The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy's and Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors In North Vietnam

by Richard H. Shultz Jr.

From 1964 to 1972, the United States executed an extremely secret campaign of covert operations against North Vietnam. Controlled by the Pentagon's Special Operations Group, under the cover name "Studies and Observation Group" (SOG), it was the United States' largest and most complex covert operation since World War II. Because it was so highly classified and politically sensitive, once the war was over the story of SOG was buried deep in the vaults of the Pentagon--until Dr. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., one of the world's leading experts on SOG's activities in Southeast Asia, began his impressive investigative research and wide-ranging special interviews.

The Secret War Against Hanoi is based on thousands of pages of recently declassified top-secret SOG documents, as well as interviews with sixty officers who ran SOG's covert programs and the senior officials who directed this secret war, including Robert McNamara, Walt Rostow, Richard Helms, William Colby, William Westmoreland, and Victor Krulak. It is the first-ever definitive and comprehensive account of the covert paramilitary and espionage campaign, with many eye-opening disclosures.

Dr. Shultz reveals how in 1963, President Kennedy, dissatisfied with the CIA's ineffective guerrilla operations against North Vietnam, turned over operational control of the covert war to the Pentagon and demanded results. Despite Kennedy's strong directive, those results were slow in coming. United States policymakers and the senior military leadership had little interest in or understanding of special operations and resisted any expansion of the secret war. When SOG finally did get started in January 1964, under newly inaugurated President Johnson, it was constantly hobbled by the micro-management of the National Security Council, State Department, and Pentagon leadership.

Despite these restraints, SOG conducted its intense secret war for eight years, through the Johnson and Nixon administrations, and managed to execute a range of operations, including the dispatch of numerous spies to North Vietnam and creation of a sophisticated triple-cross deception program: psychological warfare through a fabricated guerrilla movement, manipulation of North Vietnamese POWs and kidnapped citizens, and dirty tricks; commando raids against Hanoi's coast and navy; and operations on the Ho Chi Minh Trail to kill enemy soldiers and destroy supplies. Ultimately, the Pentagon's spies, saboteurs, and secret warriors would produce both spectacular and disastrous results.

There are lessons to be learned from Washington's conduct of the secret war against Hanoi that will be valuable and valid for years to come for presidents who engage in covert special operations to meet twenty-first-century threats to vital U.S. interests.

Genres: History, War, Espionage, Nonfiction, Military History, American History, Military Fiction

390 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1999

Reviews

[Jerome Otte · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very well researched, based on all of the declassified material that the author was able to obtain. However, I went through the entire book, hoping that the author would come to the proper historical conclusions regarding the Vietnam War, at least by the last chapter of the book.

The author does a good job of blowing away the myth that "Kennedy was going to get us out of Vietnam."

Being a product of the system, Schmidt acknowledges the poor quality of the South Vietnamese military throughout the war, but does not acknowledge the real reason why: Because the South Vietnamese knew that their puppet governments did not represent a real country. It was a false construct, the result of the good ol' US of A violating the Geneva Accords that were intended to split the country into two "regroupment zones" for a period of two years, in order to allow an internationally observed, political solution to take place. Meanwhile, their opposites in the north were fighting a virtually non-stop 1000-year fight against foreign domination. Fighting the US was literally just a large road bump in their history.

Those interested in espionage history will find a fascinating account of SOG's attempts to foster rebellion in North Vietnam and wage psychological warfare. Not only do we learn why the CIA could not start a resistance movement in the "denied" country of North Vietnam, a "counterintelligence state" of extreme paranoia and security, but why the inheritor of the project, SOG, was also doomed to fail and fail spectacularly. Of approximately 500 agents inserted into North Vietnam, all were killed or captured and many turned into double agents.

But SOG officers experienced in espionage turned this disaster into a brilliant operation that convinced North Vietnam a massive underground was operating in their country and loyal North Vietnamese were implicated as traitors. For those wanting to know exactly what is encompassed by the term "psychological warfare", Shultz gives some idea in the chapter "Drive Them Crazy with Psywar". SOG set up a fake resistance movement with accompanying bogus radio traffic, propaganda, and blocks of ice parachuted into the jungle to melt and leave empty chutes and an uneasy feeling amongst the North Vietnamese.

Shultz also tells of the few maritime operations SOG carried out against enemy targets, its sabotage efforts which included tainting caches of the enemy's rice and leaving behind tainted ammo for the VC and NVA soldiers, and its operations against the Ho Chi Minh trail.

See also:

SOG: Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam

Shooting At The Moon: The Story of America's Clandestine War in Laos

Cash on Delivery: CIA Special Operations During the Secret War in Laos

Codename Mule: Fighting the Secret War in Laos for the CIA

Across The Fence: The Secret War In Vietnam

Here There Are Tigers: The Secret Air War in Laos, 1968-69

Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos

Black Ops Vietnam: The Operational History of MACVSOG

Project Alpha: Washington's Secret Military Operations in North Vietnam

[Jeff · Rating 4 out of 5]

Should be read hand in hand with John Plaster’s book

[Scott Holstad · Rating 3 out of 5]

The author of this book used declassified material to give readers an inside view of "The Secret War Against Hanoi." Unfortunately, it's almost all from the operational level, or I guess more accurately, from a top down perspective. What I mean is we learn about special forces (SOG) fighting in the Vietnam area (N Vietnam, S Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia), but with almost no personal stories behind what went on. Instead, we get directives and papers argued about and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the State Department, the Defense Department, and the White House itself. It's a book about politics and the resulting failures of SOG due to bureaucratic bullshit. It took years for a covert war to get off the ground, and just when North Vietnam started to publicly admit they were feeling the heat, the White House pulled the plug due to political reasons.

The book covers four main areas within SOG, including psyops, maritime ops, efforts to "cross the wire" to the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, and frankly, it's a book about frustrations and failures. It was disappointing in that regard, because I've read plenty of books about SOG heroism in Vietnam, and that's rarely reflected in Schultz's book. In fact, it would have helped to add some stories of courage or valor or even cowardliness to give the reader a better feel for what he's getting at, but the author doesn't do this. Instead, you have military and civilian commanders running around subverting each other at every opportunity and it gets old after awhile. The jokers never learned to work together and they never learned in general. It's amazing SOG accomplished anything with these people in charge. Sadly, the author portrays most SOG operations as blunders and failures. The truth is, there are no real metrics with which to measure SOG success -- people went in to territories they weren't politically supposed to be with no identifying information. We don't know the true number of dead and missing SOG vets. It's a pity.

This book is fairly dry and it gets boring and repetitive quickly. There's a lot of information overlap between the chapters. I think a better book to read about the subject is John L. Plaster's "SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam." It's sad and tragic, but it gives you a real feel for what took place and just who fought these battles.

[Terri · Rating 3 out of 5]

It was bad timing for this book and I. I was squeezed for reads with multiple books out from the library and needing to be read all at once. This factor got in the way of a true impression of this book. Therefore it is hard for me to review. I thought that perhaps saying something to explain the 3 stars is better than saying nothing.

I read to page 220 and then had to put it aside for those other reads. When I tried to come back to it three weeks later I could not get into it. And let's face it, the book is one long info dump with very little break ups. The paragraphs are many pages long at times. Just solid text. I don't have issue with solid text in some non fiction, if it suits the style of writing, but these kinds of books you have to give 100% of your time to or it will never be a perfect marriage.
I will still give it 3 stars. It deserves nothing less. When I was reading those first 220 pages I was not exactly enthralled, but i was learning plenty and I was moved by the material. Moved to anger and shock mostly.

[Jeff · Rating 3 out of 5]

A well researched book, with plenty of quotes from first-hand participants. However, Shultz made the decision to segment the book depending on which part of the military was involved, hence at each new section you bounce backwards in time and start over again, seeing it through the lens of a new branch (or the CIA). While it would have been difficult to intertwine all of these concurrent stories, I still think it would have made for a more engrossing narrative.

[Paul Medici · Rating 4 out of 5]

Almost all of these missions failed. America had to inform the RSV that the ops were running and corruption in the RSV ruined the chances for success.

[Jack · Rating 5 out of 5]

A good book discussing SOG operations in Vietnam. A must for those interested in special operations

[Conrad · Rating 2 out of 5]

There is a wealth of information, insights and great sources in this book. Unfortunately the authlr is clueless in presentation of the information. Ideally for a book like this i prefer chronological presentation of facts with minor detaiked reminders of minor players roles when they are reintroduced.

The aurhor chose to group chapters by theme and not chronological. Ok, not my preference but l will take it. Unfortunately the author is all over the place in topics on each topical chapter, moves across multiple years in sentence to sentence on the same page, and non stop re introduces players that had one sentence 8 chapters back.

I really really learned a lot from the book despite the author making a mess of it.

But seriously, some one needs to rewrite it properly. It feels like 350 pages of post it notes on a mirror.

[Steve · Rating 1 out of 5]

Never really got into this book...first 100 pages just dragged and I stopped....something I rarely do.

[Andrew Tollemache · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read this both as part of research for some narrative ideas I have and out of a never ending curiosity about the US (mis)adventure in Vietnam. Shultz does a good job showing how the early bad assumptions by Kennedy admin regarding covert action dovetailed with their bad policy decisions on overt war. For the entire course of the war Hanoi was miles ahead of the US in carrying out its objectives and doing so with focus and ingenuity. US on the other hand seemed to be a case study on how to eff up policy and not do what needed doing.
On the covert side, except for some attempts to close of Ho Chi Minh trail with SOG most of the covert war was inept (ie. 100% of agents dropped into NV were captured and/or turned for years before we got wise) or insignificant (McNamara would get giddy just because 1 bridge might have been blowed up).
One side note of interest was the use by SOG of a finnish national who gained renown for fighting the Soviets during WW2 and even joined the SS when Finland surrendered to the USSR (having inflicted enormous losses on the Russians). The Finn escaped to the US with OSS help and joined the effort in Vietnam in early 60s. He then mysteriously disappeared over Laos without a trace leaving many in US govt believing USSR had gotten their Vietnamese allies to turn him over for retribution for his amazing exploits in WW2. A Google search shows that a few years after this book was published a joint US-Finland team recovered his remains from a Laotian mountainside where his chopper had crashed.

[Pete · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book got tedious at times. After reading a book about the OSS back in 2011, I thought this would be a similar account. And to a degree it was, but often focused too much on internal politics within the CIA and MACSOGV, such as who replaced who in what position, and what their style was and how they were trying to improve their career. The missions were examined from a HQ perspective and not from the boots on the ground. Still, some of the plans they came up with and executed would blow your mind.

[Leland Dalton · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a very good book about the covert operations in Vietnam. From psy-ops to dirty little tricks, it is all there. I have read this book a few times, it is quite good.

[Benjamin · Rating 4 out of 5]

I thought this was going to be a "special forces should have been use better in Vietnam and that is why we didn't win" type of book but as I read through it didn't turn out that way. The main takeaway I got from this book was that covert operations, even as cool as they seem, are really not a very good way to win wars or even accomplish objectives with any sort of certainty. Very interesting stories, viewpoints, and quotes from senior leaders and soldiers on the ground many years after the fact.