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The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Birth of the Pax Americana
A sweeping, vivid history capturing the sudden end of Britain's empire and the moment when America became a world superpower.
Britain fought and sacrificed on a worldwide scale to defeat Hitler and his allies―and won. Yet less than three years after victory, the British Empire effectively ended, and the age of America as world superpower dawned. Peter Clarke's book is the first to analyze the abrupt transition from Rule Britannia to Pax Americana. His swiftly paced narrative offers vivid portraits of pivotal figures like Churchill, Gandhi, Truman, and Stalin. The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire shows how events that followed the war reshaped the world as much as the conflict itself.
Britain fought and sacrificed on a worldwide scale to defeat Hitler and his allies―and won. Yet less than three years after victory, the British Empire effectively ended, and the age of America as world superpower dawned. Peter Clarke's book is the first to analyze the abrupt transition from Rule Britannia to Pax Americana. His swiftly paced narrative offers vivid portraits of pivotal figures like Churchill, Gandhi, Truman, and Stalin. The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire shows how events that followed the war reshaped the world as much as the conflict itself.
592 pages, Paperback
First published July 31, 2008
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460 people want to read
About the author
P.F. Clarke
13 books4 followersDr. Peter Frederick Clarke was Professor of Modern British History from 1991 to 2004 at Cambridge University and Master of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, from 2000 to 2004. He completed his BA in 1963, his MA and PhD in 1967, and his LittD in 1989 all at Cambridge University. A Fellow of the British Academy, he reviews books regularly for The Times Literary Supplement, the London Review of Books and the Sunday Times.
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Displaying 1 - 29 of 29 reviews
November 12, 2014
One can almost feel the torture the author put himself through during his research, the interminable hours plodding through the old war diaries and the endless newspaper headlines. While commendable, the approach has produced an at times too monotonous, too trivial a history - obsessed with the minutiae of an epochal phase.
At the same time, even as we see this, we can also see how Clarke tried hard to avoid doing the same to the reader, trying to alleviate the effects of an overdose of political trivia by giving (sometimes read-in) significance to even the daily routines and sleep habits of the delegates at the famous conferences that peppered the war. Maybe the author could not help it, maybe once you become familiar enough with the side characters through volumes of their personal diary, even these otherwise insignificant things might carry meaning.
The obsession with Churchill to the exclusion of much else is probably what reduces the significance of the book a few notches but, paradoxically, also increases the readability by as many and more notches. Perhaps this was intended or was an unfortunate editorial mandate? In either case, I for one wished Clarke did not indulge in this as much as he did.
To come back to the structure of the book, Clarke uses an impressive reference list that comprises little-known diaries, long-lost newspaper and magazine pieces and the many writings of the day to put together credible character portraits and sketches of daily activities that form the background to the war that shaped the modern world.
It is intriguing reading for the most part but there is a caveat: it should not be read with a strict intention of understanding the history of the war and its aftermath, but needs to be approached with a keenness to go beyond the facts of the war and to the human element and the politics that shaped its policy decisions. This too is important to understand, for while the direction of the war might not have been altered much by a change of cast, the shape of the play was most definitely determined by their unique cast of flawed yet grand players.
January 19, 2020
Reading about the significant shrinkage of the British Empire is not exactly uplifting. But one goes into a book like this expecting that. Winston Churchill, who is the main figure in this book, spoke and wrote so much about the British Empire that it sometimes drove Americans to distraction. An unreconstituted imperialist, he seemed obsessed with trying to hang onto it. Indeed I think he was obsessed with it maintaining control over India and Burma, while also calling the shots in Palestine and even trying to have his way in Greece.
Peter Clarke focuses mainly on the years 1944-1947, beginning mostly with the second Quebec Conference in September 1944 between Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt (Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King was also there, but he did not carry the clout or strength that the other two men wielded). Clarke writes about how the so-called (by Churchill) “special relationship” between Great Britain and the U.S. was in reality not that special. It was due to a matter of convenience and mutual need more than agreement on a broad range of political principles. Obviously, Hitler had to be defeated; everything else was subordinated to that. But I got the distinct sense here, as I have in many other books, that Churchill and Roosevelt were not really that close. Not many people, if any, were particularly close to FDR. Churchill seemed to delude himself into thinking that he was. The bottom line is that their relationship worked well, but it was not the great friendship that Churchill tried later to portray. Likewise the “special relationship” between the countries, Clarke writes, is overblown. I actually agree with him here: it is annoying to hear the phrase in the media. Britain is a friend of the U.S., there is no doubt about that. And I do think that a vast majority of Americans respect the British people and their islands. I view it more as like someone you might be friendly with at work: you work closely together on team projects, and may share the same views, more or less, on the company you both work for, and you respect the person; but outside of work, while still respectful, you each have your own interests and pretty much do not socialize together. An imperfect analogy, but that is how I view it.
While one of Clarke's strengths is in pointing out the differences between the U.S. and Britain, he gets bogged down in British public opinion, constantly referencing the comments of random people in Mass-Observation (something that I had to look up). While some sampling of this is fine, I found that he went to the well one too many times for me. After awhile, I did not want to hear opinions from middle-aged men somewhere and older women somewhere else. Strangely, while making sure to include these nuggets of public polling, Clarke writes very little about the everyday life of a British citizen in the latter stages of WWII and the subsequent aftermath.
Another flaw in the book was the liberal use of newspaper headlines and articles. This too, like the polling, was sprinkled throughout the book. While some of this is fine, as it helps to show what type of news stories were being given to readers, Clarke relies on it too much. First, in both Britain and also in America, he only uses a few large newspapers, while ignoring all of the others. In the U.S., he provides headlines from the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune. Yes, these were two of the largest newspapers in the country, then and now. But they did not speak for everyone, they did not reach everyone, and their opinions did not necessarily reflect those of the American people. I doubt hardly anyone in, say, San Francisco, cared much about what either of those papers were saying. Outside of reading books about people in the newspaper industry, or the media in general, I cannot recall another book that relied so heavily on newspapers. And, at the same, Clarke does not talk about the BBC at all. I think it mentioned once or twice. That seems to me to be an oversight.
Much of the final part of the book is taken up with the growing independence movement in India, and Britain's attempts to figure out how to properly let it go its own way. Clarke presents the British perspective well-enough here, but the Indian perspective was somewhat lacking. He did a better job when writing about the British mandate in Palestine and how the influence of the U.S. was what really ended up mattering the most in that regard. At times, I found his narrative difficult to follow as he would abruptly switch subjects. At times Clarke seemed more interested in giving his opinion on people, rather than sticking to a more dispassionate view. Overall I did not care for this book or Clarke's writing style.
Grade: D
Peter Clarke focuses mainly on the years 1944-1947, beginning mostly with the second Quebec Conference in September 1944 between Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt (Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King was also there, but he did not carry the clout or strength that the other two men wielded). Clarke writes about how the so-called (by Churchill) “special relationship” between Great Britain and the U.S. was in reality not that special. It was due to a matter of convenience and mutual need more than agreement on a broad range of political principles. Obviously, Hitler had to be defeated; everything else was subordinated to that. But I got the distinct sense here, as I have in many other books, that Churchill and Roosevelt were not really that close. Not many people, if any, were particularly close to FDR. Churchill seemed to delude himself into thinking that he was. The bottom line is that their relationship worked well, but it was not the great friendship that Churchill tried later to portray. Likewise the “special relationship” between the countries, Clarke writes, is overblown. I actually agree with him here: it is annoying to hear the phrase in the media. Britain is a friend of the U.S., there is no doubt about that. And I do think that a vast majority of Americans respect the British people and their islands. I view it more as like someone you might be friendly with at work: you work closely together on team projects, and may share the same views, more or less, on the company you both work for, and you respect the person; but outside of work, while still respectful, you each have your own interests and pretty much do not socialize together. An imperfect analogy, but that is how I view it.
While one of Clarke's strengths is in pointing out the differences between the U.S. and Britain, he gets bogged down in British public opinion, constantly referencing the comments of random people in Mass-Observation (something that I had to look up). While some sampling of this is fine, I found that he went to the well one too many times for me. After awhile, I did not want to hear opinions from middle-aged men somewhere and older women somewhere else. Strangely, while making sure to include these nuggets of public polling, Clarke writes very little about the everyday life of a British citizen in the latter stages of WWII and the subsequent aftermath.
Another flaw in the book was the liberal use of newspaper headlines and articles. This too, like the polling, was sprinkled throughout the book. While some of this is fine, as it helps to show what type of news stories were being given to readers, Clarke relies on it too much. First, in both Britain and also in America, he only uses a few large newspapers, while ignoring all of the others. In the U.S., he provides headlines from the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune. Yes, these were two of the largest newspapers in the country, then and now. But they did not speak for everyone, they did not reach everyone, and their opinions did not necessarily reflect those of the American people. I doubt hardly anyone in, say, San Francisco, cared much about what either of those papers were saying. Outside of reading books about people in the newspaper industry, or the media in general, I cannot recall another book that relied so heavily on newspapers. And, at the same, Clarke does not talk about the BBC at all. I think it mentioned once or twice. That seems to me to be an oversight.
Much of the final part of the book is taken up with the growing independence movement in India, and Britain's attempts to figure out how to properly let it go its own way. Clarke presents the British perspective well-enough here, but the Indian perspective was somewhat lacking. He did a better job when writing about the British mandate in Palestine and how the influence of the U.S. was what really ended up mattering the most in that regard. At times, I found his narrative difficult to follow as he would abruptly switch subjects. At times Clarke seemed more interested in giving his opinion on people, rather than sticking to a more dispassionate view. Overall I did not care for this book or Clarke's writing style.
Grade: D
February 19, 2009
Clarke writes a quite effective summary of Anglo-American relations from the Quebec Octagon Conference in September 1944 through the end of the Raj in India and the referral of the Palestinian Mandate to the UN in August 1947. The author relies heavily on primary source materials - mainly diaries of major political players and their courtiers as well as extensive mining of contemporary newspaper articles and opinion polls. The war in Europe dominates the narrative, not reaching V-E Day and the Potsdam conference until three quarters of the way through the book. The Pacific Theater and Far East (beyond India) receive surprisingly little attention in my mind (although Canada does get more attention than I'd expect).
The main focus of this book however is on what Winston Churchill called "the most unsordid act in the history of any nation," the Lend-Lease Act. By shipping supplies from America's "Arsenal of Democracy" to the front lines in Britain, this act served to keep the British war effort afloat, especially through the years before the U.S. entered the war.
I'm a little bit of two minds about this book. First, I was clearly not the intended audience. Clarke is clearly a Brit writing for a British audience. This is seen in both the vocabulary and especially in references to British political figures with the clear assumption that the reader would know of their reputation during and after the period of time being examined. While I'm an amateur WWII history buff, I'm not an Oxford historian versed in the academic debates and various theories why the British Empire dissolved. Therefore the Introduction and Epilogue especially seemed to be defending the book against attacks that I have never truly seen.
The most interesting, and at times frustrating, facet of this book is the economics. I'd heard plenty about how Lend-Lease saved Britain (and even propped-up the Soviet Union in her hour of need), but I hadn't thought much about how (if at all) the US got those loans back. I'd thought even less about how such a massive flow of aid and armaments would distort the British economy to the point that peace would bring almost the same level of economic hardship as the Blitz. The problem is that I'm just not well enough versed in Keynesian macroeconomics to understand the difference between hard and soft currencies and how the advent of convertability of British pound sterling to US dollars would hurt Britain. Maybe this is a failing in my education, but it is also a red flag for those readers not in academia.
Overall, I was happy to read a book covering this period that wasn't shackled to the story of the Crusade in Europe and the inevitable Cold War to follow. Here is a story (or rather the epilogue to a story) that easily straddles those two narratives and gives some vital insight into two conflicts (Israeli-Palestinian and India-Pakistan) that are currently dominating the narrative of the twenty-first century.
The main focus of this book however is on what Winston Churchill called "the most unsordid act in the history of any nation," the Lend-Lease Act. By shipping supplies from America's "Arsenal of Democracy" to the front lines in Britain, this act served to keep the British war effort afloat, especially through the years before the U.S. entered the war.
I'm a little bit of two minds about this book. First, I was clearly not the intended audience. Clarke is clearly a Brit writing for a British audience. This is seen in both the vocabulary and especially in references to British political figures with the clear assumption that the reader would know of their reputation during and after the period of time being examined. While I'm an amateur WWII history buff, I'm not an Oxford historian versed in the academic debates and various theories why the British Empire dissolved. Therefore the Introduction and Epilogue especially seemed to be defending the book against attacks that I have never truly seen.
The most interesting, and at times frustrating, facet of this book is the economics. I'd heard plenty about how Lend-Lease saved Britain (and even propped-up the Soviet Union in her hour of need), but I hadn't thought much about how (if at all) the US got those loans back. I'd thought even less about how such a massive flow of aid and armaments would distort the British economy to the point that peace would bring almost the same level of economic hardship as the Blitz. The problem is that I'm just not well enough versed in Keynesian macroeconomics to understand the difference between hard and soft currencies and how the advent of convertability of British pound sterling to US dollars would hurt Britain. Maybe this is a failing in my education, but it is also a red flag for those readers not in academia.
Overall, I was happy to read a book covering this period that wasn't shackled to the story of the Crusade in Europe and the inevitable Cold War to follow. Here is a story (or rather the epilogue to a story) that easily straddles those two narratives and gives some vital insight into two conflicts (Israeli-Palestinian and India-Pakistan) that are currently dominating the narrative of the twenty-first century.
February 23, 2011
Not too often I read a book that nudges my opinion about world events too much but Clarke's theses seem spot on: It would've been hypocrisy for the US to even tacitly support England's claim to any empire anywhere while condemning Stalin's claims to Eastern Europe. Also, when Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter it was not a document limited to ensuring the rights of self-government for just the Poles and French, which should've been obvious (for Winston's keen prescience about the Nazis, he sure is dismissive of the rights of any dark people anywhere). Finally, money had more of a role than politics, ultimately, in the dissolution of the empire.
Clarke is really sloppy at times with exposition. Probably a full quarter of the book focuses on Lend-Lease yet he never really bothers with a broad overview. Sure, someone reading this book probably has some knowledge of the era but the Marshall Plan literally does not get one sentence explaining what the Marshall Plan involved (actually, the Marshall Plan should've maybe gotten a bit more ink as the nail in the coffin, so to speak). A short primer on Keynesian economics would've also been nice for the sake of context, but, again, he doesn't bother.
Probably the biggest revelation of the book was India. I hadn't previously realized that India/Pakistan/Bangladesh had so much say in how their respective countries were 'created'. Sort of takes away from the less nuanced notion of England as the evil colonizer and India as the victim. If anything, Clarke makes a hero out of the Brits fighting for Indian/Pakistan independence, Wavell in particular.
The Palestine pieces were also pretty compelling. We don't hear much anymore of the Zionist terrorists who targeted and killed Englishmen in Palestine. Honestly, it was the first I'd read of those attacks. Perhaps that says something about history books in the US, not sure...
Finally, it's sort of refreshingly honest yet unsettling hearing that Churchill, Roosevelt and especially Gandhi were just too old to be at the top of their game. The amount of time most of them seemed to be BS'ing through meetings was both scary and surprising. Really surprising was Clarke essentially saying that, had Gandhi not been so wishy-washy with the Muslim League/Indian Congress question, we might've avoided years of strife in the area.
Clarke is really sloppy at times with exposition. Probably a full quarter of the book focuses on Lend-Lease yet he never really bothers with a broad overview. Sure, someone reading this book probably has some knowledge of the era but the Marshall Plan literally does not get one sentence explaining what the Marshall Plan involved (actually, the Marshall Plan should've maybe gotten a bit more ink as the nail in the coffin, so to speak). A short primer on Keynesian economics would've also been nice for the sake of context, but, again, he doesn't bother.
Probably the biggest revelation of the book was India. I hadn't previously realized that India/Pakistan/Bangladesh had so much say in how their respective countries were 'created'. Sort of takes away from the less nuanced notion of England as the evil colonizer and India as the victim. If anything, Clarke makes a hero out of the Brits fighting for Indian/Pakistan independence, Wavell in particular.
The Palestine pieces were also pretty compelling. We don't hear much anymore of the Zionist terrorists who targeted and killed Englishmen in Palestine. Honestly, it was the first I'd read of those attacks. Perhaps that says something about history books in the US, not sure...
Finally, it's sort of refreshingly honest yet unsettling hearing that Churchill, Roosevelt and especially Gandhi were just too old to be at the top of their game. The amount of time most of them seemed to be BS'ing through meetings was both scary and surprising. Really surprising was Clarke essentially saying that, had Gandhi not been so wishy-washy with the Muslim League/Indian Congress question, we might've avoided years of strife in the area.
August 6, 2013
Whether it was myth making, the fog of war, misconceptions, delusions of grandeur, or just plain delusions, it seemed to me after reading this book that many leaders in Europe and the United States labored under false impressions during the end game and immediate aftermath of World War II. Indeed, to a large extent these same illusions and cherished myths still reign today among many, myself included (well, a few less with me perhaps after this book).
In a book focusing on the key personalities of this time period – notably President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, but a host of others including General Montgomery, General Patton, Stalin, Gandhi, President Truman, and so many others – the ideals, illusions, and misconceptions either held by or generated by these people colored so many actions and thoughts in the final year or so of World War II and in the immediate aftermath of the war, so vital as it set the stage for the Cold War, the formation of a united Europe, eventually leading to the European Union, the creation of the United Nations, the World Bank, and IMF, and the independence from the British Empire (which essentially dissolved) of Pakistan, India, and of Israel (the latter creating the legacy of the Israel-Palestinian issue, still plaguing us today). What COULD seem as a very British book, focusing at times on the minutia of Parliamentary politics and the personalities and plans of many British politicians the average American has probably never heard of, really was a story of how the world we live in today was created.
These illusions and misconceptions came in so many shapes and sizes, with many famous leaders of the time not coming off so well. Author Peter Clarke for instance painted a picture of FDR the politician, a man who didn’t like to leave a paper trail, loved verbal commitments (especially to Churchill) that he could later somewhat fudge his actual adherence to, commitments very much dependent upon his goodwill, and commitments that largely vanished upon his death just before the end of the war (often the result of leaving so many of his cabinet officials – not to mention his vice president – in the dark). Gandhi, much lauded today as man of peace and vision, came off in the sections on India as obstinate, willful, refusing to compromise (even disliking the very concept of compromise), even if such compromises might prevent bloodshed. Churchill, the great orator that he was, with even his opponents acknowledging his mastery of language, sometimes acted the prima donna in meetings, not allowing much time for others to speak, and was infamous for not reading briefings prepared by various staff members and ministers, instead pretty much “winging it,” relying on his oratorical skills, his vast knowledge, and upon seizing on points made by others in a discussion.
Some illusions were the results of wishful thinking. The British and the Americans (but especially the British) so wanted to believe Stalin’s assurances of fair elections and a representative government in Poland, illusions that Stalin was glad to foster. Other illusions were the results of misperceptions, some deep rooted. The Americans again and again in the book were shown to shy away from providing the full measure of help that either the British wanted or that the Americans themselves could provide, all because they so often saw the British as more interested in great power games, endless politicking, supporting discredited foreign monarchs, and above all else maintaining the hated (by so many Americans) British Empire. Though sometimes action by the British did have a measure of this – notably in the rather lengthy (maybe too lengthy) sections devoted to British actions in Greece – I find it instructive that once the Big Three alliance dynamic broke down, with the United States viewing the Soviet Union as a new and emerging threat, the United States went from suspicion if not hostility of British interventions in the Greek political process to viewing these actions as vital in stemming the spread of communism and Soviet influence.
My two biggest take aways from the book - both ultimately related – are that Lend-Lease wasn’t the great “unsordid act” that has been so glowingly portrayed in popular history accounts and in school that it deserved to be, and that Churchill, for better or worse, was himself the main cause of the United Kingdom and the British Empire being involved as it was in World War II. With regards to the former point, the United States, though often portraying Lend-Lease as first a way to fight the Nazis before officially entering the war (and to keep Britain from falling to Germany), and later as a tool of continuing use to win the war even after the U.S. entered the conflict, wasn’t without huge costs…for Britain. I don’t want to go into much detail here in this review, but Lend-Lease so thoroughly disrupted the British economy, making it become so reliant on American goodwill (and lots and lots of money and capital equipment) that under the best of circumstances it was going to be a hard time for Britain to readjust to a peacetime economy. Did the Americans care? FDR in his slippery way had assurances that they did, but as the war drug on and issues of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, pursuing the end game in the Pacific, and the coming age of the atomic bomb came to the forefront, such assurances seemed to evaporate, vanishing altogether almost when Truman took office. Lend-Lease according to this author had ultimately always been about American self interest; bolstering a key ally in the war. That was it. Not about helping Britain in perpetuity or even for a time after the war, even if the act did thoroughly mangle the British economy. Throw in the huge costs of fighting the war, the debts Britain also owed to its colonies (notably and to me surprisingly India, which became a creditor to Britain), the immense costs of peace itself (merely feeding the Germans in its sector of occupied Germany was ruinous), and even the misfortune of one of the worst winters in decades immediately after the war, Britain was very much on the ropes. In essence, Britain leaving Palestine and what would become India and Pakistan was not so much due to high minded morals and idealism but because it was broke, broke, broke!
Back to my other take away point, the role of Churchill. Though the author cautioned a few times that one shouldn’t be too hard on Churchill, as the struggle against Germany was so vital, that he should be lauded for painting the reasons for British and later American involvement in such broad, humanitarian strokes with a real universal appeal, and that he did all that he could to help Poland, the proximate cause of Britain declaring war on Germany, he perhaps suffered under the biggest illusions of all. “A British Prime Minister with a more realistic appreciation of his country’s size and weight and power would have suffered less disillusionment …[t]he cards in the hand of a well-briefed and prudently calculating leader would have shown what limited options were realistic…as merely a titular member of the Big Three; for Great Britain as a bantam in a heavyweight league; for the Anglo-American alliance as an expedient relationship premised on subordination,; for the dilapidated British Empire as an anachronism in the phase of world history that dawned at Yalta.” Though Britain had been on the winning side, that it “might have survived the war, it had not really won the war. Its finest hour was behind it.” The British Empire “no longer constituted a united force capable of acting as a superpower.”
So by the end of my review, you can see the writing on the wall as to why the British Empire pretty much collapsed – and rapidly at that – at the end of the war. No money, limited support from abroad, except where it happened to coincide with American interests, and at least with regards to Palestine and India, remarkably similar problems, albeit on vastly different scales; a “deep-seated conflict between intermingled ethnic groups, a claim by one militant religious minority for partition and its own state, a growing resort to violence, and the confident but contradictory assertions that bloodshed would either cease or escalate if the British withdrew.”
The book, for being so long and for at times being fairly dry, did read remarkably fast. Sometimes it felt as if the author was getting buried in details of Parliamentary meetings or the politics around various Big Three meetings, but then would dig up real pearls of wisdom. There were occasional touches of humor and fun turns of phrase to keep things a little light at times; I loved the inclusion of some of the more humorous exchanges in Parliament as well as the bluntly funny statements of Truman. Churchill himself could always be counted on for something soaring, inspiring, or just plain humorous. I think the sections on the independence of India could have used a bit more background and there wasn’t as quite as much lead up to the independence discussions as I would have liked. As interesting as it was, I think a little too much time was spent on actual fighting in Europe from D-Day to the fall of Berlin, though I can see why the author included much of it, showing Britain’s evolving (devolving?) role in Europe with the arrival of American and Soviet forces. As I mentioned earlier, I think he could have edited down a lot the British involvement in Greece and still made his point. Having said all of that though, I enjoyed the book and I am glad I read it.
In a book focusing on the key personalities of this time period – notably President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, but a host of others including General Montgomery, General Patton, Stalin, Gandhi, President Truman, and so many others – the ideals, illusions, and misconceptions either held by or generated by these people colored so many actions and thoughts in the final year or so of World War II and in the immediate aftermath of the war, so vital as it set the stage for the Cold War, the formation of a united Europe, eventually leading to the European Union, the creation of the United Nations, the World Bank, and IMF, and the independence from the British Empire (which essentially dissolved) of Pakistan, India, and of Israel (the latter creating the legacy of the Israel-Palestinian issue, still plaguing us today). What COULD seem as a very British book, focusing at times on the minutia of Parliamentary politics and the personalities and plans of many British politicians the average American has probably never heard of, really was a story of how the world we live in today was created.
These illusions and misconceptions came in so many shapes and sizes, with many famous leaders of the time not coming off so well. Author Peter Clarke for instance painted a picture of FDR the politician, a man who didn’t like to leave a paper trail, loved verbal commitments (especially to Churchill) that he could later somewhat fudge his actual adherence to, commitments very much dependent upon his goodwill, and commitments that largely vanished upon his death just before the end of the war (often the result of leaving so many of his cabinet officials – not to mention his vice president – in the dark). Gandhi, much lauded today as man of peace and vision, came off in the sections on India as obstinate, willful, refusing to compromise (even disliking the very concept of compromise), even if such compromises might prevent bloodshed. Churchill, the great orator that he was, with even his opponents acknowledging his mastery of language, sometimes acted the prima donna in meetings, not allowing much time for others to speak, and was infamous for not reading briefings prepared by various staff members and ministers, instead pretty much “winging it,” relying on his oratorical skills, his vast knowledge, and upon seizing on points made by others in a discussion.
Some illusions were the results of wishful thinking. The British and the Americans (but especially the British) so wanted to believe Stalin’s assurances of fair elections and a representative government in Poland, illusions that Stalin was glad to foster. Other illusions were the results of misperceptions, some deep rooted. The Americans again and again in the book were shown to shy away from providing the full measure of help that either the British wanted or that the Americans themselves could provide, all because they so often saw the British as more interested in great power games, endless politicking, supporting discredited foreign monarchs, and above all else maintaining the hated (by so many Americans) British Empire. Though sometimes action by the British did have a measure of this – notably in the rather lengthy (maybe too lengthy) sections devoted to British actions in Greece – I find it instructive that once the Big Three alliance dynamic broke down, with the United States viewing the Soviet Union as a new and emerging threat, the United States went from suspicion if not hostility of British interventions in the Greek political process to viewing these actions as vital in stemming the spread of communism and Soviet influence.
My two biggest take aways from the book - both ultimately related – are that Lend-Lease wasn’t the great “unsordid act” that has been so glowingly portrayed in popular history accounts and in school that it deserved to be, and that Churchill, for better or worse, was himself the main cause of the United Kingdom and the British Empire being involved as it was in World War II. With regards to the former point, the United States, though often portraying Lend-Lease as first a way to fight the Nazis before officially entering the war (and to keep Britain from falling to Germany), and later as a tool of continuing use to win the war even after the U.S. entered the conflict, wasn’t without huge costs…for Britain. I don’t want to go into much detail here in this review, but Lend-Lease so thoroughly disrupted the British economy, making it become so reliant on American goodwill (and lots and lots of money and capital equipment) that under the best of circumstances it was going to be a hard time for Britain to readjust to a peacetime economy. Did the Americans care? FDR in his slippery way had assurances that they did, but as the war drug on and issues of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, pursuing the end game in the Pacific, and the coming age of the atomic bomb came to the forefront, such assurances seemed to evaporate, vanishing altogether almost when Truman took office. Lend-Lease according to this author had ultimately always been about American self interest; bolstering a key ally in the war. That was it. Not about helping Britain in perpetuity or even for a time after the war, even if the act did thoroughly mangle the British economy. Throw in the huge costs of fighting the war, the debts Britain also owed to its colonies (notably and to me surprisingly India, which became a creditor to Britain), the immense costs of peace itself (merely feeding the Germans in its sector of occupied Germany was ruinous), and even the misfortune of one of the worst winters in decades immediately after the war, Britain was very much on the ropes. In essence, Britain leaving Palestine and what would become India and Pakistan was not so much due to high minded morals and idealism but because it was broke, broke, broke!
Back to my other take away point, the role of Churchill. Though the author cautioned a few times that one shouldn’t be too hard on Churchill, as the struggle against Germany was so vital, that he should be lauded for painting the reasons for British and later American involvement in such broad, humanitarian strokes with a real universal appeal, and that he did all that he could to help Poland, the proximate cause of Britain declaring war on Germany, he perhaps suffered under the biggest illusions of all. “A British Prime Minister with a more realistic appreciation of his country’s size and weight and power would have suffered less disillusionment …[t]he cards in the hand of a well-briefed and prudently calculating leader would have shown what limited options were realistic…as merely a titular member of the Big Three; for Great Britain as a bantam in a heavyweight league; for the Anglo-American alliance as an expedient relationship premised on subordination,; for the dilapidated British Empire as an anachronism in the phase of world history that dawned at Yalta.” Though Britain had been on the winning side, that it “might have survived the war, it had not really won the war. Its finest hour was behind it.” The British Empire “no longer constituted a united force capable of acting as a superpower.”
So by the end of my review, you can see the writing on the wall as to why the British Empire pretty much collapsed – and rapidly at that – at the end of the war. No money, limited support from abroad, except where it happened to coincide with American interests, and at least with regards to Palestine and India, remarkably similar problems, albeit on vastly different scales; a “deep-seated conflict between intermingled ethnic groups, a claim by one militant religious minority for partition and its own state, a growing resort to violence, and the confident but contradictory assertions that bloodshed would either cease or escalate if the British withdrew.”
The book, for being so long and for at times being fairly dry, did read remarkably fast. Sometimes it felt as if the author was getting buried in details of Parliamentary meetings or the politics around various Big Three meetings, but then would dig up real pearls of wisdom. There were occasional touches of humor and fun turns of phrase to keep things a little light at times; I loved the inclusion of some of the more humorous exchanges in Parliament as well as the bluntly funny statements of Truman. Churchill himself could always be counted on for something soaring, inspiring, or just plain humorous. I think the sections on the independence of India could have used a bit more background and there wasn’t as quite as much lead up to the independence discussions as I would have liked. As interesting as it was, I think a little too much time was spent on actual fighting in Europe from D-Day to the fall of Berlin, though I can see why the author included much of it, showing Britain’s evolving (devolving?) role in Europe with the arrival of American and Soviet forces. As I mentioned earlier, I think he could have edited down a lot the British involvement in Greece and still made his point. Having said all of that though, I enjoyed the book and I am glad I read it.
March 10, 2021
It's really focused on the Churchill\FDR\Stalin conferences near the end of WWII and the actions of the people subject to the empire are only briefly discussed near the end of the book and then it's only focused on Indian and Palestine. It's almost entirely a WWII book and it does that fine but drags on too much without being particularly focused
May 5, 2012
Too much detail. The more important points get burried in the details, and there are so many details. If you are the sort of reader who really needs to know parctically every last word said by every last functionary at every conference, meeting, or WW2 headquarters this may be for you. If you prefer an author who cuts to the chase, or if you are looking for a broad overview stay away.
This book is a narrative that over-reports the minutia of events in the last 1,000 days before Britain left India and Palastine, a period of running from the later part of WW2 until August, 1947. It is purely a narrative. There is virtually no background material from before that time, and no analysis of causation. it is all this happened, then this, linked only by chronological order if not by any visible importance to the central theme.
This book is a narrative that over-reports the minutia of events in the last 1,000 days before Britain left India and Palastine, a period of running from the later part of WW2 until August, 1947. It is purely a narrative. There is virtually no background material from before that time, and no analysis of causation. it is all this happened, then this, linked only by chronological order if not by any visible importance to the central theme.
July 1, 2017
While indeed Peter Clarke does indeed cover a wide spread of events, and in that sense is a huge book, I believe that he does go into so many details that, after a while, I started to lose the plot.
I lost the plot in the sense that i was wondering how all this lead to the end of the British Empire. He did not bring about a good analysis of all these events, and their interconnectedness.
The Palestine and Indian issues were, in my view, glossed over.
All in all, a detailed book. Yet, I was not that much wiser at the end
I lost the plot in the sense that i was wondering how all this lead to the end of the British Empire. He did not bring about a good analysis of all these events, and their interconnectedness.
The Palestine and Indian issues were, in my view, glossed over.
All in all, a detailed book. Yet, I was not that much wiser at the end
January 7, 2009
Rather dry and heavy on economics but an interesting read nonetheless. Also paints an interesting dynamic between the so called "big three" leaders.
July 25, 2017
Copious but rambling.
January 2, 2020
This book spends a great deal of its effort trying to demonstrate that it was not Atlee and his government of feckless socialists that were to blame for the collapse of the British Empire in India and Palestine after World War II. The book attempts to push this back to the choices made by Winston Churchill, but even here it appears that Churchill had limited room to work with and that he was trying to paper over divisions with the Americans in particular and punch above his weight and that even during his time as prime minister after 1940 that Great Britain was already moribund as a world empire. Can we blame Churchill for the defeat of the British in Southeast Asia and the loss of Hong Kong and Singapore? Can we blame him for the defeats of Norway and France that left Britain to fight alone against the Nazis for so long that the resources of the empire were drawn down to such an extent? Who is to blame for such things? It would be tempting to blame earlier leaders as well as the fickleness of the British people that threw Churchill overboard because of their desire for "free" goodies of socialism that ended up wrecking the British culture as well as economy or the earlier popular folly that prevented Britain from being able to adequately prepare for war.
This book is about 500 pages long and it is divided into four parts. The first part of the book is the briefest, and it provides, after a list of illustrations, maps, and preface, a one-chapter summary of the British war effort and concerns about the imperial future between 1941 and 1944. It is my belief that this is not enough context to recognize the moribund nature of British imperialism, in that it seeks to blame Churchill rather than Atlee for the fall of the British empire and this is not just or accurate. After that there are five chapters that cover various false summits--false summits in two senses, both in being dishonest agreements like in Quebec (1) and Yalta (6), but also in the way that they were false peaks that made one think that one had finished the war when they had not, as was the case with the Battle of the Bulge (4) and the failures at Arnhem (3). The author then turns his attention to hollow victories (III) that show the effects of World War II in four chapters that discuss altered war plans (7), the death of FDR (8), American views of Justice (9) and the problems of Potsdam (10). Finally, the book ends with four chapters that show the postwar liquidation of the British Empire (IV), looking at the betrayal of British hopes (11), the costs of victory (12), thoughts of sabotage (13) and the British scuttling in India and Israel (14).
Although this book is not quite the historical tour de force that the author thinks it is, this book is still worthwhile in the way it chronicles the self-deception practiced by British leaders and the deliberate obfuscation practiced by lots of parties in order to seek the goals that they wanted from World War II. Like many books do, this book demonstrates the hypocrisy of America's efforts at imperialism without self-recognition even while being hostile towards British behaviors towards India that were not so different from the way that the US treated the black population that contributed to armies and taxation without having full civil rights. The book does not go far enough back to grasp the origins of British imperial decline, which occurred really during the period before World War II, but it does at least manage to show that British leaders were frequently blind to the realities under which they worked until the end of the empire took them by surprise and led to lots of unpleasant recriminations and blaming. One suspects that this is a common problem with empires.
This book is about 500 pages long and it is divided into four parts. The first part of the book is the briefest, and it provides, after a list of illustrations, maps, and preface, a one-chapter summary of the British war effort and concerns about the imperial future between 1941 and 1944. It is my belief that this is not enough context to recognize the moribund nature of British imperialism, in that it seeks to blame Churchill rather than Atlee for the fall of the British empire and this is not just or accurate. After that there are five chapters that cover various false summits--false summits in two senses, both in being dishonest agreements like in Quebec (1) and Yalta (6), but also in the way that they were false peaks that made one think that one had finished the war when they had not, as was the case with the Battle of the Bulge (4) and the failures at Arnhem (3). The author then turns his attention to hollow victories (III) that show the effects of World War II in four chapters that discuss altered war plans (7), the death of FDR (8), American views of Justice (9) and the problems of Potsdam (10). Finally, the book ends with four chapters that show the postwar liquidation of the British Empire (IV), looking at the betrayal of British hopes (11), the costs of victory (12), thoughts of sabotage (13) and the British scuttling in India and Israel (14).
Although this book is not quite the historical tour de force that the author thinks it is, this book is still worthwhile in the way it chronicles the self-deception practiced by British leaders and the deliberate obfuscation practiced by lots of parties in order to seek the goals that they wanted from World War II. Like many books do, this book demonstrates the hypocrisy of America's efforts at imperialism without self-recognition even while being hostile towards British behaviors towards India that were not so different from the way that the US treated the black population that contributed to armies and taxation without having full civil rights. The book does not go far enough back to grasp the origins of British imperial decline, which occurred really during the period before World War II, but it does at least manage to show that British leaders were frequently blind to the realities under which they worked until the end of the empire took them by surprise and led to lots of unpleasant recriminations and blaming. One suspects that this is a common problem with empires.
December 8, 2022
This book is a mess.
Better titles: 'Some Lazy and Stupid Things that Churchill Did', 'A View of Some Stuff Through Memoir and the Press', 'Military/Conferences/Anecdotes/High Politics/International Finance/A Bit About India/Some More Anecdotes/A Bit About Palestine'.
There is no purpose to this book. Even the date range is arbitrary. It seems to stop at Indian independance, but not, for some reason, at the creation of Israel. The only reason I read this book was for the actual empire dissolution stuff. The only thing that kept me going through Churchill, war, Churchill, Conference, Churchill, Politics, Churchill...other was the sunlit uplands of actually reading about empire. I was disappointed.
If you are interested in any of the things listed, go find a book on them. This is a Book of Everything Seemingly Designed to Disappoint Everyone. Perhaps separating the history into theme would have worked better.
There's a lot of Churchill stuff. I mean, if the author wanted to write a book about Churchill, he should have done that.
I got through it only on promise. When I've recovered from this morass, this slog, this mission, this terribly long and terribly messy book, I will read a real history on Indian independance (I will hold off on Israel a bit longer - more contentious). No mention at all of Africa, East Asia, other parts of the Middle East. This book is not about the British Empire.
It ends up being 'A Long History of the Least Important Parts of A Whole Bunch of Things'.
Better titles: 'Some Lazy and Stupid Things that Churchill Did', 'A View of Some Stuff Through Memoir and the Press', 'Military/Conferences/Anecdotes/High Politics/International Finance/A Bit About India/Some More Anecdotes/A Bit About Palestine'.
There is no purpose to this book. Even the date range is arbitrary. It seems to stop at Indian independance, but not, for some reason, at the creation of Israel. The only reason I read this book was for the actual empire dissolution stuff. The only thing that kept me going through Churchill, war, Churchill, Conference, Churchill, Politics, Churchill...other was the sunlit uplands of actually reading about empire. I was disappointed.
If you are interested in any of the things listed, go find a book on them. This is a Book of Everything Seemingly Designed to Disappoint Everyone. Perhaps separating the history into theme would have worked better.
There's a lot of Churchill stuff. I mean, if the author wanted to write a book about Churchill, he should have done that.
I got through it only on promise. When I've recovered from this morass, this slog, this mission, this terribly long and terribly messy book, I will read a real history on Indian independance (I will hold off on Israel a bit longer - more contentious). No mention at all of Africa, East Asia, other parts of the Middle East. This book is not about the British Empire.
It ends up being 'A Long History of the Least Important Parts of A Whole Bunch of Things'.
November 12, 2017
As an Indian now living in US, with my grandparents forced out of Pakistan in 1947 due to partition, I wanted to better understand what led to Britishers finally leaving India, and want caused them to spilt it on their way put. Both questions are very well answered. First, as British were under a huge debt after the WWII and had no means to maintain an empire of people wanting to be free. Second, due to Jinnah and Muslim league falsely claiming to represent all Muslim minority's interests, while Indian Congress failed to pacify Jinnah to stay within one nation. It is ironical that India has more Muslims than Pakistan. Also as 3 subsequent wars and Billions $$ spent per year by each nation on arms prove, the British solution was bad. They should've just left and let people sort it out. Better yet they should've never gone in. Overall a good book, as it also throws light on Israel's birth. The author is generally balanced but sometimes takes extra pains to make British look good, e.g., how they tried to avoid India's partition. In reality, it was the manifestation of their divide and rule policy in response to the first Indian freedom fight in 1857.
July 25, 2020
Interesting But a Slog
The general reader interested in this period, and the details of post-WWII geopolitics, might be served by this advice: Let it wash over you. Don't try to untangle the threads or join the larger themes across the chapters. It's too dense and too detailed to keep track of those. But as a survey of the decisions and drivers behind today's intractable problems of territory and settlement and borders and "theopolitics", it is instructive. The empiricists- very much including the globally muscular United States - f-ed up the world with their calculated and utterly self-interested postwar machinations. We are where we are because the powers-that-were assumed they would always be The Powers. We can't fault them for failing to foresee the 50+year outcomes, but with hindsight, we can (one hopes) learn the lessons of the disastrous compromises undertaken by comfortably arrogant western elites, and the irreparable harm done in the guise of benevolent condescension.
The general reader interested in this period, and the details of post-WWII geopolitics, might be served by this advice: Let it wash over you. Don't try to untangle the threads or join the larger themes across the chapters. It's too dense and too detailed to keep track of those. But as a survey of the decisions and drivers behind today's intractable problems of territory and settlement and borders and "theopolitics", it is instructive. The empiricists- very much including the globally muscular United States - f-ed up the world with their calculated and utterly self-interested postwar machinations. We are where we are because the powers-that-were assumed they would always be The Powers. We can't fault them for failing to foresee the 50+year outcomes, but with hindsight, we can (one hopes) learn the lessons of the disastrous compromises undertaken by comfortably arrogant western elites, and the irreparable harm done in the guise of benevolent condescension.
May 21, 2020
A very good history that explains the decline of the British Empire, which was brought to a head by the British financial crisis surrounding World War II. Britain's place in the world was on a decline in the early Twentieth Century and it virtually collapsed as a world power because of the financial stain of the war. Its hold on power was tenuous to begin with, as the resources to maintain it's empire were more that the county could bear. The cost and the debt of World War II brought on the collapse. The author does not make judgments regarding the morality of the empire itself, but does present the opposing historical opinions regarding this. In its place, the decline of the British Empire left the two new competing superpowers of the Unites States and the U.S.S.R. and the ensuring Cold War.
I would have given the book a 5 Star rating if it weren't for the author's writing regarding India's departure from the empire. The writing was tedious and spent so much time with the minutia of particular meetings that the reader - at least this reader - had trouble remaining focused on the decision-making strategy of separating India from what was left of the empire.
I would have given the book a 5 Star rating if it weren't for the author's writing regarding India's departure from the empire. The writing was tedious and spent so much time with the minutia of particular meetings that the reader - at least this reader - had trouble remaining focused on the decision-making strategy of separating India from what was left of the empire.
Read
July 7, 2022From the Publisher:
Peter Clarke's book is the first to analyze the abrupt transition from Rule Britannia to Pax Americana. His swiftly paced narrative makes superb use of letters and diaries to provide vivid portraits of the figures around whom history pivoted: Churchill, Gandhi, Roosevelt, Stalin, Truman, and a host of lesser-known figures though whom Clarke brilliantly shows the human dimension of epochal events. The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire is a captivating work of popular history that shows how the events that followed the war reshaped the world as profoundly as the conflict itself.
Peter Clarke's book is the first to analyze the abrupt transition from Rule Britannia to Pax Americana. His swiftly paced narrative makes superb use of letters and diaries to provide vivid portraits of the figures around whom history pivoted: Churchill, Gandhi, Roosevelt, Stalin, Truman, and a host of lesser-known figures though whom Clarke brilliantly shows the human dimension of epochal events. The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire is a captivating work of popular history that shows how the events that followed the war reshaped the world as profoundly as the conflict itself.
April 27, 2023
Listened to the audiobook. 24 hours. A VERY detailed account of Britains demise as a world power.
Basically WW2 was not a good decision economically speaking but Churchill acted on behalf of the world when he declared war on Germany after the invasion of Poland.
India was at the same time demanding independence and after WW2 Britain was in India's debt.
There was too much political background for me and I could not remain interested in back-benchers strifes and in-house squabbles of the lesser known players.
All in all the book is very well done and a better history buff than me will get more from it.
Basically WW2 was not a good decision economically speaking but Churchill acted on behalf of the world when he declared war on Germany after the invasion of Poland.
India was at the same time demanding independence and after WW2 Britain was in India's debt.
There was too much political background for me and I could not remain interested in back-benchers strifes and in-house squabbles of the lesser known players.
All in all the book is very well done and a better history buff than me will get more from it.
February 26, 2021
World War 2 brought about the end of the British Empire. This book covers the issue nicely. the author is an Englishman, and his prose is very British, and very entertaining. A very good read for students of history and political science. There is something poignant about the descriptions of Churchill's desperate efforts to maintain Britain's position in the world in the last days of the war, as he cast about to avoid the inevitable liquidation of the empire. Highly recommended.
February 4, 2021
An important book chronicling the transfer of world power from Great Britain to the United States. This book helped me better understand the dynamics at play during WWII and the extent to which Great Britain had been damaged during WWI.
April 19, 2019
A very good and engaging read!
July 27, 2014
In The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Birth of the Pax Americana, historian Peter Clarke presents a history of how the a victorious Britain lost its empire just a few years after the end of the Second World War in Europe. The last thousand days of the British Empire existed between 1944-1977, culminating in the lost of India as a foreign colony and its partition into Pakistan. Clarke’s thesis is manifested in his three themes of the decline of the British Empire: first, the British lost power and influence at the end of World War Two, that power having been transferred to America. Two, Britain was unable to influence and help settle the Palestine situation for the Zionist and Jewish extremist. And third, Britain’s failed to achieve a compromise in India.
Filled with biographies and politics, The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire has perhaps a fourth consistent theme running throughout: that is, the impact of Lend-Lease. Bankrupt during the war, America aided the British as well as France and USSR with supplies and weapons to help sustain their military efforts and avoid direct American fighting early on. Although this kept the war going, it also created controversy in the United States over rather what was lent should be repaid. Roosevelt argued against this, claiming this was an unavoidable expense for the American people. Of the materials leased during the war, hardly any found its way back to the American government. Lend-Lease ended American neutrality; America would enter the war in Europe just a short nine months later.
Clarke highlights Canada, a less emphasized component of British relations during World War Two. The First and Second Quebec Conferences held there determined some of the major outcomes of the war such as the plans for the D-Day invasion for June 1944. Additionally, from the beginning, Canada had fought along side Britain and benefited indirectly from the Lend-Lease program with America. After the war, Canada’s economy was self-sustaining.
After VE Day, Britain’s economy steadily grew as the Labour Party pushed for the nationalization of many major industries, followed by tax increases. The welfare state broadened to include national health and pensions. Despite restructuring their economy, Britain had to face the inevitable lost of India and the decline of its empire in the East. India, having supported the British during the war with troops, was already in consideration for independence from Britain. After the war, Stafford Cripps continued negotiation with Britain’s withdrawal from India. Ultimately, Huhammad Ali Jinnah secured Pakistan, partitioning from India. Mahatma Gandhi played a vital role in securing India’s independence as the Dominion of India before his assassination in 1948. After his death, the Union of India dissolved, forming present-day India.
Peter Clarke presents an easily consumable version of the last years of Britain’s empire, largely in India, through diaries and newspaper articles that tell the stories of the major Allied characters involved in defeating the Axis powers plus negotiating a future home for the Jews and efforts to bring peace to India. His methods are easy to follow as he takes a narrative approach, normally through Churchill or Cripps, and incorporates heavily their personal writings as well as Churchill’s history of the war, specifically Triumph and Tragedy.
Clarke explains the transfer of power and influence from Britain to the United States. Supporting that despite Britain’s contribution, the notion of empire was no longer going to be a positive thing after VE Day. At almost six hundred pages, Clarke gives a very detailed history of the Second World War that explains how America superseded Britain by the war’s end. His usage of narrative and biography help to personalize the struggles endured by the war’s major decision makers.
Clarke’s usage of quotes from common British show an evolution in the mindset of the British from the start of the war until its finish. Most Britains felt their country could not survive without the empire to support their small island country. After the war, Clarke quotes many as having said that the empire was no unnecessary and that having a vast empire was a danger to them now. Empire was no longer an option and seen as a positive way of sustaining an economy.
Overall, Clarke’s work is very enjoyable and would recommend it to those who already have a general background in Britain and America during World War Two. His prose is well done and easy to read. His use of primary sources is delicately weaved throughout making it a smooth narrative and is neither clunky nor distracting.
Filled with biographies and politics, The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire has perhaps a fourth consistent theme running throughout: that is, the impact of Lend-Lease. Bankrupt during the war, America aided the British as well as France and USSR with supplies and weapons to help sustain their military efforts and avoid direct American fighting early on. Although this kept the war going, it also created controversy in the United States over rather what was lent should be repaid. Roosevelt argued against this, claiming this was an unavoidable expense for the American people. Of the materials leased during the war, hardly any found its way back to the American government. Lend-Lease ended American neutrality; America would enter the war in Europe just a short nine months later.
Clarke highlights Canada, a less emphasized component of British relations during World War Two. The First and Second Quebec Conferences held there determined some of the major outcomes of the war such as the plans for the D-Day invasion for June 1944. Additionally, from the beginning, Canada had fought along side Britain and benefited indirectly from the Lend-Lease program with America. After the war, Canada’s economy was self-sustaining.
After VE Day, Britain’s economy steadily grew as the Labour Party pushed for the nationalization of many major industries, followed by tax increases. The welfare state broadened to include national health and pensions. Despite restructuring their economy, Britain had to face the inevitable lost of India and the decline of its empire in the East. India, having supported the British during the war with troops, was already in consideration for independence from Britain. After the war, Stafford Cripps continued negotiation with Britain’s withdrawal from India. Ultimately, Huhammad Ali Jinnah secured Pakistan, partitioning from India. Mahatma Gandhi played a vital role in securing India’s independence as the Dominion of India before his assassination in 1948. After his death, the Union of India dissolved, forming present-day India.
Peter Clarke presents an easily consumable version of the last years of Britain’s empire, largely in India, through diaries and newspaper articles that tell the stories of the major Allied characters involved in defeating the Axis powers plus negotiating a future home for the Jews and efforts to bring peace to India. His methods are easy to follow as he takes a narrative approach, normally through Churchill or Cripps, and incorporates heavily their personal writings as well as Churchill’s history of the war, specifically Triumph and Tragedy.
Clarke explains the transfer of power and influence from Britain to the United States. Supporting that despite Britain’s contribution, the notion of empire was no longer going to be a positive thing after VE Day. At almost six hundred pages, Clarke gives a very detailed history of the Second World War that explains how America superseded Britain by the war’s end. His usage of narrative and biography help to personalize the struggles endured by the war’s major decision makers.
Clarke’s usage of quotes from common British show an evolution in the mindset of the British from the start of the war until its finish. Most Britains felt their country could not survive without the empire to support their small island country. After the war, Clarke quotes many as having said that the empire was no unnecessary and that having a vast empire was a danger to them now. Empire was no longer an option and seen as a positive way of sustaining an economy.
Overall, Clarke’s work is very enjoyable and would recommend it to those who already have a general background in Britain and America during World War Two. His prose is well done and easy to read. His use of primary sources is delicately weaved throughout making it a smooth narrative and is neither clunky nor distracting.
August 6, 2011
Starting in the last year of World War Two, with all of the financial implications that this had for Britain and her Empire, this carefully-researched book by Cambridge historian and former Master of Trinity Hall, Peter Clarke traces the intricate and interlaced relationship between such diverse threads as Lend-Lease, the Palestian/Jewish question, Indian independence, the United States' vision of postwar Europe, Churchill and the postwar Labour Government in a very readable way.
It also contains some wonderful anecdoted that add a human dimension to the war and world politicking that might otherwise be overwhelming, such as Churchill "pissing in the Rhine" after a picnic on its banks with Monty and Alanbrooke, and some nice characterisations of postwar Labour ministers, such as Bevin (seemingly more of an imperialist than even Churchill!), Sir Stafford Cripps and Gandhi sharing vegetarian tales, and the self-effacing Attlee, that most enigmatic of politicians.
Highly recommended to anyone who is interested in World War Two, the postwar period, the complications of giving independence to internally-torn India, the still current Arab-Jewish problems in Palestine, and Britain's parlous financial position having bankrupted itself in a World war, the final debit repayment of which was made only in 2006!
Only one word of criticism: occasionally gets bogged down in detail, but that is a small price to pay for its comprehensive record.
It also contains some wonderful anecdoted that add a human dimension to the war and world politicking that might otherwise be overwhelming, such as Churchill "pissing in the Rhine" after a picnic on its banks with Monty and Alanbrooke, and some nice characterisations of postwar Labour ministers, such as Bevin (seemingly more of an imperialist than even Churchill!), Sir Stafford Cripps and Gandhi sharing vegetarian tales, and the self-effacing Attlee, that most enigmatic of politicians.
Highly recommended to anyone who is interested in World War Two, the postwar period, the complications of giving independence to internally-torn India, the still current Arab-Jewish problems in Palestine, and Britain's parlous financial position having bankrupted itself in a World war, the final debit repayment of which was made only in 2006!
Only one word of criticism: occasionally gets bogged down in detail, but that is a small price to pay for its comprehensive record.
December 28, 2009
The decline of the British Empire started well before the Second World War, but the economic strain of conducting a global war, maintaining a large navy, holding onto a massive and increasingly restive empire and dealing with occasionally hostile allies put the final nails in its coffin. Clarke's account excels at capturing the personalities of British officials (Churchill, Keynes, Cripps and Monty are particularly well drawn) but other important players(Ghandhi, Truman, Stalin) get shorter shrift. The book rambles from Palestine to Greece to India to Poland and to long discussions of Lend Lease but somehow retains its focus and flow. My only criticism is that the author occasionally goes a bit too far beyond the main theme of the book, especially in the first half. The treatment of the differences over military strategy after the Normandy landings was overly long and detailed. While an important event in the shift from British to American dominance, the level of detail seemed beyond the remit of the book. Overall though, this was an illuminating narrative of this pivotal period in world history.
August 30, 2015
I just finished P.F. Clarke's "The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Birth of the Pax Americana." It was an ambitious work focusing both on the end of WWII and the early post-war period culminating with the partitions of India and Palestine and the inception of the Marshall Plan. It is a well-known story, but Clarke brings new life in both detail and thought. Churchill clearly is the center of the story, but he does an excellent job covering players large and small across the globe. As much as I have studied this era, I found his coverage of Lend Lease, the U.S. Loan, and the ramifications of international economics fascinating. This work does tackle some cherished mythologies of the formation of the "Special Relationship," particularly in terms of Washington's consistent unease and opposition to British a Imperial policy. I recommend this work as a fascinating treatment of a seminal time period.
August 26, 2016
it's not an easy reading book. it took too many pages of who said what to establish themes and positions of individuals especially on the western front and on lend-lease, while not dueling quite deep enough on India and Palestine. so instead of being a book that adequately explains the final days of the British empire, in my humble opinion, reading books that deal specifically on the summits, on the western front of ww2, on the independence of India and the founding of Israel will not only give one better understanding on the historical events, but also more enjoyable readings.
January 31, 2016
In a reasonably cogent and interesting fashion, this book presents the thoughts and actions of Roosevelt, Churchill, Truman, Atlee and 10's of other insiders beginning near the end of WWII and continuing until India and Pakistan were independent. The pages are full of the thoughts, opinions, comments and strategies of the players who caused Britain to lose as much or more in WWII as Germany and Japan. Fascinating!
Want to read
February 27, 2010I did not know about the lend-lease program, and its effects of Britain and the countries freed from its rule over this period. Sounds like an interesting book, although I'd rather the focus be less on military and more on other factors; and included more about non-European areas.
September 5, 2016
This is one of the most extraordinarily detailed history books I've ever read. I enjoyed that fact during the portion that dealt with Churchill, but found it growing old after that. Still, an excellent book.
Currently reading
October 31, 2009its a book about growing US role in our region started from 1941
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