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All'ombra del dragone: Il Sudest asiatico nel secolo cinese
L’influenza della Cina si allunga inarrestabile come un’ombra sul Sudest asiatico, dove la vicinanza geografica con Pechino è allo stesso tempo una benedizione e una maledizione.
All’ombra del dragone tratteggia la storia del rapporto tra le nazioni della regione e la Cina e delinea l’attuale situazione geopolitica, analizzando ogni ambito della relazione: economico, politico, militare e culturale.
Mentre la Cina cerca di ripristinare l’antico status di potenza dominante dell’Asia, i Paesi del Sudest asiatico devono affrontare una scelta sempre più complessa: prosperare all’interno della sua orbita o languire al di fuori di essa. Intanto mentre le potenze rivali, inclusi gli Stati Uniti, intraprendono azioni concertate per frenare le ambizioni cinesi, la regione è emersa come un’area cruciale di competizione strategica.
Basandosi su più di un decennio di esperienza sul campo, Sebastian Strangio esplora l’impatto dell’ascesa della Cina, e il peso di questo scenario per i futuri equilibri di potere a livello globale.
All’ombra del dragone tratteggia la storia del rapporto tra le nazioni della regione e la Cina e delinea l’attuale situazione geopolitica, analizzando ogni ambito della relazione: economico, politico, militare e culturale.
Mentre la Cina cerca di ripristinare l’antico status di potenza dominante dell’Asia, i Paesi del Sudest asiatico devono affrontare una scelta sempre più complessa: prosperare all’interno della sua orbita o languire al di fuori di essa. Intanto mentre le potenze rivali, inclusi gli Stati Uniti, intraprendono azioni concertate per frenare le ambizioni cinesi, la regione è emersa come un’area cruciale di competizione strategica.
Basandosi su più di un decennio di esperienza sul campo, Sebastian Strangio esplora l’impatto dell’ascesa della Cina, e il peso di questo scenario per i futuri equilibri di potere a livello globale.
512 pages, Paperback
Published April 28, 2022
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About the author
Sebastian Strangio
3 books54 followersSebastian Strangio is a journalist, author, and independence analyst focusing on Southeast Asia. From 2008 to 2011, he worked as an editor and reporter at The Phnom Penh Post, Cambodia's oldest English-language newspaper, and he has since traveled and reported extensively across Asia. His writing has appeared in more than 30 leading publications including The New York Times, Foreign Policy, The Atlantic, and Foreign Affairs. Sebastian is the author of Hun Sen’s Cambodia (Yale University Press, 2014), and is a leading commentator on contemporary Cambodian politics and society. He is currently based in Chiang Mai, Thailand, where he is a research affiliate at the Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development at Chiang Mai University.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 72 reviews
December 22, 2020
[V]iews of China are more anguished and complex. Dwelling in China’s shadow, the region does not enjoy the luxury of simple binaries. While Southeast Asian governments view Chinese behavior with justified alarm, China’s economic centrality to the region makes it something they cannot ignore, as much as they might wish to.
A broad yet well-referenced backgrounder to the history of southeast Asian countries and their relationship with China. After an introduction and two introductory chapters, Strangio divides his analysis into one country per chapter. This covers most of the region, with the exceptions of Brunei and East Timor.
On multiple occasions, Strangio uses the (bizarre and distasteful) term "great power autism", first introduced in a different form by Edward Luttwak. In less derogatory language, Strangio refers to the arrogant and narrow-minded attitudes of the great powers of the world, and their inability to understand the perspective and intention of the smaller countries that they interact with. There are many intervening factors - dramatic increases in foreign direct investment, Chinese tourism, and the PRC's expansive claims on the South China Sea all, to varying degrees, have impacted China's foreign relations with the countries in this region.
While the term "Southeast Asia" is a recent invention, these countries all share geographical proximity to China, and so China has become a prominent foreign policy issue. The author has spent many years as a correspondent in Cambodia, and he observes how Cambodia's (and Hun Sen's) swing towards the Chinese side in many policy issues has led to increased Chinese investment in Phnom Penh and elsewhere.
Results in Chinese investments are uneven. In some instances, they are broadly welcomed, whereas in other cases, like the Myitsone Dam, they have encountered local discontent, due to the use of Chinese labor and the risk of environmental damage. The dam's construction has been halted - a limbo that represents the Burmese government's attempts at balancing between Chinese and domestic interests.
His view is that Chinese domination of the region is not inevitable, given slowing Chinese growth rates, and a continuing inability to understand the aims and interests of countries in the region. I still suggest it as an introduction.
A broad yet well-referenced backgrounder to the history of southeast Asian countries and their relationship with China. After an introduction and two introductory chapters, Strangio divides his analysis into one country per chapter. This covers most of the region, with the exceptions of Brunei and East Timor.
On multiple occasions, Strangio uses the (bizarre and distasteful) term "great power autism", first introduced in a different form by Edward Luttwak. In less derogatory language, Strangio refers to the arrogant and narrow-minded attitudes of the great powers of the world, and their inability to understand the perspective and intention of the smaller countries that they interact with. There are many intervening factors - dramatic increases in foreign direct investment, Chinese tourism, and the PRC's expansive claims on the South China Sea all, to varying degrees, have impacted China's foreign relations with the countries in this region.
While the term "Southeast Asia" is a recent invention, these countries all share geographical proximity to China, and so China has become a prominent foreign policy issue. The author has spent many years as a correspondent in Cambodia, and he observes how Cambodia's (and Hun Sen's) swing towards the Chinese side in many policy issues has led to increased Chinese investment in Phnom Penh and elsewhere.
Results in Chinese investments are uneven. In some instances, they are broadly welcomed, whereas in other cases, like the Myitsone Dam, they have encountered local discontent, due to the use of Chinese labor and the risk of environmental damage. The dam's construction has been halted - a limbo that represents the Burmese government's attempts at balancing between Chinese and domestic interests.
His view is that Chinese domination of the region is not inevitable, given slowing Chinese growth rates, and a continuing inability to understand the aims and interests of countries in the region. I still suggest it as an introduction.
March 27, 2025
Sebastian Strangio is a journalist who has spent most of his career working in Cambodia and Thailand. It is therefore not surprising that this book reads like a series of those in depth articles on other parts of the world that you sometimes find in the back sections of the Sunday paper. While most people don't read such articles, I enjoy them and consider this similarity to be the strongest attribute of the book.
The focus of the book, which is broken into separate chapters for each country, is the relationship of each country with China and how that has changed in recent decades as China has become a great power. Each country desires the increase in prosperity that is often the result of aligning its economy with China's, however most maintain some sort of security relationship with the Americans to counter Chinese influence. The attempt to keep both the US and China satisfied with their relationships is the primary concern of most Southeast Asian nations and often requires some delicate balancing. How each country goes about this in light of its own domestic concerns is the principal subject of the book and Strangio is able to provide some lucid explanations of why the Chinese build casinos in Laos and the Philippines tolerate Chinese fishing fleets in their waters.
The focus of the book, which is broken into separate chapters for each country, is the relationship of each country with China and how that has changed in recent decades as China has become a great power. Each country desires the increase in prosperity that is often the result of aligning its economy with China's, however most maintain some sort of security relationship with the Americans to counter Chinese influence. The attempt to keep both the US and China satisfied with their relationships is the primary concern of most Southeast Asian nations and often requires some delicate balancing. How each country goes about this in light of its own domestic concerns is the principal subject of the book and Strangio is able to provide some lucid explanations of why the Chinese build casinos in Laos and the Philippines tolerate Chinese fishing fleets in their waters.
October 14, 2020
As an Asia watcher, Strangio’s book provides a historical perspective of South East Asia from a Chinese lens. It provides an in depth detail of Chinese geopolitical reach and growing ambitions in the region as well as the degree of strategic hedging undertaken by these countries in accommodating China’s rise. The book does a good job laying out how these countries juggle the influence of China, domestic national interests and Washington. The dynamics of South East Asia should be closely observed - it has often been cited as a potential theatre for kinetic conflict
The book reminded me of 2 other titles I enjoyed namely Bill Hayton’s acclaimed The South China Sea and Humphrey Hawksley’s Asian Waters - which catalysed my interest in maritime affairs. Like both Hayton and Hawksley, the author has a journalistic background and as such, is neither a China hawk nor a dove but an impartial observer of South East Asian events. Having a journalist background is important - so the author doesn’t fall into the trap of armchair punditry. Unlike other books on the geopolitics of China by policy wonks, the author embraces the use of visualisation to paint clearer picture of a particular country. For example, he shares about his personal visits and conversations with people on the ground which makes you feel like you are present in the moment. These are rich in detail as the author is a spellbinding narrator. As a Malaysian, I was also pleased to see that the author had a deep understanding of my country’s history from 1957 to the present.
Particularly insightful are the bits on the Mekong subregions and the Indochinese states. Ashamedly I’ve been historically insular on the strategic and historical significance of the Mekong region and surrounding Indochinese states. As it seems, the Mekong river could be the next South China Sea – a potential flashpoint between China and ASEAN states. It runs all the way from the Southwestern province of Yunnan all the way to Vietnam. Its significance is totemic and has seen China embrace an aggressive construction program of hydroelectric dams in the upstream and downstream parts of the river. We also see similar undertones with the SCS in the Mekong where China pursues a strategy of divide and conquer, prefers to engage bilaterally with each ASEAN country to extract individual concessions, exploit domestic fissures and prevent a regional coalition of voices.
I was pleased with the read and would recommend any one with an interest in South East Asian history to pick up a copy for their reading leisure. It’s been a great companion on my train commutes and I am sorry to have finished it so soon
The book reminded me of 2 other titles I enjoyed namely Bill Hayton’s acclaimed The South China Sea and Humphrey Hawksley’s Asian Waters - which catalysed my interest in maritime affairs. Like both Hayton and Hawksley, the author has a journalistic background and as such, is neither a China hawk nor a dove but an impartial observer of South East Asian events. Having a journalist background is important - so the author doesn’t fall into the trap of armchair punditry. Unlike other books on the geopolitics of China by policy wonks, the author embraces the use of visualisation to paint clearer picture of a particular country. For example, he shares about his personal visits and conversations with people on the ground which makes you feel like you are present in the moment. These are rich in detail as the author is a spellbinding narrator. As a Malaysian, I was also pleased to see that the author had a deep understanding of my country’s history from 1957 to the present.
Particularly insightful are the bits on the Mekong subregions and the Indochinese states. Ashamedly I’ve been historically insular on the strategic and historical significance of the Mekong region and surrounding Indochinese states. As it seems, the Mekong river could be the next South China Sea – a potential flashpoint between China and ASEAN states. It runs all the way from the Southwestern province of Yunnan all the way to Vietnam. Its significance is totemic and has seen China embrace an aggressive construction program of hydroelectric dams in the upstream and downstream parts of the river. We also see similar undertones with the SCS in the Mekong where China pursues a strategy of divide and conquer, prefers to engage bilaterally with each ASEAN country to extract individual concessions, exploit domestic fissures and prevent a regional coalition of voices.
I was pleased with the read and would recommend any one with an interest in South East Asian history to pick up a copy for their reading leisure. It’s been a great companion on my train commutes and I am sorry to have finished it so soon
October 15, 2021
Pretty good (although sadly outdated wrt Burma)
I give the audiobook narrator 2/5 stars. An inability to pronounce “Malay”, “Kausikan” (as in Bilahari) or “Guangxi” (among many, many others) is quite damning for a book about SEA and China, and just reflects a lack of effort. It’s not hard to foresee this as necessary.
I give the audiobook narrator 2/5 stars. An inability to pronounce “Malay”, “Kausikan” (as in Bilahari) or “Guangxi” (among many, many others) is quite damning for a book about SEA and China, and just reflects a lack of effort. It’s not hard to foresee this as necessary.
July 6, 2024
Quite interesting account on a brief history of Chinese influence on South Asian countries.
TBH, I only read on Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore. I'm not interested in any other mentioned countries.
TBH, I only read on Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore. I'm not interested in any other mentioned countries.
June 29, 2023
Sebastian Strangio looks at ten Southeast Asian countries for whom geographical proximity to China is a blessing and a curse. Strangio manages to sketch the history these nations have with China and detail the current geopolitical situation in an engaging fashion.
While China’s claims in the South China Sea aren’t of benefit to anybody else, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Chinese tourism are economic incentives to maintain a good relationship with the People’s Republic of China.
In Vietnam, the wars of independence against the French and Americans are widely discussed, however, there is an official silence about the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. This was a decision leadership took in 1990 when relations between the two countries were normalised. A mutually beneficial relationship would be easier if this unpleasant history was forgotten. However, the fact that China invaded Vietnam in 1979 to teach it a lesson for deposing the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia is not forgotten by the Vietnamese people, nor are the various Chinese occupations of Vietnam over the centuries.
In 1945 the Chinese army was in North Vietnam to oversee the postwar armistice before the return of the colonial French. Ho Chi Minh was keen for the Chinese to leave and have the French back as they would ultimately be easier to dislodge. He allegedly said: “I prefer to sniff French shit for five years than to eat Chinese shit for the rest of my life.” To a greater or lesser degree the other countries here, like Vietnam, are working out how to gain economically from China’s rise while keeping the dragon to the north at arm's length.
For the countries on the Southeast Asian mainland, dams on the Mekong (Lancang) river in the Chinese province of Yunnan give the PRC control over the amount of water received downriver; this could have disastrous effects on fishing and rice cultivation in Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. Beijing wants to build railways from Yunnan to Laos’s capital and also to the west coast of Burma. These would limit its reliance on the shipping lanes through the Malacca Straits for importing oil, a development that Singapore dreads as its strategic position on a major shipping lane would be threatened. These infrastructure projects are not necessarily economic boons for the host nations: they can be debt traps and will the profits from expanding commerce stay in Laos, Cambodia and Burma etc. or merely head north to further enrich China?
While Laos and Cambodia are free of having to deal with South China Sea issues, their sovereignty is under threat in places where the Chinese have moved in to create sleazy gambling towns. Northern Burma has a number of armed groups, some led by ethnic Chinese. Beijing can support these groups to manipulate the Burmese government and threaten their weak sovereignty in that region.
At the same time, China is a good neighbour who provides financing without getting involved in domestic politics in Burma, in contrast to Western countries who meddle and withdraw support over human rights issues. This is one reason why Thailand has turned more towards China since its military coup in 2014.
In Malaysia and Indonesia the ethnic Chinese populations, despite being there for generations, are not as well integrated as in other countries in the region. They have long been scapegoats for economic and political problems. They are seen as having divided loyalties, this was partly caused by communist insurgency in British Malaya in the 1950s and President Sukarno’s turn to the left in Indonesia in the 1960s
“The PRC's export of communism led many Southeast Asian governments to accuse the Chinese of acting as a “fifth column” for Beijing - a claim that was all the more insidious for containing a grain of truth.”
Strangio makes the distinction between ethnic Chinese who have become completely Southeast Asian, and new immigrants who came from the Chinese mainland after 1978. He labels Xi Jinping’s talk of all ethnic Chinese being part of one big Chinese family as an example of great state autism. This kind of declaration only stokes local anti-Chinese sentiment.
In the Philippines, the relationship with China changed greatly with the election of the maverick Rodrigo Duterte, who moved away from America and towards China. This is complicated as the two countries are in conflict in the South China Sea. Duterte has zigzagged on the issue, saying he’ll take China on over this while really doing nothing about it. This may be a wise move.
“Duterte’s foreign policy team concurred. They believed that confronting China had brought the Philippines the worst of both worlds: it had done little to loosen China’s hold over Scarborough Shoal and its island fortresses in the Spratlys, and it had soured relations with Beijing, effectively locking the Philippines out of participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was announced at the height of bilateral tensions in 2013.”
Many of the infrastructure projects Duterte arranged with Xi Jinping in 2017 hadn’t got off the ground a year later because of local criticism of their financing conditions and lack of transparency, whereas Japanese-backed projects were progressing nicely. China is the number one trading partner of Southeast Asia, but surprisingly Japan is the biggest investor in infrastructure, and despite its awful historical legacy from World War II is seen as quite reliable.
The USA is the other major player, but its former allies like Thailand and the Philippines are less reliant on it than in the past, although all nations in the book look to the US to be involved as a balance to China in the region.
Strangio paints China not as an evil empire, but as a superpower throwing its weight around rather clumsily in trying to increase its power. The countries of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) through historical experience and cultural links are well prepared to deal with this reality, but the balance of power is against them. Strangio suggests it will be a rocky but not impassable road.
While China’s claims in the South China Sea aren’t of benefit to anybody else, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Chinese tourism are economic incentives to maintain a good relationship with the People’s Republic of China.
In Vietnam, the wars of independence against the French and Americans are widely discussed, however, there is an official silence about the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. This was a decision leadership took in 1990 when relations between the two countries were normalised. A mutually beneficial relationship would be easier if this unpleasant history was forgotten. However, the fact that China invaded Vietnam in 1979 to teach it a lesson for deposing the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia is not forgotten by the Vietnamese people, nor are the various Chinese occupations of Vietnam over the centuries.
In 1945 the Chinese army was in North Vietnam to oversee the postwar armistice before the return of the colonial French. Ho Chi Minh was keen for the Chinese to leave and have the French back as they would ultimately be easier to dislodge. He allegedly said: “I prefer to sniff French shit for five years than to eat Chinese shit for the rest of my life.” To a greater or lesser degree the other countries here, like Vietnam, are working out how to gain economically from China’s rise while keeping the dragon to the north at arm's length.
For the countries on the Southeast Asian mainland, dams on the Mekong (Lancang) river in the Chinese province of Yunnan give the PRC control over the amount of water received downriver; this could have disastrous effects on fishing and rice cultivation in Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. Beijing wants to build railways from Yunnan to Laos’s capital and also to the west coast of Burma. These would limit its reliance on the shipping lanes through the Malacca Straits for importing oil, a development that Singapore dreads as its strategic position on a major shipping lane would be threatened. These infrastructure projects are not necessarily economic boons for the host nations: they can be debt traps and will the profits from expanding commerce stay in Laos, Cambodia and Burma etc. or merely head north to further enrich China?
While Laos and Cambodia are free of having to deal with South China Sea issues, their sovereignty is under threat in places where the Chinese have moved in to create sleazy gambling towns. Northern Burma has a number of armed groups, some led by ethnic Chinese. Beijing can support these groups to manipulate the Burmese government and threaten their weak sovereignty in that region.
At the same time, China is a good neighbour who provides financing without getting involved in domestic politics in Burma, in contrast to Western countries who meddle and withdraw support over human rights issues. This is one reason why Thailand has turned more towards China since its military coup in 2014.
In Malaysia and Indonesia the ethnic Chinese populations, despite being there for generations, are not as well integrated as in other countries in the region. They have long been scapegoats for economic and political problems. They are seen as having divided loyalties, this was partly caused by communist insurgency in British Malaya in the 1950s and President Sukarno’s turn to the left in Indonesia in the 1960s
“The PRC's export of communism led many Southeast Asian governments to accuse the Chinese of acting as a “fifth column” for Beijing - a claim that was all the more insidious for containing a grain of truth.”
Strangio makes the distinction between ethnic Chinese who have become completely Southeast Asian, and new immigrants who came from the Chinese mainland after 1978. He labels Xi Jinping’s talk of all ethnic Chinese being part of one big Chinese family as an example of great state autism. This kind of declaration only stokes local anti-Chinese sentiment.
In the Philippines, the relationship with China changed greatly with the election of the maverick Rodrigo Duterte, who moved away from America and towards China. This is complicated as the two countries are in conflict in the South China Sea. Duterte has zigzagged on the issue, saying he’ll take China on over this while really doing nothing about it. This may be a wise move.
“Duterte’s foreign policy team concurred. They believed that confronting China had brought the Philippines the worst of both worlds: it had done little to loosen China’s hold over Scarborough Shoal and its island fortresses in the Spratlys, and it had soured relations with Beijing, effectively locking the Philippines out of participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was announced at the height of bilateral tensions in 2013.”
Many of the infrastructure projects Duterte arranged with Xi Jinping in 2017 hadn’t got off the ground a year later because of local criticism of their financing conditions and lack of transparency, whereas Japanese-backed projects were progressing nicely. China is the number one trading partner of Southeast Asia, but surprisingly Japan is the biggest investor in infrastructure, and despite its awful historical legacy from World War II is seen as quite reliable.
The USA is the other major player, but its former allies like Thailand and the Philippines are less reliant on it than in the past, although all nations in the book look to the US to be involved as a balance to China in the region.
Strangio paints China not as an evil empire, but as a superpower throwing its weight around rather clumsily in trying to increase its power. The countries of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) through historical experience and cultural links are well prepared to deal with this reality, but the balance of power is against them. Strangio suggests it will be a rocky but not impassable road.
January 1, 2021
There have been a number of books on the China-Southeast Asia relationship, many of which are excellent, but Sebastian's is the most essential for its wide range of interviews, and also by far the most accessible to the general reader.
January 21, 2021
Richly detailed, colorfully written, and well researched. Sebastian's latest work on China-Southeast Asia relations is a commendable contribution to our understanding of regional dynamics. His book is organized in part geographically and in part based on the depth of China's grasp over the individual country case studies concerned. For instance, he groups Cambodia and Laos together early on in his consideration of mainland Southeast Asia but later on gives Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, individual chapters (sadly he leaves out Brunei and Timor-Leste). The only point in the book where I paused to wonder where he was going was in the Singapore chapter, in which he gives a rather long and incongruous deep-dive on China's history of or with overseas Chinese migrants. Ultimately, it's not 100% clear what the goals of the book are - whether the primary units of analysis are the Southeast Asian states themselves, their individual relationships with China, or the broader regional balance of power vis-a-vis US-China competition for influence. Nonetheless, this book was incredibly nuanced and provided a very rich study of a complex region, including coverage of current events right up to the last year and thankfully fitting in some analysis of what COVID means for Southeast Asia.
Read
September 3, 2020I have only picked up this book on the last 24 hours and it makes for compelling reading. The author is knowlegeable, prescient and acute in his dissection of China's influence in South East Asia. The release of the book has been timely in light of the current events of 2020 and provides a great perspective on these events. A must read for anyone who us interested in the evolution of a new world order.
November 8, 2020
Un fantástico libro para entender algunas de las relaciones y realidades entre China y los países del ASEAN. Se analizan y explican aspectos sociales, económicos y políticos. Muy bien escrito e investigado. Cada capítulo es un país: Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, Camboya, Tailandia, Singapur, Malasia, Indonesia y Filipinas. Me ha gustado mucho.
June 4, 2021
Offers some interesting lessons.
For instance, the idea that anti- Vietnam opposition in Cambodia and anti- China opposition in Vietnam were structurally rather similar and paralleled each others behaviours was very interesting. The idea that longtime ethnic Chinese citizens of various SE Asian countries were the biggest victims of increased mainland Chinese immigration is also well articulated.
However the travelogue features and frequent use of anecdotes and rumours do detract from its seriousness. As a SE Asian myself, I found myself scratching my head at the stories of netizen outrage that didn't seem too important.
In addition the use of the bifurcated US Vs China frame, while popular, seems to unduly ignore India, Europe and Japan's impacts on SE Asia- China relations.
For instance, the idea that anti- Vietnam opposition in Cambodia and anti- China opposition in Vietnam were structurally rather similar and paralleled each others behaviours was very interesting. The idea that longtime ethnic Chinese citizens of various SE Asian countries were the biggest victims of increased mainland Chinese immigration is also well articulated.
However the travelogue features and frequent use of anecdotes and rumours do detract from its seriousness. As a SE Asian myself, I found myself scratching my head at the stories of netizen outrage that didn't seem too important.
In addition the use of the bifurcated US Vs China frame, while popular, seems to unduly ignore India, Europe and Japan's impacts on SE Asia- China relations.
January 11, 2025
Libro che riesce a rendere accessibile una situazione complessa come possono essere i rapporti politici fra una superpetonza e gli stati limitrofi. Ogni paese ha un capitolo di 50 pagine circa che copre gli aspetti principali del suo rapporto con la Cina, senza trascurare società, economia e storia: l'autore infatti ha la capacità di presentare al neofiti quelle 4 o 5 coordinate generali che gli permettono di comprendere il punto focale del saggio, poi ovviamente più la conoscenza è approfondita più tutto risulta più chiaro.
Molto interessante.
Molto interessante.
August 9, 2021
"Together or alone, the strategic meridian of the Southeast Asian nations will be one of balance...the region's governments will do what they can to maintain their freedom of maneuver in a tenser, more constrained world."
An impressive work by Sebastian - totaling close to 600 citations - that demonstrated his breadth and depth of research and interviews. The choice of doing country-by-country deep dives is a smart one for it provided the medium to illustrate the complexity and nuances of each country's relationship with China. I particularly enjoyed the sections on Zomia and the respective next-to-China borderlands in Southeast Asia where influence and authority from the center tapers off with the gap filled by the Chinese. It reminded me that territorial integrity and sovereignty often fall apart at cartographic boundaries.
While some countries may have steered irreversibly close into China's orbit like Cambodia and Laos, others remain cautious to strike a balance between China and US. Yet, Sebastian also makes the point that ASEAN will find it hard to resist defaulting to proximity - and not just geographically (where Sebastian highlights the towering control of China over the flow of natural resources downwards to Southeast Asia such as via the Mekong, which provides leverage over the region) but culturally too. China is more aligned with "Asian Values" and more reserved in speaking out against traditional US pain points like human rights violations and authoritarianism in the region. He usefully cites former Ambassador Chan Heng Chee's warning: "Don't press countries in the region to choose. You may not like what you hear".
With China's economic prowess becoming too large to ignore, it is up to the US to accommodate the region's inevitable lean towards China in terms of trade and investments without losing its mandate as a necessary and friendly partner. To Wang Gungwu (as cited), it is clear - the Americans "have to justify being here" while the Chinese "are just here".
An impressive work by Sebastian - totaling close to 600 citations - that demonstrated his breadth and depth of research and interviews. The choice of doing country-by-country deep dives is a smart one for it provided the medium to illustrate the complexity and nuances of each country's relationship with China. I particularly enjoyed the sections on Zomia and the respective next-to-China borderlands in Southeast Asia where influence and authority from the center tapers off with the gap filled by the Chinese. It reminded me that territorial integrity and sovereignty often fall apart at cartographic boundaries.
While some countries may have steered irreversibly close into China's orbit like Cambodia and Laos, others remain cautious to strike a balance between China and US. Yet, Sebastian also makes the point that ASEAN will find it hard to resist defaulting to proximity - and not just geographically (where Sebastian highlights the towering control of China over the flow of natural resources downwards to Southeast Asia such as via the Mekong, which provides leverage over the region) but culturally too. China is more aligned with "Asian Values" and more reserved in speaking out against traditional US pain points like human rights violations and authoritarianism in the region. He usefully cites former Ambassador Chan Heng Chee's warning: "Don't press countries in the region to choose. You may not like what you hear".
With China's economic prowess becoming too large to ignore, it is up to the US to accommodate the region's inevitable lean towards China in terms of trade and investments without losing its mandate as a necessary and friendly partner. To Wang Gungwu (as cited), it is clear - the Americans "have to justify being here" while the Chinese "are just here".
July 16, 2021
If journalism is the first draft of history, this is an excellent effort at a second draft.
In the Dragon's Shadow is a detailed and engaging tour of Southeast Asia, with each country receiving its own independent chapter, exploring both its internal political and social dynamics, as well as its relationship with China.
What I appreciated from this book is there is no attempt to force a common theme, other than the challenge and opportunities from China's re-emergence. Strangio is sensitive to the dynamics of each country, taking the time to explore each in detail. No one after reading this book should ever again fall into the crude board-game analogy of talking about this region falling into 'China's camp' or even specific countries as if bought and sold like tokens by the great powers.
In the Dragon's Shadow is also an enjoyable and well written tour of the region. Strangio has a travel writer's eye for the telling anecdote or story (many to do with Chinese investment and diaspora challenges). You can see the care that went into the writing, with some amusing lines, such as describing China's attack on Vietnam in 1979 as a "pedagogical invasion".
This isn't the first, nor last word on how to understand Southeast Asia, but it's a useful effort to help bring back up to speed those who don't watch the region daily, or those who like myself tune in and out of regional affairs, and feel particularly removed given the pandemic-induced restrictions on time in region. A worthwhile and compelling read of a critical region.
In the Dragon's Shadow is a detailed and engaging tour of Southeast Asia, with each country receiving its own independent chapter, exploring both its internal political and social dynamics, as well as its relationship with China.
What I appreciated from this book is there is no attempt to force a common theme, other than the challenge and opportunities from China's re-emergence. Strangio is sensitive to the dynamics of each country, taking the time to explore each in detail. No one after reading this book should ever again fall into the crude board-game analogy of talking about this region falling into 'China's camp' or even specific countries as if bought and sold like tokens by the great powers.
In the Dragon's Shadow is also an enjoyable and well written tour of the region. Strangio has a travel writer's eye for the telling anecdote or story (many to do with Chinese investment and diaspora challenges). You can see the care that went into the writing, with some amusing lines, such as describing China's attack on Vietnam in 1979 as a "pedagogical invasion".
This isn't the first, nor last word on how to understand Southeast Asia, but it's a useful effort to help bring back up to speed those who don't watch the region daily, or those who like myself tune in and out of regional affairs, and feel particularly removed given the pandemic-induced restrictions on time in region. A worthwhile and compelling read of a critical region.
January 4, 2023
Sebastian Strangio spiega Paese per Paese come la Cina si relaziona con i suoi vicini, soffermandosi su passato, presente e futuro. È un libro che più che essere letto deve essere studiato. Ricco di informazioni e di analisi ben documentate, fornisce al lettore strumenti indispensabili per comprendere le dinamiche in corso nel Sudest asiatico, facendo luce su scelte e prese di posizione cinesi e aiutando a comprenderne il significato profondo e le implicazioni per gli equilibri regionali e internazionali.
January 26, 2021
Very good primer on relations between Southeast Asian nations and China. Unlike most recent IR books on China, this is not some eschatological screed about how China is destroying the world order, but instead a level headed and fairly bottom-up text that relies more on the input of, say, Cambodian merchants in casino towns than CCP officials. This is what IR books should look like, very well done.
January 20, 2021
The late 90’s had a plethora of books written on the Asian Miracle, Asian Tigers and Tiger Cubs. I read many of them partly from interest but mostly for work.
Strangio, and others, now write on the relationship of those countries with China. In “In the Dragon’s Shadow”, Strangio sets the table with a couple of chapters on China building a foundation before moving in turn to each ASEAN country for an in depth look at this relationship.
Two themes permeate the book. First, geography dictates how the relationship is evolving. Southeast Asia is divided into two groupings, mainland and maritime, that deal with a different China thrust/initiative. The mainland countries see expanding cross border trade and investment. Yunnan province is the biggest benefactor of China’s investments with development of roads, high-speed rail, and infrastructure. Tourists and goods now flow across the borders. We see the impact of this in each chapter on these countries.
The maritime grouping is dealing with the “Nine-Dash-Line”, China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. It clearly impacts relations with China in maritime SE Asia. And the chapters on these countries delve into the issue from the perspective of these countries.
Secondly, soft power seems the current modus operandi. No longer is China supporting local communist parties or overt attempts at regime change. Rather they now use economic incentives to build closer relationships and shift perspectives toward China. Its working. You read Chinese signage is becoming common. Mandarin can be heard instead of either Cantonese or Hokkien.
The country chapters follow a similar pattern. Each begins with several current investment activities funded by China. Providing a perspective on who benefits and who doesn’t. The middle section usually provides a historical perspective on the country’s development from ancient times, how Chinese came to the country, and colonialization by western countries. The back of the chapter returns to China, its investments, the Chinese population including recent influxes of workers supporting China’s investments.
The Afterward adds the Covid-19 pandemic and how China’s relationships may evolve as a result.
The book is packed with information drawn from interviews, conversations, and observations. It’s a good read for anyone interested in the region and required reading for anyone working there. I wish I’d had this book to read before visiting and working in some of these countries.
If your vocabulary is weak have a dictionary handy as Strangio likes using sesquipedalian words and prose.
Strangio, and others, now write on the relationship of those countries with China. In “In the Dragon’s Shadow”, Strangio sets the table with a couple of chapters on China building a foundation before moving in turn to each ASEAN country for an in depth look at this relationship.
Two themes permeate the book. First, geography dictates how the relationship is evolving. Southeast Asia is divided into two groupings, mainland and maritime, that deal with a different China thrust/initiative. The mainland countries see expanding cross border trade and investment. Yunnan province is the biggest benefactor of China’s investments with development of roads, high-speed rail, and infrastructure. Tourists and goods now flow across the borders. We see the impact of this in each chapter on these countries.
The maritime grouping is dealing with the “Nine-Dash-Line”, China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. It clearly impacts relations with China in maritime SE Asia. And the chapters on these countries delve into the issue from the perspective of these countries.
Secondly, soft power seems the current modus operandi. No longer is China supporting local communist parties or overt attempts at regime change. Rather they now use economic incentives to build closer relationships and shift perspectives toward China. Its working. You read Chinese signage is becoming common. Mandarin can be heard instead of either Cantonese or Hokkien.
The country chapters follow a similar pattern. Each begins with several current investment activities funded by China. Providing a perspective on who benefits and who doesn’t. The middle section usually provides a historical perspective on the country’s development from ancient times, how Chinese came to the country, and colonialization by western countries. The back of the chapter returns to China, its investments, the Chinese population including recent influxes of workers supporting China’s investments.
The Afterward adds the Covid-19 pandemic and how China’s relationships may evolve as a result.
The book is packed with information drawn from interviews, conversations, and observations. It’s a good read for anyone interested in the region and required reading for anyone working there. I wish I’d had this book to read before visiting and working in some of these countries.
If your vocabulary is weak have a dictionary handy as Strangio likes using sesquipedalian words and prose.
December 19, 2025
Strangio is the GOAT South East Asia journalist. I’ve been reading his stuff in the Diplomat for years and appreciated this longer compilation of his work and reflections on Chinese influence in the region. Each chapter is a snapshot of the current political situation and relative China relations of each country in SE Asia, and I likely will refer back to it often.
January 31, 2024
Great overview on SEA geopolitics
October 27, 2020
I find it concise without much fluff. Book is engaging enough for me to finish it in 5 sittings. This book provides a high overview and understanding between the intertwining relationship between ASEAN and China / US. Sometimes exploits.
We know there is more external power in play for these nations in the last 100 years but author manage to keep within the scope as stipulated.
I recommend Empire of the winds by Philip Bowring and books on imperialism to cover the gap before the 100 years in this book.
We know there is more external power in play for these nations in the last 100 years but author manage to keep within the scope as stipulated.
I recommend Empire of the winds by Philip Bowring and books on imperialism to cover the gap before the 100 years in this book.
December 8, 2021
An essential book to understand the motivations, pressures, desires and hopes of the South East Asian nations. Clearly and well written. Having lived in three of the countries the author writes about and visited all of the others, including Indonesia when the anti-Chinese riots were occurring, I felt that the author has portrayed these places accurately. Well done.
February 3, 2021
superb!!! concise, well thought out arguments strung together and relevant in today’s context. i recall writing abt the South China Sea in uni.... ahh those days .... another author I regret not hearing of beforehand... btw always good to educate yourself on what’s happening next door
March 19, 2021
Highly recommend
And outstanding primer in political economy in South East Asia and the region's dynamic relationships with China. I highly recommend this book.
And outstanding primer in political economy in South East Asia and the region's dynamic relationships with China. I highly recommend this book.
January 27, 2021
In the Dragon's Shadow is, essentially, a look at the role China has played historically and currently in the affairs of Southeast Asia. Much like the smaller nations in the Americas have had to learn to live with the presence and policies of the United States, so it is for the nations of Southeast Asia in the shadow of China. The caveat, of course, is that the countries, people, and cultures have had centuries, if not millennia, to adapt.
More than that, it's a comparison between the approach the Chinese has adopted in Southeast Asia and that of the Americans, though Strangio frequently contrasts both with the Japanese, who have arguably struck the best note the most consistently. It's also a clear-eyed look at the colonial hangover that is still felt throughout the region, as well as the arguably imperialistic designs the Chinese may have....to say nothing of providing excellent historical context for each country in the region (minus Brunei and East Timor) and the various animosities and alliances that have so impacted the region's history.
More than once Strangio's descriptions evoked the Monroe Doctrine for me, not least in the closing pages where he quoted a historian who noted "the Americans 'have to justify being here.' The Chinese, on the other hand, 'are just here...It's their backyard." And, as with any work that deals with globalization these days, there's the ever-looming shadow of the American consumer culture, the overarching, homogenizing force that brings everything it touches into its fold by varying degrees.
Strangio speaks to this directly, as a shared concern of the Vietnamese and Chinese, who otherwise find little common ground, but he also speaks to it obliquely, as when he notes the depth of the anxiety felt by many Burmans that their culture "could be engulfed by a flood of outsiders from the north." That such a notion is completely and utterly unfathomable to Americans - what flood of outsiders could possibly dislodge American culture - shows the extent to which said culture has taken hold around the world. (On the other hand, one could argue that those who found such solace in the previous administration did fear this very thing, treasuring, perhaps elements of "American culture" that others of us no longer see as paramount. But I digress.)
More than that, it's a comparison between the approach the Chinese has adopted in Southeast Asia and that of the Americans, though Strangio frequently contrasts both with the Japanese, who have arguably struck the best note the most consistently. It's also a clear-eyed look at the colonial hangover that is still felt throughout the region, as well as the arguably imperialistic designs the Chinese may have....to say nothing of providing excellent historical context for each country in the region (minus Brunei and East Timor) and the various animosities and alliances that have so impacted the region's history.
More than once Strangio's descriptions evoked the Monroe Doctrine for me, not least in the closing pages where he quoted a historian who noted "the Americans 'have to justify being here.' The Chinese, on the other hand, 'are just here...It's their backyard." And, as with any work that deals with globalization these days, there's the ever-looming shadow of the American consumer culture, the overarching, homogenizing force that brings everything it touches into its fold by varying degrees.
Strangio speaks to this directly, as a shared concern of the Vietnamese and Chinese, who otherwise find little common ground, but he also speaks to it obliquely, as when he notes the depth of the anxiety felt by many Burmans that their culture "could be engulfed by a flood of outsiders from the north." That such a notion is completely and utterly unfathomable to Americans - what flood of outsiders could possibly dislodge American culture - shows the extent to which said culture has taken hold around the world. (On the other hand, one could argue that those who found such solace in the previous administration did fear this very thing, treasuring, perhaps elements of "American culture" that others of us no longer see as paramount. But I digress.)
January 27, 2021
A tour of all ASEAN countries (except Brunei) highlighting influence from and attitudes towards China. Strangio’s thesis is that China is not trying to remake the region in its own image, it just provides a non-judgemental financial backstop to regimes in the region. By tying “liberal values” to FDI, the West is just pushing SEA nations into China’s arms. This ties directly into the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept. Strangio argues viewing US-China competition as an ideological showdown is “Great State Autism” and mirror-imaging. It is wrong and will get the US in trouble. He counsels the best approach is to BROADEN choices of SEA nations, rather than narrowing them.
Strangio has done some excellent work here. The book is jam-packed with regional information (I took about 3500 words worth of notes) and written in an entertaining way. A really ambitious project. Obviously he cannot go that deep on each country as the book has to cover a very wide area, but his overviews give you a sense of each country’s stance, with some concrete examples torn from the headlines. He ends right at the beginning of the COVID pandemic. The only problem is that by the nature of the book being so timely, it might lose value as the situation in the region changes. So buy it and read it now! I would really love to read a follow up in 5 years or so.
Some more of my thoughts while I read this book.
Southeast Asia really is a hub that Asia rotates around — a Mackinderlike Heartland. Geographically it is where China meets the open sea, and politically since NE Asian relations are terrible ASEAN conferences are the only place where all sides can come together to talk. SEA has a huge population with lots of potential, lots of investment dollars are pouring in, but also a wary region balancing superpowers. This is why I find the region fascinating to study these days. Also, the Japan’s position is interesting. Despite being eclipsed by China, with a shrinking economy and losing relevance in the world, Japan could play an important role again on the world stage through its actions in SEA, especially as the US recedes. Japan is the biggest investor, and has good relations built up since Fukuda Doctrine times making it a viable hedge against China, especially since it engages without asking for much democracy. Strangio points this out without going too much into J-SEA relations, but it is certainly there.
Strangio has done some excellent work here. The book is jam-packed with regional information (I took about 3500 words worth of notes) and written in an entertaining way. A really ambitious project. Obviously he cannot go that deep on each country as the book has to cover a very wide area, but his overviews give you a sense of each country’s stance, with some concrete examples torn from the headlines. He ends right at the beginning of the COVID pandemic. The only problem is that by the nature of the book being so timely, it might lose value as the situation in the region changes. So buy it and read it now! I would really love to read a follow up in 5 years or so.
Some more of my thoughts while I read this book.
Southeast Asia really is a hub that Asia rotates around — a Mackinderlike Heartland. Geographically it is where China meets the open sea, and politically since NE Asian relations are terrible ASEAN conferences are the only place where all sides can come together to talk. SEA has a huge population with lots of potential, lots of investment dollars are pouring in, but also a wary region balancing superpowers. This is why I find the region fascinating to study these days. Also, the Japan’s position is interesting. Despite being eclipsed by China, with a shrinking economy and losing relevance in the world, Japan could play an important role again on the world stage through its actions in SEA, especially as the US recedes. Japan is the biggest investor, and has good relations built up since Fukuda Doctrine times making it a viable hedge against China, especially since it engages without asking for much democracy. Strangio points this out without going too much into J-SEA relations, but it is certainly there.
January 31, 2022
May edit later with more substantial content but immediately I have 3 takeaways:
1. Countries like China because China Does Not Care about their human rights violations
2. Sino-SEAsians are very rich and successful but also oppressed
3. "Great-state autism" is an actual legitimate term (but still it seems unnecessary)
anyway I jest. Since China is omnipresent in the region (As the historian Wang Gungwu put it when we spoke in Singapore, the Americans “have to justify being here.” The Chinese, on the other hand, “are just here,” he said. “It’s their backyard.") Strangio basically speedruns the last 80 years of SEAsian history (but with varying degrees of depth) which helped me put the pieces of info jostling around in my brain about individual events / groups together more coherently. So now I can better appreciate events in relation to one another. The RCEP is mentioned in the Afterword and it is ridiculous how gleeful I got. I am Southeast Asia Stan.
I began "reading" this via audiobook but it was super distracting because the narrator kept mispronouncing words - most egregious was Malay as "May-lay". (also just remembered there are some glaring inaccuracies eg wrt Merger in 1963 and his understanding of Austronesian languages - these are topics I'm more familiar with so I could actually spot the problem - hmm I should take the other info with a bigger pinch of salt). Last ~40% read in Botanic Gardens with Reuben.
1. Countries like China because China Does Not Care about their human rights violations
2. Sino-SEAsians are very rich and successful but also oppressed
3. "Great-state autism" is an actual legitimate term (but still it seems unnecessary)
anyway I jest. Since China is omnipresent in the region (As the historian Wang Gungwu put it when we spoke in Singapore, the Americans “have to justify being here.” The Chinese, on the other hand, “are just here,” he said. “It’s their backyard.") Strangio basically speedruns the last 80 years of SEAsian history (but with varying degrees of depth) which helped me put the pieces of info jostling around in my brain about individual events / groups together more coherently. So now I can better appreciate events in relation to one another. The RCEP is mentioned in the Afterword and it is ridiculous how gleeful I got. I am Southeast Asia Stan.
I began "reading" this via audiobook but it was super distracting because the narrator kept mispronouncing words - most egregious was Malay as "May-lay". (also just remembered there are some glaring inaccuracies eg wrt Merger in 1963 and his understanding of Austronesian languages - these are topics I'm more familiar with so I could actually spot the problem - hmm I should take the other info with a bigger pinch of salt). Last ~40% read in Botanic Gardens with Reuben.
December 27, 2025
Author worked in Cambodia and Thailand; so the mainland South East Asia articles feel more well thought out. Each chapter talks a bit about the history; the tensions with each country, refers to at least one critic of the current government, and then a little summary at the end. Chapters seem to be discrete.
To be honest, I was disappointed by the Singapore chapter, and that will colour my view of the book. Half of the chapter covers Malacca, which is not part of Singapore. Yes, it gives a sense of history and context, but I don’t think it’s relevant to the subsequent chapters.
Interesting bits:
- great state autism - difficulty of large powers to break free of entrenched ways of thinking and behaving.
- repeated reference to Chinese pragmatism / focus on economics / judgment free money vs Western idealism
- key question of the book: “in general, China has presented each of the Southeast Asian states with a similar challenge: how to benefit from its booming economy while safeguarding its sovereignty from the perils of overdependence.”
- Cambodia chapter: mentions Vietnam’s position as a Soviet Union client as a concern for China; mention of the Soviet Union is absent in the Vietnam chapter.
To be honest, I was disappointed by the Singapore chapter, and that will colour my view of the book. Half of the chapter covers Malacca, which is not part of Singapore. Yes, it gives a sense of history and context, but I don’t think it’s relevant to the subsequent chapters.
Interesting bits:
- great state autism - difficulty of large powers to break free of entrenched ways of thinking and behaving.
- repeated reference to Chinese pragmatism / focus on economics / judgment free money vs Western idealism
- key question of the book: “in general, China has presented each of the Southeast Asian states with a similar challenge: how to benefit from its booming economy while safeguarding its sovereignty from the perils of overdependence.”
- Cambodia chapter: mentions Vietnam’s position as a Soviet Union client as a concern for China; mention of the Soviet Union is absent in the Vietnam chapter.
September 14, 2021
This is a pretty good overview of the developments in Southeast Asia’s increasingly dependent relationship with China over the past few years. I thought that most of its chapters were well done, though I have some reservations about the concluding final chapter that attempts to tie it all together and give recommendations for US policy in the region. The inclusion of COVID-19 at the very end also felt unnecessary, especially since there’s nothing interesting said about it:
“But when the pandemic finally petered out, Southeast Asia’s relationship with China was unlikely to have been altered in any fundamental way” does not age well. A whole new book of equal length could one day be written about how the pandemic shaped relations in the region, so the dismissal of it here seems inappropriate.
Nevertheless, the main sections of the book were quite enlightening and I learned a lot. I’d highly recommend this to anyone who wants to learn more about how China is currently exerting its geopolitical power in Southeast Asia, particularly in preparation for its ambitious Belt Road Initiative.
“But when the pandemic finally petered out, Southeast Asia’s relationship with China was unlikely to have been altered in any fundamental way” does not age well. A whole new book of equal length could one day be written about how the pandemic shaped relations in the region, so the dismissal of it here seems inappropriate.
Nevertheless, the main sections of the book were quite enlightening and I learned a lot. I’d highly recommend this to anyone who wants to learn more about how China is currently exerting its geopolitical power in Southeast Asia, particularly in preparation for its ambitious Belt Road Initiative.
January 5, 2023
An insightful book analysing the varied impact of China’s rise across ASEAN. Strangio gives a tour of the ASEAN nations (Vietnam, Cambodia & Loas, Thailand, Burma, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines). Each chapter begins with a historical overview discussing the impact of the Chinese diaspora and Chinese state on the political, economic and cultural spheres in each country. Shifting to the modern day, the book details the balance being struck between each nation as well as ASEAN as a block, in their respective searches for strategic autonomy versus the rising superpower. Strangio covers areas of potential mutual benefit (e.g infrastructure investment via Belt & Road) as well as potential challenges (border and maritime disputes, political issues stemming from rival identities of “Overseas Chinese” and geopolitical competition with the US). One area for further reading, which is briefly touched upon in the conclusion, is the role to be played by Japan, the US, India and other blocs (Europe and GCC countries), each of which aims to shape Southeast Asia over the coming years. Overall a worthwhile read.
March 8, 2023
It's no surprise that China has an outsized influence on Southeast Asia, particularly since the US has disengaged from the region in the past twenty years. Mr. Strangio does a good job of analyzing relationships with China on a country by country basis. It turns out that only Cambodia and Laos are firmly within China's orbit, and that is because they are both tiny countries that use the power of friendship with China as a balance against more powerful and sometimes threatening neighbors. The other regional players - Thailand, Vientnam, Indonesia and the Philippines - all have relationships with China that go up and down and that reflect differing national interests. None of these places are Chinese puppets. And China itself has a very pragmatic approach to the region. Yes, it wants influence, and the influence is in some ways inevitably imperialistic, but it is mostly pragmatic, and much of China's aid is provided with less strings attached and less of an agenda of domination than aid from the United States. It's a reasonably encouraging picture of a region that has its difficulties but that nevertheless prospering in many ways.
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