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Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy
Colin Gray presents an inventive treatise on the nature of strategy, war, and peace, organized around forty maxims. This collection of mini essays will forearm politicians, soldiers, and the attentive general public against many―probably most― fallacies that abound in contemporary debates about war, peace, and security. While one can never guarantee strategic success, which depends on policy, military prowess, and the quality of the dialogue between the two, a strategic education led by the judgments in these maxims increases the chances that one’s errors will be small rather than catastrophic.
The maxims are grouped according to five clusters. “War and Peace” tackles the larger issues of strategic history that drive the demand for the services of strategic thought and practice. “Strategy” presses further, into the realm of strategic behavior, and serves as a bridge between the political focus of part one and the military concerns that follow. “Military Power and Warfare” turns to the pragmatic business of military operations, tactics, and logistics. Part four, “Security and Insecurity,” examines why strategy is important, including a discussion of the nature, dynamic character, and functioning of world politics. Finally, “History and the Future” is meant to help strategists better understand the processes of historical change.
The maxims are grouped according to five clusters. “War and Peace” tackles the larger issues of strategic history that drive the demand for the services of strategic thought and practice. “Strategy” presses further, into the realm of strategic behavior, and serves as a bridge between the political focus of part one and the military concerns that follow. “Military Power and Warfare” turns to the pragmatic business of military operations, tactics, and logistics. Part four, “Security and Insecurity,” examines why strategy is important, including a discussion of the nature, dynamic character, and functioning of world politics. Finally, “History and the Future” is meant to help strategists better understand the processes of historical change.
208 pages, Paperback
First published April 30, 2007
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About the author
Colin S. Gray
95 books73 followersColin S. Gray was a British-American strategic thinker and professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, where he was the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies. In addition, he was a Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy.
Gray was educated at the University of Manchester and the University of Oxford. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute, before founding the National Institute for Public Policy in Washington, D.C. He also served as a defense adviser both to the British and U.S. governments. Gray served from 1982 until 1987 in the Reagan Administration's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Furthermore, he taught at the University of Hull, the University of Lancaster, York University, Toronto and University of British Columbia. Gray published 23 books on military history and strategic studies, as well as numerous articles.
Gray was educated at the University of Manchester and the University of Oxford. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute, before founding the National Institute for Public Policy in Washington, D.C. He also served as a defense adviser both to the British and U.S. governments. Gray served from 1982 until 1987 in the Reagan Administration's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Furthermore, he taught at the University of Hull, the University of Lancaster, York University, Toronto and University of British Columbia. Gray published 23 books on military history and strategic studies, as well as numerous articles.
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
October 30, 2012
Gray's writings on strategy provide us the realistic look at how nations use peaceful and military coercion to achieve national policies. His perspectives stand outside the narrow confines of journalists and public political debate. The 40 maxims on strategy, war, and peace allow us to peer around the blinds thrown up by political rhetoric and the media's creation of the news to see the truer cause of contemporary events and how the lessons of the past always apply to the present. Gray's axions are the currents underneath the flow of international relations.
December 21, 2020
There were some good points in Fighting Talk which I shall mention, but unfortunately the book is devestated by it's author's lack of knowledge. Colin Gray's fails to consult with experts from fields in which he has made bold, unscientific, and even ahistorical claims.
To our benefit, Mr Gray makes useful analogy to Strategists being the "bridge" between policy and the battlespace. Maxim 15 also innovatively realizes the effect of the Military-Industrial Complex (though he is unfamiliar with the concept itself) and it's effect of watering down military academia.
But in failing to consult with experts before making claims on Psychology, Sociology, and Anthropology, Colin Gray fails to live up to his potential. The result is unscientific claims about human nature, individual motives, societal motives, diplomacy, and genetics (he is of the dangerously unscientific view that a nation's "gene pool" influences it's stock of capable strategists)
It leads also to his ahistorical claims on Vietnam and most Islamic countries. At one point, while referring to the Resistance War Against America (Vietnam) he claims that the United States was fighting "for a noble cause". He is deathly afraid of Islam, failing to make the connection between overaggressive US foreign policy through the 20th century, and 21st century extremism.
By failing to consult with experts, Colin Gray limits Fighting Talk to his own limited worldview, a worldview that is entirely Westernized, and localized to the epoch in which he has developed. By limiting himself in this way, he is incapable of noticing the development of the Military-Industrial Complex, and how that would influence his own thoughts on appropriate military spending. As a product of the MIC, Gray advocated for $527 billion in military spending in 2007. It is now 2020, the US now spends $686 billion as a result of such lack of historical perspective. Limited by his blind nationalism and lack of historical perspective, Gray repeatedly labels any small inconvenience to the Military-Industrial Complex as a major threat to world peace. This goes so far, that in Maxim 33, the author makes four categories of national interests: Survival, Vital, Major, and Other. Human rights, such as to bread, life, shelter, he files under category 4: Other.
To our benefit, Mr Gray makes useful analogy to Strategists being the "bridge" between policy and the battlespace. Maxim 15 also innovatively realizes the effect of the Military-Industrial Complex (though he is unfamiliar with the concept itself) and it's effect of watering down military academia.
But in failing to consult with experts before making claims on Psychology, Sociology, and Anthropology, Colin Gray fails to live up to his potential. The result is unscientific claims about human nature, individual motives, societal motives, diplomacy, and genetics (he is of the dangerously unscientific view that a nation's "gene pool" influences it's stock of capable strategists)
It leads also to his ahistorical claims on Vietnam and most Islamic countries. At one point, while referring to the Resistance War Against America (Vietnam) he claims that the United States was fighting "for a noble cause". He is deathly afraid of Islam, failing to make the connection between overaggressive US foreign policy through the 20th century, and 21st century extremism.
By failing to consult with experts, Colin Gray limits Fighting Talk to his own limited worldview, a worldview that is entirely Westernized, and localized to the epoch in which he has developed. By limiting himself in this way, he is incapable of noticing the development of the Military-Industrial Complex, and how that would influence his own thoughts on appropriate military spending. As a product of the MIC, Gray advocated for $527 billion in military spending in 2007. It is now 2020, the US now spends $686 billion as a result of such lack of historical perspective. Limited by his blind nationalism and lack of historical perspective, Gray repeatedly labels any small inconvenience to the Military-Industrial Complex as a major threat to world peace. This goes so far, that in Maxim 33, the author makes four categories of national interests: Survival, Vital, Major, and Other. Human rights, such as to bread, life, shelter, he files under category 4: Other.
August 31, 2014
Gray is the modern day Clauswitz, to whom he pays great homage. This is a short book, consisting of 40 maxims on war, peace and strategy defined and described by Gray, each with a short essay explaining the immutable significance and application of the maxim with historical examples and compelling reasoning. As you read it, and contemplate events, policies and results around the world, you will have many "aha!" moments. Gray's perceptive, incisive and historically substantiated arguments and dicta gives the reader insights into what is happening, why and why it is or is not working. This book should be a constant reference among our governing leadership and policy-makers... sadly it clearly is not. Hopefully reading this short collection of maxims will induce you to seek out Gray's more expansive and substantive books - I would strongly recommend "Another Bloody Century" as the starting choice... why the next hundred years is not going to be any different the last hundred, or the centuries before that. Fascinating - an epiphany of erudition, history and strategic scholarship by one of the best.
April 7, 2017
I'm with Dad and some of the other reviewers who applauded Gray's effort to reduce his 30-plus years of experience as a strategist and social scientist to produce these thoughtful and incisive maxims. Indeed, there were many "Aha!" moments, notable for me the quick takedown the author performs on the arms control field.
December 30, 2021
Useful maxims. While Napoleon’s maxims are technique centric, and thus confined by time, Gray’s provide a framework for thinking about and practicing the art of strategy, war, and peace.
November 20, 2017
Although this book barely exceeds 160 pages (not including notes), it is nevertheless packed with distilled wisdom and insights on the topics located in its subtitle: war, peace, and strategy. Gray abjures the platitudes and pieties common in this domain and leads us almost effortlessly to a greater understanding of these important subjects. Read as a primer, a reminder, or a deeper understanding of war, peace, and strategy, this multi-dimensional work cannot fail to educate and entertain. Although Gray's prose can be a bit clunky, it is clear to me that he chooses his words with care to make his points and, in my view, he succeeds. Recommended.
May 2, 2023
Good book overall! Great style, good use of case studies, and concise essays throughout
But the thing with modern military strategy texts in general is that they inevitably end up converging into the same principles and ideas
You might want to read this book in order to skip other ones
But the thing with modern military strategy texts in general is that they inevitably end up converging into the same principles and ideas
You might want to read this book in order to skip other ones
July 5, 2024
Fantastic summation of strategic issues, boiled down to forty maxims, each explained in two pages. Must read for strategic leaders and anyone trying to understand the complexity and contradictory nature of war, peace, and strategic issues.
May 10, 2018
A thought provoking book for somebody trying to understand strategy and world events.
February 28, 2020
Foundational. Outstanding.
October 20, 2020
Great book for reading in short bursts.
40 maxims - most of which are no Brainers- all of which are delivered in a great manner for reinforcing basic truths of strategy.
40 maxims - most of which are no Brainers- all of which are delivered in a great manner for reinforcing basic truths of strategy.
January 15, 2017
Collin Gray, one of the most formidable contemporary strategic thinkers, presents 40 digestible and insightful essays on strategy, historical perspectives on that subject, peace, and war. These essays, in aggregate, weave together a powerful narrative to aid the reader and policy makers navigate the strategic landscape. Highly recommend for policy makers, strategists and those in the military.
August 17, 2021
An exceptional work by a master strategist, with decades of wisdom (drawn from millennia of material) distilled into a very concentrated volume. Dense- not a fast read, despite its brevity- but very enlightening
July 12, 2015
A bit heavy at times, but the manner in which the content is presented makes getting through the book pretty easy. A good read. Informative...
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews