Summary: This is what people think right now among those that have a lot of influence, so you should read it. While I largely agree with many parts, I do not hold the same framework and these are fundamental differences in how I see the world.
Having read his newsletters for more than a decade, I will never be anything but a huge fan of Dalio. He's brilliant and anyone who believes otherwise has missed the point. The star removal is because we do not agree on a few fundamental things, and I know he's smart AF, so it could only possibly be because he is refusing to see it that way.
My notes are for me, so I'm more citing, b/c I sometimes have to repeat why I feel the way I do. This is not a review in the normal sense.
p.14 "I believe the reason people typically miss the big moments of evolution coming at them inlife is that we each experience only tiny pieces of what is happening."
"From gaining this perspective, I've come to believe that there are only a limited number of personality types going down a limited number of paths that lead them to encounter a limited number of situations to produce only a limited number of stories that repeat over time.
.... something to think about in the context of his previous book and the idea that we can sometimes be academically lazy in reinforcing our own viewpoints.
p. 15 - He talks about how he came to this path of thought of this book. He was studying money and credit cycles and hoping to go backwards with his lens: "... central bank actions push financial asset prices and the economy up, which widen the wealth gap and led to an era of populism and conflict."
p. 36 - He talks about ways to distribute wealth to advance society: ... "... the formula for success has been a system in which educated people come up with innovations, receive funding through capital markets, andn own the means by which their innovations are turned into the production and allocation of resources allowing them to be rewarded by profit making. This happens best in capitalism and the government systems that work symbiotically with it. At the same time, how this is happening continues to evolve. For example, while ages ago agricultural land and agricultural production are worth the most and that evolved into machines and what they produce being worth the most, digital things that have no apparent physical existence (data and information process) are evolving to become worth the most." This is one of a couple of foundation stone in his thought process that implies the way he's thinking about it is waves of preferences. I don't see it that way because this set-up embeds a particular thought process about causality and active action that I don't agree with. I would likely flip it backwards.
p. 44 He states the measure of power and wealth: "1) education, 2) competitiveness 3) technology, 4) economic output, 5) share of world trade, 6) military strength, 7) financial center strength, and 8) reserve currency.
p. 63 "However, unlike what most people intuitively think, there isn't a fixed amount of money and credit in existence. Money and credit can easily be created by governments. Their creating it is liked because it gives people, companies, nonprofit organizations, and governments more spending power." He then talks about the idea that if you have too much debt the paying it back can be difficult. Here is where we are not quite on the same page. Because there is a period of time before money. While some might find that is irrelevant, the challenge with excluding it fails to incorporate the years prior to the dominance of money in politics. In other times, you might have just enslaved a bunch of people (or gone to war and brought back slaves). Alternatively, you can just have very rich people donate it (time, resources, money....etc) outright. That's not money. That's something else, i.e. making a bunch of people do something they don't want, inspiring people to do something you want them to do. That becomes important later to understand a particular unexplored area of cases and solutions in the book.
p. 70 "For example, when the money and credit that central banks are creating no longer go into lending that fuels increases in economic demand and instead go into other currencies and inflation-hedge assets, it fails to stimulate economic activity and instead causes the value of the currency to decline and the value of inflation-hedge assets to rise. At such times high inflation can occur because the supply of money and credit has increased relative to the demand for it, which we call monetary inflation. That can happen at the same time there is weak demand.".... Can't tell if he's implying that is the case right this minute. If yes, I respectfully disagree.
p. 71 "In other words, using market values of what one owns to measure one's wealth gives an illusion of changes in wealth that doesn't really exist. As far as how the economic machine works, the big thing is that money and credit is stimulative when it's given out and depressing when it has to be paid back. That's what normally makes money, credit, and economic growth so cyclical."
p. 76 "Soon people treated these paper "claims on money" as if they were money themselves. After all, they were as good as money because they could be redeemed for tangible money. This type of currency system is called a linked currency system because the value of the currency is linked to the value of something, typically hard money such as gold."
Ok... at this point it became clear to me that he is using the idea of money and currency in a way that is very different from the book "1000 years of debt" that clearly and cleanly demonstrates that even currency is a form of debt. here we are not on the same page, because i agree with that author. In thinking of money in this way he is thinking of money in terms of stored value that can be physically produced. In fact, that is not what money is or is moving toward. Money has always been a store of value and the idea of currency or debt has been surrounding how do store value for portability both geographically and temporarily in a manner that can be confirmed. This means that for a few chapters Dalio and I must agree to disagree, because he goes in the direction of the Gold Standard concepts and produces a history that, while true, is not the way I see it.
p. 78 - "Money is what settles claims - i.e. one pays one's bills and one is done. Debt is a promise to deliver money. In watching how the machine is working it is important to watch a) the amounts of both debt and money that exist relative to the amount of hard money (e.g. gold) in the bank and b) the amount of goods and services that exist, which can vary, remembering that debt cycles happen because most people love to expand their buying power (generally through debt) while central banks tend to want to expand the amount of money in existence because people are happier when they do that." IMO, no. this is merely a framework we've created. What settles a claim is the other person acknowledging the terms, of which money has become the predominant manner to do so. The amount of goods and service and your ability to provide this become the primary relevance, the amount relative to anything specific is irrelevant, as long as you debtor and debtee agree... this has to do with my definition in the previous section and leads to a very different conclusion. We both land on the same idea that the reserve currency is all good, but with different nuances.
p. 81 - "When credit cycles reach their limit it is both the logical and classic response for central governments and their central banks to create a lot of debt and print money that will be spent on goods, services, and investment assets to keep the economy moving. That is what was done during the 2008 debt crisis, when interest rates could no longer be lowered because they had already hit 0%."
p. 85 - "Some people think there needs to be an alternative reserve currency to go to, but that's not true as the same dynamics of the breakdown of the monetary system and the running to other assets happened in cases in which there was no alternative currency to go to(e.g. in China and in the Roman Empire). The debasement of the currency leads it to devalue and have people run from it and debt denominated in it into something else." .... It almost ...and I really mean almost, that this is his pot shot at e-currencies/bitcoin.
p. 86 - "By keeping an eye on the amount of debt that needs to be paid relative to the amount of hard money that there is to pay it, the amount of debt payments that have to be made relative to the amount of cash flow the debtors have to service the debt, and the interest rewards that one is getting for lending one's money, one can assess the risk/reward of holding the time bonds." Yes... but .... and the but has to do with reserve currencies and also the idea that in such a case there is a desire to ignore in this any hard assets a country has that have nothing to do with assets. This is how China has taken over random mines and raw materials in a host of countries, so it's not a kinda nuanced point. A bit of a pet peeve that people talk about balance sheet without incorporating all assets.
p. 96 - "The US dollar now accounts for about 55% of the world's international transactions, savings, and borrowing. The Eurozone's euro accounts for about 25%. The Japanese yen accounts for less than 10%. The Chinese renminbi accounts for about 2%.
p. 104. "There is a real economy and there is a financial economy which are intertwined but different. The real economy and the financial economy each has its own supply and demand dynamics."
p. 115 - Here he talks about why the US was the net beneficiary of WWI and WWII.
p. 120 - Here he talks about not holding bonds late in debt cycles. Interesting....
p. 157 - "At its peak in the 19th century, the UK's 2.5% of the world's population produced 20% of the world's income and the UK controlled over 40% of global exports. This economic strength grew in tandem with a strong military which, along with the privately driven conquests of the British East India Company, drove the creation of a global empire upon which "the sun never set."
p. 158 - it took 20 years after WWII for the US to gain dominance over the British pound. He attributes that to post-war debt. I would say yes and.... the US rise is more important on a relative basis and also what they had already lost from the colonies situation and their ability to exploit cheap later via that route, which dominated the period of imperialism. I know... this book tries to stay away from the idea of slavery for good reason in this political environment, but let's just call it what it is ok....
p. 179 - ok... top paragraph on the Soviets being a rival to the US post WWII.... even if we made them a rival country and did this whole cold war, it's f-in stupid IMO. .. the idea that the Soviets were a comparable rival power at any point is just disrespectful AF to what the Russians suffered post WWII and how that carried through. Super not fair. The scary thing to me is that Dalio knows that so why he's putting it this way is awkward.
p. 182 - this 10 years of economic warfare before we actually take guns out... scary stuff.
p. 206 - talks about the importance of gold and reserve currencies in cross border transactions. I'm gonna say yes... and yet again, but he's not willing to go all the way to where I mentioned atop, i.e. that the point is not money, it's the ability to agree on value portability both temporary and geographically. As such, we then have to listen to all this on gold and ignore any conversation about electronic currencies such as bitcoin which have no sovereignty attached. I'm going to call it a microaggression.
p. 207... This is why I love Dalio. He's willing to admit that Post WWII the US was super rich and as such it paid off a bunch of countries to do certain things.... those countries benefited .... btw... they are all the countries surrounding the borders of Russian and specifically China.
p. 215 -... Ok Look, I get why he's blaming moving from the gold standard. There are so many tellings of this across the board. But seriously.... this love of Volker... really? I mean, let's be really honest.... oil prices and food prices, doesn't matter what you do on a monetary side, it wouldn't have changed things given what was happening with the Middle East Nations and how they felt about it. That would take decades of oil policy that we are currently undoing and it sure as hell wouldn't have undone mother nature making crops not grow and our own stupid AF policies related to the way we paid farmers not to farm... and I KNOW Dalio knows this. so why is this being presented as such??????????
p. 218 - I had no idea that he had an early bad series of calls. Wow. vulnerable. #Respect.
p. 221 - he indicates the rise of EM due to the swap out of middle income American jobs to overseas outsourcing. He indicates he knows this is a massive simplification. I'll allow it.
p. 225 - He puts the rise of income gap to the idea of a Money Financed Capitalist boom. The logic of this is that printing money and buying back stock largely made the wealthy wealthier at the expense of the poor.... I always hate these because another way to look at it is globally and you'll see a very different picture, i.e. the US poor are just middle class in a global scale and the rich are coming up to the global scale. But then you have to incorporate the really poor countries to properly see it over the history of humanity. Still....
This leads to his point that domestically in the US you end up with social and economic inequality that leads to the rise of Trump. Maybe... or ... something else.... I think the something else is even more nuanced than what he's saying here. So I don't love this logical short cut.
p. 237 - He shows how large China's reserves are (in reserve currencies and other...) he then says ... "... the US is very powerful because it can print the world's money and would be very vulnerable if it lost its reserve currency status." This is true.
p.. 238 - "... if the US dollar were to lose its reserve status and significantly depreciate in value it would have a devastating effect on the finances of those countries holding those reserves as well as private-sector holders of dollar-debt assets. Who would be the winners? Those with dollar-debt liabilities and those with non-dollar assets would be the big winners." True... but his path drawing might be abrupt, and the scenarios you'd have to have if someone were to pay me cash money to assess how would you dislodge the US as the reserve currencies… it won’t just be China rising further.
p. 255 - His depiction of China is so spot on... strategic with a far longer history to pull from for that strategy.
p. 259-260 He talks about the idea that there are few wars outside of China but many internally. YESSSSS!!! I have said this over and over again. China is not a European country.... why they would go to war is WAY the heck more limited. Their history tells you this. It’s not their deal to be the aggressor. They are FAAARRR more likely to use other means.
p. 266 - This idea that the Chinese like to save more. I'm not a believer. The public at large doesn't have as many options on the investment side. If there is no lending market at a reasonable rate with a legal system that easily supports it then yeah… people save.
p. 269 - He intro's the Century of Humiliation and the stakes that Taiwan has. Ok... so like this concept is from the last 20 years as a rallying cry for China to centralize together internally against an outside group.
p. 277-279 - He's got a telling of China that is very quick, but largely, it's fine. I do worry how laymen will read it who know nothing of the nuance of how he's saying it.
p. 280... ths is a very fast history of China.. wow... hope people learn more ... while accurate it's a bit glib. But I get it. Dalio's got a lot of ground to cover.
p. 286... The long term goal of Reuniting China is a bit odd to say this way. I mean HK and Macao had specific lease terms during imperialism. If we hadn't done a bunch of stupid shit including the having Taiwan semi be lodged on that island, then possibly the island of Formosa could be "worked out." at this point, I'm not convinced the politicians know how to do this correctly..... I mean you have to dial back the microscope for a better understanding of Chinese territorial history.....but the whole world keeps leaning in to these highly biased nasty pictures of things… particularly recently....
p. 328 - "China will probably advance its technologies and the quality of its decision making that is enabled by them faster than the US will. Big data + Big AI + big computing = superior decision making." Way to skirt the implications of why, which Dalio obviously knows..... and obviously it's not because they are investing more....
p. 332-334 - This idea of the strengthening of China's military... I wish he'd just show the borders and what territory they are trying to control and it would make it less inciting and mysterious as to why they have to do that.
p. 342 - I like how he walks through each of the current reserve currencies and why even at 2% we should care a lot about the state of the RMB.
p. 357 the Enemy is Us is an intriguing one....It's a long list... some of which includes defunding the military. I mean, you could also retool it if it's that controversial.
also... I totally heart this: "The internal wars and challenges in both China and the US are more improtant and bigger than external wars and challenges."