Again these Oxford "very short introduction" books show their worth. Narlikar's succinct, 138-page book answers all the basic questions one might have had about the WTO but were afraid to ask.
First, Narlikar analyzes the history of international trade negotiations since World War II, from Bretton Woods to the current Doha round, and describes how these influenced the structure of GATT (the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs), and then, after 1994, the WTO itself.
Her description of the failure of the International Trade Organization (ITO) is particularly illuminating. Apparently at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference the ITO was meant to be a substantial compliment to the IMF and the World Bank on the international scene. Its 106 article "Havana Charter" gave it a broad mandate to not only lower tariffs, but to set standards for employment, antitrust, and even humanitarian issues. Yet this broad mandate ultimately brought it down, and even though 53 countries had signed on, the US Congress, Republican after 1946, refused to support such an overpowering international institution, and Truman withdrew the treaty from consideration in 1950. GATT, when it was negotiated at the 1947 Geneva Conference, was merely supposed to be an interim agreement to facilitate trade until ITO was ratified. Its main advantage was that, unlike the ITO treaty, the more limited GATT could be approved by the US President unilaterally under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Yet this interim agreement became the foundation for world trade negotiations for the next 50 years. Interestingly, although it was just a somewhat vague standard for tariff negotiations, GATT gradually acquired all the airs of an independent institution. At first governments (known merely as "CONTRACTING PARTIES") just met semiannually, but soon they set up a small group to organize airmail packages and telegraph communications, and then this was soon replaced by an official Secretariat, the Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization (ICITO). The ICITO soon acquired its own rules and mores, which later evolved later into the WTO. It was an almost natural evolution of necessity, though it took much hard work and constant negotiations on all sides.
Narlikar focuses more on the structures of the GATT and WTO than the rules and regulations they promulgated. She shows that despite their simple majority-rule decision making process, the de facto principle has always been for all countries present at a trade discussion to reach an agreement by consensus about new rules. Although this seems simple enough, Narlikar shows some surprising ramifications of the "present at the discussion" rule. Originally, the "Principle Supplier Principle" obliged deference to the main supplier of a good during the "agenda setting process," which functionally meant the First World nations always decided what was going to be discussed at future meetings. These nations would then go to an invitation-only "Green Room" session to debate tariff reductions and goals, where again the First World dominated by its design of the participants. When the agreements were finally proposed, many Third World nations who had no input into the discussion were forced to acquiesce out of ignorance. Later, even when invitations and Green Room meetings became less important, poor countries' lack of sophisticated negotiators and their lack of money for sufficient long-term representatives at the WTO base in Geneva meant they were often excluded or marginalized from trade debates that might have had some interest for them. It is strange to think that the lack of money for hiring a few Swiss lawyers could shape the contours of world trade, but for many poor nations WTO representatives are very low on the list of national priorities.
Although all this sounds like the author might be bashing the organization, Narlikar is generally a big fan of free trade and the general goals of the WTO; she mainly just wants to open it up to more participants. She shows that this has become vastly more important since the official creation of the WTO at the Uruguay round of negotiations in 1994, because since then the WTO has become increasingly intimate in the national lives of all its member countries. While the GATT dealt only with tariff barriers (some "plurilateral agreements" between voluntarily grouped nations allowed for control of non-tariff barriers), the WTO now rules on such things as Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) barriers to trade, which basically mean a nation's health rules and regulations. The WTO, through its much praised and surprisingly independent Dispute Settlement Mechanism, now evaluates such issues as whether national health regulations have a scientific basis or are merely a sub rosa means of restricting international competitors (this recently forced the EU to open itself to US beef sales and overturned the EU's older, irrelevant restrictions on any animals treated with hormones). The new standards these SPS negotiations set, however, often impose very high costs on all nations (but especially the Third World) to upgrade their research and customs equipment to accommodate now prevailing norms. For better or worse, the WTO is now vigorously encroaching on ground once left entirely to sovereign nations.
Overall, the book provides an interesting example of how bureaucratic processes and seemingly insignificant rules have a real effect on world governance. It gives one a little better understanding of an organization that even most news sources are reluctant to discuss in detail.