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The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
In the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam, the American military cast about for answers--and, bizarrely, settled upon a view of warfare promulgated by a Prussian general in the 1830s, Carl von Clausewitz. This doctrine was utterly inappropriate to the wars the U.S. faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. It led the U.S. Army to abandon its time-honored methods of offensive war--which had guided America to success from the early Indian campaigns all the way through the Second World War--in favor of a military philosophy derived from the dynastic campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great. It should come as no surprise, then, that the military's conceptualization of modern offensive war, as well as its execution, has failed in every real-life test of our day. This book reveals the failings of the U.S. Army in its adoption of a postmodern “Full Spectrum Operations" doctrine, which codifies Clauswitzian thinking. Such an approach, the author contends, leaves the military without the doctrine, training base, or force structure necessary to win offensive wars in our time. Instead, the author suggests, the army should adopt a new doctrinal framework based on an analysis of the historical record and previously successful American methods of war. A clear and persuasive critique of current operative ideas about warfare, The Clausewitz Delusion lays out a new explanation of victory in war, based on an analysis of wartime casualties and post-conflict governance. It is a book of critical importance to policymakers, statesmen, and military strategists at every level.
320 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2009
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
July 3, 2017
Pane bože to je kravina. A môže za to Keegan a van Creveld.
May 25, 2013
What should one make of yet another book with a Clausewitzian theme? Have not Clausewitzian studies reached saturation point? Perhaps, but, as the title suggests, Stephen Melton’s book tends to buck the trend in that it offers a critique of Clausewitz’s influence rather than extolling his ideas.
Melton, who teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff College having served in the US Army for over 20 years, makes some contentious and, in my view, wrong-headed arguments regarding Clausewitz. The reader could, however, allow these to obscure some interesting points and recommendations about contemporary US strategy.
But, to start with Melton’s interpretation of Clausewitz’s influence on the US military and, in particular, the army, he argues that turning to Clausewitz for inspiration after the Vietnam War was an error. “Reinventing ourselves as nineteenth century Prussians was perhaps the worst way to resolve the army’s post-Vietnam crisis.”
However, the US Army did not swallow Clausewitz whole after Vietnam let alone fully understand his thinking. Melton implicitly acknowledges this through his constant reference to Clausewitz’s theory of the centre of gravity and its inclusion in various doctrinal publications while overlooking the adoption of other Clausewitzian concepts. To Melton, governance, not the centre of gravity, is the most useful framework for modern military doctrine. This ignores the fact that Clausewitz identified public opinion, the whole basis of good governance, as a potential enemy centre of gravity. Melton’s understanding of Clausewitz’s theory of war would have benefited from a reading of recent work by Antulio Echevarria and Hew Strachan but, disappointingly, neither author is cited in this book.
For Melton, attrition is the most effective way of bringing what he calls offensive war to an end and he uses statistics from 20th century conflicts to demonstrate this point. However, he erroneously writes that Clausewitz preferred decisive “war-ending battles of annihilation” as opposed to “protracted wars of attrition”. There is no clear dichotomy between annihilation and attrition. Both are techniques that can be employed to the same end and Clausewitz was perfectly aware of what he described as the “chameleon-like” nature of war. Moreover, the assertion that Clausewitz focused on limited war and addressed an “archaic form of warfare, wars between kings” fails to acknowledge his penetration to the very heart of the nature of war and his addressing of a conflict – the Napoleonic Wars – that went well beyond limited, dynastic warfare.
Melton defines contemporary limited war as involving those “military measures, short of regime change, taken to force a government to change its policies or actions”. His espousal of the example of Iraq between 1990 and 2003 as a successful limited conflict is surely erroneous given the events that took place after the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Melton makes several valid points about contemporary US strategy and how it could benefit from a reading of history. For example, he describes how, as early as 1942, the US Army started making preparations for the post-war occupation of Germany and Japan. It is fair to say, as Melton does, that US military doctrine tends to be thin on analysis at the strategic level. In his view, the joint doctrinal publications that have emerged since the mid-1980s have been “disembodied from a stated theory of war or strategy”. Nevertheless, the book would have benefited from a reading of Marine Corps doctrinal publications since 1989, notably the capstone manuals on Strategy and Warfighting, for their clear understanding of the inter-relationship between strategy and operations. These manuals were informed by a clear understanding of Clausewitz.
The Roman Empire is cited as an example of past overextension and subsequent collapse, and Melton’s book makes some pertinent points about the undesirability of escalating America’s wars to include direct intervention in Pakistan and Iran. In describing military action as a last resort, Melton makes a good case against the use of pre-emption. This would involve ensuring that there is an optimum balance between the executive and the legislature in making decisions about whether or not the nation should use force.
Melton has written a thought-provoking book which, while its criticisms of Clausewitz’s theories and their influence leaves much to be desired, should be read by serving officers and scholars for the important points it makes about contemporary US strategic thought and how it could prosper from understanding the lessons of the past.
Melton, who teaches at the US Army Command and General Staff College having served in the US Army for over 20 years, makes some contentious and, in my view, wrong-headed arguments regarding Clausewitz. The reader could, however, allow these to obscure some interesting points and recommendations about contemporary US strategy.
But, to start with Melton’s interpretation of Clausewitz’s influence on the US military and, in particular, the army, he argues that turning to Clausewitz for inspiration after the Vietnam War was an error. “Reinventing ourselves as nineteenth century Prussians was perhaps the worst way to resolve the army’s post-Vietnam crisis.”
However, the US Army did not swallow Clausewitz whole after Vietnam let alone fully understand his thinking. Melton implicitly acknowledges this through his constant reference to Clausewitz’s theory of the centre of gravity and its inclusion in various doctrinal publications while overlooking the adoption of other Clausewitzian concepts. To Melton, governance, not the centre of gravity, is the most useful framework for modern military doctrine. This ignores the fact that Clausewitz identified public opinion, the whole basis of good governance, as a potential enemy centre of gravity. Melton’s understanding of Clausewitz’s theory of war would have benefited from a reading of recent work by Antulio Echevarria and Hew Strachan but, disappointingly, neither author is cited in this book.
For Melton, attrition is the most effective way of bringing what he calls offensive war to an end and he uses statistics from 20th century conflicts to demonstrate this point. However, he erroneously writes that Clausewitz preferred decisive “war-ending battles of annihilation” as opposed to “protracted wars of attrition”. There is no clear dichotomy between annihilation and attrition. Both are techniques that can be employed to the same end and Clausewitz was perfectly aware of what he described as the “chameleon-like” nature of war. Moreover, the assertion that Clausewitz focused on limited war and addressed an “archaic form of warfare, wars between kings” fails to acknowledge his penetration to the very heart of the nature of war and his addressing of a conflict – the Napoleonic Wars – that went well beyond limited, dynastic warfare.
Melton defines contemporary limited war as involving those “military measures, short of regime change, taken to force a government to change its policies or actions”. His espousal of the example of Iraq between 1990 and 2003 as a successful limited conflict is surely erroneous given the events that took place after the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Melton makes several valid points about contemporary US strategy and how it could benefit from a reading of history. For example, he describes how, as early as 1942, the US Army started making preparations for the post-war occupation of Germany and Japan. It is fair to say, as Melton does, that US military doctrine tends to be thin on analysis at the strategic level. In his view, the joint doctrinal publications that have emerged since the mid-1980s have been “disembodied from a stated theory of war or strategy”. Nevertheless, the book would have benefited from a reading of Marine Corps doctrinal publications since 1989, notably the capstone manuals on Strategy and Warfighting, for their clear understanding of the inter-relationship between strategy and operations. These manuals were informed by a clear understanding of Clausewitz.
The Roman Empire is cited as an example of past overextension and subsequent collapse, and Melton’s book makes some pertinent points about the undesirability of escalating America’s wars to include direct intervention in Pakistan and Iran. In describing military action as a last resort, Melton makes a good case against the use of pre-emption. This would involve ensuring that there is an optimum balance between the executive and the legislature in making decisions about whether or not the nation should use force.
Melton has written a thought-provoking book which, while its criticisms of Clausewitz’s theories and their influence leaves much to be desired, should be read by serving officers and scholars for the important points it makes about contemporary US strategic thought and how it could prosper from understanding the lessons of the past.
September 11, 2010
Surprisingly, the author of this book actually had some interesting things to say. Mr. Melton is certainly not the most skillful or entertaining writer I've ever read, but I actually would have given this book another star if he had simply left out all the bullshit about Clausewitz, and concentrated on his criticism and suggestions vis-a-vis recent U.S. military performance. Another small matter I should mention is that, when reading books about military affairs, I prefer to have at least a vague idea of the author's credentials, particularly when that author happens to be a serving or retired officer. Obviously, I'm going to take an infantry officer's opinion on tactics more seriously than, say, a career supply officer for example; all the more so when the former is highly decorated. Even after "Googling" Stephen L. Melton, I could not find any more information than was included in the not particularly enlightening author profile on the dust-jacket, which does not even mention his rank at retirement, never mind any other details of his career.
***Update***
I ran another web-search for this author's name today (5 August 2021), and found a short bio at the 'Small Wars Journal' website which reads as follows:
"Stephen L. Melton (Lieutenant Colonel, Army, Retired) is an Assistant Professor in the Department for Army Tactics at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas".
***Update***
I ran another web-search for this author's name today (5 August 2021), and found a short bio at the 'Small Wars Journal' website which reads as follows:
"Stephen L. Melton (Lieutenant Colonel, Army, Retired) is an Assistant Professor in the Department for Army Tactics at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas".
March 12, 2013
An interesting analysis that claims the reason the US Army ignored counterinsurgency doctrine and stability operations after Vietnam was a fixation on battle and centers of gravity, as proposed by Clausewitz. The analysis of Clausewitz as being a product of limited wars between monarchies is interesting, though he creates something of a strawman in attacking the centers of gravity concept and the Clausewitzian trinity. Some questionable "empiricism" in here about how much of a population must be killed in a war in order to force demographic submission, as well, though the offensive-versus-defensive war framework is decent.
The last part of the book, proposing a strategic defensive for the US, is well-traveled ground, and written better elsewhere. That doesn't make it wrong, however. The most valuable part of the book is the proposal for a US Army force structure that includes military governance capabilities.
The last part of the book, proposing a strategic defensive for the US, is well-traveled ground, and written better elsewhere. That doesn't make it wrong, however. The most valuable part of the book is the proposal for a US Army force structure that includes military governance capabilities.
January 1, 2010
Not a page turner for the average reader, but I like real-time strategy and thought piece titles that provide the reader a little more insight into why American's choose to fight and why we succeed or fail.
Want to Read
December 23, 2009Thanks ArmChairGeneral
May 26, 2013
a good counter argument to Harry Summers "On Strategy" and a real condemnation of neo-con fantasies
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews