_Imperial Grunts_ by Robert D. Kaplan is a brilliant and fascinating look at the American military's deployment in countries throughout the world today. Given how wide that deployment is (particularly thanks to the war on terror), the increasingly decentralized nature of command, and the impact individual units and even soldiers can have worldwide thanks to the global media, Kaplan felt it important to tell the stories of soldiers "from the ground up, at the point of contact." He was fascinated by just how important the actions of the "lowliest corporals and privates" could be even at the strategic level. Also, he was interested in how the U.S. was able to regulate and monitor an often chaotic world without large-scale wars and with only a minimal number of troops on the ground. Part military and political analysis and part travelogue, Kaplan visited American forces in Yemen, Colombia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Afghanistan, eastern Africa, and Iraq, embedding with American Special Forces and U.S. Marines.
Many factors necessitate often tiny American presences abroad. Congress has in the past passed legislation limiting the number of soldiers that can be present in a country at one time, leery of an uncontrolled escalation of forces and an unending commitment to a foreign conflict. The Pentagon (which many of those in Special Forces that Kaplan interviewed derisively called "Big Army") was itself leery of American causalities, hoping to limit that by deploying only small numbers of troops. Troop numbers can also be limited by the host country, often concerned about how such a presence would appear domestically and internationally.
So what could such small forces hope to accomplish overseas, particularly when one is discussing groups as small as 12 men or even single individuals? The United States sought to maintain order worldwide not through conquest but through the training of local armies. In fact the original point of the Green Berets (and still their main job today) is to infiltrate a region and train the local indigenous people, the military if the nation is friendly, the rebels or insurgents if they are American allies instead.
By training these armies, generally the elite units of these armies (and also training their trainers), several things are hopefully accomplished. A web or "empire of behind-the-scene relationships" is hopefully formed, cadres of American-influenced and American-friendly troops in troubled nations throughout the world, more amenable to the U.S. and its foreign policy, more professional and effective, and a point of access for U.S. policymakers. These American trained units can be "motors for change;" as a national army is essentially impossible to reform without widespread social and cultural change, the only hope to start change is to reform a military's elite units using America's own elite units.
Such actions have a long history. The frontier borders of empires have long been held by small numbers of lightly armed militias and friendly tribal auxiliaries; one need only look at the Roman Empire and it German troops, the British experience in what would be northern Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the American experience with the Native Americans in the Old West and in the southern Philippines against the Moros.
Additionally, these elite units often end up acting like "Peace Corps with guns," helping dig wells, build schools, treat sick people and even animals. By such actions, the U.S. hopes to win "hearts and minds," cultivate local intelligence sources, and undercut the propaganda and political and material appeal of enemies like Abu Sayyaf.
If the primary tool of imperialism was training local armies, the primary responsibility was to "grapple with countries that weren't really countries" and to contend with "the unwieldy process of modernization itself." Yemen was hardly united; the imposition of central authority hindered by rugged terrain, a 3,000 year legacy of separate Yemeni kingdoms, and "the anarchistic trinity of family, village, and tribe." Colombia was less a country "than a series of fortified city-states," perched 8,000 feet up in the mountains, "surrounded by ungovernable...tropical lowlands," dominated by anti-government narcoterrorists. The Philippines he wrote was basically the island of Luzon, with Mindanao and the various islands and island groups mere possessions, many of which were Islamic lands in a poorly-governed Christian-run nation, a series of remote, "poor, shantyish, unpoliceable islands" that formed with Malaysia and Indonesia a vast interconnected archipelago that was virtually ungovernable. Afghanistan never really was a true nation-state, as it best it existed only as a few major cities and towns and the roads connecting them, much like Yemen, its citizens were another "unreconstructed people of the mountains and high plains who had never been successfully colonized." Even under Saddam Hussein Iraq had a difficult time with central government, as the Iraqi dictator had to both coerce and co-opt local tribal leaders, particularly in Iraq's "sprawling, hard-to-control desert badlands."
Kaplan was enormously impressed with the American soldiers he found on the ground, finding time and again that they were dedicated, hard-working, intelligent men and women who loved their job.
Kaplan did however find problems. He found the bureaucracy of "Big Army" too stifling, top-heavy, and not conducive to quick operations, delaying so much at times on approving missions that they were diluted of any real impact. He felt it was too bound by regulations, not allowing for local leaders and troops on the spot to make the decisions that they needed to make and to blend with the culture (he mentioned the beards that many Special Forces grew to blend in in Afghanistan, something that really bothered "Big Army"). He felt that the American military was in many ways still geared up to fight World War II and the Korean War again, not the current reality of low-intensity, inconclusive conflicts. American forces needed to learn more community policing skills (such as crowd control and cultivating snitches). Rules of engagement could be too strict as well, which instead of making troops safer could make them more vulnerable. He found the lack of linguistic skills appalling and woefully in need of improvement.