Keane writes from the perspective of a radical democrat who is worried that the best arguments in favour of democracy have not yet been made. What we get instead is a mess of confused advocacy heavily inflected with the national prejudices of this or that political elite which sees the contribution made by its own country to the cause of representative government as the thing which makes democracy itself truly great.
Arguments of this sort are just not good enough, according to Keane, and risk handing all the really good cards over to democracy’s many critics, who see in it just another attempt to impose the values and mindsets of imperial masters on diverse local populations. If this argument is to be countered the pressing need is that we find evidence that democracy is capable of being supported from within a larger portion of the cultures and social systems by which humanity organises its affairs.
Keane’s approach is to discount the idea that we will find fully-fledged democracies functioning in communities over which subsequent history has cast dark shadows. The reason for this is that democracies have never been ‘fully-fledged’, but always works in progress; including all the ones we are working with in our own time. Further, the excavation of this history reveals that the assemblage of the components of democracy follows three different models. The first of these is assembly democracy, as practiced not first by the Athens and the Greek city states, but the towns and villages of the Mesopotamian region. Subsequently a toolkit was put together which allowed representative democracy to sustain itself, which in turn was displaced by something he calls ‘monitory’ democracy.
He is anxious to avoid grand theories of democracy, which root it in ontological reasoning of necessity and inevitability. It seems that people stumbled on the components of democracy by accident but were then happily relieved that it assisted them in the tasks before them in the times in which they lived. The assemblies which brought together the citizens of a city state addressed the needs of prosperous agrarian and manufactured goods trading societies to hold together the leading groups to reach a consensus on the rules needed to order commerce internally and to maintain relations with neighbouring states and political authorities. Small and homogeneous enough to allow believe that such agreement could be brokered, the assembly provided the means to unify a body of male, free citizens which seldom numbered more than a few thousands of people.
The age of the city states gave way to empires and democracy became a memory which was often spoken of in harsh terms by the intellectuals who served the successor regimes. It was remembered as a system of government which restrained the options for action on the part of the strong men of aristocratic temperament who really needed to be given their head. It took the dissolution of their handiwork for democracy in a new guise to begin to find purchase once again.
As the energy for building and maintaining empires dissipated, space was created for emergence of entities which, though founded as administrative units of empire, provided a framework which allowed denizens to establish structures in which a new form of democracy could be established. The contours now were national rather than civic and this democracy had to be representative rather than direct.
Keane explores the differences at length. Assembly democracy belonged to particularly stage of communicative technology as much as anything, with limits set by the volume of the human voice, or the speed of a messenger travelling on foot or horseback. Representative democracy belonged to the age of the printing press, with a daily press offering its take on events that concerned the life of the nation to its citizens. But representation also allowed for something else to be attempted by democracy. The ancient assemblies had required unanimity, or as close as possible, for their mandate for action: representative democracy provided a form which facilitated the presence of different viewpoints and interests in its parliaments, with the government emerging from voting practices which produced majorities and minorities.
How this played out in all the countries which adopted some type of democratic is the subject of a lengthy middle section of the book. The United States provided a strong constitution-based model for its representative democracy, setting out complex ground rules for its various institutions. The enlightened minds which produced this work were careful to provide mechanisms which prevented majorities from turning into tyrannies, through a strict separation of the powers of government and other checks and balances. Representative government became in this way an immensely complex business which reflected the character to the society it ruled.
But Keane follows representation down others paths. The Spanish American example after the continent established its independence from Spain and Portugal after 1812 produced a variant called caudillism, which arose when elections produced rulers who operated with the authority of dictators. In Asia a banyan democracy emerged with the establishment of the Republic of India, which sheltered structures intended to provide representation to hundreds of millions of people of different religious and ethnic backgrounds.
The point here, essential to Keane’s argument, is that democracy evades proscriptions which tie it to particular cultures, presence of a supposed essential class component, or levels of technical and education development of the peoples who live within its system of government. For this author, democracy in some form is always possible whenever the mass of people perceive of the need for the accountability of government to the society it rules over.
In the final section of his book, Keane discusses the advent of what he calls ‘monitory’ democracy. In his history, the representative form entered into a crisis at the beginning of the 20th century and this extended right up until the end of the second world war. This was a time when democracy could have been washed away altogether by the rising tide of dictatorships of both communist and fascist varieties. That is didn’t, and in fact staged a remarkable comeback after 1945, was to do the accommodation representative democracy made with a wider civil society, allowing its organisations a monitoring function which embedded its structures more deeply into the activities of ordinary citizens.
Effective and efficient monitoring of government was made possible by new developments in communicative technologies associated with the rise of the electronic media – the telegraph, radio, television, and latterly the internet – which increased the rate of flow of information and generated more opportunities for citizens to shape the narrative of national life. More monitoring meant more scrutiny, and more opportunities to check and balance the activities of government through citizens’ action which was at least the equivalent of the constitutionalism which was the hall mark of representative democracy.
Monitory democracy is the phase of history in which we currently reside, and on the basis of this story it might seem to be a good place to be. There has been a huge advance in the numbers of countries whose governments are now formed on the basis of periodic elections – in the region of 120 out of around 200 across the world – and everyone with access to a laptop and a mobile phone seems to have the potential to operate as a much more effective citizen than ever they could in the past.
But Keane sees problems for democracy which aren’t as far away as the horizon. In apparently empowering the individual citizen monitory democracy has eroded confidence in many of the forms of collectivism which had previously structured political life. Political parties across the world are declining in membership as people cease to see the relevance of perspectives and values forged across decades as being relevant to the fast-moving circumstances of the modern world. Noting this development, the professional political class seeks new relationships with voters which are based on more immediate, popularist approaches. The sheer volume of chatter about possible interpretations of everyday life can induce torpor and indifference to the actions of government, as well as outright cynicism.
The book concludes with a discussion with an imaginary historian from the future who is in a position to report on the aspects of our contemporary lives which ought to generate alarms and warnings. Rather than the world having been secured for democracy, the future commentator suggests it again is balanced on a cusp with the danger, just as back in the early 1900s, it might retreat and became extinct once again. That is shouldn’t Keane suggests, has much more to do with the cultures of hope which human society appears to need to keep moving forward and solving problems than with any particular ideological or prejudices based on the special role of special nations.
The implication appears to be that if democracy is to be renewed in the 21st century then it will need once again to get closer to the people who would draw most obvious benefits from making sure that the business of government remains accountable to their needs and interests. The political programme which would support this action for the next generation has not yet been written. If it ever is, Keane’s substantial book – nearly 900 hundred pages without the footnotes – will be regarded as a fitting foreword to the project.