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The Battle of Dienbienphu
Cover has mild wear, small crease on front. Narrow, pale coffee or tea stain on inside cover has transferred in descending size to ffep, half-title page and title page. All other pages are very clean and unmarked. Ships fast from Northern California.
344 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1963
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About the author
Jules Roy
137 books11 followersJules Roy was a French writer.Roy, born an Algerian pied noir (Algerian settler of French descent) and sent to a Roman Catholic seminary, used his experiences in the French colony and during his service in the Royal Air Force during the Second World War as inspiration for a number of his works. He began writing in 1946, while still serving in the military, and continued to publish fiction and historical works after his resignation in 1953 in protest of the First Indochina War. He was an outspoken critic of French colonialism and the Algerian War of Independence and later civil war, as well as a strongly religious man.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
January 8, 2022
They say Don't judge a book by its cover, and I agree. The covers of Jules Roy's work are splendid – they betray nothing of the horror hidden between them. (And by horror I mean not the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, but the literary and academic merits of Roy's account of it.) Indeed, the cover must not be trusted. On the other hand, the introduction, and especially the name of the author of the introduction, often tells volumes about the quality of the book.
When I saw the name Neil Sheehan displayed proudly next to the author's, I already knew to expect no good from both Sheehan's introduction and the book he was so enthusiastically recommending.
If one traces Neil Sheehan's history as a reporter in Saigon during Ngo Dinh Diem's rule, one will end up with a strikingly unflattering portrait of the journalist. He belonged to the David Halberstam & Friends alliance in Saigon, a.k.a a bunch of young American reporters who had arrived in South Vietnam convinced that they were entitled to every bit of confidential information available. They all suffered from profound ignorance of the complexities of South Vietnam's society and politics. As soon as they realized government officials and the military would not share information with reporters who had never pledged their loyalty to the government's policies, they collectively forgot they were not on American soil anymore and assumed that the Diem regime was encroaching on the liberties of free speech and free press. Not one of them stopped to think about how exactly Diem was supposed to combat countless, invisible Communist guerrillas and relax government control at the same time. Instead, they embarked on a relentless anti-Diem crusade, making life hard for his whole regime, as well as for the American military and civilian personnel, by undermining Diem's legitimacy and thus, the war effort. Their vengeful reporting, often based on outright lies, fostered a feeling of doom and gloom in both Washington and Saigon, and contributed greatly to the eventual – disastrous – decision of the Kennedy administration to overthrow the Ngo brothers.
All of the aforementioned established my unfavorable opinion of Neil Sheehan as a dishonest, ignorant journalist with a penchant for sensationalism. His introduction to Jules Roy's work solidified this opinion. After only four paragraphs, Sheehan switches to his usual song, "Ngo Dinh Diem – bad." Why is it so important for him to disparage Diem even in an introduction to a book about Dien Bien Phu? "The head of the family, President Ngo Dinh Diem, a plump little man who waddled like a duck when he walked, was sitting in his air-conditioned office in the presidential palace, isolated from the people by his own choice, surrounded by sycophants and security policemen and convinced he ruled by divine right," writes he in his pompous tone reminiscent of Halberstam's.
Diem was not ignorant or isolated from the people – this description better fits the American reporters in Saigon. The Prime Minister's background, in reality, had made him well aware of the complexities of Vietnam and its civil war - while American policy-makers refused to recognize that the conflict in Vietnam was a civil war in the first place. After college graduation in 1921, he became a district chief in charge of 225 villages. Despite his youth and inexperience, he proved himself a gifted leader. He successfully combatted guerrilla insurgency in southern villages by infiltrating the Communist ranks, arresting Viet Minh's agents, and re-educating them. According to Diem biographer Geoffrey Shaw, the young colonial official thoroughly studied Marxism and Communism, paying attention to the nuances of Ho Chi Minh"s Vietnamese Communism, thus becoming one of the first Vietnamese officials fully to discern the extent to which the Communists had gained support in the country.”
Sheehan's accusations are empty and ridiculous. The lavish praise he directs at Jules Roy's book led me to the conclusion that I should not take Roy's account at face value.
The read turned out to be worse than I thought. The style of the narrative was unpleasantly familiar – exaggerated, vague, sarcastic. It reminded me of David Halberstam's THE MAKING OF A QUAGMIRE and THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST so much that I was tempted to double-check whether Jules Roy was not an alternate pen name of Halberstam's.
And it got progressively worse. With every page, Roy turns up the feeling of gloom and doom, with which his narrative is imbued, another notch until the work – a work he claims is a truthful, unbiased account of the battle – loses all objectivity and becomes an attempt to assign the blame for what happened to one general or another. What is more, just like in THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST, the ending is anticlimactic – no scapegoat is assigned, no definitive advice on how to avoid similar fiascos in the future is given, and the reader learns no lessons. The feeling of hours wasted sinks in, for even the truthfulness of the information introduced is questionable, mainly due to Roy's annoyingly unacademic tone: "Lions led by asses? Let us say rather, to be respectful, lions led by other lions whose manes were moth-eaten and who felt the need to telephone Mother every day to reassure her."
I believe that descriptions like the one above have never belonged and never will belong in academic works. The cheap humor and the pathos add up to the overall air of untrustworthiness. David Halberstam & Friends, and apparently Jules Roy, are immeasurably fond of such poignant utterances, which, in reality, contribute nothing to the academic value of their works. Roy seems to have strived to throw as many of them into his work as possible – which makes the book sound twice as unprofessional and ridiculous as it could have been otherwise.
Not to mention that the attempt to assign blame is pointless enough by itself. I was especially bewildered to read Roy's accusations against the French people. He calls the people of France "blind, deaf, and less intelligent than it is said to be" because they had allowed Dien Bien Phu to happen, had not stopped it. Quite a few questions arise.
Weak post-war France had been waging a costly, fruitless war against the Viet Minh since 1946. The government had strained French resources to keep the war effort going – despite the people's opposition. In 1954, a good chance presented itself – a battle that would possibly crush the Communists and allow the French to emerge victorious. Since France was getting ready to get out of the war anyways, it was better to do so after demonstrating at least something to the people – after showing them why they had been losing men and resources in a faraway country. That is why the government decided to go through with Dien Bien Phu. And who were the common people to stop it? If leaders started listening to the common folk, we would live in a very different world. Not to mention that the French truly believed America had their backs. They had grown used to Truman's support and generosity – they refused to come to terms with Eisenhower's cautiousness until it was late. So what exactly was the French people's fault?
Jules Roy goes on in the same fashion for quite a few pages. I can also go on and on about what is wrong with THE BATTLE OF DIENBIENPHU, but my review will be as long as Roy's work. Generally, I would recommend you to skip this book – or at least take it with many pinches of salt.
When I saw the name Neil Sheehan displayed proudly next to the author's, I already knew to expect no good from both Sheehan's introduction and the book he was so enthusiastically recommending.
If one traces Neil Sheehan's history as a reporter in Saigon during Ngo Dinh Diem's rule, one will end up with a strikingly unflattering portrait of the journalist. He belonged to the David Halberstam & Friends alliance in Saigon, a.k.a a bunch of young American reporters who had arrived in South Vietnam convinced that they were entitled to every bit of confidential information available. They all suffered from profound ignorance of the complexities of South Vietnam's society and politics. As soon as they realized government officials and the military would not share information with reporters who had never pledged their loyalty to the government's policies, they collectively forgot they were not on American soil anymore and assumed that the Diem regime was encroaching on the liberties of free speech and free press. Not one of them stopped to think about how exactly Diem was supposed to combat countless, invisible Communist guerrillas and relax government control at the same time. Instead, they embarked on a relentless anti-Diem crusade, making life hard for his whole regime, as well as for the American military and civilian personnel, by undermining Diem's legitimacy and thus, the war effort. Their vengeful reporting, often based on outright lies, fostered a feeling of doom and gloom in both Washington and Saigon, and contributed greatly to the eventual – disastrous – decision of the Kennedy administration to overthrow the Ngo brothers.
All of the aforementioned established my unfavorable opinion of Neil Sheehan as a dishonest, ignorant journalist with a penchant for sensationalism. His introduction to Jules Roy's work solidified this opinion. After only four paragraphs, Sheehan switches to his usual song, "Ngo Dinh Diem – bad." Why is it so important for him to disparage Diem even in an introduction to a book about Dien Bien Phu? "The head of the family, President Ngo Dinh Diem, a plump little man who waddled like a duck when he walked, was sitting in his air-conditioned office in the presidential palace, isolated from the people by his own choice, surrounded by sycophants and security policemen and convinced he ruled by divine right," writes he in his pompous tone reminiscent of Halberstam's.
Diem was not ignorant or isolated from the people – this description better fits the American reporters in Saigon. The Prime Minister's background, in reality, had made him well aware of the complexities of Vietnam and its civil war - while American policy-makers refused to recognize that the conflict in Vietnam was a civil war in the first place. After college graduation in 1921, he became a district chief in charge of 225 villages. Despite his youth and inexperience, he proved himself a gifted leader. He successfully combatted guerrilla insurgency in southern villages by infiltrating the Communist ranks, arresting Viet Minh's agents, and re-educating them. According to Diem biographer Geoffrey Shaw, the young colonial official thoroughly studied Marxism and Communism, paying attention to the nuances of Ho Chi Minh"s Vietnamese Communism, thus becoming one of the first Vietnamese officials fully to discern the extent to which the Communists had gained support in the country.”
Sheehan's accusations are empty and ridiculous. The lavish praise he directs at Jules Roy's book led me to the conclusion that I should not take Roy's account at face value.
The read turned out to be worse than I thought. The style of the narrative was unpleasantly familiar – exaggerated, vague, sarcastic. It reminded me of David Halberstam's THE MAKING OF A QUAGMIRE and THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST so much that I was tempted to double-check whether Jules Roy was not an alternate pen name of Halberstam's.
And it got progressively worse. With every page, Roy turns up the feeling of gloom and doom, with which his narrative is imbued, another notch until the work – a work he claims is a truthful, unbiased account of the battle – loses all objectivity and becomes an attempt to assign the blame for what happened to one general or another. What is more, just like in THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST, the ending is anticlimactic – no scapegoat is assigned, no definitive advice on how to avoid similar fiascos in the future is given, and the reader learns no lessons. The feeling of hours wasted sinks in, for even the truthfulness of the information introduced is questionable, mainly due to Roy's annoyingly unacademic tone: "Lions led by asses? Let us say rather, to be respectful, lions led by other lions whose manes were moth-eaten and who felt the need to telephone Mother every day to reassure her."
I believe that descriptions like the one above have never belonged and never will belong in academic works. The cheap humor and the pathos add up to the overall air of untrustworthiness. David Halberstam & Friends, and apparently Jules Roy, are immeasurably fond of such poignant utterances, which, in reality, contribute nothing to the academic value of their works. Roy seems to have strived to throw as many of them into his work as possible – which makes the book sound twice as unprofessional and ridiculous as it could have been otherwise.
Not to mention that the attempt to assign blame is pointless enough by itself. I was especially bewildered to read Roy's accusations against the French people. He calls the people of France "blind, deaf, and less intelligent than it is said to be" because they had allowed Dien Bien Phu to happen, had not stopped it. Quite a few questions arise.
Weak post-war France had been waging a costly, fruitless war against the Viet Minh since 1946. The government had strained French resources to keep the war effort going – despite the people's opposition. In 1954, a good chance presented itself – a battle that would possibly crush the Communists and allow the French to emerge victorious. Since France was getting ready to get out of the war anyways, it was better to do so after demonstrating at least something to the people – after showing them why they had been losing men and resources in a faraway country. That is why the government decided to go through with Dien Bien Phu. And who were the common people to stop it? If leaders started listening to the common folk, we would live in a very different world. Not to mention that the French truly believed America had their backs. They had grown used to Truman's support and generosity – they refused to come to terms with Eisenhower's cautiousness until it was late. So what exactly was the French people's fault?
Jules Roy goes on in the same fashion for quite a few pages. I can also go on and on about what is wrong with THE BATTLE OF DIENBIENPHU, but my review will be as long as Roy's work. Generally, I would recommend you to skip this book – or at least take it with many pinches of salt.
January 8, 2026
If you want a dry factual account of the battle of Dienbienphu, this is not the book to read. If you want a heart-felt paean to both the French and Vietminh soldier, on the stupidity and wastefulness of the whole French effort in Indochina, this book is a must-read. The Battle of Dienbienphu is a very French book about a very French military catastrophe. It is a story of pride, hatred, and incompetence on the French side, and of determination and ruthlessness on the side of the Vietminh.
Jules Roy was a former member of the French Air Force, who had resigned his commission in response to French policy in Indochina. His initial idea was to write a book about the battle and the heroism of the French troops, but as he researched more he realised that that the true story of Dienbienphu was one of the generals and government, the pettiness of the former and the cynicism of the latter, who didn't want to remain in Vietnam, but couldn't bear the loss of face a withdrawal would require.
It pays, as a reader, to have a basic idea of the course of the battle before you come to this book. Written about ten years after the battle, by a Frenchman in France, there is an assumption that some knowledge of events will be brought to the book by the reader. Written in a diary format, Roy begins his book with the appointment of Navarre as commander in Vietnam, and with his idea to provoke Giap by investing Dienbienphu to cut the Vietminh off from Laos and to draw them into pitched battle, while also providing a base from which to patrol and attack. This was a lot to accomplish, but Navarre was very sure of himself despite his inexperience in Indochinese warfare and refused to listen to the doubts his juniors cast on his scheme when they voiced them, which they perhaps didn't do aggressively enough.
That they didn't push their doubts may have been partly down to the contempt in which most French officers held the Vietminh troops. There was little doubt from the French that they could not only hold Dienbienphu, but also destroy any attack the Vietminh might like to launch. Navarre envisaged that Dienbienphu would draw the Vietminh in and allow him, while the bulk of the enemy were fighting there, to clear the Delta of enemy combatants.
This underestimation was fatal for the French. Not only could Giap get an army to Dienbienphu, he could also feed them and keep them in ammunition. More importantly, and to the complete surprise of the French, he could get heavy artillery into the hills surrounding the French base and dig them in well enough to survive any bombardment.
The geographical position of Dienbienphu was an appalling one in which to survive a siege: the bottom of a basin ("the Chamber Pot"), surrounded by jungle-covered hills, far from air support (fighters could only spend ten minutes over the base before they had to return), it was impossible for the French to effectively deny the hills to the Vietminh, and thus protect themselves.
The ambivalence of the French Government - unwilling to expand their commitment to Indochina - led to the French forces being short of the equipment they needed. Most of the Air Force consisted of war surplus US equipment, and Navarre stinted on ramping up Dienbienphu, insisting that it was the decoy for his larger Delta campaign long after it was obvious that Dienbienphu was in fact becoming the decisive battle for control of Vietnam.
Roy is quite naturally angry about this aspect of the debacle: men were being sent to die in the weeks before the final surrender in the full knowledge that it was pointless, with the Generals knowing that Dienbienphu was lost. This makes the many heroic actions of the troops on the ground poignant and tragic.
Roy does not ignore the Vietminh story, with respectful (too respectful?) interludes describing the herculean efforts of the Viets to undertake the logistical effort as well as the fighting to win a historic victory.
The diary-like structure that Roy has chosen does much to add to the drama of his telling of this story: each day brings the inevitable end closer, and the horrors suffered by the French are well conveyed. Roy pulls no punches in his views of the French leadership - Navarre the cynic, Cogny the schemer, Castries, hopelessly out of his depth, Langlais keeping it all together on the ground, Bigeard the hero. Roy builds his story around these personalities, and others such as Grauwin the chief medic.
Roy's conclusion is that Dienbienphu didn't have to happen, or that it could have turned out differently. But, the particular combination of both military and civilian leaders that were on the spot at the time led to the inevitability of the final disaster.
Dienbienphu was not the end in Vietnam: there was another twenty years of warfare ahead of it. One outcome of the French defeat was that the United States was drawn in to the quagmire, only in the end to fail just as the French did.
For a powerful, if partisan and opinionated, description of Dienbienphu, I recommend this book.
Check out my other reviews at http://aviewoverthebell.blogspot.com.au/
Cheers for now, from
A View Over the Bell
Jules Roy was a former member of the French Air Force, who had resigned his commission in response to French policy in Indochina. His initial idea was to write a book about the battle and the heroism of the French troops, but as he researched more he realised that that the true story of Dienbienphu was one of the generals and government, the pettiness of the former and the cynicism of the latter, who didn't want to remain in Vietnam, but couldn't bear the loss of face a withdrawal would require.
It pays, as a reader, to have a basic idea of the course of the battle before you come to this book. Written about ten years after the battle, by a Frenchman in France, there is an assumption that some knowledge of events will be brought to the book by the reader. Written in a diary format, Roy begins his book with the appointment of Navarre as commander in Vietnam, and with his idea to provoke Giap by investing Dienbienphu to cut the Vietminh off from Laos and to draw them into pitched battle, while also providing a base from which to patrol and attack. This was a lot to accomplish, but Navarre was very sure of himself despite his inexperience in Indochinese warfare and refused to listen to the doubts his juniors cast on his scheme when they voiced them, which they perhaps didn't do aggressively enough.
That they didn't push their doubts may have been partly down to the contempt in which most French officers held the Vietminh troops. There was little doubt from the French that they could not only hold Dienbienphu, but also destroy any attack the Vietminh might like to launch. Navarre envisaged that Dienbienphu would draw the Vietminh in and allow him, while the bulk of the enemy were fighting there, to clear the Delta of enemy combatants.
This underestimation was fatal for the French. Not only could Giap get an army to Dienbienphu, he could also feed them and keep them in ammunition. More importantly, and to the complete surprise of the French, he could get heavy artillery into the hills surrounding the French base and dig them in well enough to survive any bombardment.
The geographical position of Dienbienphu was an appalling one in which to survive a siege: the bottom of a basin ("the Chamber Pot"), surrounded by jungle-covered hills, far from air support (fighters could only spend ten minutes over the base before they had to return), it was impossible for the French to effectively deny the hills to the Vietminh, and thus protect themselves.
The ambivalence of the French Government - unwilling to expand their commitment to Indochina - led to the French forces being short of the equipment they needed. Most of the Air Force consisted of war surplus US equipment, and Navarre stinted on ramping up Dienbienphu, insisting that it was the decoy for his larger Delta campaign long after it was obvious that Dienbienphu was in fact becoming the decisive battle for control of Vietnam.
Roy is quite naturally angry about this aspect of the debacle: men were being sent to die in the weeks before the final surrender in the full knowledge that it was pointless, with the Generals knowing that Dienbienphu was lost. This makes the many heroic actions of the troops on the ground poignant and tragic.
Roy does not ignore the Vietminh story, with respectful (too respectful?) interludes describing the herculean efforts of the Viets to undertake the logistical effort as well as the fighting to win a historic victory.
The diary-like structure that Roy has chosen does much to add to the drama of his telling of this story: each day brings the inevitable end closer, and the horrors suffered by the French are well conveyed. Roy pulls no punches in his views of the French leadership - Navarre the cynic, Cogny the schemer, Castries, hopelessly out of his depth, Langlais keeping it all together on the ground, Bigeard the hero. Roy builds his story around these personalities, and others such as Grauwin the chief medic.
Roy's conclusion is that Dienbienphu didn't have to happen, or that it could have turned out differently. But, the particular combination of both military and civilian leaders that were on the spot at the time led to the inevitability of the final disaster.
Dienbienphu was not the end in Vietnam: there was another twenty years of warfare ahead of it. One outcome of the French defeat was that the United States was drawn in to the quagmire, only in the end to fail just as the French did.
For a powerful, if partisan and opinionated, description of Dienbienphu, I recommend this book.
Check out my other reviews at http://aviewoverthebell.blogspot.com.au/
Cheers for now, from
A View Over the Bell
February 9, 2023
Excellent story of France's ill-fated attempt to defeat the Viet-Minh in open battle. Written 7 years after the battle. Roy returns to Viet Nam to discuss the battle with the victors. His final chapter is a powerful statement on the fall of France's colony as well as a preview of what the USA could expect.
December 27, 2012
For an overview of the battle see www.dienbienphu.org.
"The debacle occurred, Roy explains, not because of a shortage of men, guns or bullets, but for other, more important and intangible reasons. These were the arrogance and the vanity of the French military and political leaders, and there self-delusion and moral weakness and their contempt for the Asian enemy." (page 13; Introcuction)
"The most significant aspects of this book, therefore, are not the details of the battle itself, ... but the motives and reasoning which led the French to deliberately risk battle with the Vietminh at Dienbienphu ..." (page 13; Introduction)
"Dienbienphu ended the search for the classic, set-piece battle in which the French hoped to bring the destructive power of modern technology to bear on the elusive Communist enemy and smash him with an iron fist." (pages 13-14; Introduction)
"Was Dienbienphu a battle lost in advance? ... Even under the circumstances in which it was begun, a few intelligent men could have overcome distance, obstacles and adversity, and wrested victory from an enemy whose resources were not unlimited. THESE MEN EXISTED; THEY WERE NOT USED, or they were used too late, without the means to show what they were capable of." (page 353)
"The debacle occurred, Roy explains, not because of a shortage of men, guns or bullets, but for other, more important and intangible reasons. These were the arrogance and the vanity of the French military and political leaders, and there self-delusion and moral weakness and their contempt for the Asian enemy." (page 13; Introcuction)
"The most significant aspects of this book, therefore, are not the details of the battle itself, ... but the motives and reasoning which led the French to deliberately risk battle with the Vietminh at Dienbienphu ..." (page 13; Introduction)
"Dienbienphu ended the search for the classic, set-piece battle in which the French hoped to bring the destructive power of modern technology to bear on the elusive Communist enemy and smash him with an iron fist." (pages 13-14; Introduction)
"Was Dienbienphu a battle lost in advance? ... Even under the circumstances in which it was begun, a few intelligent men could have overcome distance, obstacles and adversity, and wrested victory from an enemy whose resources were not unlimited. THESE MEN EXISTED; THEY WERE NOT USED, or they were used too late, without the means to show what they were capable of." (page 353)
February 2, 2017
From the book it is quite clear that the French underestimated the enemy and was fighting a war that they did not understand. Likewise the Americans made the same mistakes later during their time in Vietnam. The affair at Dienbienphu is a sobering lesson on why we need to understand what happened and how to avoid future troubles.
December 16, 2011
I gave it 100 pages and then gave up. The subject is interesting, the book is so dry. I was dissapointed I wanted to like it I wanted to know more, but life is to short.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews