The Rise and Fall of the Elites

by Vilfredo Pareto

This book is the first edition in English of a minor classic in sociology. Vilfredo Pareto's long essay from the turn of the century on The Rise and Fall of the Elites marks his giant step from econometrics into sociology. Here in brief outline is the major sociological ideas for which he later became famous. This essay is more readable and disciplined than most of his later elaborations and serves exceedingly well as a first introduction to his political sociology.

Translation of Un applicazione di teorie sociologiche, published in Revista Italiana di sociologia, 1901. Bibliography and notes: p. [103]-120. Introd. by Hans L. Zetterberg.

Genres: Sociology, Politics, Philosophy, Economics, History, Nonfiction, Political Science

120 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1901

About the author

Vilfredo Federico Damaso Pareto, born Wilfried Fritz Pareto, was an Italian engineer, sociologist, economist, political scientist and philosopher. He made several important contributions to economics, particularly in the study of income distribution and in the analysis of individuals' choices.

He introduced the concept of Pareto efficiency and helped develop the field of microeconomics. He also was the first to discover that income follows a Pareto distribution, which is a power law probability distribution. The Pareto principle was named after him and built on observations of his such as that 80% of the land in Italy was owned by 20% of the population. He also contributed to the fields of sociology and mathematics.

Reviews

[Matthew W · Rating 5 out of 5]

Mandatory reading for those interested in understanding "power shifts" in the West. Essentially, Pareto (who was apolitical) shows how most elites bring their own demise. Overtime, elites become weak and passive, thus allowing a "new elite" to come and destroy them. The decadent elites are the ones that promote liberalism, humanitarianism, and socialism which eventually brings their own demise. In the modern West, if one wants to be considered "sophisticated", one has to believe in the leftist "we are the world" spiel. Of course, those underclasses aren't really interested in word peace - they want power and plan to destroy the upper classes, using their own altruistic philosophies against them. If the U.S. follows the same route as elites in the past (which it is, America has certainly degenerated over the past 60 years), certain minorities and "special interest" groups will completely take control of this country (which has already pretty much happened).

Anyways, this book was a huge influence on Mussolini and he certainly took power in Italy for a couple decades.

[T · Rating 4 out of 5]

"As regards the bitter hatred which some elated moralists display against less ascetic men, it has its origin not only in that religious and sectarian sentiment for which the heretic will die and destroy himself, but it also springs from that envy which unknowingly and unintentionally the non-enjoyer resents in the enjoyer, or the eunuch in the virile man" (45)

Pareto's powerful essay on the rise and fall of the elite class is the apogee of Nietzschean politics. Pareto, like Nietzsche, took some effort to distance himself from fascism, or at least the intellectual origins of it. However, the overlap between their thought and fascism is still rather striking. It's no surprise that Mussolini admired Pareto, and Hitler claimed to adore Nietzsche. Both Pareto and Nietzsche share a cyclical view of the rise and fall of Great Leaders, a disdain for the masses, and a disdain for the 'illogical' drives of the nonelite. Also, reading them both thinkers side by side, the reader wouldn't be wrong in assuming that both thinkers wanted to become part of the ruling elite.

Paretian politics are clear - elites dominate the world, and no social system can possibly offer an escape out of this. The elites do not dominate in peace, they face squawking critics who stand outside the system, harbouring a deep resentment and secret desire to replace their oppressors. These 'counter elites' include rival religious fanatics, socialists, democrats, and even obliging reformers. In fact, it is those who condemn and scream the loudest who harbour the most ressentiment at the system.

The natural inequity between man which allows for one group to dominate is discussed in Darwinian terms, with Pareto seeming to believe that this is an innate human trait. Here Pareto is fundamentally a conflict theorist. But, rather than the classes of working men and women changing the world, it is a small segment of the elites who change it. History is a Shakespearean tragedy, not a dialectical one.

The aetiology of this 'natural' inequality which allows for elites to rise isn't worked out fully in this short essay. In the preface Hans L. Zetterberg does note that it is tied in with Pareto's famous 80/20 principle, an idea which sociologists and economic historians have argued simply reifies the inequity which exists in societies (see A History of Economic Thought), rather than explaining it.

For Pareto, it isn't the ideology of religion, nationalism, or utopianism that allows the elite to dominate - it simply is the nature of the world. The ideas are secondary, and the fixed pyramid structure of society is primary. It is through manipulating the "nonlogical motives" (27) of the masses that the elite rule. The internecine debates about transubstantiation, nationalism, or the universalist claims of liberal philosophy mean nothing - they are merely the superstructure of the power struggle between elites.

Reading this, I was also struck by the overlap between Adam Fabry's depiction of Viktor Orban's ideal 'illiberal' democracy, where a class of powerful bureaucrats organises society and uses its power and resources to direct investment to an incestuous corporate elite (see The Political Economy of Hungary: From State Capitalism to Authoritarian NeoliberalismThe Political Economy of Hungary: From State Capitalism to Authoritarian Neoliberalism).

[Helen · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a brief powerful book, written at the turn of the 20th C, which was said to have been subsequently favored by fascists; however, the author condemns equally old elites, new elites, nationalism, anti-Semitism, Catholicism, socialism, Marxism. He is also disillusioned with the bourgeoisie - and so the book is critical of all sides in the never-ending battle he sees as unfolding, the succession of elites, as one elite weakens and is supplanted by a new more vigorous elite. About the only group he consistently applauds is labor unions, which he sees as forming part of the new elite - fueled by the secular religion (as he sees it) of socialism. Ultimately, though, he has little hope for any elite group, or for the longevity of any elite group, to retain power - he says all elites become exclusive, and eventually give way to new elites.

There are some unnervingly accurate observations in this very powerful book, which is almost the length of a long essay. He is scornful of the promises of each new elite group that comes along, which usually enlists the downtrodden and the poor, deceives them, and then exploits them once it achieves power. He says this is always what happens to the poor, and that despite the promises of each new elite group to come along, the poor remain poor. Here's how he puts it with respect to a new elite of the ancient world, which of course, either arose from or enlisted the help of the poor or proletarians of its age: "Many centuries have passes since the day when the Carmi Sibillini promised to man that "there would be no more rich and poor, no more tyrants and slaves, norwould anyone be greater or smaller; no more kings or leaders; all things would be held in common." The poor wretches still wait for these promises to come true. There is every likelihood that the new big promises will have the same outcome, and this can be expected within an equally short time. After the victory the new aristocracy will perhaps allow some concessions of form and language to the new proletarians; that is, to the weak, the improvident, or the incapable, but actually these latter will probably have to bear an even heavier yoke than the one they are bearing now. The new masters will not, at least for a little while, have the senile weaknesses of our bourgeoisie."

And regarding how the elites treat businesses, specifically with respect to taxes: "Experience taught the Roman masters that it was profitable for them to let the slave keep a certain nest egg for himself, as this would spur him on to work and produce more for the master. Similarly, experience has taught certain democratic governments that to despoil the contractor and the capitalist entirely was precisely to kill the hen that laid the golden eggs. Therefore they let them keep certain earnings and are satisfied to take from them as much as is possible without discouraging them from using their intellectual gifts and their wealth in the interests of economic production. Thus they exploit them in the best possible manner, just as the master exploited the slave. It is not certain whether the new elite will have as much patience in allowing itself to be robbed as has the present one..."

Regarding the Dreyfus affair:

"The Dreyfus affair is simply an episode in the contest between the present and the future elite. A not very large segment of the present elite had tried, especially in the years 1850 to 1870, to rely upon freedom, reason, and good sense. These people have now seen their mistake, realizing that men are governed by sentiment and not by reason; the only possible choice therefore is choice of the kind of sentiment, or rather of the kind of religion. Hence, that bourgeois minority had again drawn closer to the majority which, consciously or unconsciously, had always held similar ideas.
What could one oppose to the invading socialist religion? The higher class in France did not have much to choose from. It sought to invigorate old religious forms, especially the Catholic one. It tried to turn certain aversions against socialism to its advantage, thus giving rise to Antisemitism; and finally, it too had a new religion in the guise of "nationalism." This latter had the enormous advantage of being useful in seducing the army. It should be well noted: I do not even hint that such a plan was premeditated and then deliberately carried out. Indeed the facts prove that most of those who follow this plan do so under pressure of the circumstances in which they find themselves, without being aware of it. Perhaps one or another more cunning and artful leader may see in which direction the movement is driving, but he will take every care not to refer to it so as not to weaken the blind faith of his companions."

The author wraps up quite presciently:

"There always remains an unknown element of future social modifications, and there exist changers with could produce long wars among the civilized nations. These would probably have the effect of imposing a military dictatorship on some European nation. But what the relationship between such a dictatorship and the new would be, escapes us. Those who judge by the movements of the subjective phenomenon alone will be convinced that a military dictatorship can benefit only the present elite, but he who is principally concerned with the objective phenomenon will not accept such a hypothesis without considerable doubt."

In short, the author believes that the decay and fall of old elites is inevitable, the movement giving rise to the new elite usurping the old, is usually marked by an upsurge in religious feeling - in his era, he feels that socialism has become the new secular religion, and that in fact, certain Protestant forms of Christianity with their emphasis on social service, are nearly indistinguishable from socialism. The old elites become decadent, and no longer defend their interests; he identifies the Roman Catholic establishment as having almost been entirely swept away by the Reformation, for example, and discusses the circumstances of the French Revolution at length. He claims that old elites become weaker as they become more focused on humanitarian concerns - but he equally criticizes all elites in this way, and states that it is inevitable that new elites become old, decay and are overthrown. Thus, I at least do not read the book as being a blueprint for fascism - or any particular ideology for that matter, since according to Pareto, all elites eventually fall. If some passages are taken out of context, then I suppose a fascist could find "justification" for brushing aside and supplanting the decadent bourgeois old order, but the next new elite to come along would simply do the same thing. The take-away of the book is that no elite lasts forever - each elite is in a way doomed to decay and be overthrown. The old elites become totally senile and deluded, and cease to defend themselves, but help their adversaries instead. More vigorous, energetic individuals rise up either from the bourgeoisie itself or from the proletariat, and overthrow either all of society or the elite leadership. Yet they too are eventually doomed to fall victim to the new elites which rise up.

Pareto is obviously highly learned and erudite and gives excellent supporting examples for his theses. The book is prescient in that the 20th C was marked by two bloody wars in Europe and the rise of a murderous military dictatorship in Germany, exactly as Pareto predicted 30+ years before Hitler assumed power in Germany.

The book is bleak in that the author is basically saying the same thing, with supporting examples, over and over again. It is a thought-provoking book of great power - in that it's eye-opening. Is Pareto oversimplifying the course of history as a succession of revolutions overthrowing sclerotic and senile elites? Is Pareto's view perhaps unconsciously modeled on the succession of generations - the younger generation eventually supplanting the older generation, with sons and fathers reversing roles as fathers weaken and become senile, they end up being cared for by their sons instead of vice versa? Of course, that too is an oversimplification of Pareto's theory, which is quite a bit more elaborated than that. Simpler yet is the analogy to vegetation. A perennial plant is vigorous in the Spring, powerful in the Summer, only to weaken and decay in the Fall and finally die out as Winter snow falls. The following Spring though, the same plant will start sending up shoots again, to repeat the same growth-efflorescence-decay-death process again. Is human society really only an analog of the life of a perennial plant? Pareto's implication that the matrix from which each new elite is drawn, from elements of the proletariat or sometimes from the bourgeoisie, means the organism (society) auto-regenerates itself - each elite is, despite the succession of ideologies/religions, really the same elite since each new elite is drawn from the same matrix (elements).

This book may be annoying to some - because clearly, if taken out of context, some of what Pareto says could be seen as pointing to the excesses of fascism (a movement which had yet to occur when Pareto wrote this book). He is disdainful of what he sees as the inevitable softening of any old elite - as they become focused on humanitarian concerns and so forth. However, as repeatedly stated above, Pareto believes every old elite weakens, becomes decadent and is eventually supplanted. His view is in the end hopeless - perhaps too realistic in its assessment of human history from a teleological perspective. Thus, any reader of any ideology - at least any reader who reads the entire book - will realize that Pareto doesn't actually exempt any ideology or belief system held by any elite, from the eventual fate of all elites. There's no way to avoid the fate of all elites, Pareto says. In fact, he's quite critical, as in his above quotes, of the devious routes by which would-be dictators seize power and seduce segments of society. As noted above, he is however, very impressed with labor unions.

There is one other quote that is worth reading:

"To many bourgeois the Christian religious wave on which they ride seems to be a means for combating socialism. That is to say that among the many manifestations of the religious sentiment, they choose, or rather believe they choose, the one which is least opposed to their interests. This reason for their choice has certainly had some effect, but much less than would be imagined. Sometimes it has existed a priori, but more often it was found a posteriori, in order to provide a reason for the religious movement. Be that as it may, if there was a strategic thought behind it, it failed to produce the desired effect. The governing classes wished to use the old religious beliefs in order to keep the people subdued, and it so happened that the people are now becoming more detached from these beliefs and turning to the new ones, particularly to the socialist belief; the bourgeois were successful only within the ranks of the bourgeoisie itself. Take the case of a general who wants to hypnotize the solders of the enemy so as to defeat them more easily; yet with all the ado, he does not hypnotize a single enemy, but instead his own men become hypnotized, and therefore an easier prey for the adversary. Such was precisely, insofar as it was conscious, the achievement of the bourgeoisie, not only as regards the old forms of religion, but with regard to the new ones as well."

And:

"The divergence between the subjective and the objective phenomenon produces many illusions. Thus, many people imagine that they can effectively combat socialism by combating he theories of Marx, just as others believed it possible to combat Christianity effectively by pointing out the scientific errors of the Bible. There are few educated people today who would not recognize those errors. And yet, what damage has it done to Christianity? None. It prospers more than ever. The Marxian theory of value is not valid; after they had tried out various and subtle interpretations, we now witness some of the most educated Marxists going so far as to say that Marx never intended to set up a theory of value. All this has hurt the socialist faith little or not at all. It was not the book by Marx which has created the socialists; it is the socialists who have made Marx's book famous. It was not the works of Voltaire which, toward the end of the eighteenth century, produced skepticism; it was that skepticism which gave the writings of Voltaire their reputation. This is meant only to define the principal aspect of the phenomenon, for it must be added that form, too has value. Voltaire and the Encyclopedists, expressing the existing sentiments of the French higher class in a select form, endowed those sentiments with new vigor. A similar observation must be made with regard to Marx."

This book was written in 1901, and the author considered the French revolution and the succeeding dictatorship as a relatively recent example of old elites becoming decrepit and giving way to new elites.

The book includes a good albeit somewhat critical introductory essay by Hans Zetterberg. Here is what Zetterberg says about Pareto's work:

"...what he [Pareto] wanted to find was a rational explanation of irrational behavior. But it is equally true that Pareto was not in agreement with the philosophies of the Enlightenment, which held that the critical factor in the survival of an elite is the extent to which it allows reason to control sentiments; a government by intellectuals, for example, Pareto held to be a near-certain disaster.
The inability to solve the problem of the role of reason in the circulation of the elites is most obvious when the issue is phrased as reason versus sentiment. It is neither reason nor sentiment that should be maximized to insure the survival of an elite, but efficiency. And efficiency is produced through a delicately balanced mixture of reason and sentiment, working not against one another, but in harness. In the last analysis, is is only the efficient elites, whether elected, appointed, or self-chosen- that gain substantial support from those who are on the receiving end of their decrees, who buy their goods and services, who attend their sacred rites, who receive their knowledge. It is the overall-all efficiency in the tasks of generating and distributing order, riches, knowledge, beauty, sacredness, and virtue that slowly makes the elites perceived as "legitimate," and thus helps insure their tenure."

This book refreshingly doesn't have much technical jargon and the introductory essay certainly helps place the book in the context of Pareto's thought. Zetterberg notes that "... Pareto himself was a proud, detached, and ironic man without much desire to align himself with any political movement. His bias-- which is loud and clear--is rather against people of all political persuasions who favor social ossification over social change, ascription over achievement, and softness over toughness." And: "Pareto obviously thinks of himself as a sophisticated visitor to the theater of historical drama who early discovers the entire plot which the rest of the audience still is misled by dramatic gestures, moralistic speeches, and the comings and goings of the actors. Pareto took pride in his superior sophistication in this respect, and he sees no reason to hide it. Many readers are apt to be annoyed with him for being so smugly sure."

This is a worthwhile book to read, if only to glimpse a (perhaps rather cynical) viewpoint into how and why elites rise and fall. Whether Pareto's theory is cynical or enlightened I suppose depends on the reader's world view and/or level of ingenuousness.

[Cody Moser · Rating 5 out of 5]

Can't help but feel this was specifically written about David French.

Excellent book. Unfortunately not very Pareto "mathy", so much as an extended diatribe by Pareto against 1) socialists and 2) the bourgeoise who capitulate to their demands. Book contains a lot of humor along with digressions where he rails against teetotalers, humanitarians, humanitarian Christians, and nationalists. As with most things Pareto, about 20% of the book does 80% of the work, but the rest is fun reading.

[İlşad Özkan]

Yazar özgün ve cesur yorumlar yapmış. okunabilir. Fakat kitap kötü hazırlanmış, ikincil metinlerin çoğu çevrilmemiş bile. Ayrıca Türkçe yazım hataları az da olsa göze çarpacak şekilde.

[Juan Torrecillas · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ensayo donde Pareto intenta explicar el proceso por el que las élites llegan al poder y caen. Para ello, Pareto parte de una idea básica: toda civilización o sociedad, inevitablemente, está organizada jerárquicamente y las élites son las que dirigen esa sociedad para su propio beneficio.

Para Pareto, el ascenso y caída de las élites es cíclico, como las leyes del movimiento que aplican a la naturaleza. La fuerza motora de estos ciclos es el sentimiento. Si bien el motor de revoluciones a lo largo de la historia ha tenido orígenes varios, todos ellos comparten una razón superior y fundamental: son ideas que conectan con los deseos del Pueblo y son capaces de movilizarlos. Esto aplica tanto a la religión como al socialismo, donde el hecho subjetivo varía, pero el hecho objetivo o causa primaria es común: la firme creencia en unas ideas que deben ser implementadas a nivel social.

Las élites decadentes comparten ciertas características, un canario en la mina que nos indica que están en la parte decreciente de su curva de poder: falta de moralidad, debilidad, uso excesivo de la violencia para imponer sus intereses, apatía o subordinación a élites mayores. Por otro lado, para que el reemplazo sea efectivo, debe coincidir con el ascenso de una nueva élite que aspire al poder. Esta nueva élite parte de ideas capaces de movilizar al Pueblo e instrumentalizarlo a su favor. Trabajadores que luchan por sus intereses, que están dispuestos a perder su trabajo para conseguir un bien común para la clase trabajadora y que creen firmemente en sus ideas. Cuando una élite con apoyo popular y convicciones se enfrenta a una decadente, es cuando se da el reemplazo.

Sin embargo, estas élites, asegura, no tardarán en comportarse como las antiguas, de forma egoísta y beneficiándose de su poder. Como ejemplo: la Iglesia Católica o la teocracia del Tíbet, que partieron de ideas con fuertes bases solidarias, sociales y humanistas, pero que poco a poco fueron perdiéndose en su corrupción y propios beneficios conforme adquirieron poder.

Por último, cabe reseñar que el interés principal de Pareto en este ensayo no es otro que advertir a su propia clase (la burguesía) sobre el ascenso del socialismo. Como persona acomodada, rechazaba el socialismo y realizó varias críticas (no carentes de fundamento) al marxismo. Su ensayo es un toque de atención a unas élites que, perdidas en la vida cómoda, el robo y la falta de moralidad, estan en riesgo de ser reemplazadas por las élites que se formarían tras el desarrollo del movimiento obrero. Sus temores no eran infundados. Aunque la historia no le dé la razón del todo, el socialismo y los movimientos obreros siguieron siendo los fenómenos políticos y sociales más importantes de buena parte del siglo XX.

[Joe · Rating 4 out of 5]

7/23/2006

The Eternal Return of the Elite

This monograph first saw the light of day in 1901 and has been understood as a somewhat famous attempt at a non race-based understanding of 'elitism'. The failure of this attempt to be either genuinely explanatory or entirely successful seems, by almost all accounts, to have been historically verified by fascisms repeated descent into racism. But, given the utter failure of the Fascist movements of the post World War II era to gain traction, one wonders if perhaps now Pareto can, at last, be given a fair hearing. One even wonders if Pareto is fairly characterized as a fascist.

Be that as it may, Pareto still might have much to teach us about the interactions of elites. According to Pareto, elites rise to power, maintain dominance, and then fall; but only if another elite is struggling to take its place. (One is here reminded of Lenin's remark against Trotsky, I believe, 'that no state ever fell without being pushed'.) History is, according to this text, a circulation of elites; and for Pareto, the ideologies that these elites represent are only of secondary importance. What one must always keep in mind while reading this book is that, for Pareto, Liberals and Socialists (that is, the leaders of these ideological positions) are equally elites. By the 'elite', I should point out, Pareto always means the leadership of a class.

Pareto distinguishes between subjective and objective factors; the latter being real objects while the former are psychological states. Thus belief and unbelief are, for Pareto, equally psychological states. In fact, according to our author, belief is often the sign of a rising elite. Note that by 'belief' he doesn't merely mean religious beliefs; according to Pareto socialism is a belief, that is, it is a psychological state. Indeed, for Pareto, perhaps somewhat surprisingly given his right-wing tendency and reputation, nationalism itself is also a belief. Now, he doesn't propose to ignore these beliefs; on the contrary, it is the skepticism of the rulers towards beliefs that weakens them in the face of the rising elite. These 'myths' are a part of history and need to be explained.

The 'religious sentiment' (i.e., belief) of the masses is what leads to revolt. This sentiment is exploited by the rising elite in its attempt to overthrow the ruling elite. (In this matter the 'skepticism' of the ruling elite is no small aid to the rising elite.) And what we also need to keep in mind is that logical argument almost always fails in these matters; people believe for non-rational reasons, sentiment must be met with sentiment, i.e. socialism must be countered with nationalism. In fact, in these pages Pareto, over a hundred years ago, by describing the similarity between Christian and Socialist behavior, seems to indicate the possibility of a convergence of Christianity and Socialism vis-à-vis the ruling bourgeois. This possibility is currently being explored, thanks to the collapse of 'really existing socialism' in the USSR, by the most au courant leftist continental theory.

Keep in mind that, for Pareto, it is the 'decadence' (i.e., it is 'less apt to defend its own power') and the unabated rapacity of the old elite that causes it to perish. Indeed, he says of this decadence and rapacity that the old elite "could prosper if one of them were absent." Scientifically, or so Pareto maintains, there really is nothing to choose between. Speaking of some historical examples of some crimes of new elites Pareto says, "The old elite, when it was in power, did even worse, so that one cannot conclude from these facts anything against one or the other regime..." Pareto simultaneously holds that reform is the most dangerous moment for the ruling elite, and that the waning of power is perfectly compatible with a rise in the use of violence. In fact, one comes away from this book feeling that the things that Pareto held in most contempt were inefficiency and incompetence and, indeed, some of his most contemptuous gestures in this matter are reserved for the capitalists.

In any case, the problem seems to be that the falling class, no longer believing in itself, can no longer attract the best young people to its cause. The rising class has 'belief' and hope, the falling one only has its privileges. Persecution seems to be no remedy for this. Indeed, thanks to persecutions, "many people of doubtful loyalty and unsteady character were eliminated and professional politicians kept away." ...Very amusing! But here, in 1901, Pareto sees the best of future generations going to socialism while all persecution does is prune the revolutionary plant.

In fact, if one carries away anything from this book it is that old elites must eventually fall. We learn here that socialism is the heir of Christian 'belief'. And since Christianity is dying, all the old elite can do is delay the inevitable 'homecoming' of the common people (and their 'religious sentiment') to socialism. Thus 'belief' replaces 'belief'. Again, there is little rationality in this process; Pareto is at pains to emphasize the 'subjective phenomenon'. This is why nationalism is the best answer to socialism; one counters one irrationality with another.

This book is really only a long essay, the hardcover edition before me has 75 pages of text, 18 pages of notes, and a 22 page introduction. The notes are quite good and should not be passed up. For example, while nicely playing off his understanding of socialism as but another belief, Pareto, after discussing some socialist 'sectarians', writes, "One day we will perhaps have the Holy Inquisition of the socialist faith. (Note 18)" The Soviet 'show trials' of the thirties were indeed this Inquisition. This really is a superb book, a worthy companion piece to all the great political realists of history - from Machiavelli to Gramsci.

[O_O · Rating 3 out of 5]

Many people unwittingly know Pareto through the 80–20 law, or, in statistics, the Pareto Distribution. I knew him as a pioneering quantitative economist, but later learned he eventually turned to political–historical–philosophical research resulting in major contributions to sociology.

The “Rise and Fall of Elites” in this respect is a short book that is essentially an application of his sociological theory developed at length in the “Trattato di Sociologia Generale”. Thus this essay serves as a good introduction to Pareto’s thinking.

Before starting I need to note that the Greek edition of “The Rise and Fall of the Elites” (Ἄνοδος καὶ Πτώση τῶν Ἐλίτ, Κουκκίδα, 2017) includes translations of two essays: “Un’applicazione di Teorie Sociologiche” (1900) and “Transformazione della Democrazia” (1921). The second essay’s translation, not included in the English editions, can be found here.

Although I haven’t read Pareto’s Trattato, his theory is based on two fundamental assumptions:
a) people’s actions are influenced by what he calls residues, which are mostly extra-rational factors (instincts, sentiments, sexual drives etc.);
b) people rationalize their actions by appropriate selection or creation of derivatives, e.g. ideologies, philosophies, religions, scientific rationalizations etc.

Starting with these assumptions, it is easy for Pareto to seek the causes of the actions of groups of people in the less scrutinized residues, while discounting the importance or showing the superficial nature of derivatives. The actions of many groups are analyzed in this frame of reference, but the main focus is on established elites and their struggle with upcoming elites.

A second recurring theme that helps organize the book and connect geographically or historically disparate examples is Pareto’s theory of cycles. In analogy to business cycles, Pareto sees cycles in religious beliefs (suitably defined to include socialist beliefs, and mainly developed in the Applicazione), centralization and decentralization of authority, and concentration or diffusion of wealth (developed in the Transformazione). All cycles are correlated to the struggle of different groups for power, but mainly with the decline of the dominant elite.

Most of the supportive arguments are based on historical events, mainly from the Roman Republic, the period of the French revolution and contemporary Italian (and European) politics. For instance the politics of the Roman Republic are explained as successive confrontations of Patricians, Plebeians, Equites and finally Emperors. Or centralization waves by the kingdoms of the Merovingians and Carolingians, and the subsequent decentralization waves and establishment of upcoming feudal elites. France’s gradual transition to absolute monarchy and eventual revolution and counter-revolution.

Pareto is not manichæan in his view of elites; in contemporary societies he sees much more than a unified bourgeois elite vs the rest. Among others he differentiates the military (especially dominant in Germany before the Great War), plutocrats, industrialists, speculators, land owners, farmers and peasants, intellectuals, skilled labour, unskilled labour, syndicalists and unionized workers etc. In all these groups he looks for distinct economic—but crucially—also other motives, often opposing economic self-interest, and notes their ephemeral alliances and asymmetric relationships that cannot be easily explained by economic motives alone.

The scientific utility of his theories is debatable, and he himself, although diagnosing a definite position in the various cycles (e.g. increasing religious beliefs ca 1900), wisely refrains from making predictions about the future evolution of these cycles. His aim is to demarcate what is possible and assess what is probable in the near future. What impressed me is Pareto’s insistence to only focus on underlying causes—not phenomena—and only on those that lead to significant and recurring transitions. He goes into some pain to differentiate this approach from both a purely empirical approach, as far as it is dealing with any and all phenomena superficially, and a purely dialectical approach, as far as it is stylized and does not consider all effective causes of the observed phenomena and their interactions. In this respect Pareto’s methodology is a step forward.

On the other hand, identifying the cycles can never be extremely useful, since according to Pareto, they could be short, medium, and long range while progressing at different rates! But at least one can estimate the direction society has been moving towards up to the present—but not in the future. Moreover the mechanism through which overlapping “residual” interests get combined (or not) to form groups that struggle with dominant elites is barely touched upon.

In practice, Pareto is deeply pragmatist, realist, apparently amoral, mostly unemotional, almost cynical and sometimes arrogant and brash; definitely a successor of Machiavelli. To the extent that the reader is unfamiliar with this approach to political and historical commentary, and adding Pareto’s comprehensive knowledge of and uncanny observations on European political history, this book can be a provocative read. A necessary caveat if this is the case: it's not hard for a disinclined reader to accuse Pareto of trying to associate widely supported and “justified” demands against the abuses and excesses of dominant elites, with selfish and narrow group interests, in order to neutralize any of those demands’ moral merit. In any case, his comments on contemporary Italian politics illuminate less known aspects of the fin de siècle Zeitgeist (and later developments in the Transformazione) and are—to me—very novel and striking.

He also maintains a façade of disinterest and neutrality (in the Transformazione he explicitly asserts his work is not a call to action), albeit ineffective when dealing with the Italian society. It’s clear he is sympathetic to a classical liberal program on economic principles: free trade, low taxation, increase in saving, absolute respect for property law, free labour markets etc. This provides a lot of entertaining passive-aggressive passages, where he is irritated, resentful and scornful of the then dominant Italian bourgeoisie’s concessions, cowardice and sentimentality, but respectful of and admiring (though unsympathetic to) Italian syndicalists for their practicality, common sense, rationality, vigour and militancy.

Finally, as an illustration of his approach, let’s turn to Pareto himself. Pareto, the bourgeois economist, is “convinced” of the utilitarian necessity of the liberal economic program, and thus definitely sympathetic to the part of the elite that support this program. However they are crumbling and unwilling to fight the combination of crony capitalists, organized labour, socialists and demagogues. He feels threatened and angry but has no theory to morally justify a combative stance by the bourgeoisie. Pareto’s theory—from his theory's viewpoint—could well be the derivative of his self-preservation residue, as a bourgeois academic. In any case, the extent to which this self-preservation sentiment became ubiquitous in the then struggling Italian elites, could help justify the raise of Mussolini shortly thereafter.

[Tim Lundquist · Rating 3 out of 5]

Remarkable little book that details the rise and fall of elites. Full of wonderful turns of phrases--does one give credit to Pareto, or to his translator? Pareto has little patience for anyone or any class. Still his TCFS attitude makes for a fun read. Also an interesting comparison between Christianity and Socialism; at times his criticism of modern religion (1860-present) seems like a contemporary screed against a moral therapeutic deism.

[Eileen · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a small book with quite complete investigation on the revolution, why and how all these revolutions happen. Even it was written years ago, this book is still quite relevant. For those who are passionate and hope revolution could help them, go and read it, then cool down please.

The book is definitely influenced by Karl Max, which is, for me growing up in China, easy to understand. Also, it predicts quite accurately why our communist revolution happen.

[Zach · Rating 3 out of 5]

Thought-provoking, to be sure; also breathtakingly cynical, to the point where it becomes almost parodic. Probably a useful antithesis to the idea of capital-p Progress, but definitely needs some work to be a synthesis.

As a squishy, weak humanitarian myself, I think Pareto's scorn for humanitarian elites is simply wrong, and I think my point of view has been born out by the last hundred years of history. He would no doubt disagree and would have some solid arguments to make.

[Mz · Rating 3 out of 5]

Σχολιασμός του βιβλίου από μένα: https://www.bookpress.gr/kritikes/ide...
και επίσης: https://www.respublica.gr/2021/03/pos...

[Ma Vera · Rating 5 out of 5]

“Greater part of human actions have their origin not in logical reasoning but in sentiment" - (Pareto, 1901)

[Barış]

1901 tarihli bu çalışma basit birkaç önermeye ve temellendirmeye dayanmaktadır.

Öncelikle, Pareto, "insan doğası"nı kendisine meşruiyet zemini olarak almaktadır ve bu gayri-bilimsel zemin, iddialarını kanıtlama zorunluluğundan kendisini kurtarır. İnsan doğası meselesi, Hıristiyan teolojisinden Aydınlanma'ya, oradan da pozitivizm hevesiyle sosyal bilimlere sıçramıştır. İnsanın (veya herhangi bir canlının) doğası olduğunu iddia edebilmek, yani tüm çevresel etkilere karşın değişmeden kalabilecek bir özünün olabilmesi için "Tanrı" benzeri bir figürün savunulması gerekir, aksi hâlde o değişmez özü oraya kimin koyduğu, değişmezliğin nasıl mümkün olduğu açıklanamaz. Pareto da bu temelsiz temeli (!) kullanarak evrensel bir siyasal analize girişme niyetindedir.

İnsan doğasının varlığı bir kez kabul edildikten sonra tüm insanların mantıklarıyla değil duygularıyla hareket ettiği iddia edilir. Pareto'ya göre iktisadî krizlerin iktisat-dışı sebeplerinden biri de insan psikolojisinin bu sorunlu yanıdır. Duyguyla hareket etmek insan doğasının bir parçasıdır ve gerçeklerin var oldukları biçimiyle analiz edilmesini engellemektedir (gerçek fenomen ile öznel fenomen arasındaki uyuşmazlık). Duygular karar vermede asıl belirleyicidir, mantıksal açıklamalar sonradan (a posteriori), sırf meşrulaştırmak için getirilir. İnsandaki bu duygusal temel, tarihteki değişimlerin sebebini oluşturur: Duygular değiştiği için tarih tek düze gitmez, dalgalanır.

Pareto'nun insan doğası, genel ve öznel fenomen ve duygusallık kavramlarıyla kurduğu ilk kısım, sosyoloji kuramını oluşturur. Tarihin anlamlandırılmasında seçkinlere neden odaklanmak gerektiği de aslında buradan türetilir: Tarihin akışına etki edenler aslında sıradan insan çoklukları değildir, aksine, sayıları az ama sahip oldukları bilgisel/ekonomik/siyasal etkileri (yani güçleri) fazla olan seçkinler (ita. aristocrazia) bunu gerçekleştirirler. Pareto, gerçek ile bireysel algı arasında kopukluk olduğu, yani insan zihni gerçekliği kırılmalarla aktardığından, tarihsel değişimlerin de halk kitleleri eliyle gerçekleştiği algısının olduğunu söyler ve siyasal analizin merkezine bu epistemolojik hareketler seçkinleri oturtur. Burada iki Cermen düşünürün etkileri görülür: İlki Nietzsche'dir, zira yükselmekte olan seçkinler kendilerini adeta bir köle ahlâkıyla acizlerin tarafına atar, onların güçlerinden faydalanarak davalarının evrensel olduğunu iddia ederler (söylemsel düzey) ama mücadele bittiğinde, oligarşinin tunç kanunu devreye girmişçesine eski seçkinci düzen tekrar kurulur, sadece oyuncular farklıdır. Eski ile yeni seçkinler arasındaki yer değişmece aslında Freud'un Oedipus karmaşasında dile getirdiği "baba katli"nin bir türevidir: Oğullar (yükselmekte olan seçkinler), iktidarından korktukları babalarını (eski seçkinleri) öldürür sonra da aynı iktidarı taklit ederek babaları gibi olurlar (pratik düzey), sıradan insanları tıpkı eskilerin yaptığı gibi sömürmeye devam ederler.

Pareto'nun demokrasiye ve hatta sosyalizme dair görüşlerini de bu basit analizden türetmek kolay olacaktır: Kendisinin de ifade ettiği gibi, sosyalizm hem başarılı hem de başarısız olacaktır, çünkü evrensel kurtuluşu vaat eden sosyalist hareket arkasına aldığı insan gücüyle ve "insan hakları" vb. söylemlerle burjuvaziyi (eski seçkinleri) yumuşatarak tahtından edecektir ama aynı zamanda başarısız olacaktır, zira devrim bir kez gerçekleştiğinde sosyalist mücadeleye öncülük edenler, yani sosyalist seçkinler bütün siyasal eşitlik vaatlerini kaldırıp atmış olurlar, artık eşit değildirler, karar alma mekanizmalarının merkezine oturmuşlardır. Benzer bir süreç demokraside de gerçekleşir ama bunun detayları için "Demokrasinin Dönüşümü" eserine bakmak gerekir.

Görüleceği üzere Pareto'nun temellendirmeleri ve çıkarımları pek çok boşlukla maluldür, kanıtlaması gereken şeyleri varsayarak hareket etmekte, özellikle sosyalizm analizinde temel noktaları kaçırmaktadır. Yine de bir muhafazakâr olarak, mevcut sistemlerin boşluklarına ve tehlikelerine işaret etme konusunda romantik bir demokrat ya da sosyalistten çok daha gerçekçi hareket etmekte, sınıfsız bir toplumun hayallerini kuran her okuyucunun düşmandan bir şeyler öğrenmesini sağlamaktadır.

[Terese · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very good, short, essay that feels very relevant still. Perhaps not groundbreaking or new, but still worth contemplating.

In essence, one of Pareto's main points is that sentiments are a priori, while reasons are a posteriori, yet, people generally claim the reverse.

He links this to what he calls a "religious wave" that one can see throughout history, going back to Ancient Rome becoming Christian. A religious sentiment sweeps society, this is seen in both actual religious movements (different ones) and political ideologies (which have a similar function of providing meaning and group adherence for people). For Pareto the actual "winner" of the culmination of such a religious wave, say Christianity becoming the state religion, is secondary to the sentiment/religious wave itself. Basically, religion A might "win", but it could have been religion or belief B just as well, and while the consequences are not entirely interchangeable, the after effects are less pivotal to understand the shift itself than are the popular sentiments which stirred the movement in the first place.

This is also why we can see in either religion or politics that someone who says "I support, e.g., politician X because he proclaims/espouses reasons A and B", will not be swayed if it is proved that X does not support A and B, and even if X acts contrarian to reasons A and B. The believer/follower will then simply shift their reasons to reasons C and D and continue to support X, because it was never the reasons that formed the ultimate basis for the support, but rather the sentiments which then latched on to reasons as a justification.

Generally people convince themselves of the a priori status of their reasons, hence they are not really lying when they are sharing it with others, but worse, they have lied themselves into a hard conviction that is hard to break free from.

The religious wave, as mentioned, can be both religious in nature, but also political. Which is what makes it eternally apropos. It also underlines how these things are generally "popular" as in moves through the popular masses and brings about a shift in elites as the old grow stagnant, while new manage to gather the sentiments of discontent and hope of renewal to themselves (for a while).

It also speaks to how the old elites, when threatened, react and become reactive.

All in all, a short but fairly dense read. Recommended.

[Sema · Rating 5 out of 5]

Sosyolojik bağlamda günümüz Türkiye siyasi ortamını okumaya çok yardımcı olabilecek bir eser. Pareto'nun bu kadar iyi öngörülerde ve çözümlemelerde bulunması diğer sosyal bilimcilerden daha az meşhur olması bakımından şaşırtıcı.

[Mikael Heydt · Rating 4 out of 5]

A few of Pareto's arguments, analysis, and attitudes were rendered wrong and outdated just by the Russian revolution and WW1, but these were mostly side arguments that just didn't age well. His central thesis and arguments are solid otherwise.

[Emre · Rating 5 out of 5]

Siyaset sosyolojisi için klasik metinlerden biri.

[Yalin · Rating 5 out of 5]

This essay of Pareto is a cornerstone work of elite sociology and analysis, which I would recommend to all who are interested in getting more involved with the field.

[Florian · Rating 4 out of 5]

un uomo che, nell'ingenuità e nel rigore, è caduto vittima nella sua stessa crociata ideologica.

[noblethumos · Rating 5 out of 5]

Vilfredo Pareto's "The Rise and Fall of the Elites" stands as a classic work in sociology and political theory, providing a penetrating analysis of power dynamics within societies. Pareto explores the formation, ascent, and decline of ruling elites, examining the underlying social and psychological factors that contribute to their rise and fall. This review aims to provide an academic evaluation of Pareto's arguments, discussing the book's strengths, weaknesses, and its significance within the field of social theory.


"The Rise and Fall of the Elites" by Vilfredo Pareto offers a critical examination of the dynamics of power and the ruling elite within societies. Pareto analyzes the forces that shape the composition of elites, focusing on the interplay between social classes, psychological traits, and the distribution of power. He argues that elites are formed through a combination of economic, political, and intellectual factors, and their ascent to power is often marked by a consolidation of resources and a manipulation of social dynamics. However, Pareto suggests that elites ultimately face internal contradictions and conflicts that contribute to their downfall, leading to the rise of new ruling classes.

Pareto's work stands out for its rigorous analysis of power relations and its emphasis on the role of individuals within the elite structure. He introduces the concept of "circulation of elites," highlighting how the rise and fall of ruling classes is influenced by factors such as meritocracy, nepotism, and the interplay of different psychological types. Pareto's examination of social stratification and elite formation offers insights into the complexities of power dynamics, challenging prevailing assumptions about social order and the stability of ruling classes.


One of the notable strengths of "The Rise and Fall of the Elites" lies in Pareto's ability to provide a comprehensive framework for understanding power relations within societies. His multidimensional analysis, drawing upon sociology, psychology, and political theory, contributes to a nuanced understanding of elite dynamics. Pareto's exploration of the interplay between economic interests, political maneuvering, and psychological factors offers valuable insights into the complexities of power structures and their implications for social stability.

Furthermore, Pareto's emphasis on the psychological traits of individuals within the ruling elite provides a unique perspective on power dynamics. By examining the motivations, ambitions, and behavioral patterns of elite members, he offers a deeper understanding of the mechanisms through which elites maintain their dominance and the internal tensions that contribute to their downfall.


While "The Rise and Fall of the Elites" presents a compelling analysis, it is not without its limitations. Some critics argue that Pareto's analysis focuses primarily on historical and anecdotal evidence, which may limit the generalizability of his arguments. A more systematic and empirical approach could strengthen the book's theoretical foundations and enhance its applicability to diverse social contexts.

Additionally, Pareto's work has been subject to criticism for its pessimistic and deterministic view of social change. Some argue that his analysis overlooks the agency of social actors and the potential for transformative action to challenge and reshape power structures. A more nuanced consideration of collective agency and social movements could enrich the book's analysis of elite dynamics and their relationship with broader societal changes.


"The Rise and Fall of the Elites" holds significant importance within the field of social theory for its examination of power dynamics and the formation of ruling classes. Pareto's analysis challenges traditional notions of social order and provides a framework for understanding the complexities of elite power. The book's contribution lies in its ability to stimulate critical reflections on the dynamics of power, social inequality, and the role of individuals within the elite structure.

GPT

[Daria · Rating 4 out of 5]

e 'l fiorentino spirito bizzarro
in sé medesmo si volvea co' denti

[Ioana · Rating 3 out of 5]

The salvageable idea of this book is that people act based on feelings, not on reason.
In the tradition of Heraclitus, Pareto is convinced that everything decays, and leading classes also. Somehow, they become too kind, too liberal, even vegetarian (!), and they lose their elan vital and fall victim to another — surprise — class. That apparently happened to the aristocracy during the French Revolution, and it has become now the fate of the bourgeoisie. The ongoing conflict is between bourgeoisie and socialists. Socialists bring forward such ideas like solidarity, saving the poor, while the bourgeois might use such ideas in order to bring home some public contracts.
Poverty is presented as a dehumanising state, out of which not even the kindness of the rich can extract one.

[Rippole]

GHFH

[Damla · Rating 3 out of 5]

bazı kitaplara başlarken kuramlara karşı önyargılı olmamak gerekiyor sanırım. farklı bir bakış açısı.

[Bahtiyar Bayrak]

“İlk olarak, insan eylemlerinin büyük bir kısmının kökeninde mantıksal düşünme değil duygunun yer aldığına dikkat çekebiliriz. Ekonomik olarak güdülenmemiş eylemler için genellikle bu doğrudur. Özellikle ticaret ve endüstri ile ilgili ekonomik faaliyetler için bunun aksi söylenebilir. İnsan akıl dışı güdülerle hareket etmeye itilse de eylemlerini mantıksal olarak belli bazı ilkelere bağlamaktan hoşlanır ve bu yüzden kendi eylemlerinin doğruluğunu meşrulaştırmak için bu prensipleri a posteriori olarak kabul eder. Böylece gerçekten B nedeninin sonucu olan A eylemi, onun sahibi tarafından genel bir hayali C nedeninin sonucu olarak gösterilir. Böylece diğer insanları aldatan kişi öncelikle kendini aldatır ve kendi savlarına kesin olarak inanır.” sayfa:27