present. Palmer's premise is beguiling and simple, but actually complex and profound in its implications. Centralized command does not work as effectively as decentralized command. However, the decentralized form can only gain victory provided captains are well schooled in doctrine and know the plan and their commander's intent, as well as commanding well-trained crews running well-maintained ships.
Palmer illustrates the struggle between centralized and decentralized command in a succint, focused review of British and American naval history, keeping an eye on how those fleets fought, what style of command was used and the outcomes of various battles.
The Royal Navy started with generals in command of ships, trying to extend the precepts of land warfare to the sea. They found out the hard way that it did not work. Thus the RN, like navies everywhere, evolved into a form that suited its need. Line-ahead became the most efficient formation to bring cannon fire to bear. Signal flags eventually brought centralized command and control to bear on fleets, but the speed and efficiency of command and response was slow and variable. Admirals of the day, even with improved signals books, could not bring force to bear more quickly than the appearance of opportunities in battle.
British admirals who signalled "general chase" ceded command of the fleet, placing reliance upon aggressive captains and well-trained crews. Only Nelson took this as far as developing something like a "doctrine" that embodied his thinking and making sure his captains understood it. Proof was seen at The Nile, Copenhagen and Trafalgar, where deliberate reliance on chaos gained decisive victory.
Palmer shows decentralization codified in the doctrine of the United States Navy as early as 1913. Come WWII, an entire generation of flag officers well-versed in decentralized command brought victory after victory over the Japanese Navy. Palmer also points out decentralization's downside as well at Leyte Gulf, when Halsey left uncovered the US invasion fleet that could have been wiped out by the Japanese, had they been more aggressive in the face of uncertainty.
Radio communications and later nuclear weapons command and control made greater centralization possible, sometimes to ill-effect for the USN. The case study Palmer offers is the Tanker War in the Persian Gulf, back in 1987-88. Restrictive rules of engagement coming from the White House forced the Navy to fight with one hand tied behind its back, that is until the Iranians were stupid enough to attack. One day was all the time needed to wipe out half the Iranian navy, but even then restrictive ROE and the need to radio Washington DC for permission allowed several opportunities to slip away.
Palmer's writing style is clear and his recounting of naval history is fascinating, adding details to blank spaces we assumed were filled. The entire complexion of naval history changes once viewed through the prism of command, and the challenges in exercising it in the heat of battle. Armies and air forces have it easy, attacking targets that don't move. They operate with a measure of centralization as a result, Palmer points out, while the Navy must always maintain a flexible outlook as it confronts forces that move and could be anywhere at any time. Hence the need for decentralized command.
May 25, 2020
Absolutely essential reading for any officer, but especially those Navy and Marine officers facing the complexities of a future war in the Pacific.
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