When Ernest Gellner was his early thirties, he took it upon himself to challenge the prevailing philosophical orthodoxy of the day, Linguistic Philosophy. Finding a powerful ally in Bertrand Russell, who provided the foreword for this book, Gellner embarked on the project that was to put him on the intellectual map.
The first determined attempt to state the premises and operational rules of the movement, Words and Things remains philosophy's most devastating attack on a conventional wisdom to this day.
Ryle was right that Gellner was "abusive," but the Ordinary Language School had it coming. Mixes philosophical criticism with a sociological explanation of why the Later Wittgenstein was so attractive to philosophers in the mid-twentieth century.
This is a thorough but convoluted argument against Wittgenstein (both early and late periods) and "Wittgensteinianism," Gellner's broadly generalized category, it seems, for everyone ever to agree, in part or wholly, with Wittgenstein. Gellner makes all his points in the first hundred pages, then goes on for another two hundred, becoming increasingly belligerent. Gilbert Ryle was right to call him abusive, and though Gellner often makes great points, the whole project suffers from extreme insensitivity and cockiness. With that said, Wittgenstein himself can be quite an agitation, and Gellner's final word on him captures my frustration with the Tractatus: "Philosophy is explicitness... That which one would insinuate, thereof one must speak."