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The Emotional Construction of Morals
Jesse Prinz argues that recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology supports two radical hypotheses about the nature of moral values are based on emotional responses, and these emotional responses are inculcated by culture, not hard-wired through natural selection.
In the first half of the book, Jesse Prinz defends the hypothesis that morality has an emotional foundation. Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are merely expressing our emotions. Prinz argues that these emotions do not track objective features of reality; rather, the rightness and wrongness of an act consists in the fact that people are disposed to have certain emotions towards it. In the second half of the book, he turns to a defense of moral relativism. Moral facts depend on emotional responses, and emotional responses vary from culture to culture. Prinz surveys the anthropological record to establish moral variation, and he draws on cultural history to show how attitudes toward practices such as cannibalism and marriage change over time. He also criticizes evidence from animal behavior and child development that has been taken to support the claim that moral attitudes are hard-wired by
natural selection. Prinz concludes that there is no single true morality, but he also argues that some moral values are better than others; moral progress is possible.
Throughout the book, Prinz relates his views to contemporary and historical work in philosophical ethics. His views echo themes in the writings of David Hume and Friedrich Nietzsche, but Prinz supports, extends, and revises these classic theories using the resources of cutting-edge cognitive science. The Emotional Construction of Morals will stimulate and challenge anyone who is curious about the nature and origin of moral values.
In the first half of the book, Jesse Prinz defends the hypothesis that morality has an emotional foundation. Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are merely expressing our emotions. Prinz argues that these emotions do not track objective features of reality; rather, the rightness and wrongness of an act consists in the fact that people are disposed to have certain emotions towards it. In the second half of the book, he turns to a defense of moral relativism. Moral facts depend on emotional responses, and emotional responses vary from culture to culture. Prinz surveys the anthropological record to establish moral variation, and he draws on cultural history to show how attitudes toward practices such as cannibalism and marriage change over time. He also criticizes evidence from animal behavior and child development that has been taken to support the claim that moral attitudes are hard-wired by
natural selection. Prinz concludes that there is no single true morality, but he also argues that some moral values are better than others; moral progress is possible.
Throughout the book, Prinz relates his views to contemporary and historical work in philosophical ethics. His views echo themes in the writings of David Hume and Friedrich Nietzsche, but Prinz supports, extends, and revises these classic theories using the resources of cutting-edge cognitive science. The Emotional Construction of Morals will stimulate and challenge anyone who is curious about the nature and origin of moral values.
348 pages, Paperback
First published October 1, 2007
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334 people want to read
About the author
Jesse J. Prinz
11 books43 followersJesse J. Prinz is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and director of the Committee for Interdisciplinary Science Studies at the City University of New York, Graduate Center. He lives in New York.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
July 13, 2010
Prinz argues for a sentimentalist theory of moral judgment. Moral concepts are essentially related to emotions and moral properties are dispositions to cause particular emotions. For example, the wrongness of an action is its tendency to cause in me, guilt when I do it and anger when others do it.
Prinz makes an important distinction between sentiments and emotions. A sentiment is a disposition (instantiated in the brain) to feel certain emotions in certain contexts, whereas an emotion is an occurrant mental state. Moral concepts and moral rules are instantiated in sentiments, while particular emotional reactions constitute moral judgments. This allows for moral judgments to be false (insofar as the emotional reaction is atypical and does not represent the appraiser’s general dispositions).
Prinz goes on to draw the implications of his theory. In particular, it supports appraiser-relativism. Moral judgments are true and false, but only relative to the person judging. When I say that “murder is wrong,” what I really mean is that I tend to feel angry when others commit murder and feel guilty when I commit murder. That is a true statement, but it is true relative to me. The statement, “murder is wrong,” would be false if uttered by a psychopath who feels no such anger or remorse. Prinz goes on to argue that his theory also entails agent-relativism: it makes no sense, on this theory, for us to say that it is wrong for the psychopath to murder.
Prinz’s theory is remarkably coherent, and he presents it in a convincing manner. But most of the arguments for the theory appear in the first chapter, and they are a bit sketchy. The rest of the book defends the theory against criticisms and provides the details that allow for both internal and external consistency. Though overall consistency is convincingly achieved, many parts of the theory are implausible when considered in isolation. A particularly striking example is Prinz’s suggestion, in defending relativism, that the horror of female genital mutilation is merely a subjective attitude on our part that reflects our western bias.
Prinz makes an important distinction between sentiments and emotions. A sentiment is a disposition (instantiated in the brain) to feel certain emotions in certain contexts, whereas an emotion is an occurrant mental state. Moral concepts and moral rules are instantiated in sentiments, while particular emotional reactions constitute moral judgments. This allows for moral judgments to be false (insofar as the emotional reaction is atypical and does not represent the appraiser’s general dispositions).
Prinz goes on to draw the implications of his theory. In particular, it supports appraiser-relativism. Moral judgments are true and false, but only relative to the person judging. When I say that “murder is wrong,” what I really mean is that I tend to feel angry when others commit murder and feel guilty when I commit murder. That is a true statement, but it is true relative to me. The statement, “murder is wrong,” would be false if uttered by a psychopath who feels no such anger or remorse. Prinz goes on to argue that his theory also entails agent-relativism: it makes no sense, on this theory, for us to say that it is wrong for the psychopath to murder.
Prinz’s theory is remarkably coherent, and he presents it in a convincing manner. But most of the arguments for the theory appear in the first chapter, and they are a bit sketchy. The rest of the book defends the theory against criticisms and provides the details that allow for both internal and external consistency. Though overall consistency is convincingly achieved, many parts of the theory are implausible when considered in isolation. A particularly striking example is Prinz’s suggestion, in defending relativism, that the horror of female genital mutilation is merely a subjective attitude on our part that reflects our western bias.
June 26, 2016
Jesse Prinz is probably one of the most frustrating people for me to read, for the same reason Robert Cray is the hardest guitarist for me to listen to; as I work through the manuscript, I'm struck simultaneously by aspiration and desperation.
This is Prinz's full length stab at metaethics and really the best book length articulation of the developing constructivist programme. As is Prinz's style, it's thick with moves through the cognitive scientific literature, and gestures to contemporary and historical philosophical literature. This makes it a really rich and thorough overview, but probably not the best introduction to the constructivist view for those who are unfamiliar. It is, however, a good piece of writing for those familiar with and writing on the constructivist project to have access to as a general starting point for talking about various features of the view (e.g. subjectivism; the difference between the social and the moral; mind-dependence; etc.). Every philosopher has idiosyncracies to their version of any philosophically interesting view; but Prinz does a pretty good job clarifying which of his own positions are idiosyncratic and which are more well accepted by sympathetic constructivists.
Prinz, in particular, writes from a strong philosophy of mind standpoint and focuses heavily on the mind-dependence claims about moral values (in contrast to, e.g., the epistemic necessity of mind dependence that someone like Street argues for) and I think this is a pretty good way to go about articulating the view, especially for the various philosophers not as intimately familiar with contemporary ethics and metaethics. (It's probably not the most compelling approach for articulating the book to entrenched ethicists; but you can't do everything at once.)
I think this book is a terrific place to take a graduate level seminar in metaethics, especially as a response to Parfit's "On What Matters" (vol 2 and 3, especially) and generally as a preface to constructivist approaches as a counterpoint. The fact that Prinz comments directly on issues including relativism, moral epistemology, and many of the concerns that worm they way into first-order ethics really shows how thoughtful and well developed the book is, and how much work Prinz put into making sure this would communicate well with input from a lot of philosophical domains.
As always, I walk away from one of Prinz's books both better informed and impressed by the argument. In this case, I happened to agree with him pretty strongly going into the book (minus some minutiae on exactly how the account handles some particular issues) but still feel like he did a good job taking concerns and counter arguments seriously. I would strongly recommend this book to those interested in contemporary work in metaethics, provided that person can read philosophy at a graduate level.
This is Prinz's full length stab at metaethics and really the best book length articulation of the developing constructivist programme. As is Prinz's style, it's thick with moves through the cognitive scientific literature, and gestures to contemporary and historical philosophical literature. This makes it a really rich and thorough overview, but probably not the best introduction to the constructivist view for those who are unfamiliar. It is, however, a good piece of writing for those familiar with and writing on the constructivist project to have access to as a general starting point for talking about various features of the view (e.g. subjectivism; the difference between the social and the moral; mind-dependence; etc.). Every philosopher has idiosyncracies to their version of any philosophically interesting view; but Prinz does a pretty good job clarifying which of his own positions are idiosyncratic and which are more well accepted by sympathetic constructivists.
Prinz, in particular, writes from a strong philosophy of mind standpoint and focuses heavily on the mind-dependence claims about moral values (in contrast to, e.g., the epistemic necessity of mind dependence that someone like Street argues for) and I think this is a pretty good way to go about articulating the view, especially for the various philosophers not as intimately familiar with contemporary ethics and metaethics. (It's probably not the most compelling approach for articulating the book to entrenched ethicists; but you can't do everything at once.)
I think this book is a terrific place to take a graduate level seminar in metaethics, especially as a response to Parfit's "On What Matters" (vol 2 and 3, especially) and generally as a preface to constructivist approaches as a counterpoint. The fact that Prinz comments directly on issues including relativism, moral epistemology, and many of the concerns that worm they way into first-order ethics really shows how thoughtful and well developed the book is, and how much work Prinz put into making sure this would communicate well with input from a lot of philosophical domains.
As always, I walk away from one of Prinz's books both better informed and impressed by the argument. In this case, I happened to agree with him pretty strongly going into the book (minus some minutiae on exactly how the account handles some particular issues) but still feel like he did a good job taking concerns and counter arguments seriously. I would strongly recommend this book to those interested in contemporary work in metaethics, provided that person can read philosophy at a graduate level.
August 5, 2021
A provocative take on morality that weaves together an abundance of empirical evidence with innovative metaethical thinking. Ultimately, it falls short of being convincing as an entire argument, but there are many interesting and useful observations and arguments that make this a strong counterpoint to much of the conventional thinking in metaethics.
January 8, 2021
This book completely changed my perception of the epistemology of morals.
January 11, 2026
ok cool théorie des émotions mais toujours pas chaud de dîner avec des cannibales en vrai
July 12, 2013
An excellent, thorough-going, and rigorous defense of a sensibility theory of morality. It's one of the best defenses of moral relativism that I've read. The sections on moral judgment and hidden indexicals, genealogy, and the limitations of evolutionary approaches to morality are particularly good, I think. The discussion of moral progress from a relativist standpoint is also notable. Prinz's The Emotional Construction of Morals will be of interest to a wide range of scholars in academic philosophy including specialists in meta-ethics, the science of morality, Hume, and Nietzsche. General readers will find it accessible, although they may find some of the more technical discussions found in some sections difficult (e.g. sections on objectivity, meaning of moral judgments).
June 30, 2017
Jesse's endeavour is a tour the force. He goes on point by point, objection by objection, author by author with responses with creative insights and profound knowledge. It's commendable to see this kind of rigorous work in academia, in an age we're surrounded by nonsense and not rigorous postmodern thought. His writing is clear, engaging and thought through.
The overall resulting theory is cogent, although yet not perfectly polished.
Hume is alive and kicking.
The overall resulting theory is cogent, although yet not perfectly polished.
Hume is alive and kicking.
March 26, 2014
Contentious but tautly argued and packed with illustration. Essential reading for anyone with a serious interest in ethics. The critique of Aristotle's theory of the golden mean is particularly cogent.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews