Russia Against Napoleon, written by Dominic Lieven, himself a Russian of Baltic German lineage, with an ancestor who served the Czar during this epic, stands as the best look at the Russian Empire during the Napoleonic Wars.
Although there is a section devoted to the background of the French Revolutionary Wars, and Russia’s involvement in them, Lieven is primarily concerned with the Russian role from 1810 onwards. As such, even the period of 1805-1807, when the Russians were very active, but who faced a series of either disastrous defeats at the hands of the French, or won bloody, pyrrhic victories that at best were stalemates, gets only a brief summary. However, the Russians would learn from their mistakes, and their defeats, and would reform their armed forces to make them capable of standing firm against their foes once again.
It’s at this point that I had my first disagreement with Lieven’s tome.
It’s fanciful to portray the French as nearly invincible in the period from 1804-1807, rather than what they really were, which is simply really good at the business of war.
This was an army that had a very recent heritage of near total warfare during the Revolutionary Wars, had won just as many battles as they had lost, and for better or worse (considering the means of doing so), the more capable officers had risen to the top. During these conflicts, the French fought most of Europe, and the Revolution had survived largely on the force of their bayonets.
When Napoleon’s coup effectively ended the Revolution, and reformed it back to a more conservative, normal, (though not fully) European autocratic system, Napoleon also codified the lessons learned during this period, and implemented new ones, as well as codifying older theories that Napoleon found highly superior to any methods then, currently, in play in other European armies. The result was a marvelous weapon of war, that would be unleashed as a first strike weapon, once a Coalition was formed against France, and Napoleon realized that diplomacy was useless.
However, it is usually here that all of the European armies are denigrated as next to useless in comparison to Napoleon’s forces.
And it is here that Lieven, though not fully carrying into this line of thought, does stray into these mythological waters.
The Russians in particular performed superbly against the French during this period, Austerlitz notwithstanding. Austerlitz was, indeed, a catastrophic defeat. But it had less to do with innate Russian, systemic, military ineptness, than it did both the quality of the French Army, the French superior maneuverability and more rapid command and control system, Napoleon’s genius certainly, but also Czar Alexander’s ceaseless battlefield meddling.
At Austerlitz, the Czar’s eager, and well intentioned, meddling into the tactics of the grand battle, did nothing but to muddy the Allied command and control apparatus, and therefore slowed down both Russian and Austrian response times.
Too many of those who are beholden to the mythical status of La Grande Armée focus almost exclusively upon Austerlitz when judging the quality of the Czarist Army. In doing so they ignore the achievements of the Russians in Poland a year later.
In late 1806 through the first half of 1807, the Russians waged a brilliant campaign in Poland that delivered Napoleon's first, qualified, setback at the brutal Battle of Eylau. In all of the engagements during the sprawling Polish Campaign, which had numerous minor engagements and set piece battles, and sieges, the Russians gave as good as they got.
And more than once, the Russians delivered a humbling trouncing to the French. However, their luck ran out and Napoleon caught them making a very unwise offensive while crossing a river, at Friedland.
Napoleon's crushing victory at Friedland, at least in part, made up for the frustrations of the last half year, and forced Czar Alexander's advisors to pressure the Czar to agree to discuss terms of peace with Napoleon. In all of this, while Lieven doesn't go quite as far as denigrating the Russian performance, as many military historians have, he does, however, not go far enough, in my estimation, in pointing out that even in his glory years, the Russians were Napoleon's toughest opponents.
This is largely due to the fact that the Russian Army was already a very good army, easily the best of the Ancien Regime armies of Europe.
While many of Czar Paul's pro-Prussian reforms were undone by many in the Russian Army hierarchy who were highly uncomfortable with too much Germanic influence in their organization (a source of internal tension that will be discussed frequently in this tome), the legacy of the training and standards of fitness that Paul's reforms initially set stayed with the Army.
And as events would soon prove, by 1810, this professional standard set by Paul's reforms would do the Russian Army tremendous good and blessings.
Following Lieven's summary of the events leading up to 1810 and '11, Lieven spends a great deal of time discussing the political and strategic situation that Czar Alexander had to deal with. This included the economic chaos that Napoleon's Continental System brought to Russia internally, the rapidly fraying relations between Emperor and Czar, and the external threats which lead to open warfare with both Sweden and the Ottoman Empire.
During this discussion, which goes into some detail, Lieven spends some time discussing the strategic situation of the French, and this section of the book is a very important one as it further bursts some long standing myths of the Napoleonic era, especially regarding Napoleon himself.
Liven does not fall into the school of thought that Napoleon was an "antichrist", or "The Ogre" (he even showcases the Orthodox Church's waffling stance on Napoleon, depending upon the Czarist mood toward Napoleon at the time), but neither is he a Napoleon enthusiast. He isn't afraid to burst some myths that have seeped into the English language historiography of the period, both about Napoleon, but also about Russia, but he also doesn't give The Emperor a clean slate, either.
As Lieven stresses, Napoleon had no desire whatsoever to conquer Russia (as some still like to say, entirely sans basis in fact), nor did he view the Russians as a natural enemy of France. Throughout the epoch in question, one nation, and one nation only, was Napoleon's, and France's, bête noir: Great Britain.
Lieven points out to the reader, as many more historians are beginning to stress now as well, that the Napoleonic Wars were, in effect, the climax of what has come to be known as: The Second Hundred Years War. Napoleon's own grand strategic designs must be viewed from the prism of this larger, long standing, conflict between two, global, colonial, and Mercantile empires.
It would be conflict over the status of the island of Malta, and the leadership of the Knights of Saint John (whom Napoleon hoped would become a protectorate of the Czar, keeping British presence in the Mediterranean balanced by adding a strategic Russian presence, which Napoleon hoped would be a source of arbitration between the competing French and British interests), which would force London to abrogate the Treaty of Amiens in 1803, and eventually lead to the War of the Third Coalition.
The great Battle of Austerlitz, in Bohemia, would be the culmination of Napoleon's first strike against a Coalition which was already making moves against France, to strategically encircle her, and which had already invaded a sovereign kingdom in Bavaria.
Rather than wait for the Coalition forces to invade France, Napoleon decided to bring the battle to them, and to force the, very long standing (as in centuries) French strategic imperative of enforcing French hegemony over Germany and German destiny.
The brief conquest of Prussia was provoked by further British conniving to build yet another Coalition against Napoleon (despite French peace overtures to London), and which saw the Russians forced to engage Napoleon in Poland, rather than Germany as was their original intent.
Despite doing, extremely, well against Napoleon in Poland, the Russian defeat at Friedland was catastrophic enough to force Czar Alexander to meet Napoleon himself on a raft on the Nieman River outside Tilsit.
And it should be noted that both men hit it off quite well and it would be poor Prussia who would face all of the negativity of the Treaty.
In fact, despite waging a desperately bloody campaign so recently, Napoleon magnanimously enlarged Russian territories and treasure, and while it was clearly done in a desperate bid to bind St. Petersburg to Napoleon's Imperial interests (which were, entirely, based upon waging a global war against the British Empire, and in fulfilling France's long standing, Bourbon, grand strategy of securing French hegemony over the German states), Lieven points out that Napoleon himself was genuine in his enthusiasm for the new alliance. In fact, Napoleon would be more than just a bit of a Russophile, and would consciously try to keep the Czar in his good graces.
Unfortunately, this was simply an impossibility.
First of all, the biggest block to a longstanding, Franco-Russian Alliance was Napoleon's own Continental System. Designed to starve the British economically by depriving the British of trade with the continent of Europe (it was, as Lieven points out, only slightly successful), but it was not damaging to the British heavy industry, which is what really counted in the game of nations. Furthermore, it did more harm to Russian, and ironically French, economic interests in the long run.
Obviously, Czar Alexander wasn't going to allow his people to suffer in what he saw as a needless fashion to appease an alliance partner who, as time went on, seemed utterly obsessed with doing anything to harm the British, even if it meant damaging all of Europe in the process. Also, Napoleon failed to take into account Russian interests in Germany, especially in regards to Prussia.
Russia saw itself as the ultimate arbiter of the long standing strategic contest between Berlin and Vienna, and the French strategic imperative of enforcing French hegemony over the whole of the Germanic world (again, not a Napoleonic invention but a native French one), was entirely counter to Russian interests.
Ever since the days of a predatory Sweden and a Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russia has always been highly nervous about affairs in central Europe.
Anything that could impact Russian security in what they see as their buffer zone (which includes Poland) is something that will meet with pushback from St. Petersburg then and Moscow now. Napoleon, for all of his genius, was blind to this.
And his own conflict with Austria in the 1809 War (again, a war that Napoleon did not start, as Lieven points out), only further exacerbated Russian concerns over their buffer zone when Napoleon, again, defeated the Hapsburgs. It didn't help that Napoleon directly went against Czar Alexander's wishes and created the Duchy of Warsaw, a semi-independant Polish state, directly on Russia's borders.
This was not a willy nilly decision on behalf of Napoleon, but one made after a long standing campaign of diplomatic pressure on the behalf of Polish emigres and Polish Nationalists who saw, in Napoleon and the French Empire, their best chance to revive Poland as an independent country. Russia, who saw Poland as part of their natural frontiers (despite Polish feelings to the contrary), and who weren't all too keen on an independent Poland thanks to historical rivalries and tensions dating back a century and a half prior, was needless to say less than thrilled with Napoleon's decision.
One of the final straws for the Czar was Napoleon's actions in Spain in 1808 and 1809.
Although an ally of France for some years, the reigning Bourbon Dynasty in Madrid was highly unpopular both with a large number of the Spanish government, the common people, and Napoleon himself. Much like the Bourbons from France, the Spanish branch of the family was equally as dunderheadedly incompetent, and the Spanish (and Portuguese) violations of the Continental System forced Napoleon to take an active role in the disintegrating Spanish Monarchy.
However, not being unduly impressed with any of the Spanish candidates for King, Napoleon, in a colossal, callously hubristic move, opted for his own brother, Joseph.
Although Joseph would go out of his way to be a good Monarch (as much as Napoleon would allow him any autonomy at all, that is), the simple fact was that Joseph wasn't Spanish, and wasn't Catholic, and therefore his mere presence turned an ally into a mortal enemy. Napoleon's less than brilliant decision was compounded when he decided to occupy the entire Iberian Peninsula, and force the issue, setting off The Peninsular War, and convincing Czar Alexander that Napoleon was out merely to conquer and destroy.
Again, as Lieven, and others, have pointed out, this is a baseless assumption, and an utter misunderstanding of grand strategy and actions of contingency.
Nevertheless, Alexander was convinced, and he determined to make Russia ready for war with Napoleon at some point in the near future. Combined with Russian violations of The Continental System and trade with the British (again, for the good of the Russian people), both Emperors were soon on a cataclysmic collision course.
Lieven's discussion of the Russian preparations for war, as well as the worry that the Ottomans might hold out long enough to tie down a majority of the Russian Army (which came close to happening), is well analyzed, and when one considers that the Russians were outnumbered two to one by the invaders, it's hard not to see why the strategy of trading space for time, and of scorched earth tactics, was adopted.
When Napoleon made the, for him genuinely painful, decision to make war on Russia (Lieven points out that, as a means to both further legitimate his own Dynasty, and to further bond France to Russia, Napoleon had hoped desperately to marry a Romanov [one wonders what Josephine's thoughts on this score would be…]) he had assembled an enormous force drawn from nearly every nation in Europe (barely half of the force was French, with a slight majority of the entire force being non-French forces).
The strategy of falling back, and depriving the European forces of anything logistically viable, despite knowing that it would cause tremendous pain and suffering to the Russian and Ukrainian peoples in the process, was genuinely the only realistic option open to them.
The best of their forces were far away, having only very recently concluded a long and bloody war with the Ottomans in Moldova and the Caucasus, and these forces had to march a huge distance before they could be ready in the zone of operations. Also, falling back would deny Napoleon the swift and decisive victory he needed by forcing a general set piece battle with the main Russian forces.
It's telling that, even despite doing quite well against Napoleon until Friedland in Poland in 1807, the Russians were tremendously nervous over facing him in open battle in 1812.
This also denied to Napoleon the ability to rapidly force a return to the status quo antebellum, which was Napoleon's ultimate war aim, and which, due to Spain, and Napoleon's further dismemberment of the Austrian Empire following victory in 1809, was something Czar Alexander would never accept.
Lieven's discussion of the military events themselves are from an operational and strategic level, and moves along very rapidly. And though he doesn't go into fine detail, it confirms the general tone as portrayed by George Nafziger in his study on the 1812 War between Russia and the Napoleonic Empire.
Tactically the Russians did far better than even, it seems, they're willing to give themselves credit for. The Russian Army, outnumbered and outgunned, waged a brilliant rearguard action that likewise continuously harried Napoleon's supply lines, and inflicted an equal share of losses in every single engagement.
Although The Battle of Smolensk was a European/French victory, it was a pyrrhic one, and the same can be said for Borodino a couple of weeks later. Napoleon was continuously frustrated by being drawn ever deeper into Russia, never his intent as he intended to end the war by the time he reached Minsk. And the further they plunged into Russia, the more their logistical system broke down until it collapsed entirely.
More Europeans would die of malnutrition and the associated diseases then they would Russian arms. And, of course, the winter only aggravated European/French woes.
Following the tossing out of Russia of the Imperial Napoleonic host, Lieven discusses the strategic argument within Alexander's Court. Contrary to popular opinion, the Czar's Court was not of one mind, even with the invasion, in their views on Napoleon.
There were many in St. Petersburg who viewed Great Britain, not Napoleon, and their technocratic, mercantilist empire (their terminology), as the real long term threat to Russia. There was a very large, bare minority, contingent of Czarist advisers who viewed Napoleon and France as a necessary buffer against an ever expanding British Empire which would, undoubtedly, encroach upon Russian interests in Asia and Central Asia as well as the Middle East should Napoleon be ultimately defeated.
Even though their fears would prove incredibly prescient, as history showed, Czar Alexander, and a small enough of a majority saw this as the chance to make Russia the main power and arbiter of European affairs.
And the Czar himself began to consciously cast himself as a liberator of Europe from Napoleon.
This strategic debate sets the backdrop for both the 1813 German, and 1814 French Campaigns, with Count Metternich of Austria being a key figure when Lieven discusses Russian decision making leading up to the invasion of France.
Despite all that they had been through with the French, and Napoleon, Metternich appreciated Napoleon for who and what he was: a Conservative governor switch placed firmly on the engine of Revolution in Europe.
Considering that all of his reforms in Europe were designed not to abrogate the Revolution, but longstanding French strategic interests, Metternich felt that Napoleon was a man who could be dealt with as an equal. Austria was likewise very concerned with the growing ties between Berlin and St. Petersburg as well as the encroaching power of London on the continent.
As Lieven points out, however, Czar Alexander was not blind nor deaf to these fears of Austria, and many of his advisors. The Czar himself had cooled in his initial fury against the French following victory in Germany, and Lieven points out that the Czar himself, despite his growing conversion to Orthodoxy (as a real, lived, personal faith as opposed to a mere cultural symbol), was a social revolutionary of sorts, and sympathized with much of Napoleon's reforms such as the idea of a social meritocracy.
However, the Czar was simply unyielding in his demands that Napoleon must be forced to abdicate as a war aim of the Coalition.
Even though this war aim would be the source of future conflicts between Russia, Austria and with Great Britain, it also ensured that it would be Russian troops, more than anyone else's, who ultimately triumphed over Napoleon, and who marched in procession down the streets of Paris.
One part military history, one part political and diplomatic history, part biography of Czar Alexander, and overall a very well written, deeply engrossing book, that tells the full story of Russia's War against Napoleon, from the Russian perspective, written by a Russian who understands the Russians.
With only a couple of disagreements with the authors own analyses, I have to say this is one of my favorite books on the Napoleonic era.
Very highly recommended.