First encountered Fitzpatrick in the endnotes of Hobsbawm. If I remember correctly she was one of the most cited scholars when Hobsbawm was discussing the Soviet Union in Age of Extremes. I bookmarked Everyday Stalinism to read but have not yet gotten around to it.
I think I’ve encountered most of this stuff in this book before, but it’s nice to work through a lot of it in this concisely formatted way. It’s basically pre-revolutionary context, revolution, Lenin, Stalin, WW2, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and collapse. I still struggle to organize this history in my head well in a way that I could hold a substantive conversation on it. But I find this history very interesting. Most of my remarks from here on will move unsystematically through the book, largely by way of excerpts.
Fitzpatrick does unequivocally state she sees the famine in Ukraine known as ‘Holodomor’ (reinterpreted as genocide by Ukrainians according to Fitzpatrick) not as a deliberate plan by Stalin to starve Ukrainians but a failure of the way collectivisation was executed. She mainly thinks so because there were famines of equal order during this time in other parts of the Soviet Union like southern Russia and Kazakhstan. The issue for Fitzpatrick was that the state was trying to maximize grain exports from peasant producers but there was very poor quality information and local officials never trusted quantities reported by peasants. They were perpetually suspicious that peasants were hiding grain in secret reserves. Stalin eventually did come to generally believe peasant-reported numbers but by then it was too late, and many people had already died.
Fitzpatrick also elaborates on the really horrible conditions that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, noting that: “Margaret Thatcher, scarcely a friend of socialists, declared that she liked Gorbachev and they could do business together.”
Another illuminating comment by Fitzpatrick on this period of collapse:
“Gorbachev thought that he had secured verbal assurances from German foreign minister Kohl and US secretary of state James Baker that US-led NATO would not expand into Eastern Europe in the wake of the unravelling of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, not even into a newly unified Germany. Perhaps he had, but Gorbachev should have remembered never to trust the capitalists – and, as a lawyer, he should have known that you get your assurances in writing. By October 1990, the former German Democratic Republic was absorbed into the Federal Republic of Germany and became, ipso facto, a part of NATO.”
This is also an interesting overview of public perception of ‘western democracy’ in Russia in the 90s:
“No more than a fifth of respondents to opinion polls in the 1990s thought that Russia would benefit from ‘democracy’ in its Western forms, and observation of post-Soviet political practice generated widespread negative reactions to the word itself, along with ‘freedom’ and ‘elections’. In response to a 1999 poll asking Russians which of thirteen variables were most important to them, ‘democracy’ came in second last, less popular than any of the options except ‘freedom of entrepreneurship’. Top choices were ‘stability’ and ‘social welfare’.”
Finally I just wanted to leave this interesting comment on an interesting shift in Western academic scholarship on the Soviet Union that Fitzpatrick makes much earlier on in the book, which I think outlived the Soviet Union’s collapse in some ways:
“The West had made a totalitarian bogeyman out of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, equating Communism with Nazism as the antithesis of Western democracy, and one of the tenets of this theory was that a totalitarian regime, once in place, was immutable and could be overthrown only by external force. But that idea seemed less plausible when, after Stalin’s death, the regime not only failed to collapse but also showed itself capable of radical change. By 1980, ‘totalitarianism’, although remaining a powerful and emotive image for the Western public, had lost its appeal for scholars, American political scientists Stephen F. Cohen and Jerry Hough being among its challengers. Even in conservative quarters, hopes that had been cherished for more than sixty years about the imminent collapse of the Soviet regime were being quietly abandoned.”