حراس الخليج : تاريخ توسع الدور الامريكي في الخليج العربي 1833- 1992

by Michael A. Palmer, نبيل زكي (Translator)

The East's riches and untapped markets in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century, and its strategic and geopolitical assets in the twentieth century, have continually attracted American interest and investment to the countries of the Persian Gulf. Describing a complex two-century-old relationship, Michael Palmer tells the illuminating story of our nation's steadily escalating involvement in the region despite our ongoing resistance to active guardianship of its stability and security. Initially, American commercial activity basked in the protection of British military prowess. But as Yankee merchants successfully displaced the declining empire's influence, the United States was forced to assume increased responsibility for the volatile nations of the gulf. Relying heavily on the Shah as a surrogate police power in the ensuing decades, we actively intervened in Iranian politics to sustain his rule. The United States was finally compelled to assume the mantle of guardianship, which we had long avoided, when he fell from power in 1979. Today, our military presence ensures the continued existence of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. Tracing the trajectory of American influence and engagement in the Persian Gulf, Palmer reveals the recent war with Iraq to have been a logical culmination of our past history. The limited objectives sought reflected our traditional reluctance to be militarily engaged in foreign lands and to incur postwar commitments. The gross over-estimation of Iraqi capability by President Bush and Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf continued a long-standing misperception of the realities of the gulf countries and their military and political potential. Exploring the issues raised by our presence in the Persian Gulf and our role as protector of this unstable region, Palmer reveals American ambivalence toward the responsibilities, risks, and costs of guardianship. His historical analysis provides an essential primer for ou

Genres: History, Iran

300 pages, Paperback

First published July 6, 1992

About the author

Michael A. Palmer is a professor of History and Maritime Studies at East Carolina University.

Reviews

[Joseph Stieb · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a solid read with a couple of quirks about US foreign policy in the Gulf. Palmer argues that early US policy in the Gulf relied on the British to provide security while the US benefitted from economic exchange. The Gulf became progressively more important to the US for 2 major reasons: 1. The increasing importance of oil to the US and world economy. 2. The need to keep the USSR out. In strict realist terms, the US succeeded wildly in these objectives. When GB had to back out the security commitment in the 1950's and 1960's, the US stepped in more directly with the Ike and Nixon doctrines. Then, when the Iranian pillar fell, the Carter Doctrine promised direct US military aid to any outside attempt to dominate the Gulf. Of course, denial of outside attempts at hegemony implied denial of inside attempts, so the US found itself balancing against Iran and ultimately fighting Iraq to maintain a stable gulf through which oil can flow freely. US policy reached this point of significant involvement not exactly by intention, but each policy step was a logical response to new situations given the defining of US interests.

Overall, Palmer is a balanced, even slightly conservative analyst. He doesn't get into foolish accusations of American hegemony in the region, showing in contrast that the consistent US goal has been to prevent insider or outsider hegemony in the region. US interest in the region is largely about oil, but that interest cannot be divorced from global economic and political goals, especially the rehabilitation of Europe and the containment of the USSR. There's also an excellent account of the 1953 Iranian coup which shows that US intervention was largely about the fear that Mossadegh, as a weak leader who had undermined other bases of power in Iran, would be overthrown by the Tudeh Party, bringing the USSR into de facto control of Iran. This account just pushes back on the evil empire view of the coup. Lastly, Palmer makes a good point that the Gulf States, while autocratic and conservative, are somewhat worth defending. Not only are they vital cogs in the world economy, they are also fairly successful at providing a decent lifestyle for their people, especially in contrast to the regimes of the greater middle east. These regimes may ultimately prove to be houses of cards, but they are not the worst of allies or autocracies.

Palmer reveals his strong preference for military history in his excellent account of the Gulf War, which takes up a solid 100 pages of a 250 page book. It's funny when historians claim to be adding historical depth to a topic and then spend virtually the entire book on the very recent past. The truth is that heavy US strategic involvement in the region really just goes back to WWII. The economic and missionary contacts before then were sparse and peripheral.

It's hard to recommend this book to anyone not specializing in USFP in the region because there are so many other works on the Gulf War and US policy more generally. Still, this is a competent, balanced, and fairly interesting work.

[Dan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very well researched and written account of US foreign policy in the Gulf from 1833 through 1991. He does a good job explaining the evolution of US foreign policy in the Gulf in response to the decline of the British Empire and the rise of the Soviet threat. Only complaint is this book does not go beyond the 1990-1991 Gulf War.