The story of post-9/11 international finance, told from an unmatched vantage point. Sworn in as head of the U.S. Treasury Department's international finance division just three months prior to 9/11, John B. Taylor soon found himself at the center of the war on terror. Global Financial Warriors takes you inside the White House situation room, to meetings of the G7 finance ministers, and to cities around the world as Taylor assembles a coalition to freeze terrorist assets worldwide, plans the financial reconstruction of Afghanistan, oversees the development of a new currency in Iraq, and deals with the spread of financial crises. From reforming the IMF and the World Bank to negotiating international agreements to reduce Iraq's debt by 80 percent and cancel the debt of very poor countries, Taylor's unparalleled access offers the reader not only an insider's account of a pivotal time in international finance but also an invaluable primer on the policy development and operational strategies that helped Taylor and his team succeed. 16 pages of illustrations
I read a lot of Washington memoirs, and they tend towards the self-congratulatory or the defensive. This is definitely the former. It helps, however, that John Taylor, the famous Stanford economist, has much to congratulate himself about. As the Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs under President George W. Bush, he helped block terrorist financing after 9/11, reformed the World Bank and the IMF, helped establish the new currencies and finances for Afghanistan and Iraq, and negotiated with China and other countries to end their currency controls. Although the early years of the Bush administration were not littered with policy successes, a surprising number of them did come from Taylor's shop, and he knows it.
The best part of the book describes Taylor's work establishing the new Iraqi currency. The Treasury decided to first pay everyone in dollars from frozen Iraqi assets in the US until the Iraqis could decide for themselves what to do. They printed small bills in the Federal Reserve's plant in East Rutherford, New Jersey and flew them to Iraq, after which they assembled scattered Iraqi government records to get these bills to over a million pensioners and civil servants (Bush commanded them to pay these people slightly more than the old Saddam policy). At the same time the U.S. Treasury assured the populace that the old currency would still be accepted. After the Coalition government was in place, the "Iraqis" decided to replace both the old Saddam dinars at 1-1 for new dinars and give a 2500 to 1 replacement to the "Swiss dinars" that circulated in Kurdistan (which actually undervalued that local currency). Treasury had to contract with the British firm De La Rue and seven other printers across the world to manufacture a new bill. They then had to ship billions of dollars worth on military 707s to points across Iraq and then institute controls to make sure the bills moved down the chain as receipts moved back up it. As people turned in their old dollars for new dinars, billions in physical dollars piled up in the basement of the Iraqi central bank. The team then had to establish a special fund in the New York Federal Reserve so Iraq could keep electronic funds secure and then they helped set up an electronic transfer system. At the same time, Taylor successfully negotiated a 80% write-down of the old Saddam-era Iraqi debt (it totalled over 400% of the country's GDP!) at the Paris Club of rich countries, which allowed the new government to get its financial footing. Although much in Iraq didn't go right in those years, most of the financial policies did.
Too much of this book can read like a typical management bromide: establish clear principles, allow your subordinates to fulfill them in their own way, "bird dog" policy initiatives and ensure follow-through, convey information don't contain it, etc. Yet from a successful policy-maker, they carry some weight. Although there are better Washington memoirs out there, Taylor's is a welcome addition to the pile.
This was a quick read, and even though it wasn't the best book I've read - there were still some nuggets of good information.
Taylor was an undersecretary at the Treasury in the first Bush term. As such, he played a large role in dealing with the post 9/11 financial crises, as well as setting up institutions in Afghanistan and Iraq. He was also very active in achieving African debt forgiveness.
For Taylor, conducting such activities in the post-9/11 world made one a "Global Financial Warrior." I was expecting something a bit more glamorous, but most of what he describes is generally the usual diplomatic work of an undersecretary.
Overall, the book reads like it was written for an undergraduate classroom - and maybe it was. Taylor has returned to teaching at Stanford. This style makes it pretty boring in parts, as Taylor seems to be cutting-and-pasting his diary into the book. However, there are the aforementioned nuggets where he does a nice job explaining the nuances of various international financial institutions. I definitely learned something from these. There are also some memorable anecdotes, such as the story of the school in Kenya. Now I will always remember that "what gets measured, gets done."
A user primer on how US economic diplomacy was reshaped by 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’. This is despite the abundance of self congratulatory anecdotes.