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Conservatism: The Fight for a Tradition
A fresh and sharp-eyed history of political conservatism from its nineteenth-century origins to today’s hard Right
For two hundred years, conservatism has defied its reputation as a backward-looking creed by confronting and adapting to liberal modernity. By doing so, the Right has won long periods of power and effectively become the dominant tradition in politics. Yet, despite their success, conservatives have continued to fight with each other about how far to compromise with liberalism and democracy―or which values to defend and how. In Conservatism , Edmund Fawcett provides a gripping account of this conflicted history, clarifies key ideas, and illuminates quarrels within the Right today.
Focusing on the United States, Britain, France, and Germany, Fawcett’s vivid narrative covers thinkers and politicians. They include the forerunners James Madison, Edmund Burke, and Joseph de Maistre; early friends and foes of capitalism; defenders of religion; and builders of modern parties, such as William McKinley and Lord Salisbury. The book chronicles the cultural critics and radical disruptors of the 1920s and 1930s, recounts how advocates of laissez-faire economics broke the post 1945 consensus, and describes how Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, and their European counterparts are pushing conservatism toward a nation-first, hard Right.
An absorbing, original history of the Right, Conservatism portrays a tradition as much at war with itself as with its opponents.
For two hundred years, conservatism has defied its reputation as a backward-looking creed by confronting and adapting to liberal modernity. By doing so, the Right has won long periods of power and effectively become the dominant tradition in politics. Yet, despite their success, conservatives have continued to fight with each other about how far to compromise with liberalism and democracy―or which values to defend and how. In Conservatism , Edmund Fawcett provides a gripping account of this conflicted history, clarifies key ideas, and illuminates quarrels within the Right today.
Focusing on the United States, Britain, France, and Germany, Fawcett’s vivid narrative covers thinkers and politicians. They include the forerunners James Madison, Edmund Burke, and Joseph de Maistre; early friends and foes of capitalism; defenders of religion; and builders of modern parties, such as William McKinley and Lord Salisbury. The book chronicles the cultural critics and radical disruptors of the 1920s and 1930s, recounts how advocates of laissez-faire economics broke the post 1945 consensus, and describes how Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, and their European counterparts are pushing conservatism toward a nation-first, hard Right.
An absorbing, original history of the Right, Conservatism portrays a tradition as much at war with itself as with its opponents.
544 pages, Paperback
Published April 5, 2022
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About the author
Edmund Fawcett
7 books29 followersEdmund Fawcett is a British political journalist. Formerly chief correspondent of The Economist, he now writes for The New York Times, The Guardian and New Statesman. His latest book is Liberalism: The Life of an Idea
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Displaying 1 - 23 of 23 reviews
July 1, 2022
Fawcett’s previous book, "Liberalism" stands out, among other things, for the wide-angle approach of its subject. Fawcett includes in the club people such as Orwell, a self-declared socialist, and, at the other end of the spectrum, Oakeshott, who was really a conservative. This inspired usurpation really benefits the book’s perspective. "Liberalism" also looks beyond the UK and the US and discusses France's and Germany's rich liberal traditions.
Its successor book, “Conservatism”, shares some of that broad view, starting with its geographical sweep. It would of course have been interesting to consider conservatism in other countries, and outside the Western world (Solzhenitsyn, Lee Kuan Yew, etc.) but in fairness that would have meant at least four more volumes and much more complexity. Inevitably, Fawcett’s selection of subjects is at times debatable. I would not have minded more focus on the recent past, but Fawcett’s choice of kicking off with the reaction against the French Revolution, and proceeding from there at an even pace, does not weaken the book.
The elephant in the room is that Fawcett is not himself a conservative but a left-leaning liberal. It is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, Fawcett does not paper over the less pleasant opinions of many of his subjects on painful topics, providing some much-needed perspective. On the other hand, and despite his evident wish to be fair-handed, his lack of sympathy with some conservative criticisms of liberalism at times leads him to miss the point, and leaves him muttering about them not being constructive. Fawcett also does not seem to grasp the real importance of the paradoxical plasticity of conservative thought, which, while pretending to stand for eternal values, is in fact constantly mutating and much more in tune with current conditions than the competition tends to be. That leads to the real issue with the book; its underestimation of the danger conservatism’s most recent iterations pose to Liberalism.
The most obvious symptom of Fawcett’s liberal myopia is that the book virtually ignores the Left, which is dispatched in one sentence of the introduction as “in retreat, both intellectually and in party terms”. That seems, to put it mildly, rather exaggerated. Fawcett curtly rejects Carl Schmitt’s observation that “politics is the art of identifying the enemy” (p. 255). It could have helped him understand that Liberalism is in danger of becoming irrelevant. Fawcett used to write for the Economist; in his world, serious politics seem to consist of a rather civilized dialogue between liberals and conservatives. Or to put it in his words, “we are living in an era of the right” (“Coda”, p. 415) He does not seem to have noticed that the present-day Left has regenerated itself by adopting ideas that originated on the Right: the conservation of the natural world, a vaguely pagan mysticism and a strong focus on group identities. One of the “hard right” thinkers Fawcett mentions, Alain de Benoist, arguably even provided the (distorted) blueprint for this new Left during the seventies, in “Vu de droite”, a book that Fawcett lists in the bibliography (p. 491). These borrowings mirror the voyage in the opposite direction - and with catastrophic results - of the idea of the nation during the 19th century. The growing focus on competing identities and the proper place of humans in the natural world is making the old chasm between liberals and conservatives increasingly irrelevant, which is of course another way to state that Liberalism is in danger of becoming ever more out of touch. More respect for the Left might have helped Fawcett better understand conservatism and, more importantly, realize that Liberalism is in fact under threat and that we need to defend it vigorously. If Fawcett has another book on political philosophy in him, I think he could do a useful job by directing his attention to the Left.
Its successor book, “Conservatism”, shares some of that broad view, starting with its geographical sweep. It would of course have been interesting to consider conservatism in other countries, and outside the Western world (Solzhenitsyn, Lee Kuan Yew, etc.) but in fairness that would have meant at least four more volumes and much more complexity. Inevitably, Fawcett’s selection of subjects is at times debatable. I would not have minded more focus on the recent past, but Fawcett’s choice of kicking off with the reaction against the French Revolution, and proceeding from there at an even pace, does not weaken the book.
The elephant in the room is that Fawcett is not himself a conservative but a left-leaning liberal. It is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, Fawcett does not paper over the less pleasant opinions of many of his subjects on painful topics, providing some much-needed perspective. On the other hand, and despite his evident wish to be fair-handed, his lack of sympathy with some conservative criticisms of liberalism at times leads him to miss the point, and leaves him muttering about them not being constructive. Fawcett also does not seem to grasp the real importance of the paradoxical plasticity of conservative thought, which, while pretending to stand for eternal values, is in fact constantly mutating and much more in tune with current conditions than the competition tends to be. That leads to the real issue with the book; its underestimation of the danger conservatism’s most recent iterations pose to Liberalism.
The most obvious symptom of Fawcett’s liberal myopia is that the book virtually ignores the Left, which is dispatched in one sentence of the introduction as “in retreat, both intellectually and in party terms”. That seems, to put it mildly, rather exaggerated. Fawcett curtly rejects Carl Schmitt’s observation that “politics is the art of identifying the enemy” (p. 255). It could have helped him understand that Liberalism is in danger of becoming irrelevant. Fawcett used to write for the Economist; in his world, serious politics seem to consist of a rather civilized dialogue between liberals and conservatives. Or to put it in his words, “we are living in an era of the right” (“Coda”, p. 415) He does not seem to have noticed that the present-day Left has regenerated itself by adopting ideas that originated on the Right: the conservation of the natural world, a vaguely pagan mysticism and a strong focus on group identities. One of the “hard right” thinkers Fawcett mentions, Alain de Benoist, arguably even provided the (distorted) blueprint for this new Left during the seventies, in “Vu de droite”, a book that Fawcett lists in the bibliography (p. 491). These borrowings mirror the voyage in the opposite direction - and with catastrophic results - of the idea of the nation during the 19th century. The growing focus on competing identities and the proper place of humans in the natural world is making the old chasm between liberals and conservatives increasingly irrelevant, which is of course another way to state that Liberalism is in danger of becoming ever more out of touch. More respect for the Left might have helped Fawcett better understand conservatism and, more importantly, realize that Liberalism is in fact under threat and that we need to defend it vigorously. If Fawcett has another book on political philosophy in him, I think he could do a useful job by directing his attention to the Left.
November 29, 2021
Jaw-dropping. The best book on Conservativism I've ever read. It's not preachy or opinionated, just a damn good worldwide history.
5 out of 5 stars. Most highly recommended. Use this book in class or for your research. I will be.
5 out of 5 stars. Most highly recommended. Use this book in class or for your research. I will be.
August 6, 2021
Trying to get a grasp of an entire intellectual tradition, from its historical roots to its various contemporary incarnations, within the cover of a single book is a daunting job. As it turns out, this is not the first time that Edmund Fawcett has accomplished such a task, but the second. His 2018 “Liberalism: The Life of an Idea” does largely the same thing. His book on conservatism came out in October 2020 and was also published by Princeton University Press.
The presentation and formatting of the ideas is chronological and easy to follow. Fawcett begins with two introductory chapters, the first of which discusses the birth of the idea of conservatism as two distinctly different kinds of responses to the events of the French Revolution: first, the more measured, quiet skepticism toward the Revolution advanced by Edmund Burke and then the more stentorian, aggressively counterrevolutionary response offered up by Joseph de Maistre. These are then followed up four chapters (1830-1880, 1880-1945, 1945-1980, and 1980-present) that each begin with a theoretical overview of the themes and events that defined conservative politics during that period, followed by near-encyclopedic commentaries on the events of the United States, France, Germany, and Britain.
Because of Fawcett’s four-fold analysis that relies heavily on a detailed knowledge of nineteenth- and twentieth-century European history, readers without this background will find this part of the book a bit of a chore. American readers will recognize, one hopes, their own history. But can you tell a Bourbonist from a Bonapartist? The British Reform Act of 1832? The Reform Act of 1867? How about 1882? It’s not so much that these play a large part in the book, but if you’re not at least passingly familiar with the general shape of British, French, and German politics over these two centuries, one’s appreciation of the book’s comprehensive approach will be limited.
What, then, distinguishes conservatism from any other brand of political thought? Whether in the realm of economics or social matters, thinkers Fawcett identifies as aligned with conservatism have a few things that loosely tie them together: the inscrutability of history, the severely limited power of human reason, and the imperfectability of man. Echoing Russell Kirk’s “permanent things,” Fawcett also claims most conservatives are drawn together in their mutual respect for established institutions, custom, order, tradition, and religion, though most of them are open and accommodating of gradual amounts of change.
In the first period (1830-1880), French politics were dominated by a discussion of whether or not to return to the monarchy, while conservative British leaders like Lord Derby and Disraeli tried to negotiate within the framework of liberal democracy. During the second half of the nineteenth century, Fawcett takes up thinkers as myriad and diverse as Orestes Brownson, Charles Hodge, Felicite de Lamennais, Otto von Gierke, Wilhelm von Ketteler, Cardinal Newman, James Fitzjames Stephen, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. The third period (1945-1980) takes up De Gaulle, Adenauer, Goldwater, Nixon, Reagan, Taft, Macmillan, and Thatcher and frames the conservatism of the latter part of the period as a backlash against the radical countercultural politics of the 1960s. I’d tell you Fawcett’s opinions on American conservatism post-1980, but I just want to get through this review without having to think about the Laffer Curve or Donald Trump.
The strengths of this book are many, but there may be a few weaknesses for the general reader. First, the likely aforementioned lack of familiarity with the politics of Western Europe over the last two centuries. A second would be the occasional oversight of what I would consider to be a major thinker, two examples being Michael Oakeshott and Raymond Aron. (Oakeshott is actually mentioned in the text, but for some reason isn’t listed in the Subject Index.) Aron remains completely absent from the book despite his radical critique of many strains of the French intellectual tradition for being overtly influenced by Marxism in his 1955 book “The Opium of the Intellectuals”. But I’m also well aware that any book on such a broad swath of intellectual territory as conservatism writ large must curate careful decisions about both omissions and commissions, and I myself often roll my eyes when I read reviews that exasperatedly exclaim, “But … but .. but, what about X, Y, and Z?” or “Too much time was spent on…” So enough with the quibbles.
Above, I used the word “near-encyclopedic” to describe Fawcett’s treatment of his subject. I promise that the long list of names that I gave wasn’t just to sate my insufferable garrulousness. It was to give some faint hint of the research and excavation of ideas that Fawcett clearly put into the book. You will learn names and ideas with which you were previously unfamiliar, even if only a few. This book’s overwhelming forte is its international approach. Books on American conservatism are easy to find, but ones that draw just as readily from European conservative traditions, and do so even-handedly, are few and far between. Because of all of this and more, it deserves a respected place on any bookshelf devoted to the history of political ideas.
I would like the record to note that I made it to the end of this review without ever once using the word “magisterial.”
The presentation and formatting of the ideas is chronological and easy to follow. Fawcett begins with two introductory chapters, the first of which discusses the birth of the idea of conservatism as two distinctly different kinds of responses to the events of the French Revolution: first, the more measured, quiet skepticism toward the Revolution advanced by Edmund Burke and then the more stentorian, aggressively counterrevolutionary response offered up by Joseph de Maistre. These are then followed up four chapters (1830-1880, 1880-1945, 1945-1980, and 1980-present) that each begin with a theoretical overview of the themes and events that defined conservative politics during that period, followed by near-encyclopedic commentaries on the events of the United States, France, Germany, and Britain.
Because of Fawcett’s four-fold analysis that relies heavily on a detailed knowledge of nineteenth- and twentieth-century European history, readers without this background will find this part of the book a bit of a chore. American readers will recognize, one hopes, their own history. But can you tell a Bourbonist from a Bonapartist? The British Reform Act of 1832? The Reform Act of 1867? How about 1882? It’s not so much that these play a large part in the book, but if you’re not at least passingly familiar with the general shape of British, French, and German politics over these two centuries, one’s appreciation of the book’s comprehensive approach will be limited.
What, then, distinguishes conservatism from any other brand of political thought? Whether in the realm of economics or social matters, thinkers Fawcett identifies as aligned with conservatism have a few things that loosely tie them together: the inscrutability of history, the severely limited power of human reason, and the imperfectability of man. Echoing Russell Kirk’s “permanent things,” Fawcett also claims most conservatives are drawn together in their mutual respect for established institutions, custom, order, tradition, and religion, though most of them are open and accommodating of gradual amounts of change.
In the first period (1830-1880), French politics were dominated by a discussion of whether or not to return to the monarchy, while conservative British leaders like Lord Derby and Disraeli tried to negotiate within the framework of liberal democracy. During the second half of the nineteenth century, Fawcett takes up thinkers as myriad and diverse as Orestes Brownson, Charles Hodge, Felicite de Lamennais, Otto von Gierke, Wilhelm von Ketteler, Cardinal Newman, James Fitzjames Stephen, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. The third period (1945-1980) takes up De Gaulle, Adenauer, Goldwater, Nixon, Reagan, Taft, Macmillan, and Thatcher and frames the conservatism of the latter part of the period as a backlash against the radical countercultural politics of the 1960s. I’d tell you Fawcett’s opinions on American conservatism post-1980, but I just want to get through this review without having to think about the Laffer Curve or Donald Trump.
The strengths of this book are many, but there may be a few weaknesses for the general reader. First, the likely aforementioned lack of familiarity with the politics of Western Europe over the last two centuries. A second would be the occasional oversight of what I would consider to be a major thinker, two examples being Michael Oakeshott and Raymond Aron. (Oakeshott is actually mentioned in the text, but for some reason isn’t listed in the Subject Index.) Aron remains completely absent from the book despite his radical critique of many strains of the French intellectual tradition for being overtly influenced by Marxism in his 1955 book “The Opium of the Intellectuals”. But I’m also well aware that any book on such a broad swath of intellectual territory as conservatism writ large must curate careful decisions about both omissions and commissions, and I myself often roll my eyes when I read reviews that exasperatedly exclaim, “But … but .. but, what about X, Y, and Z?” or “Too much time was spent on…” So enough with the quibbles.
Above, I used the word “near-encyclopedic” to describe Fawcett’s treatment of his subject. I promise that the long list of names that I gave wasn’t just to sate my insufferable garrulousness. It was to give some faint hint of the research and excavation of ideas that Fawcett clearly put into the book. You will learn names and ideas with which you were previously unfamiliar, even if only a few. This book’s overwhelming forte is its international approach. Books on American conservatism are easy to find, but ones that draw just as readily from European conservative traditions, and do so even-handedly, are few and far between. Because of all of this and more, it deserves a respected place on any bookshelf devoted to the history of political ideas.
I would like the record to note that I made it to the end of this review without ever once using the word “magisterial.”
May 10, 2021
I stopped reading two chapters after the introduction.
The book's introduction seems to claim that the recent conservatism movement has slipped into ultra-right, and the author implies that the “classical conservatism,” or conservatism from the past, is more palatable. However, when I read the first two chapters, I got a different impression.
The first two chapters talk about what the author viewed as the start of the conservatism: Edmund Burke and some followers in England and France in the 18th and 19th centuries. This is a good starting place for the author’s framework. But the description and discussion of their political and philosophical views are repetitive and not deep-probing. Such discussions can be summarized in two or three bullet points. On the other hand, the author’s recounting of the thinker’s personalities and personal circumstances, as well as the author’s choice of vocabulary when describing their views, aim to paint an emotional picture against these thinkers. After reading these two chapters, I have the feeling that the author does not like any of their views. As such, it is not meaningful to contrast these “classical” views with the modern “far-right”: they are both evils in the author’s eyes. Therefore, I don’t feel that I can expect a fair and objective narrative of the conservatism history from this book. So I stopped reading.
Also, the author seems to focus on cultural issues. On the other hand, conservatism is also about how Government should function and what powers the Government is justified to have. For example, George F. Will’s “The Conservative Sensibility” and Mark R. Levin’s “Rediscovering Americanism” describe a very different American conservative tradition, where they believe in perpetuating natural laws instead of a progressing society, power vested in the people instead of big government, etc. The well-known conservative write Thomas Sowell wrote much about the power of the market economy and against Government interference in the name of social justice. So maybe the definition of “Conservatism” is different for different people. I am personally less interested in cultural issues. This is another reason I stopped reading this book.
The book's introduction seems to claim that the recent conservatism movement has slipped into ultra-right, and the author implies that the “classical conservatism,” or conservatism from the past, is more palatable. However, when I read the first two chapters, I got a different impression.
The first two chapters talk about what the author viewed as the start of the conservatism: Edmund Burke and some followers in England and France in the 18th and 19th centuries. This is a good starting place for the author’s framework. But the description and discussion of their political and philosophical views are repetitive and not deep-probing. Such discussions can be summarized in two or three bullet points. On the other hand, the author’s recounting of the thinker’s personalities and personal circumstances, as well as the author’s choice of vocabulary when describing their views, aim to paint an emotional picture against these thinkers. After reading these two chapters, I have the feeling that the author does not like any of their views. As such, it is not meaningful to contrast these “classical” views with the modern “far-right”: they are both evils in the author’s eyes. Therefore, I don’t feel that I can expect a fair and objective narrative of the conservatism history from this book. So I stopped reading.
Also, the author seems to focus on cultural issues. On the other hand, conservatism is also about how Government should function and what powers the Government is justified to have. For example, George F. Will’s “The Conservative Sensibility” and Mark R. Levin’s “Rediscovering Americanism” describe a very different American conservative tradition, where they believe in perpetuating natural laws instead of a progressing society, power vested in the people instead of big government, etc. The well-known conservative write Thomas Sowell wrote much about the power of the market economy and against Government interference in the name of social justice. So maybe the definition of “Conservatism” is different for different people. I am personally less interested in cultural issues. This is another reason I stopped reading this book.
January 11, 2021
A brief history of conservative thinking built as a sequence of the thinkers. Well balanced and without rancor, coming from a professed liberal. Attempts to show that a reasonable conservative wing is a necessity for a contemporary society. Would have liked it more if the reasons for the current disbalance were discussed in more detail, but perhaps the author did not see it as a part of his task. His previous book on liberalism which I read earlier could be also recommended.
March 7, 2021
Abandoned on 145. I liked the idea- but it was a little too academic for me and assumed I had quite a bit of prior knowledge. This might be one I revisit another time.
May 17, 2021
A useful, impressively large-scale history of conservatism. The structure of the book is nice: it chops the history of conservatism up into 5 phases following the French Revolution. In each phase, Fawcett does a chapter on politicians and a chapter on thinkers. These were helpful, although at times I'd like to see more argument and less coverage about what made each of these phases distinct.
The main argument is compelling: the core recurring dynamic of conservatism is the choice between accommodating to liberal modernity and trying to govern within it (and restrain or correct it) or rejecting liberal modernity by trying to topple it, remove oneself from it, or snipe at it from the sidelines. At first, the conservatism of a de Maistre or Burke was largely rejectionist, although not necessarily counter-revolutionary. In the 19th century, traditional conservatives formed alliances with more economically liberal conservatives to protect property from rising economic democracy/socialism. In the 20th century, many conservatives broke off into radical forms of nationalism, while others again tried to accommodate to the expansion of the state, the rise of the welfare state, and the expansion of voting rights to women and minorities. In the US and GB, the right's ascendency put them on top in a modern society/political system that they are inherently somewhat uncomfortable with; Fawcett is brilliant at exploring these tensions in the later 20th and early 21st centuries.
Fawcett's big conclusion is that liberal democracy requires a right willing to accommodate itself to change and aspects of liberalism and capitalism. He maybe could have gone further to draw out this argument, but the basic point is that a democratic and liberal (in the classical sense) right is a fairly recent historical creation, that it exists in deep tension with many aspects of modern life and politics, and that it acts as a crucial guardrail for democracy. Conservative-learning people are not going away, and they will always seek a political home. That home must be within the liberal democratic camp to some extent or neither of those things will survive. One of the underlying lessons of the book is that liberals like me have a major stake in who wins out on the right; that's part of why I probably follow conservative/GOP politics closer today than my own side.
This overall argument is compelling, and the author does a great job examining how this adaptation/rejection dynamic played out in different contexts. The page by page reading, however, isn't always fascinating: a lot of the figures here are quite obscure, there's not a ton of color, and you sometimes feel you are reading about the same concepts over and over. So this is a peruse kind of book for most political scholars, a read for scholars of conservatism (especially international aspects), and probably a pass for the average history reader. It's a good complement book for Corey Robin's Reactionary Mind, which is thematic rather than comprehensive.
The main argument is compelling: the core recurring dynamic of conservatism is the choice between accommodating to liberal modernity and trying to govern within it (and restrain or correct it) or rejecting liberal modernity by trying to topple it, remove oneself from it, or snipe at it from the sidelines. At first, the conservatism of a de Maistre or Burke was largely rejectionist, although not necessarily counter-revolutionary. In the 19th century, traditional conservatives formed alliances with more economically liberal conservatives to protect property from rising economic democracy/socialism. In the 20th century, many conservatives broke off into radical forms of nationalism, while others again tried to accommodate to the expansion of the state, the rise of the welfare state, and the expansion of voting rights to women and minorities. In the US and GB, the right's ascendency put them on top in a modern society/political system that they are inherently somewhat uncomfortable with; Fawcett is brilliant at exploring these tensions in the later 20th and early 21st centuries.
Fawcett's big conclusion is that liberal democracy requires a right willing to accommodate itself to change and aspects of liberalism and capitalism. He maybe could have gone further to draw out this argument, but the basic point is that a democratic and liberal (in the classical sense) right is a fairly recent historical creation, that it exists in deep tension with many aspects of modern life and politics, and that it acts as a crucial guardrail for democracy. Conservative-learning people are not going away, and they will always seek a political home. That home must be within the liberal democratic camp to some extent or neither of those things will survive. One of the underlying lessons of the book is that liberals like me have a major stake in who wins out on the right; that's part of why I probably follow conservative/GOP politics closer today than my own side.
This overall argument is compelling, and the author does a great job examining how this adaptation/rejection dynamic played out in different contexts. The page by page reading, however, isn't always fascinating: a lot of the figures here are quite obscure, there's not a ton of color, and you sometimes feel you are reading about the same concepts over and over. So this is a peruse kind of book for most political scholars, a read for scholars of conservatism (especially international aspects), and probably a pass for the average history reader. It's a good complement book for Corey Robin's Reactionary Mind, which is thematic rather than comprehensive.
April 27, 2022
I found the first half slow going, which says more about my personal interest in the historical details than about the quality of the work. The material covering the period after 1945, however, was remarkable. The author manages to be both nuanced and critical about contemporary conservatism and the role that the far right has played (and continues to play) in shaping its identity.
January 10, 2023
I thought this book was excellent until it entered the modern era at which time the author’s liberal leanings became evident in his unsympathetic and often grossly off-base interpretations of the motives behind conservative movements.
Are contemporary liberals incapable of perspective taking? I say this as a classical liberal. I may not agree with a contemporary liberal on many things, but I can put myself in their shoes enough to understand why they believe as they do. The same goes for conservatives, and I have witnessed conservatives empathize with liberals, but I rarely see liberals do this well when seeking to think like conservatives. I think it’s because they refuse to do so based on an ignorant belief that conservatives are racist or bigoted in some way. Even if that were true (but I don’t believe it is), one can understand a bigot without endorsing the view or becoming one.
My hunch is that many liberals are fundamentalists who worry that their faith might not stand up to scrutiny if they truly consider other positions based on why people actually believe in those positions instead of dismissing them as positions held out of hate or fear without substantiating that claim.
Had the author interpreted conservative principles as charitably as he did his own in Liberalism, this could have easily been a 5 star book, instead of the 3 star book it unfortunately became in the last fourth or fifth of the book.
Are contemporary liberals incapable of perspective taking? I say this as a classical liberal. I may not agree with a contemporary liberal on many things, but I can put myself in their shoes enough to understand why they believe as they do. The same goes for conservatives, and I have witnessed conservatives empathize with liberals, but I rarely see liberals do this well when seeking to think like conservatives. I think it’s because they refuse to do so based on an ignorant belief that conservatives are racist or bigoted in some way. Even if that were true (but I don’t believe it is), one can understand a bigot without endorsing the view or becoming one.
My hunch is that many liberals are fundamentalists who worry that their faith might not stand up to scrutiny if they truly consider other positions based on why people actually believe in those positions instead of dismissing them as positions held out of hate or fear without substantiating that claim.
Had the author interpreted conservative principles as charitably as he did his own in Liberalism, this could have easily been a 5 star book, instead of the 3 star book it unfortunately became in the last fourth or fifth of the book.
January 8, 2022
This is a brilliant, encyclopedic journey through the key events, thinkers and ideas of Conservatism, which I found insightful and timely. The author makes no pretense of being neutral - he is a Liberal and he says it upfront! I have seen criticisms of this book stating that this disqualifies him from writing about Conservativism, but this is exactly why he is writing: To define what conservatism is and why it's not about doctrinal purity or subservience to pretenders of the realm, but rather a realist approach to life and politics and embrace of slow, natural change.
books-i-m-not-going-to-finish
May 3, 2021The topic is fascinating but the book assumed way too much knowledge about 19th century European history and political philosophy. If I had infinite time and the patience to Google everything that I don't remember from my history classes and prior reading, it would be great, but I don't have it in me.
May 15, 2021
Conservatism, over the last 200 years, has had to adjust to the challenges of a changing world, challenges that have come from an ascendant liberalism. The opening up of markets, the internationalisation of trade, the erosion of borders followed by the surge for political and economic equality, acceptance of the values of others and diverse lifestyles have been presented to the world and the conservative fold has had to respond.
While the liberal pull has not, so far, provided the world with paradise, utopia or nirvana, it has provided the conservative voice with powerful tragets to oppose the trend. Conservatives appeal to tradition and customs, local values and traditional rights, social order and subservience to authority, things lost, it is felt, in the liberal world.
Edmund Fawcett traces the development of conservatism in four countries; from the defenders of values, to the politicians, the popularizers and even touches on the rabble rousers of public disorder. Edmund Burke is the common thread of thought that filters through the linkages from the deep thinkers, politicians, journalists, community leaders and reaches eventually, in a much diffused form, to the violence inclined actors, the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers. While it is unlikely that many, if any, of the stormers from January 6th have read Burke, those to whom they look for inspiration and directions may have and those shit disturbers have received inspiration from conservative intellectuals and religious influencers who are definitely familiar with Burke.
As the values of Burke and other thinkers flow through the linkages they seem to morph into values of the current social disturbers. Tradition has become privilege, social order has become control and social values has become racial exclusivity.
It is the attack on Liberals that units Conservates, when it looks within if finds that it is not a monolithic unified ideal but is split up into many and minute ideals which coexist, support and often oppose each other. There are the extremities of white privilege, religious intolerance but there are also hints of tolerance and co-operation. But there is one immense divide that may, unless this chasm can minimized, cast Conservatism into irrelevance in the forseable future. Market conservatism, moderate conservatism, democratic conservatism has frequently threatened, or in fact has, jettisoned its more socially oriented brethern in a truce with the market liberals, moderate liberals and democratic liberals. Fawcett has outlined this changing of dance partners in all four of the countries under study. The increase in radical conservative influence may be a current sign of the conservative and liberal centres coming to an alignment with the radical and social right lossing out. The right may lose its access to restricted immigration, free flow of armaments, the limiting of gender definitions and influence of abortion rights. (Although this central alliance has not necessarily produced this in the past).
But recent events presents the threat that radical conservatism may take the lead and the moderate conservatives will need to decide whether to side uneasily with their brethern, or to break and team up with the centre. We have witnessed this over the last five years in the U.S. and England. In England this alliance has held but in the U.S. the alliance is still in the process of reorganization with the trajectory yet to be confirmed.
Edmund Fawcett has provided a road map of where this trajectory has come from, only history can tell us where it will lead.
While the liberal pull has not, so far, provided the world with paradise, utopia or nirvana, it has provided the conservative voice with powerful tragets to oppose the trend. Conservatives appeal to tradition and customs, local values and traditional rights, social order and subservience to authority, things lost, it is felt, in the liberal world.
Edmund Fawcett traces the development of conservatism in four countries; from the defenders of values, to the politicians, the popularizers and even touches on the rabble rousers of public disorder. Edmund Burke is the common thread of thought that filters through the linkages from the deep thinkers, politicians, journalists, community leaders and reaches eventually, in a much diffused form, to the violence inclined actors, the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers. While it is unlikely that many, if any, of the stormers from January 6th have read Burke, those to whom they look for inspiration and directions may have and those shit disturbers have received inspiration from conservative intellectuals and religious influencers who are definitely familiar with Burke.
As the values of Burke and other thinkers flow through the linkages they seem to morph into values of the current social disturbers. Tradition has become privilege, social order has become control and social values has become racial exclusivity.
It is the attack on Liberals that units Conservates, when it looks within if finds that it is not a monolithic unified ideal but is split up into many and minute ideals which coexist, support and often oppose each other. There are the extremities of white privilege, religious intolerance but there are also hints of tolerance and co-operation. But there is one immense divide that may, unless this chasm can minimized, cast Conservatism into irrelevance in the forseable future. Market conservatism, moderate conservatism, democratic conservatism has frequently threatened, or in fact has, jettisoned its more socially oriented brethern in a truce with the market liberals, moderate liberals and democratic liberals. Fawcett has outlined this changing of dance partners in all four of the countries under study. The increase in radical conservative influence may be a current sign of the conservative and liberal centres coming to an alignment with the radical and social right lossing out. The right may lose its access to restricted immigration, free flow of armaments, the limiting of gender definitions and influence of abortion rights. (Although this central alliance has not necessarily produced this in the past).
But recent events presents the threat that radical conservatism may take the lead and the moderate conservatives will need to decide whether to side uneasily with their brethern, or to break and team up with the centre. We have witnessed this over the last five years in the U.S. and England. In England this alliance has held but in the U.S. the alliance is still in the process of reorganization with the trajectory yet to be confirmed.
Edmund Fawcett has provided a road map of where this trajectory has come from, only history can tell us where it will lead.
March 28, 2021
Edmund; Fawcett is a journalist who writes about political ideas. His latest book - Conservatism: The Fight for a Tradition - does not seem like a history of conservatism, more an historical essay - as the author describes it. He wrote an earlier book in a similar format on liberalism, which I was not aware of. After reading this book, I think I will track it down.
The liberal-conservative, left-right, democrat-republican, (fill in other dichotomies as you wish here) split is an odd one to me. It is not about philosophy as generally understood. Its substantive focus varies over time and according to whatever policies are of interest. There are of course liberal and conservative philosophers but there are also political and economic philosophers who do not fit into easy labels or packages on these dimensions. More importantly, discussions about what is liberal and what is conservative are not often carried on in forums featuring the discussion of long erudite books. These sorts of discussions are much more common in broader media, such as cable TV, what passes for newspapers, and social media. Moreover, these discussions involve the labelling of politicians and their actions and policies for more easy consumption. Name calling and barnyard epithets are not unusual. Finding lasting identities is also not part of “liberal versus conservative” discussions. What once was conservative can soon become anathema to conservatives and their exponents expelled and branded RINOs or worse. In the past decade or so, these trends have only accelerated and parallel developments are apparent in the US, Britain, and Europe.
My point? Why is there a need for a fairly erudite and complex historical essay about a topical area that in its practice is becoming not only less erudite but increasingly coarse, superficial, and disturbing?
What I really enjoyed about this book is that Fawcett shows that ideas really do matter - albeit indirectly sometimes - and that the thinkers behind those ideas also matter and are worth learning about. He also does his homework and in the process demonstrates that there is much less new in popular politics than advocates claim. New trends are really not so new. Fringe ideas can become mainstream and even commonplace. Even granting the strong role of history and local conditions, the conflicts that arise among people have surprising commonalities and ideas developed in one country and time can easily show up elsewhere. I have also enjoyed making connections in my reading history and Fawcett’s book encourages this.
The style is a bit dense and some of the chapters run on a bit, especially as the present is approaches. To his credit, Fawcett is helpful for readers and provides a glossary of key terms, along with definitions, and a listing of key writers and thinkers. These appendices are helpful. This is a good book to go back to and provides some good suggestions for additional reading.
I may also read his book on liberalism.
The liberal-conservative, left-right, democrat-republican, (fill in other dichotomies as you wish here) split is an odd one to me. It is not about philosophy as generally understood. Its substantive focus varies over time and according to whatever policies are of interest. There are of course liberal and conservative philosophers but there are also political and economic philosophers who do not fit into easy labels or packages on these dimensions. More importantly, discussions about what is liberal and what is conservative are not often carried on in forums featuring the discussion of long erudite books. These sorts of discussions are much more common in broader media, such as cable TV, what passes for newspapers, and social media. Moreover, these discussions involve the labelling of politicians and their actions and policies for more easy consumption. Name calling and barnyard epithets are not unusual. Finding lasting identities is also not part of “liberal versus conservative” discussions. What once was conservative can soon become anathema to conservatives and their exponents expelled and branded RINOs or worse. In the past decade or so, these trends have only accelerated and parallel developments are apparent in the US, Britain, and Europe.
My point? Why is there a need for a fairly erudite and complex historical essay about a topical area that in its practice is becoming not only less erudite but increasingly coarse, superficial, and disturbing?
What I really enjoyed about this book is that Fawcett shows that ideas really do matter - albeit indirectly sometimes - and that the thinkers behind those ideas also matter and are worth learning about. He also does his homework and in the process demonstrates that there is much less new in popular politics than advocates claim. New trends are really not so new. Fringe ideas can become mainstream and even commonplace. Even granting the strong role of history and local conditions, the conflicts that arise among people have surprising commonalities and ideas developed in one country and time can easily show up elsewhere. I have also enjoyed making connections in my reading history and Fawcett’s book encourages this.
The style is a bit dense and some of the chapters run on a bit, especially as the present is approaches. To his credit, Fawcett is helpful for readers and provides a glossary of key terms, along with definitions, and a listing of key writers and thinkers. These appendices are helpful. This is a good book to go back to and provides some good suggestions for additional reading.
I may also read his book on liberalism.
August 5, 2023
This is an important book, and one I intend to reread in print form (audio didn't serve the density of its prose well). Fawcett is a self-described left-leaning liberal, but does his best to trace the intellectual and movement history of conservatism with an even hand and careful attention to primary sources. It's especially useful that he sets his narrative in broad international context, surveying the US, UK, France, and Germany together through each period. That focus complicates the narrative, but it's a helpful complication - even if I suspect it probably also elides complexities in each story.
Like Matthew Continetti's survey work, Fawcett attempts to shed light on the 2016-2020 political in the West by showing that conservatism has never been one thing, but a spectrum of reactions to, and settlements with, Western Enlightenment legacy, capitalist modernity.
Like Matthew Continetti's survey work, Fawcett attempts to shed light on the 2016-2020 political in the West by showing that conservatism has never been one thing, but a spectrum of reactions to, and settlements with, Western Enlightenment legacy, capitalist modernity.
July 29, 2023
A obra tenta fazer uma excursão pela história do conservadorismo, desde as suas origens na contrarrevolução francesa, com Burke e Maistre, até à nova direita de Trump, Le Pen e Salvini, demonstrando as origens e desenvolvimentos deste movimento centenário. A meu ver, a obra está brilhantemente divida, passando por cada época em dois períodos, um de acontecimentos importantes e outro onde se mencionam as personalidades marcantes daquele período do conservadorismo.
Assim, recomendo esta obra para compreender o conservadorismo e a direita em geral, tantas vezes mal representada quer por oportunismo ou ignorância política. O leitor certamente ganhará novas perspetivas com as opiniões demonstradas pelo autor ao analisar os desenvolvimentos e coligações de forma coesa e clara.
Assim, recomendo esta obra para compreender o conservadorismo e a direita em geral, tantas vezes mal representada quer por oportunismo ou ignorância política. O leitor certamente ganhará novas perspetivas com as opiniões demonstradas pelo autor ao analisar os desenvolvimentos e coligações de forma coesa e clara.
October 30, 2022
Numa viagem pelos principais pensadores conservadores desde Burke e Maistre, no R. U., França, Alemanha e E. U. A., o autor tenta marcar duas linhas dentro do pensamento conservador - a que se concilia com o liberalismo e tem dificuldade em se definir, e a linha dura, com dificuldade em oferecer soluções.
É interessante como o autor afasta qualquer tipo de conservadorismo, pelo menos europeu, de extremismo, diferenciando-o bem das experiências absolutistas modernas, ou nazi-fascistas do século XX.
Ficou a faltar uma referência a Chesterton, Maritain, e ao pensamento democrata-cristão.
Gostaria de ler um volume idêntico sobre Portugal, Espanha e Itália.
É interessante como o autor afasta qualquer tipo de conservadorismo, pelo menos europeu, de extremismo, diferenciando-o bem das experiências absolutistas modernas, ou nazi-fascistas do século XX.
Ficou a faltar uma referência a Chesterton, Maritain, e ao pensamento democrata-cristão.
Gostaria de ler um volume idêntico sobre Portugal, Espanha e Itália.
November 8, 2022
Not perfect, but pretty close. If only Fawcett wasn't so into both-sidesing when it comes to the left (liberalism is holding the fort against the fascists on both sides, don't you know), and necessary balance when it comes to the right (Weimar might have survived if only the liberals and leftists hadn't been so extreme).
June 7, 2023
Thought provoking. Gives too much of a pass to the failures of liberals (right or left) to govern with the perverse incentives created for politicians by electoral democracy but that was not the main point of the book.
February 13, 2021
I just couldn't get into it. :-(
July 25, 2021
I had no idea what I did not know. Thank you Mr. Fawcett.
October 20, 2021
I highly recommend this book to all interested in the history of political ideas and political movements.
Want to read
March 27, 2023Leon
February 12, 2024
The book was fascinating and ambitious. How to tell the history of Conservatism and keep it engaging, not easy to achieve and sometimes not so, becoming bogged down in minutiae for a book of this kind. A slog of a read. Dense with information and references for more investigation that could fill my remaining days and more. I might dip into some of the characters referenced at some point.
However, for the concept of Conservatism, the philosophy of, there is a short cut as the core ideas don’t really change, apart from a constant split between liberal minded and not liberal minded and, with the latter, a range of shades from centre to way to the right. Ownership, keeping the status quo, the mass of population incapable of thinking rationally and therefore ruling itself so they need to be ruled by their ‘superiors’, and the need for policing/rules/control. The latter only applies to those not in the perceived elite club.
The club has evolved over time but essentially is based on status, existing power and, a later addition, money.
The author is Mr Boris Johnson’s uncle, clearly more left leaning than Mr J, with very different politics, although I’ve never known what Mr J’s politics were: I’ll say fluid but that’s giving some licence.
Overall, well done to the writer.
However, for the concept of Conservatism, the philosophy of, there is a short cut as the core ideas don’t really change, apart from a constant split between liberal minded and not liberal minded and, with the latter, a range of shades from centre to way to the right. Ownership, keeping the status quo, the mass of population incapable of thinking rationally and therefore ruling itself so they need to be ruled by their ‘superiors’, and the need for policing/rules/control. The latter only applies to those not in the perceived elite club.
The club has evolved over time but essentially is based on status, existing power and, a later addition, money.
The author is Mr Boris Johnson’s uncle, clearly more left leaning than Mr J, with very different politics, although I’ve never known what Mr J’s politics were: I’ll say fluid but that’s giving some licence.
Overall, well done to the writer.
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