The relationship between Germany and Russia is Europe’s most important link with the largest country on the continent. But despite Germany’s unparalleled knowledge and historical experience, its policymakers struggle to accept that Moscow’s efforts to rebalance Europe at the cost of the cohesion of the EU and NATO are an attack on Germany’s core interests. This book explains the scale of the challenge facing Germany in managing relations with a changing Russia. It analyses how successive German governments from 1991 to 2014 misread Russian intentions, until Angela Merkel sharply recalibrated German and EU policy towards Moscow. The book also examines what lies behind efforts to revise Merkel’s bold policy shift, including attitudes inherited from the GDR and the role of Russian influence channels in Germany.
When I asked for an explanation for Germany's fuzzy politics towards Russia and Ukraine, somebody recommended this book. And it was a real eye opener. Most of the things Lough strings together to form his theory about Germany's Russia Problem aren't exactly new, when you read the news, but Lough forms a coherent picture out of this mess. I especially liked his psycho-socio-historical approach, that gives him a good framework to describe and explain this very german mixture of straightforward economic interest politics and high flying ideas about Wandel durch Handel etc. I highly recommend it.
Zusammen mit Daniel Yergins "The New Map" die perfekte Kombination, um die Ukraine-Krise aus der Sicht deutscher Politik zu verstehen. Deutschlands "Russland Problem" beschäftigt (und frustriert) mich schon länger. John Lough liefert eine Mehrzahl von Gründen für das naive Verhältnis der deutschen "Elite" zu Russland, und wie die dadurch entstandenen Illusionen ab 2014 (viel zu spät) an der Realität scheiterten. Auch oder gerade die geschichtliche Perspektive der deutsch-russischen Beziehungen, die im frühen 16. Jahrhundert beginnt und im 19. Jahrhundert intensiviert wird, und für die Einstellung zu Russland noch heute eine Rolle spielt, ist lesenswert.
Germany has long occupied the proverbial "middle" of Europe, based on its geography, its postwar political stability and moderating influence on the EU, and its ambivalence between being Western and being Middle European. John Lough teases out Germany's stance with the USSR and Russia since 1945, highlighting the challenges Germany has faced in the aftermath of Russia's emergence as an authoritarian state on Putin bent on catching the EU and NATO off-balance and strengthening its own security corridor.
Germany occupies such a central place in European-Russian relations because of its economic ties to Moscow. While Lough finds that Germany's economic ties with Russia are often overstated, there is no doubting that Germany and Russia are bound together by Germany's appetite for natural gas and Russia's abundance in that product, symbolized by the Nord Stream pipeline saga.
Lough makes a convincing case that Germany needs to slough off its Cold War allusions and gratitude to Russia for allowing Germany to re-unify in 1990, and instead approach Russia as an antagonistic power that, rather than embracing Europe, is trying to undermine it. Alas, there seems to be an imbalance: as much as Germany, and the rest of Europe, want to stand against Russian aggression, no power on the continent seems ready to commit the money, men and potential blood to defend such principles. Russia seems ever more poised to expend exactly that in its quest for national regeneration.
Geras skaitymas siekinat suprasti, iš kur atsiranda tokie santykiai tarp Vokietijos ir Rusijos. Istoriškai susiklostė, kad vokiečiai turėjo labai daug įtakos Rusijai. Dabartinė santykių tarp šių valstybių raida pilna nesusipratimų ir neaiškumų. Iš Rusijos pusės tai - ciniškumas ir visiškas nesiskaitymas. Iš Vokietijos pusės - ištisinis situacijos Rusijoje ir aplink Rusiją blogas nuskaitymas. Panašu, kad visa tai sąlygoja kažkoks sunkiai paaiškinamas kaltės jausmas ar gal net pastovus noras nuolat užlipti ant to paties grėblio. Kokia galima tendencija ateityje turint omeny tokias apraiškas? Paskitykite apie tai šioje knygoje.
Essential reading for anyone who, like me, has often found themselves puzzled by Germany's rhetoric and rationale in dealing with Russia over the past few years. Despite the changed context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine - the book was published in 2021 - the eleven assumptions that should stand central in German (and, frankly, European) policy thinking on Russia presented in the book's final chapter remain very relevant.
Hyvä peruskattaus. Lukujen lopussa hyvät yhteenvedot teemoista. Mutta jostain syystä jäi vaikutelma, ettei niin paljon isoja uusia tietoja, enempi tarkennuksia. Ehkä asiaa on käsitelty nyt niin paljon, että antaa väärän vaikutelman pohjatiedoista.
An eye opener. If this book would have been available, and the German leadership would have read it in 2014, the world may have looked different today.