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Knowing and Being
Because of the difficulty posed by the contrast between the search for truth and truth itself, Michael Polanyi believes that we must alter the foundation of epistemology to include as essential to the very nature of mind, the kind of groping that constitutes the recognition of a problem.
This collection of essays, assembled by Marjorie Grene, exemplifies the development of Polanyi's theory of knowledge which was first presented in Science, Faith, and Society and later systematized in Personal Knowledge . Polanyi believes that the dilemma of the modern mind arises from the peculiar relation between the positivist claim for total objectivity in scientific knowledge and the unprecedented moral dynamism characterizing the social and political aspirations of the last century. The first part of Knowing and Being deals with this theme. Part two develops Polanyi's idea that centralization is incompatible with the life of science as well as his views on the role of tradition and authority in science. The essays on tacit knowing in Part Three proceed directly from his preoccupation with the nature of scientific discovery and reveal a pervasive substructure of all intelligent behavior. Polanyi believes that all knowing involves movement from internal clues to external evidence. Therefore, to explain the process of knowing, we must develop a theory of the nature of living things in general, including an account of that aspect of living things we call "mind." Part Four elaborates upon this theme.
This collection of essays, assembled by Marjorie Grene, exemplifies the development of Polanyi's theory of knowledge which was first presented in Science, Faith, and Society and later systematized in Personal Knowledge . Polanyi believes that the dilemma of the modern mind arises from the peculiar relation between the positivist claim for total objectivity in scientific knowledge and the unprecedented moral dynamism characterizing the social and political aspirations of the last century. The first part of Knowing and Being deals with this theme. Part two develops Polanyi's idea that centralization is incompatible with the life of science as well as his views on the role of tradition and authority in science. The essays on tacit knowing in Part Three proceed directly from his preoccupation with the nature of scientific discovery and reveal a pervasive substructure of all intelligent behavior. Polanyi believes that all knowing involves movement from internal clues to external evidence. Therefore, to explain the process of knowing, we must develop a theory of the nature of living things in general, including an account of that aspect of living things we call "mind." Part Four elaborates upon this theme.
264 pages, Paperback
First published January 15, 1969
About the author
Michael Polanyi
30 books115 followersMichael Polanyi was a Hungarian-British polymath, who made important theoretical contributions to physical chemistry, economics, and philosophy.
His wide-ranging research in physical science included chemical kinetics, x-ray diffraction, and adsorption of gases.
He argued that positivism supplies a false account of knowing, which if taken seriously undermines humanity's highest achievements.
He pioneered the theory of fibre diffraction analysis in 1921, and the dislocation theory of plastic deformation of ductile metals and other materials in 1934. He emigrated to Germany, in 1926 becoming a chemistry professor at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, and then in 1933 to England, becoming first a chemistry professor, and then a social sciences professor at the University of Manchester. In 1944 Polanyi was elected to the Royal Society.
His wide-ranging research in physical science included chemical kinetics, x-ray diffraction, and adsorption of gases.
He argued that positivism supplies a false account of knowing, which if taken seriously undermines humanity's highest achievements.
He pioneered the theory of fibre diffraction analysis in 1921, and the dislocation theory of plastic deformation of ductile metals and other materials in 1934. He emigrated to Germany, in 1926 becoming a chemistry professor at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, and then in 1933 to England, becoming first a chemistry professor, and then a social sciences professor at the University of Manchester. In 1944 Polanyi was elected to the Royal Society.
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
June 12, 2013
Collection of essays. You don't check this book out from the library expecting an easy read, and you are correct. Basic premise, iterated through variations, is that there is a tacit dimension of all knowing. For example, you recognize the shapes as letters semi-consciously, you recognize letters as words semi-consciously, you ascribe meaning to words semi-consciously, but your integration of all those levels into a meaningful thought or idea is completely unconscious and follows no set precepts that we can understand. Similarly, science, although it professes to follow a set of explicit logical rules, also must rely on non-explicit integration of observation into meaning. Basically, because you can't explain consciousness of knowledge, there is an element of unknowing in all knowledge. I think that's what he said, anyway. His ideas on religion were not addressed in this book but it's easy to see how the ideas in these essays are relevant.
These essays were written in the 1950s and 60s. Some of the examples used were sort of 'we can observe signals in the brain, but we can never convert those signals into the meaning or observations of the observer' and while I'm no neuroscientist I'm not sure that is still completely true. However, the most sticking point for me was the intuition in science. Rightly, scientists don't actually follow the scientific method for all propositions. Some are dismissed out of hand, and this is necessary in order to avoid wasting time on quacks. Sometimes though, it leads to faulty decisions. The author's history behind his theory of adsorption was offered as evidence. Based on how we do research, this one seemed like a good point.
Overall, how did reading this book help me with this subject? The only solid conclusion that I can take from this book is that "we don't know how we know things, and science is no less guilty of this unknowing that anything else. Therefore, science will never give us an ultimate explanation of the universe." Not quite the silver bullet I was hoping for.
These essays were written in the 1950s and 60s. Some of the examples used were sort of 'we can observe signals in the brain, but we can never convert those signals into the meaning or observations of the observer' and while I'm no neuroscientist I'm not sure that is still completely true. However, the most sticking point for me was the intuition in science. Rightly, scientists don't actually follow the scientific method for all propositions. Some are dismissed out of hand, and this is necessary in order to avoid wasting time on quacks. Sometimes though, it leads to faulty decisions. The author's history behind his theory of adsorption was offered as evidence. Based on how we do research, this one seemed like a good point.
Overall, how did reading this book help me with this subject? The only solid conclusion that I can take from this book is that "we don't know how we know things, and science is no less guilty of this unknowing that anything else. Therefore, science will never give us an ultimate explanation of the universe." Not quite the silver bullet I was hoping for.
October 15, 2024
A BROAD COLLECTION OF POLANYI’S ESSAYS
Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was a Hungarian-British chemist and philosopher; he wrote other books such as 'Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy,' 'The Tacit Dimension,' 'The Logic of Liberty,' 'Science, Faith, and Society,' etc.
He points out, “The inconsistency of a science professing that it can explain all human action without making value judgments, while the scientist’s private actions are said to be often motivated by moral motives, can be more simply demonstrated the other way round. If the social scientist can explain all human actions by value-free observations, then none of his own actions can claim to be motivated by moral values. Either he exempts himself from his own theory of human motivation, or he must conclude that all reference to moral values---or any values---are meaningless: are empty sounds.” (Pg. 34)
He states, “Successful induction can be concerned only in the light of a genuine problem. An inductive problem is an intimation of coherence among hitherto uncomprehended particulars, and the problem is genuine to the extent to which this intimation is true. Such a surmise vaguely anticipates the evidence which will support it and guides the mind engrossed by it to the discovery of this evidence. This usually proceeds stepwise, the original problem and surmise being modified and corrected by each new piece of evidence, a process which is repeated until eventually some generalization is accepted as final.” (Pg. 131)
He explains, ”My definition of reality, as that which may yet exhaustibly manifest itself, implies the presence of an INDETERMINATE range of ANTICIPATIONS in any knowledge bearing on reality. But besides this indeterminacy of its prospects, tacit knowing may contain also an ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE that is indeterminate, in the sense that its content cannot be explicitly stated.
"We can see this best in the way we possess a skill. If I know how to ride a bicycle or how to swim, this does not mean that I can tell how I manage to keep my balance on a bicycle or keep afloat when swimming… does the successful teaching of skills and of the characteristic appearance of a physiognomy not prove that one CAN tell our knowledge of them? No, what the pupil must discover by an effort of his own is something we could not tell him. And he knows it then in his turn but cannot tell it. This result… shows also that such tacit knowledge can be DISCOVERED, without our being able to identify what it is what we have come to know.” (Pg. 141-142)
He says, “The fact that we can possess knowledge that is unspoken is a commonplace and so is the fact that we must know something yet unspoken before we can express it in words. It has been taken for granted in the philosophical analysis of language in earlier centuries, but modern positivism has tried to ignore it, on the grounds that tacit knowledge was not accessible to objective observation. The present theory of meaning assigns a firm place to the inarticulate meaning of experience and shows that it is the foundation of all explicit meaning.” (Pg. 187)
He observes, “We must conclude then that it is the effort of our imagination, seeking to re-interpret our vision in a way that will control the scene before us, which produces the right way of seeing inverted images. This is the dynamics of tacit knowing: the questing imagination vaguely anticipating experiences not yet grounded in subsidiary particulars evokes these subsidiaries and thus implements the experience the imagination has sought to achieve.” (Pg. 199-200)
He comments about Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind: “what actually follows from the fact that mind and body do not interact explicitly is that they interact according to the logic of tacit knowing. And it is this logic that disposes of the Cartesian dilemma by acknowledging two mutually exclusive ways of being aware of our body.” (Pg. 222-223)
He also makes a (quite understated) statement reflecting his belief in God: “We can account for this capacity of ours to know more than we can tell if we believe in the presence of an external reality with which we can establish contact. This I do. I declare myself committed to the belief in an external reality gradually accessible to knowing, and I regard all true understanding as an imitation of such a reality which, being real, may yet reveal itself to our deepened understanding in an indefinite range of unexpected manifestations. I accept the obligation to search for the truth though my own intimations of reality, knowing that there is, and can be, no strict rule by which my conclusions can be justified.”(Pg. 131)
These essays shed much light on other areas of Polanyi’s philosophy, which are not covered in his books such as “Personal Knowledge.”
Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was a Hungarian-British chemist and philosopher; he wrote other books such as 'Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy,' 'The Tacit Dimension,' 'The Logic of Liberty,' 'Science, Faith, and Society,' etc.
He points out, “The inconsistency of a science professing that it can explain all human action without making value judgments, while the scientist’s private actions are said to be often motivated by moral motives, can be more simply demonstrated the other way round. If the social scientist can explain all human actions by value-free observations, then none of his own actions can claim to be motivated by moral values. Either he exempts himself from his own theory of human motivation, or he must conclude that all reference to moral values---or any values---are meaningless: are empty sounds.” (Pg. 34)
He states, “Successful induction can be concerned only in the light of a genuine problem. An inductive problem is an intimation of coherence among hitherto uncomprehended particulars, and the problem is genuine to the extent to which this intimation is true. Such a surmise vaguely anticipates the evidence which will support it and guides the mind engrossed by it to the discovery of this evidence. This usually proceeds stepwise, the original problem and surmise being modified and corrected by each new piece of evidence, a process which is repeated until eventually some generalization is accepted as final.” (Pg. 131)
He explains, ”My definition of reality, as that which may yet exhaustibly manifest itself, implies the presence of an INDETERMINATE range of ANTICIPATIONS in any knowledge bearing on reality. But besides this indeterminacy of its prospects, tacit knowing may contain also an ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE that is indeterminate, in the sense that its content cannot be explicitly stated.
"We can see this best in the way we possess a skill. If I know how to ride a bicycle or how to swim, this does not mean that I can tell how I manage to keep my balance on a bicycle or keep afloat when swimming… does the successful teaching of skills and of the characteristic appearance of a physiognomy not prove that one CAN tell our knowledge of them? No, what the pupil must discover by an effort of his own is something we could not tell him. And he knows it then in his turn but cannot tell it. This result… shows also that such tacit knowledge can be DISCOVERED, without our being able to identify what it is what we have come to know.” (Pg. 141-142)
He says, “The fact that we can possess knowledge that is unspoken is a commonplace and so is the fact that we must know something yet unspoken before we can express it in words. It has been taken for granted in the philosophical analysis of language in earlier centuries, but modern positivism has tried to ignore it, on the grounds that tacit knowledge was not accessible to objective observation. The present theory of meaning assigns a firm place to the inarticulate meaning of experience and shows that it is the foundation of all explicit meaning.” (Pg. 187)
He observes, “We must conclude then that it is the effort of our imagination, seeking to re-interpret our vision in a way that will control the scene before us, which produces the right way of seeing inverted images. This is the dynamics of tacit knowing: the questing imagination vaguely anticipating experiences not yet grounded in subsidiary particulars evokes these subsidiaries and thus implements the experience the imagination has sought to achieve.” (Pg. 199-200)
He comments about Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind: “what actually follows from the fact that mind and body do not interact explicitly is that they interact according to the logic of tacit knowing. And it is this logic that disposes of the Cartesian dilemma by acknowledging two mutually exclusive ways of being aware of our body.” (Pg. 222-223)
He also makes a (quite understated) statement reflecting his belief in God: “We can account for this capacity of ours to know more than we can tell if we believe in the presence of an external reality with which we can establish contact. This I do. I declare myself committed to the belief in an external reality gradually accessible to knowing, and I regard all true understanding as an imitation of such a reality which, being real, may yet reveal itself to our deepened understanding in an indefinite range of unexpected manifestations. I accept the obligation to search for the truth though my own intimations of reality, knowing that there is, and can be, no strict rule by which my conclusions can be justified.”(Pg. 131)
These essays shed much light on other areas of Polanyi’s philosophy, which are not covered in his books such as “Personal Knowledge.”
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews