England's Last War Against France: Fighting Vichy 1940-1942

by Colin Smith

The last shots fired between England and France weren’t during the Napoleonic Age, but rather during World War II, when Vichy, France was left unoccupied by the Nazi regime in return for their collaboration. For more than two years, from the summer of 1940 through November of 1942, British forces engaged the Vichy French on land, sea and air. Thousands of lives were lost, and the history of this conflict was buried—until now. Through painstaking historical research, historian Colin Smith throws back the veil of secrecy to detail this last bloody conflict between modern Europe’s great powers.   

 

Genres: History, France, World War II, Nonfiction, Military History, War, British Literature

490 pages, Hardcover

First published September 1, 2009

About the author

Colin Smith, author of ’England’s Last War Against France', ‘Singapore Burning’ and most recently collaborator in Andrew Borowiec's Warsaw Boy,was brought up in the British Midlands.
At 18 he had the chance to join the Guernsey Evening Press as a cub reporter.
Jobs on several other provincial newspapers followed and in 1968, after working on the Birmingham Post and the Daily Sketch, he joined David Astor’s Observer.

Smith lives with his wife Sylvia in Nicosia where, in the late 1970’s, he was first based as The Observer’s Middle East correspondent. In more recent years he has concentrated on writing books, both fiction and non-fiction but mostly the same school of narrative history.

Smith's first book was Carlos - Portrait of a Terrorist, which came out of a three part Observer series following the Venezuelan’s 1976 raid on OPEC’s Vienna headquarters and the kidnapping of the oil ministers. Revised after Carlos’ capture in 1995 and published as a Mandarin Paperback, in 2012, after a Paris court sentenced the terrorist to a second term life imprisonment for bombings in France in the 1980's, it was revised yet again.

He has pubished three novels, all with Palestinian themes. Spies of Jerusalem is set in the Ottoman Palestine of 1917 as outnumbred Turkish and German forces do their best to thwart Britain's General Allenby as his army advances on Jerusalem; Let Us Do Evil takes place in Mandate Palestine during World War Two where some Jews see the British as their main enemy and make a pact with the Devil; his thriller Collateral Damage sees a vengeful widower on the trail of the man who killed his wife as the Cold War terrorism that plagued Western European capitals in the 1970's becomes a very hot war indeed in Beirut and southern Lebanon.

Reviews

[Manray9 · Rating 2 out of 5]

Colin Smith's "England's Last War Against France" is almost a great book. It is a wide-ranging and stylishly written account of the conflict between Churchill's England and Vichy France after the Nazi victory of 1940. Smith is a good writer of prose who apparently spared little effort in fully exploiting British sources and those French accounts available in translation. Primary accounts by French participants, however, are noticeably absent from the bibliography. Smith does not succumb to the traps often experienced by writers of history. Academics often reduce events to narratives so dry and accounts so cautious as to be virtually unreadable by laymen. Journalists tend to concentrate on a "good story" to the detriment of balance or the requirements of history. Smith creates a balanced work that should have earned him a five-star rating

"England's Last War Against France" should be a great book. It is not. It suffers from a regrettable lack of attention to detail in writing and production. The volume is marred by a surprising number of misspellings, typographical errors, and just plain mistakes of fact. These include:
- The German pocket-battleship "Graf Spee" is referred to as "Gruff Spee" on page 98.
- Noted Australian soldier and diplomat, Roden Cutler, winner of the Victoria Cross in Syria, is referred to as Butler on page 234.
- British ship classes are not printed as titles, e.g., "the flower class corvette Jasmine" should read "the Flower-class corvette Jasmine (see page 326) and the "county class cruiser HMS Devonshire" should be "County-class cruiser HMS Devonshire" on page 313.
- The maps are riddled with misspellings. Major Keyes' positions on the map on page 190 are listed as the positions of Maj. Keys. The map on page 292 shows Ambararaia rather than Ambararata Bay, while references to Antsirane and Antisarane move back and forth in the text and maps. There are even more map errors than those just listed.
- The sentence regarding Sir Samuel Hoare on page 143 only makes sense if the word flattery is changed to flatterer. On page 253 the sentence on the French Dewoitine aircraft only makes sense if "squadrons" replaces "squadron."
-On page 311 Venezuela's Lake Maracaibo becomes "Lake Maricibo."
-Unfortunately for the memory of the esteemed soldier and adventurer Fitzroy MacLean, Compton Mackenzie is given credit on page 238 for MacLean's "Eastern Approaches." Mackenzie's book, correctly listed in the bibliography, is "Eastern Epic."
- Many tankers of World War II would have been surprised to find out the M4 Sherman was a heavy tank (page 413). The Sherman was a medium tank.
- The leader of the Russian Provisional Government was Alexander Kerensky, not Karensky, as on page 19. Kerensky is spelled correctly in the index.

These errors may seem minor, but they undermine the credibility of "England's Last War Against France." The book is just shoddy work. Serious effort in copy editing and proofreading would have contributed greatly to the production of a fine volume of history with pride of place on the small shelf devoted to Britain's heroic stand against Vichyite collaborationism.

[Cold War Conversations Podcast · Rating 4 out of 5]

Solid account of the war with Vichy France

Ask most people when Britain was last at war with France, they’d say Waterloo. This well researched account provides the casual reader with great insight into a relatively little known aspect of World War 2.

Smith writes well creating a rare read that works for the non-military historian whilst making it detailed enough for readers wanting a more detailed view point.

A good balanced account of a little know part of World War 2.

Thanks to netgalley for the review copy.

[Emmanuel Gustin · Rating 5 out of 5]

This story is far more interesting than the rather obscure subject seems to promise. Colin Smith has managed to write an account that weaves together the personal experiences and recollections of the men at the front with the grand strategy of the men in government, never losing sight of the human perspectives. It probably helped that the scale of the conflict between Vichy France and Britain was often small, involving thousands of men at a time when millions fought on other fronts.
But many of these battles still resulted in absurdly unnecessary death and destruction, caused by the warped sense of honor of officers who somehow felt obliged to sent their men to die for a cause that was both bad and lost. Smith is sharp in his condemnation of such behaviour, but otherwise conveys insight in and sympathy for many of the men who played out their role in this story.
It was an odd conflict, in which men who had been allies in a recent past and might soon be allies again, fought each other with a murderous politeness that Louis XIV would have considered rather quaint. And afterwards many preferred to forget about it completely, but it should not be, and Smith tells the story well.

[Ozymandias · Rating 3 out of 5]

World War 2 is weird. Everybody knows the sort of conventional narrative, but that skips back and forth to the interesting bits while leaving out an awful lot in between. And nowhere is that more true than the opening years of the war. Reading the history books you'd be forgiven for thinking that after the humiliating Battle of France in 1940 land battles ended for the English until Operation Torch in 1942. Well they didn't. England was busy fighting a lot of battles. Just not in the heart of Europe. And often not against the Germans but the Vichy French.

So this book aims to tell the account of Britain's wars with Vichy France. It takes us to Syria, Tasmania, and ultimately Africa. It is not a glorious tale of success. The heroes are ambiguous and the villains moreso. I found myself constantly wondering why the French fought so fiercely against the English. He did try to set this up beforehand. Before the fall of France, the emphasis placed on Anglophobia in the French command and England's dismissive treatment of French concerns was very illuminating. And the following around of Admiral Darlan offered something of an explanation.

But overall I found myself perplexed. Two allies so firmly in step during the last war falling out because one lost so utterly? I could at least understand the viewpoint of Darlan and other leaders of the government. The war having been lost, it became essential to gain France as much independence as could be achieved through diplomacy. And if that meant getting rid of a few undesirable Jews and Communists so be it. Few in the army would miss them, not even an old Dreyfusard like Darlan.

But what made the average soldier so vehemently anti-British? That seems to be the major question that needs to be answered here. The British were very reluctant, why not the French? And ultimately I felt it remained an enigma. Maybe that's what it has to be. After all, every man's reaction is different. But I felt that the book could have achieved more beyond perplexity. Examples of petty French bitterness were disgusting. "You thought we were yellow, didn’t you? You thought we couldn’t fight in France. You thought we were like the Italians. Well, we’ve shown you." What a waste of human life, killing allies to salve your masculinity. But was this really typical of the whole? Was there no ambiguity among the French command? I don't know. And since we only ever consider the question from the English side (were there perhaps a shortage of embarrassed French memoirs?) we're left entirely in the dark.

The warzones were described quite ably and with a good deal of color. The author has some experience with the Middle East and knows how to describe it. Each region is given a personality and style that sets it apart from the others. You get a pretty good idea of what life was like in French Tasmania for example, at least for the narrow viewpoint of a French soldier.

The battles themselves were somewhat muddled affairs. The book really only follows a limited set of viewpoints, mainly English memoirs, and tries to add a little context. But on the whole I thought it brought only a narrow vision to the conflict. It feels anecdotal rather than analytical, but it lacks the immediacy of a participant. Larger strategic concerns are largely absent. By focusing on Anglo-French engagements rather than general ones we're left at a bit of a loss what to make of, say, the Battle of Crete and what that means for the strategic situation.

Someday someone will write the history of the first two (non-American) years of the war. They'll cover underexplored theaters like Ethiopia, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Greece, and put all of this into the greater context of the overall war. Until that day I suppose this book will do. It certainly made me more curious about Vichy, if only because its coverage of that government was so spotty. But it's a fascinating topic that becomes only a reasonably interesting book. And that, I feel, is a waste.

[Les McGuire · Rating 4 out of 5]

I blame my 40-something kid for getting me interested in the topic of WWs I and II, but it has fascinated me ever since he did. My dad fought in WWII, which helped spark the interest, but the idea of the French and British in conflict with each other was a strange one to me.
The coverage of the various battles and intrigue behind some of the decisions the play makers made was excellent. While I did enjoy the inclusion of much of the obscure detail that Colin Smith provided, (I imagine that he went to great lengths to collect it) there was often just too much of it; such that it made the primary elements of the story more difficult to follow. I expected the writing style to be more British English than American English, but the last time I recall such lengthy sentences was during a recent re-reading of Robinson Crusoe. At least Defoe had little previously published work to guide him in any other direction, as his creation is regarded as a contender for the first English novel. The problem with trying to tie too many things into a long sentence is that you can lose your readers on whatever point you want them to get. It was quite distracting to have to reread sentences a number of times. Defoe's long sentences at least made sense.
I was nearly half-way through before I decided to make notes for a review, so I didn't capture some grammatical errors that also made the read more difficult than it needed to be. In my opinion, Mr. Smith would have benefited greatly from a more thorough editing of the work before publication. I did capture a dozen or so sentences that I thought were unnecessarily confusing. To avoid the splash-back from the tomatoes I'm throwing, I'll provide only two:

Pétain had been a 14-year-old boarder at a strict Catholic school in the marshy flatlands of his native Pas de Calais when the Franco-Prussian War - usually referred to as the debacle until the next debacle some seventy years later - persuaded him that his vocation was for the military and not, as he had believed for most of his boyhood, in holy orders. (pp 15)
Between them the Ist Essex and the Wiltshire Yeomanry had succeeded in capturing the Chateau, the site of an ancient fortress northwest of the town, and Yellow ridge, a tactical bump in the ground with a decent field of fire which at one point the French had recaptured and the Essex recovered. (pp 254)

Overall, I loved the subject matter and the coverage. While the difficulties pointed out here were distracting, I would recommend the book to anyone with an interest in the war period.

[F.R. · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a piece of recent history I had very little knowledge of – how in The Second World War, Britain (and latterly America) found itself in conflict not only with Germany, but with France as well. The Vichy government opposed the allies from its North African strongholds, causing a great loss of life and equipment. Often these were brutal encounters, but more than that they were an irritating distraction for the allies as they tried to concentrate on fighting the main enemies.

(It must have been quite discombobulating to volunteer – or be conscripted – into the British Army to [at least in part] defend what had happened to France, and then find yourself getting shot at by Frenchmen.)

If I’m honest, I’m not a great fan of all that Alistair Maclean derring-do stuff (you can keep your C.S. Forester as well). So there was an element of this book’s structure – battle after engagement after battle – which I found a little wearying. But then some of the descriptions do carry a great deal of vim and excitement, and I began to suspect by the end that how much I enjoyed each particular chapter depended on what kind of mood I was in at that moment, rather than anything the author actually did.

This is an interesting tale, told in an uncluttered and straightforward style. Like many narratives of this period it has quite definite good guys and bad guys, and when you read about some of the bad guys in Vichy France – still seeming to believe that the Nazis were right even after Hitler’s death – you are astounded at how wrong-headed, and unable to admit errors of judgement, some men can be.

[Michael · Rating 5 out of 5]

Brilliant read

Well researched, balanced too and raises plenty of moral questions.

Vichy France is rarely spoken about and it’s undeniable that the history has been rewritten by De Gaulle and co, desperate to avoid the extremely questionable collaboration with Hitler.

That said, who are we to judge them, the decisions they had to make were awful.

One particular naval commander sailed his Cruiser out to take on 144 Allied ships because those were his orders and yet he believed that he should be fighting with the Allies against the Axis powers. He died.

For anyone interested in WW2, this should be a must read.

[Thomas McCall · Rating 4 out of 5]

An exhaustive narrative history of Britain's war with Vichy France. This book provides much needed detail of the campaigns fought in Lebanon, Syria, Madagascar and French North Africa which are usually dismissed or summarised as "walk overs" or sideshows. Smith convincingly shows they were not. As noted by other reviewers there is a lack of French sources and more detail on Darlan's demise and the legal end of the Vichy regime would have been welcome. These are, however, quibbles in what was a thorough and interesting book.

[Paul W · Rating 4 out of 5]

When France fell to the German invasion in 1940 it stood at a cross roads.
It could remain a defeated and dejected country, led by the aging hero of the first world war, Marshal Pétain, but defending itself against any attacks. It could regain its honour, by following General de Gaulle, who had risen from relative obscurity to issue a rallying call to all Frenchmen to form the Free French. Or it could join the totalitarian powers and heed Pierre Laval’s call to fight alongside Germany against their erstwhile ally, the British and its Commonwealth of Nations.
However, rather than committing to one of these paths, the French chose all three, and were ineffectual at all of them.
Smith’s engaging story starts with the making and breaking of the Entente Cordiale, the 1904 Anglo-French agreement reconciling past differences between Britain and France, which was broken with the fall of the Third Republic on 22 June 1940. Britain’s Mediterranean strategy had been based on collaboration between the British and French fleets at sea, and containment of Italian forces on land in Libya and East Africa. France’s defeat turned the tables. Italy now had a larger navy at sea, and larger land forces in Libya and East Africa than the British Commonwealth forces.

After negotiations failed, the undeclared war between Britain and Vichy France opened on 3 July 1940 with attacks on French ships in Britain and Mers-el-Kébir in Algeria, ‘the first shots exchanged between official representative of the British and French military in the 125 years since Waterloo.’ In Cairo, Admiral Cunningham managed to defy Churchill’s orders, and negotiated a peaceful resolution with his French counterpart, Amiral Godfroy. Five days later, an attack on French ships at Dakar in French West Africa turned into a fiasco with near collisions, engine failures and depth charges that failed to explode with the British forced to ignominiously withdraw.
Smith’s description of these events is detailed and brings to life the personalities of those involved. However he does not shed any light on why the French at Mers-el-Kébir had failed to take simple precautions and were so woefully unprepared for the ‘perfidious’ British attack.
French Amiral Gensoul in Mers-el-Kébir warned the British representative Captain Cedric Holland, that ‘the first shot fired would not only alienate the whole French navy but would be tantamount to a declaration of war between France and Great Britain.’ The US representative in France, warned the US president that ‘The intense anger caused in France by the British attacks on the French Navy is so universal at Vichy...that little stands between French acts of war against Britain except the good sense of Marshal Pétain.’ But, at Pétain’s insistence, the Vichy French reaction to the attack which killed over 1300 French sailors was mooted – limited to a few ineffective raids on Gibraltar and severing diplomatic relations with Britain for the first time since 1815. However it also saw the French Assembly vote for its own extinction, resulting in the fascist Pierre Laval, taking command.

Three months later, a joint Anglo-French force sailed for Dakar. Having been a strong advocate for the operation to start with, at the last minute Churchill got cold feet and tried unsuccessfully to call it off. Like the first aborted attack on Dakar, Operation Menace also turned into a fiasco. A British diplomat described the landing by the Free French fusiliers marins as “pathetic” and accused them of lacking both leadership and training and “even the minimum required for brave men to dash for an objective”. Having regained his courage, Churchill signalled “Having begun we must go on to the end. Stop at nothing”, not counting on the resolve of Vichy French Governor Boisson: 'France has entrusted me Dakar. I shall Defend Dakar to the end'. When the French submarine Bévéziers slid out of Dakar and lurked at periscope depth amongst the Allied fleet, only poor judgement by the French prevented two British battleships being sunk. After three ineffectual days Churchill finally took the decision to abandon the ill-conceived operation. The UK’s Daily Mirror editorialised that the Dakar blunder made the Norwegian campaign look like ‘a distinguished naval exploit ... Dakar has claims to rank with the lowest depths of imbecility to which we have yet sunk.’
To deflect blame from himself, Churchill found a scapegoat in Admiral Dudley North, the Gibraltar based commander of the Royal Navy’s North Atlantic Station. North, being unaware of Operation Menace, had, in accordance with the Admiralty’s standing orders, allowed six French warships to sail through the Straits of Gibraltar to Dakar. (For a more complete overview of the role played by Admiral Dudley North, see Neil Monks, That Day at Gibraltar, Frederick Muller Ltd, London, 1957)
For a second time, France considered a formal declaration of war against its erstwhile ally, Britain. But again, despite German encouragement, France stepped back from the brink.

In 1941 the undeclared war between Vichy France and Britain flared again – this time in the Middle East. This conflict forms Part 2 of Smith’s narrative. Following a coup by four Iraqi colonels who called themselves the Golden Square, the Allies rushed forces to Iraq from India, and with obsolete planes and trainee pilots, held off an Iraqi siege at Habbaniya air base. Having assigned responsibility for Iraq to Auchinleck in India, Churchill changed his mind after the coup and handed responsibility back to the over-committed Wavell – who was already trying to deal with campaigns in North Africa, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Greece and Crete – and insisted he divert forces from North Africa to quell the Iraqi rebellion.
The Germans also decided to support the Iraqi colonels, with a belated realisation of the strategic potential this offered. This required Vichy French support in Syria. Planes flown to Iraq refuelled at Syrian airfields. Weapons stored with the Armistice Commission in Syria were released for use by Vichy and the Iraqi army.
With Germans now threatening the back door of the Allies in the Middle East, Churchill was persuaded to adopt a hare-brained scheme devised by the Free French to invade Syria, and insisted that Wavell, despite his valid protestations, support this too.
On 7 June 41, the Allies invaded Syria with a force comprising fewer troops, fewer aircraft and no tanks than their opponents. The Allied units leading yet another Churchill-driven fiasco were Australian. They were supported by the Free French forces of Major General Paul Louis Legentilhomme as well as three Indian brigades, two British brigades, a Czechoslovak battalion, a battalion of French Foreign Legionnaires, Syrian Circassian cavalry, Senegalese troops and equatorial African troops from Chad.
The Allied forces were opposed by the Vichy French Armèe du Levant commanded by Legentilhomme’s friend Raoul de Verdilhac. The French-officered Armèe was comprised primarily of Algerians, Lebanese, Moroccans, Senegalese, Syrians and Tunisians supported by French Foreign Legionnaires.
The invasion was predicated on the naive hope that the Vichy French would put up no more than a token resistance. Instead, at one location just six Vichy French Foreign Legionnaires kept two battalions of British cavalry at bay for a week. At Palmyra twenty-four Vichy French Syrians held up 3,000 British troops for 12 days.
James notes in his book (see below), ‘the Allied campaign got off to a bad start when General ‘Jumbo’ Wilson was appointed as commander. Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, found it 'Difficult to identify the qualities that justified Wilson’s high rank.” Smith glosses over the limitations of Wilson as a commander. James’ book on the Syrian campaign more completely brings Wilson’s incompetence to life with the anecdotes he relates.
Under the inept leadership of Jumbo Wilson, the Allies split their already limited and inferior force into three columns. Vichy French Général Dentz, as James notes, had not assumed that the British would do something quite as pedestrian as attack with three parallel columns along the three rather obvious geographical routes.
Wavell’s doubts about the Free French were realised when the Free French Foreign Legion forces, on encountering the Vichy French Foreign Legion forces, paid respect to the unwritten but unbreakable rule that 'Legion does not fight Legion’ and ‘took no further part in the campaign'.
At the end of the first week the Allies had made limited progress. The Allies under Wilson had ‘managed to neglect a fairly impressive array of the most important principles of warfare: their force was not concentrated; their command lacked unity and continuity; their resources were misused; and they reinforced failure rather than success.’ When the Vichy French launched successful counterattacks, the ‘very meagre resources’ that had been allocated to Operation Exporter, limited the Allies ability to respond, and saw the campaign drag out.
The battle turned when the Australian General Lavarack took over primary responsibility for the battle from Wilson, and as additional forces were deployed. Despite the bravery of the African soldiers, the Allies were assisted by the Vichy French leadership’s hesitant use of their tanks and timid troop deployments. James, but not Smith, points out that had Dentz’s columns ‘pushed on further at Merdjayoun, Kuneitra, and Ezraa, he may have cut off the Allied force inside Syria and achieved an improbable and brilliant victory. As it was, his commanders halted and consolidated their gains…’ (For a more complete overview of this campaign, see Richard James, Australia’s War with France: The Campaign in Syria and Lebanon, 1941, Big Sky Publishing, Newport New South Wales, 2017)

Another year went by before the next phase: the Allied invasion of the Vichy French controlled Madagascar. At 590,000 square kilometres, Madagascar is larger than France but in 1942 was garrisoned by only 8000 Vichy French soldiers, primarily local Malagasy, supplemented by Senegalese tirailleurs, whose defence of the island resulted in a ‘Quixotic defiance so irrelevant to the rest of the world conflict.’ The initial British force of three brigades met virtually no resistance to their beach landings in May 1942 (Operation Ironclad), but were surprised when they encountered the heavily defended Vichy French naval base of Antisarane and the fortified ‘Joffre line’. The Vichy French managed to knock out 10 of the 12 tanks the British had brought to the island. But the French failed to press home their advantage. They appealed from assistance from the Japanese, but none was forthcoming, and the British were able to capture Diego Suarez at the northern end of the island.
In the next three months two of the three British brigades were replaced by east and southern African commonwealth forces. In September 1942 the Allies commenced Operation Stream Line Jane, conducting three separate operations - two amphibious landings and an advance overland to the capital Tannanarive. After a long delaying withdrawal, the Vichy French surrendered on 8 November 1942. As another author has noted, the French held out longer against the Allies in Madagascar in 1942 than they had against the Germans in 1940.

Act 4 of the undeclared war was Operation Torch, the combined Anglo-American assault in November 1942 on Vichy French controlled Morocco and Algeria. Against more determined opposition, Operation Torch would have been a failure.
An attempt to seize Oran harbour, Operation Reservist, resulted in 90 per cent casualties in the Anglo-American troops involved. The attack on the port at Algiers, Operation Terminal, resulted in the death or capture of all the American troops. The first American airborne operation, Operation Villain, ended in disaster after a calamity of errors with transports, short on fuel shot down or forced to land by Vichy French fighters, landing in Spanish Morocco, and landing in Gibraltar, after homing signals were not sent, sent on the wrong frequency, and sent at the wrong time. As Smith notes ‘The spectacular failure of [these operations] might have given the French so much encouragement it could have been the undoing of Operation Torch or at least brought about the kind of prolonged resistance seen in Syria.’ But by good luck and sheer weight of numbers, the Allies prevailed and reclaimed Morocco and Algeria. But not Tunisia. The ultimate goal of Operation Torch had been the quick occupation of Tunisia to prevent the Germans reinforcing the Axis forces in North Africa. But the delays they experienced allowed the Germans to rapidly transport troops to Tunisia, and would see the campaign in North Africa extended another seven months.
But even this final act in the undeclared war between Vichy France and the Allies, did not result in a formal declaration of war by France. Instead the lack of sustained resistance by the Vichy French convinced the Germans that France could not be trusted.

Along the way, Smith introduces the reader to many individuals whose actions changed the course of history. Smith’s well-researched anecdotes brings to life their actions in each of these campaigns, some heroic, some comical, and some farcical.

Given the title of the book, Smith focuses on the deployment of English troops. However, given that all of the battles were fought with troops from the Commonwealth and other allies, this results in a narrative which exaggerates the strengths of the British troops, underplays their limitations, and understates the role played by troops from other countries.
Unfortunately, poor editing and reviewing by the publisher has resulted in errors scattered throughout the text, which undermines a reader's confidence in the accuracy of the narrative. Map 2 on East Africa mixes up Italian and British Somaliland. The German pocket battleship was the Graf Spee not the Gruff Spee (p98). The attack on Dakar was Operation Menace, not Operation Matador (p128): Operation Matador was a plan of the British Malaya Command to move forces into position to counter a Japanese amphibious attack on Malaya. At times, events occur out of order or no dates are noted, for example, the role of 11 Commando in the Battle of Litani River.

But these points are relatively minor. Overall, Smith has written an engaging history of an undeclared war that both sides were eager to gloss over and forget when, with the British and French fighting once again as allies, victory was finally declared in 1945.

[James Crawford · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a very interesting book. It seems that once the Nazis were going to overrun France there were numerous French boats that left their coastline. Some sailed to English ports and some sailed to ports in Africa.

The English did not want any of these boats to end up being used by the Nazis. Many of the boats that had docked in England were overrun by English soldiers and taken by force. Those near Africa were bottled up by English ships. They were told they could turn the boats over to the English, sail their boats somewhere else or be fired upon.

The English ended up firing on them. The attack involved both boats and planes. The result of these attacks were 350 wounded French and killed 1, 297 of them.

These were Frenchmen killed that had fled the Nazis and had no intention of fighting against England. The only reason they fought back was because they were attacked by a country that supposedly was supporting a free France.

That part was pretty shocking. The rest of the book dealt with England's continued war with the Vichy (Nazi-supported) government of France.

One other thing that surprised me was that biplanes appeared to be used a lot in these attacks and in other action. These planes were terribly outdated but apparently with good pilots they fought well.

[Guy L. Tirk · Rating 4 out of 5]

A well written work on little known actions in the Second World War that pitted Great Britain against Vichy forces in West Africa, North Africa, the Levant, Iraq, and Madagascar. The author’s coverage of interactions between Berlin and Vichy also added much to understanding of Vichy actions in the French overseas territories up to, and including, Operation TORCH. My only complaint is the lack of endnotes sourcing the material covered. The lack of sourcing was partly mitigated through the author’s acknowledgments and bibliography, but it wasn’t quite enough. Regardless, it’s an excellent read on a topic that is rarely adequately addressed.

[Dan McCarthy · Rating 5 out of 5]

An in depth look at the battles fought between the allies and Vichy France, 1940-1942. Often overlooked or just forgotten, this period of surreal fighting between former and future allies is an unusual chapter in World War Two history. The sinking of the French fleet at Mers-al-kabir, the attempted invasion of Dakar, the campaigns in Syria and Madagascar, and finally Operation Torch are all covered in great detail.

[Will · Rating 5 out of 5]

Quite an amazing book about the amazing, tragic, undeclared war between England and Vichy France between June 1940 and November 1942. I often thought while reading this book that this particular conflict was one of the saddest and most unnecessary I ever read about. I learned quite a lot I did not know, for instance about the Battle for Madagascar! I never knew that. Extremely well-written and informative. Recommended.

[Dan Cohen · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a good book describing the context and detail of British military actions against Vichy France, primarily in the Middle East and North Africa. It also covers the politics of Vichy France itself, the relationships between the Vichy French and the Germans, and US involvement. Not exactly a thrilling read but well written and thorough, so well worth reading if you are interested in this less well-known part of the second world war.

[Jim Foley · Rating 5 out of 5]

If you like World War Two history - particularly from a British perspective - Colin Smith is great. Both his previous “El Alamein” and this one are superb as Smith details the British military efforts against Vichy France in Africa and the Middle East. He gathers a amazing cast of characters - Paddy Mayne, Evelyn Waugh, Randolph Churchill, Moshe Dayan, and many others - in what has the makings of a 20 hour Netflix film.

[Titus Hackman · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent. I’ve just rewritten history in my head. France has lied about their role in the fight against the Nazis and in doing so, sullied the memories of those Frenchmen and women who did risk their lives so bravely and died at the hands of the Nazis to free the world of the horrors of the fascist regime.

It should be a source of National shame.

[Mandi Reader · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fascinating and eye-opening history that uncovers a forgotten chapter of WWII. Colin Smith brings to life the tense, tragic battles between Britain and Vichy France with depth and clarity, gripping from start to finish.

[Brian · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very well written account of the UK's actions against Vichy France in WW2. Very clearly written, well-organized and does a nice job of introducing key personalities and providing analysis.

[Philip Chaston · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent narrative of this forgotten war!

[Rod · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book provides a detailed insight into the Allies war with Vichy. In answer to the question - 'Why did the French fight with such enthusiasm against the Allies?' - I think we need to look at history. The Anglo Saxons and French have been fighting each other for centuries. Also Vichy thought (at least until '42) that Great Britain would lose. You had a job to find a Frenchman who would fall in with the Allies, (but after the war they were 'all in the resistance'!). At least with the Germans you knew who your enemy was!
One rather annoying, although trivial issue - the author used the word 'slither' instead of 'sliver' on three occasions. eg. 'A slither of land between two rivers' - What is that? - an area over-run with snakes?

[Adam · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent insight into a little-known corner of World War 2. The title is a bit forced: Scotland had been historically an ally of France but of course, it had been the UK against its enemies for over 200 years by the outbreak of the War.

The campaigns against Vichy France in Syria, Madagascar and elsewhere are clearly laid out. For me however, the background to Vichy France with its principal protagonists, their disagreements, jealousies and rivalries, made the book what it is. A must for anyone interested in French history as well as British military history.

[Francisco Colmenares · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very well written account of the various campaigns and personalities involved in Britain's undeclared war against Vichy France. The background, structure and description of all the different battles are well presented and laid out. The various events ocurring in Metropolitan France are weaved in to complete the picture. For me, perhaps it would have been nice to have more content that dealt with the intrigue and politics of Vichy France as the war progressed in 1941 and 1942, though the personal story of Darlan is done quite nicely.

[Rob · Rating 5 out of 5]

A well written account of the overlooked battles for the Vichy French colonies in WWII. England attacked their erstwhile ally by sinking their fleet at Mers-el-Kebir, in Algeria, then by defeating Vichy armies in Syria and Madagascar. Finally, England and the US landed troops in French Northwest Africa in operation Torch, which caused the Germans to put an end to the independent existence of the collaborationist Vichy government.

[Perry Andrus · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting book with lots of detail on the relationship between UK and Vichy France during the first part of WWII.

The coverage of the Allied invasion of French North Africa is the weakest part but the coverage of the political intrigue is very good.

I was interested in the CW invasion of Syria and the coverage was more than good.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

A well researched book on a underreported part of the war. Could have used some more info from the French perspective, particularly the private soldier's experiences... and the Operation Torch chapters seemed more pertinent to America's Last War Against France. But all in all, a thoroughly interesting read.

[Mark Maguire · Rating 4 out of 5]

An indispensable, and critical overview of the forgotten aspects of the hidden War within a War that was the conflict between Great Britain and Vichy France.

[Dominic King · Rating 3 out of 5]

At times very detailed and thus heavy going but fascinating read.

[John Plowright · Rating 3 out of 5]

It is odd to reflect that in Britain’s ‘Finest Hour’ - the year between the armistice signed between France and Germany on 22 June 1940 and the German invasion of Soviet Russia on 22 June 1941 when Britain ‘stood alone’ in Europe - British servicemen stood less risk of being killed by the Nazis than British housewives braving the Blitz, whilst at the start of that period the British killed more Frenchmen than Germans.

This last fact is attributable to the Royal Navy’s action at Mers-el-Kébir in the Vichy French colony of Algeria on 3 July 1940. Following the Fall of France, Britain was concerned that the French fleet might fall into the hands of the Nazis. Churchill therefore offered the French three choices: to scuttle their ships, join the Royal Navy or be sunk. The message was mishandled, the British opened fire and 1,297 French lives were lost.

One can argue that Churchill needed to show appeasers like Halifax and neutrals like the United States, that Britain was determined to fight, even if that meant killing Frenchmen but militarily the action is very difficult to justify, especially given that in 1943, when Hitler occupied Vichy France, the remainder of the French fleet was scuttled without overt pressure from Britain. There’s thus every reason to suppose that the French would have done the same in 1940, if the Germans had looked like they were going to gain control over the fleet at Mers-el-Kébir.

This incident is central to Colin Smith’s book ‘England’s Last War Against France’, which is subtitled ‘Fighting Vichy 1940-1942’. Smith seeks to place this event and these years in the broader context of Anglo-French relations since the Entente Cordiale of 1904 but his account makes no mention of Anglo-French tensions arising from issues such as the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr (1923-25) or the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement.

Even more surprising is the fact that the book makes no mention of the 1941 Free French coup against the tiny, Vichy-controlled islands of St Pierre and Miquelon, which lie just off the coast of Newfoundland, which did so much to sour Roosevelt’s attitude towards de Gaulle, resulting in de Gaulle’s exclusion from Operation Torch: the Anglo-American landings in Vichy-controlled Morocco and Algeria in 1942.

Thus whilst Smith has a very nice turn of phrase, a strong narrative drive and a good understanding of military affairs, his neglect of the diplomatic sphere severely restricts the usefulness of his otherwise very readable book.