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Anthony Eden : A Biography
Eden was Neville Chamberlain's foreign secretary in the 1930s, held the same position under Churchill during World War II and succeeded the latter as prime minister in 1955. Asked by Eden's widow to undertake the project, Jamesa distinguished historian (The British Revolution, etc.) and member of Parliamentwas given access to Eden's private papers, including revealing correspondence with Churchill. The biography sheds new light on Eden's 1938 resignation over Chamberlain's policy of appeasement; his contribution to the 1954 Geneva conference (James argues that Eden "virtually single-handedly" kept America out of a war in Indochina); and examines the full context of Eden's controversial leadership during the Suez crisis of 1956. A sympathetic but not uncritical portrayal of a complex figure who "brought honor and dignity, kindness and loyalty to the often grubby trade of politics." Photos. Major ad/promo; History Book Club selection. Copyright 1987 Reed Business Information, Inc.
665 pages, Hardcover
First published October 13, 1986
67 people want to read
About the author
Robert Rhodes James
46 books5 followersSir Robert Vidal Rhodes James (10 April 1933 – 20 May 1999) was a British historian who served as a Conservative Member of Parliament from 1976 until 1992.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
March 1, 2013
Although this is a thorough biography of Anthony Eden it is very subjective at times. A biographer should be both best friend and worst enemy of his subject. In too many instances the author worships at the shrine of Anthony Eden.
Nonetheless the author does fully cover his remarkable life. What a span that covers! Anthony Eden served in the trenches of the First World as an officer; after he ran for parliament and eventually managed to win a seat (he initially lost and changed ridings). This did set the pattern for his long career. Nothing came very easily for Anthony Eden through-out his life and he never became wealthy. As the author correctly points out Eden was a man of principals. He resigned as Foreign Secretary under Chamberlain after protracted disagreements over the way foreign policy was being carried out. As to the pre-war descriptions of Mr. Eden I have relatively few disagreements with Mr. James.
In the early 1930’s during peace talks with European powers, Eden wanted to propose the ‘total abolition of the naval and military air arm’. This appears ludicrous and without much foundation for a military power like England. Yet this gets the endorsement of Mr. James (page 118 of my volume). But Mr. James does provide a good description of the relationship between Eden and Neville Chamberlain. Mr. James is correct that Eden misjudged and under-estimated the strength (and vindictiveness) of Mr. Chamberlain’s personality and path in foreign affairs. During this breach Eden again showed integrity; he never divulged the reasons for his resignation which would have led to acute embarrassment for the Prime Minister.
It is after he again became Foreign Secretary under Winston Churchill that I felt Mr. James to be vehemently anti-Roosevelt (and to some extent anti-American). To some extent Mr. James places Eden at the same level as Winston Churchill. Anthony Eden’s use of the English language in both his speeches and his writings never approach the eloquence and force of Winston Churchill. Anthony Eden’s writings (he was the author of three volumes of his career and a short manuscript on his early upbringing) clearly don’t approach the output of Winston Churchill.
Mr. James suggests on many occasions that Roosevelt handed Poland over to Stalin on a silver platter (p. 280). This is historical nonsense. Stalin had 2 million soldiers in Poland by 1944 when the talks with him began – what were the Allies to do – go to war with Russia after the defeat of Germany? Roosevelt (and Churchill) had obtained the promise at Yalta of ‘free and unfettered elections’ in Poland after Germany was defeated. It was Stalin who did not keep this promise. Roosevelt obtained several concessions from Stalin at Yalta – participation in the United Nations, a promise to attack Japan after the war with Germany was over (the atom bomb was still under development). Mr. James also suggests that Churchill was unconcerned about the growing Soviet menace in Eastern Europe. This is not proven by the abundance of letters that Churchill wrote to Stalin during and after the Warsaw uprising in the summer of 1944, with the Russian armies halted a few miles outside the city and doing nothing to help the Polish partisans. Averill Harriman was one of the key diplomats to be wary of the Russians – there is no mention of this by Mr. James.
Mr. James grossly overestimates the role of Eden in the formation of the United Nations (p.282). It was Roosevelt who always pushed for the U.N. Roosevelt initiated this at the Atlantic conference in 1941 which Mr. James mentions only disparagingly.
On page 283 – the author states ‘Until the middle of 1944 the British Empire had more forces engaged with the enemy than any other belligerent’. No, Russia had more forces, starting in June 1941 when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union.
On page 380 – ‘Eden, virtually single-handedly had kept America out of the war in Indo-China [in mid-fifties:]’ It was Eisenhower who prevented U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Also Mr. James goes on to say that Eden succeeded in resolving political tensions in Southeast Asia stating this as a ‘remarkable diplomatic achievement’,this sounds particularly hollow considering that fighting ended only in the 1980’s.
Then we come to the Suez Crisis (1956-57) which led to Anthony Eden’s resignation as the Prime Minister. As one reads this account in Mr. James book – one is baffled to know what exactly was going on with Mr. Eden. He never had full parliamentary support and at least George Bush told the entire world that he was going to attack Iraq. Eden tried to obfuscate this issue by pretending he had no knowledge that Israel was going to attack Egypt and then use that as a pre-text for the Anglo-French attack on Egypt to protect the Suez Canal. Mr. James cites correctly the clarity of President Eisenhower’s initial letter (p 472) to Prime Minister Eden where he explicitly urges Eden to open diplomatic talks or use the U.N.; but the U.S. will not become involved militarily in the Suez. This is a tribute to Mr. James honesty, but several pages later the author blames Eisenhower instead of Eden for the ridiculously belligerent position that England found herself in! Mr. James refuses to admit that maybe there was a personal vendetta between Eden and Nasser. Also he does not fault Eden for listening too closely to Secretary of State Dulles, instead of the President. He castigates the Labour opposition for changing their opinion over time – perhaps Mr. Eden should have done likewise but ended up placing England into a most sordid position, contrasting with her triumphal standing after the Second World War. Eden resigned office shortly after this fiasco.
Nonetheless the author does fully cover his remarkable life. What a span that covers! Anthony Eden served in the trenches of the First World as an officer; after he ran for parliament and eventually managed to win a seat (he initially lost and changed ridings). This did set the pattern for his long career. Nothing came very easily for Anthony Eden through-out his life and he never became wealthy. As the author correctly points out Eden was a man of principals. He resigned as Foreign Secretary under Chamberlain after protracted disagreements over the way foreign policy was being carried out. As to the pre-war descriptions of Mr. Eden I have relatively few disagreements with Mr. James.
In the early 1930’s during peace talks with European powers, Eden wanted to propose the ‘total abolition of the naval and military air arm’. This appears ludicrous and without much foundation for a military power like England. Yet this gets the endorsement of Mr. James (page 118 of my volume). But Mr. James does provide a good description of the relationship between Eden and Neville Chamberlain. Mr. James is correct that Eden misjudged and under-estimated the strength (and vindictiveness) of Mr. Chamberlain’s personality and path in foreign affairs. During this breach Eden again showed integrity; he never divulged the reasons for his resignation which would have led to acute embarrassment for the Prime Minister.
It is after he again became Foreign Secretary under Winston Churchill that I felt Mr. James to be vehemently anti-Roosevelt (and to some extent anti-American). To some extent Mr. James places Eden at the same level as Winston Churchill. Anthony Eden’s use of the English language in both his speeches and his writings never approach the eloquence and force of Winston Churchill. Anthony Eden’s writings (he was the author of three volumes of his career and a short manuscript on his early upbringing) clearly don’t approach the output of Winston Churchill.
Mr. James suggests on many occasions that Roosevelt handed Poland over to Stalin on a silver platter (p. 280). This is historical nonsense. Stalin had 2 million soldiers in Poland by 1944 when the talks with him began – what were the Allies to do – go to war with Russia after the defeat of Germany? Roosevelt (and Churchill) had obtained the promise at Yalta of ‘free and unfettered elections’ in Poland after Germany was defeated. It was Stalin who did not keep this promise. Roosevelt obtained several concessions from Stalin at Yalta – participation in the United Nations, a promise to attack Japan after the war with Germany was over (the atom bomb was still under development). Mr. James also suggests that Churchill was unconcerned about the growing Soviet menace in Eastern Europe. This is not proven by the abundance of letters that Churchill wrote to Stalin during and after the Warsaw uprising in the summer of 1944, with the Russian armies halted a few miles outside the city and doing nothing to help the Polish partisans. Averill Harriman was one of the key diplomats to be wary of the Russians – there is no mention of this by Mr. James.
Mr. James grossly overestimates the role of Eden in the formation of the United Nations (p.282). It was Roosevelt who always pushed for the U.N. Roosevelt initiated this at the Atlantic conference in 1941 which Mr. James mentions only disparagingly.
On page 283 – the author states ‘Until the middle of 1944 the British Empire had more forces engaged with the enemy than any other belligerent’. No, Russia had more forces, starting in June 1941 when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union.
On page 380 – ‘Eden, virtually single-handedly had kept America out of the war in Indo-China [in mid-fifties:]’ It was Eisenhower who prevented U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Also Mr. James goes on to say that Eden succeeded in resolving political tensions in Southeast Asia stating this as a ‘remarkable diplomatic achievement’,this sounds particularly hollow considering that fighting ended only in the 1980’s.
Then we come to the Suez Crisis (1956-57) which led to Anthony Eden’s resignation as the Prime Minister. As one reads this account in Mr. James book – one is baffled to know what exactly was going on with Mr. Eden. He never had full parliamentary support and at least George Bush told the entire world that he was going to attack Iraq. Eden tried to obfuscate this issue by pretending he had no knowledge that Israel was going to attack Egypt and then use that as a pre-text for the Anglo-French attack on Egypt to protect the Suez Canal. Mr. James cites correctly the clarity of President Eisenhower’s initial letter (p 472) to Prime Minister Eden where he explicitly urges Eden to open diplomatic talks or use the U.N.; but the U.S. will not become involved militarily in the Suez. This is a tribute to Mr. James honesty, but several pages later the author blames Eisenhower instead of Eden for the ridiculously belligerent position that England found herself in! Mr. James refuses to admit that maybe there was a personal vendetta between Eden and Nasser. Also he does not fault Eden for listening too closely to Secretary of State Dulles, instead of the President. He castigates the Labour opposition for changing their opinion over time – perhaps Mr. Eden should have done likewise but ended up placing England into a most sordid position, contrasting with her triumphal standing after the Second World War. Eden resigned office shortly after this fiasco.
September 8, 2017
Robert Rhodes James' Anthony Eden is the "authorized" biography of that ill-starred Prime Minister, yet much more balanced than you might suppose. James, an accomplished historian and MP, takes the approach that Eden (whom he knew personally) was a great man with several fatal flaws: an uncontrollable temper, an irritating habit of glomming on to a conviction and not letting go, even when it was wrong. James shows his constantly butting heads with Chamberlain over appeasement during the '30s, his generally admirable record as Foreign Secretary during WWII (and later), while also owning up to his mistakes (blaming him for Churchill's decision to intervene in Greece, for instance). He does downplay Eden's often-fractious relationship with Churchill and his vaulting ambition, besides an irritating habit of blaming everything from Yalta to Suez on the Americans (the former is especially galling, since it was Churchill, not FDR who gift-wrapped Poland for Stalin). So far as Suez goes, he views Eden as taking a justifiable stand against Nasser but that he adopted an unreasonable, disreputable method of carrying it out. A debatable conclusion, but easier to stomach than other Eden apologists (John Pearson) who'd have you believe he wasn't a shambling, drug-addled mess during the Crisis. If not quite warts and all, neither is it hagiography, which honestly is much more than I expected.
August 2, 2020
Very informative. Biographers who take the side of their subject explicitly leave me questioning the content. That is the case here. Throughout the book a defensive narrative develops and it became a little tiresome and left me questioning whether I was hearing the objective facts or the case for Eden. I’d like to have made up my own mind.
October 12, 2020
James writes great political biographies. Unfortunately, the Suez crisis gives Eden’s otherwise glorious career a very tragic conclusion.
August 22, 2011
Clear & Concise written in the early 20th century style of Biography. Maybe because of the subject.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews