A graduate of Harvard University, Philip M. Stern worked as a reporter and editorial writer for the New Orleans Item before moving to Washington, D.C., where he worked as editor and publisher of the Northern Virginia Sun before serving as a deputy assistant secretary of state for public affairs in the Kennedy administration.
I found this book in an excellent independent bookshop on the outskirts of Denver and was drawn in by the pitiable photograph of Robert Oppenheimer on the cover. This book details Oppenheimer's life, his role as 'father of the atomic bomb,' and the 1954 administrative hearing that permanently removed him from government service. Coincidentally, as the author points out, his hearing took place at the same time as the Army-McCarthy hearings, although Oppenheimer's hearing was largely conducted behind closed doors. I say 'largely' because many parts of the hearing were leaked and there was press reporting about it at the time.
I love reading non-fiction about the US security state apparatus, government investigations, and Cold War politics, so this book was ideal. I did not know much about Oppenheimer and I did not even know that he was determined to be a 'security risk' and subsequently removed from his post at the Atomic Energy Commission. It is a long book--roughly 500 pages excluding a 'Response' section (a letter from Oppenheimer's attorney at the hearing, Lloyd Garrison) and the bibliography--and it has an unusual structure, which I found appropriate. The book opens with the 'Chevalier incident'--the encounter between Oppenheimer and his friend Haakon Chevalier, which is at the center of the controversy, where the latter mentioned to the former his acquaintance with a scientist who revealed himself as a link to the Soviet Union. The book then has a 200-page biographical section, then two sections on the indictment and the hearing preparations, then a section on the hearing itself, and then 10 shorter sections. These shorter sections include the decision-making process of Oppenheimer's judges, the political and institutional aftereffects, and then a couple of brief essays on the nature of the US security state.
I admire this book for its rigorous documentation, its ability to separate fact from commentary, and its thoughtful comments on the plight of the subject and indeed the nation due to the deeply misguided, paranoid, and hateful politics of the time. It would be easy to side with Oppenheimer after reading the account of his inquisition, however the author attempts to balance this with reminders about his regularly caustic attitude (towards his fellow scientists but especially towards air force and other high-ranking government officials, which in hindsight was probably a serious error on his part) and the fact that he was the mastermind of the most regrettable invention of the 20th century--the atomic bomb. Nonetheless, I found this to be a fascinating institutional history and an important, although perhaps under-appreciated, narrative of the political and sociological atmosphere of the US during the Cold War.
I gave four-stars because, for an otherwise good read, it was slightly repetitive, there were parts that dragged on, and there was occasional fatigue from information overload.
A few things I learned while reading this book: 1. Richard Nixon (as Congressman and Vice President) was a staunch supporter of Oppenheimer, and even voiced public support for him during his hearing. Eisenhower, on the other hand, seemed somewhat eager to get rid of Oppenheimer. I expected the roles to be reversed, and though I suspect it has something to do with their personal relationships with other political and military leaders (who in turn might have had stronger feelings about Oppenheimer and the specific direction of atomic warfare), the book never adequately (in my view) addressed this. 2. Edward Teller--for his participation as a hostile witness to Oppenheimer in the hearing--suffered immense damage to his reputation in the scientific community, and was actually shunned for a time. 3. I learned about the 'blank pad' doctrine in American legal thinking: the idea that, in your average American courtroom trial, the jury and judge may only consider evidence introduced during the trial and may not consider outside material. I obviously understood this idea before I read this book, but the author put a name to it and described in agonizing detail how this doctrine was totally subverted in the case of Oppenheimer. Actually found it quite horrifying the degree to which his inquisition deviated from many legal norms. 4. A number of the gentlemen who bear most responsibility for bringing and prosecuting the security case against Oppenheimer--such as Lewis Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission and the informant Paul Crouch--failed to prosper afterwards. Crouch was investigated by DOJ and then had the gall to accuse Eisenhower's Attorney General of being a traitor, while Strauss saw his later nomination to a Cabinet post go down in flames. (The author describes that this was only partly in retaliation for the Oppenheimer case; it mainly had to do with Strauss being something of a congenital liar). So, karma?
J. Robert Oppenheimer is one of those people who cannot be forgotten. Born well-to-do, educated as an elite, and the person who managed the development and building of the atomic bomb that hurried along the close of World War II. Those interested in the science can find more details of this in many books. Lesser known is his troubles with the U.S. government, its military, and its agencies. In the 1930s, it was not taboo to associate with Communists or even be a member of the party. This drastically changed after WWII when the Soviet Union became a cold war enemy of the U.S. Then communist witch hunts became normalized, and many got into trouble with their past associations. Oppenheimer was no exception. His dalliances with Communism were known even during the war, but afterwards, his “loyalty” was questioned. Despite this, he was approved as an advisor to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). His problem was his mercurial temperament as he went from charismatic to insulting. He made formidable enemies within the military and other agencies that wanted him out. This was formally done in 1954 when a security hearing within the AEC revoked his security clearance and he could no longer advise the government on nuclear issues.
The Stern book (1969) covers this history in almost excruciating detail. It was written only fifteen years after the event. It covers Oppenheimer’s leftist associations before the war and even after the war. How he made his enemies (and friends) and how they finally worked out a procedure to shame him in front of the country. It damns the security agencies and procedures as overbearing and secretive. No ordinary trial would have allowed such abuses of power over an individual simply for having opinions that ran against those on the lookout for spies. And since Oppenheimer was an atomic expert, he was also involved in the development of the hydrogen bomb that the military wanted. His apparent lack of enthusiasm for it may have been the straw that broke the camel’s back. Not only was Oppenheimer on trial, but so was the security establishment itself as is made clear in the book. Should be a standard for the topic.