I have a few books about the heyday of the Soviet revolution in the last few years and was looking forward to reading this one that deals mostly with the post-Stalin years in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, it is not one that I can recommend.
Coleman spent many years in Soviet Russia working for various Western press organizations, writing in mainstream publications like Time, US News, and major newspapers. His perspective should give him lots of useful insights in the workings of the Soviet Union, but the book has a pervasive sense of unearned convictions about superpower relations and commitment to ideological opposition to the Soviets that comes across as reflexive and almost as dogmatic as Soviet policymakers themselves.
For instance, early in the book Coleman is highly critical of US "Kremlinologists" for failing to see what is very clear to Coleman: that Soviet leaders will alternate between hardline factions and reform factions. He draws this conclusion based on the succession of Khrushchev (reform), Brezhnev (hardline), Andropov and Chernenko (hardline but with tenures too short for Coleman to count), and Gorbachev (reform). These leaders were in place from 1956 through the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. To see an obvious pattern that must be asserting itself in this extremely small sample over such a long time is nonsense but Coleman treats it as obvious, and castigates the US foreign policy establishment for not seeing this same certainty.
Similarly, Coleman believes the US erred by not being more proactive in confronting the USSR, especially regarding the USSR's interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. He believes the US could have I guess used more strong threats or possibly even militarily intervened in some way, and that the USSR, recognizing it was by far the weaker of the superpowers, would have acquiesced. While possibly some version of this may have been true, these countries directly bordered the USSR and were in a very different geopolitical context than, say, Cuba during the missile crisis.
Coleman is very cavalier in swinging his big stick, seeming to forget that the prospect of worldwide nuclear war was a very real possibility if things went off the tracks. He continually depicts the US actions during the decades the book covers as overly deferential to the Soviets, seemingly ignoring the near constant US involvement in every corner of the globe, either directly or indirectly. The United States, whatever our faults and our virtues may be, was not idly sitting at home.
Finally, the book is littered with little asides were Coleman makes ideological assertions about the impossibility of functional planned economies or other communist ideas. He cannot limit himself to making historical observations about the collapse of the Soviet Union, but has a side project of inserting unsupported ideological statements throughout.
One thing that is clear is that he has great admiration for Gorbachev and his efforts at perestroika and glasnost, and somewhat less admiration for Yeltsin. The final section of the book is more engaging reading as he describes how the closed society was gradually opened to increasing forms of democratization. The book ends in 1996, so this is where we leave off; the new forces of autocracy and kleptocracy had not yet fully emerged.