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Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace: The Rise, Demise and Revival of Arms Control
"The definitive guide to the history of nuclear arms control by a wise eavesdropper and masterful storyteller, Michael Krepon. The greatest unacknowledged diplomatic achievement of the Cold War was the absence of mushroom clouds. Deterrence alone was too dangerous to succeed; it needed arms control to prevent nuclear warfare. So, U.S. and Soviet leaders ventured into the unknown to devise guardrails for nuclear arms control and to treat the Bomb differently than other weapons. Against the odds, they succeeded. Nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare for three quarters of a century. This book is the first in-depth history of how the nuclear peace was won by complementing deterrence with reassurance, and then jeopardized by discarding arms control after the Cold War ended. "Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace" tells a remarkable story of highwire acts of diplomacy, close calls, dogged persistence, and extraordinary success. Michael Krepon brings to life the pitched battles between arms controllers and advocates of nuclear deterrence, the ironic twists and unexpected outcomes from Truman to Trump. What began with a ban on atmospheric testing and a nonproliferation treaty reached its apogee with treaties that mandated deep cuts and corralled "loose nukes" after the Soviet Union imploded. After the Cold War ended, much of this diplomatic accomplishment was cast aside in favor of freedom of action. The nuclear peace is now imperiled by no less than four nuclear-armed rivalries. Arms control needs to be revived and re-imagined for Russia and China to prevent nuclear warfare. New guardrails have to be erected. "Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace" is an engaging account of how the practice of arms control was built from scratch, how it was torn down, and how it can be rebuilt"--
656 pages, Hardcover
First published October 19, 2021
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
January 5, 2022
My best book.
April 14, 2022
Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace: The Rise, Demise, and Revival of Arms Control by Michael Krepon.
Krepon is a well-respected "outside" expert in nuclear arms control, and he has written a useful overview of the history of nuclear arms control from 1945 to 2020. Even at 500+ pages, this is just an overview, and of just the Washington-Moscow negotiations at that. Krepon has included small biographic vignettes of the more prominent American negotiators - which I found of note as I worked with many of them from 1987 onward.
Krepon grounds his discussion in the seminal work of Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, of which he states: "[As] argued in their seminal 1961 study, Strategy and Arms Control, nuclear weapons limitation agreements with adversaries can help achieve three critical foreign policy objectives: “the avoidance of war that neither side wants, minimizing the costs and risks of the arms competition, and curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs.”
Krepon further observes in line with Schelling and Halperin that "arms control agreements are not a concession made by the United States, nor a favor done for another nation; they are an essential component of, and contributor to, our national security."
It is this latter point that has been missed by the deterrence advocates, who see nuclear deterrence as weakened by arms control, and imposing unacceptable constraints on "Freedom of action." To the contrary, they engage in a costly and dangerous pursuit of strategic supremacy. Combined with a pusillanimous and partisan desire to not "reward" Democratic Presidents by confirming successful negotations by ratifying the subsequent treaties, a number of useful treaties have been cast aside even while actions are taken that conform with those agreements - notable the Comphrehensive Test Ban Treaty. In other cases, in-force treaties have been cast aside rather than devote serious efforts to remedies and amendments. Here I disagree with Krepon that the US was correct to end the INF Treaty (banning land-based missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 km) over allegations of a land-based Russian cruise missile with a range of over 1500 km (the 9M729 (SSC-8) but compare the 3M-14 Kalibr - now being used by the Russian Navy against Ukraine - the sea-based version IS allowable under INF). In my view, the 1985 INF Treaty should have been adapted to other environments and extended to other countries - no serious effort was made in either direction.
Krepon concludes that while it is increasingly difficult to get arms control treaties ratified, arms control can still measureably add to a world in which safety and security is enhanced by extending three key nuclear norms: no proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states, no testing and, most importantly, no battlefield use. The first norm has been in place since North Korea (c. 2005), the second since 2006 (again, North Korea), and the last of course since 1945. I find this "Norm Extension" idea attractive in view of the hostility of the Senate (notably but not exclusively the GOP) to formal arms control and indeed to restraint generally in defense.
Losing the Nuclear Peace is long work, but Krepon spins an engaing tale and the book is readable while scholarly.
Krepon is a well-respected "outside" expert in nuclear arms control, and he has written a useful overview of the history of nuclear arms control from 1945 to 2020. Even at 500+ pages, this is just an overview, and of just the Washington-Moscow negotiations at that. Krepon has included small biographic vignettes of the more prominent American negotiators - which I found of note as I worked with many of them from 1987 onward.
Krepon grounds his discussion in the seminal work of Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, of which he states: "[As] argued in their seminal 1961 study, Strategy and Arms Control, nuclear weapons limitation agreements with adversaries can help achieve three critical foreign policy objectives: “the avoidance of war that neither side wants, minimizing the costs and risks of the arms competition, and curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs.”
Krepon further observes in line with Schelling and Halperin that "arms control agreements are not a concession made by the United States, nor a favor done for another nation; they are an essential component of, and contributor to, our national security."
It is this latter point that has been missed by the deterrence advocates, who see nuclear deterrence as weakened by arms control, and imposing unacceptable constraints on "Freedom of action." To the contrary, they engage in a costly and dangerous pursuit of strategic supremacy. Combined with a pusillanimous and partisan desire to not "reward" Democratic Presidents by confirming successful negotations by ratifying the subsequent treaties, a number of useful treaties have been cast aside even while actions are taken that conform with those agreements - notable the Comphrehensive Test Ban Treaty. In other cases, in-force treaties have been cast aside rather than devote serious efforts to remedies and amendments. Here I disagree with Krepon that the US was correct to end the INF Treaty (banning land-based missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 km) over allegations of a land-based Russian cruise missile with a range of over 1500 km (the 9M729 (SSC-8) but compare the 3M-14 Kalibr - now being used by the Russian Navy against Ukraine - the sea-based version IS allowable under INF). In my view, the 1985 INF Treaty should have been adapted to other environments and extended to other countries - no serious effort was made in either direction.
Krepon concludes that while it is increasingly difficult to get arms control treaties ratified, arms control can still measureably add to a world in which safety and security is enhanced by extending three key nuclear norms: no proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states, no testing and, most importantly, no battlefield use. The first norm has been in place since North Korea (c. 2005), the second since 2006 (again, North Korea), and the last of course since 1945. I find this "Norm Extension" idea attractive in view of the hostility of the Senate (notably but not exclusively the GOP) to formal arms control and indeed to restraint generally in defense.
Losing the Nuclear Peace is long work, but Krepon spins an engaing tale and the book is readable while scholarly.
May 30, 2023
An excellent, detailed overview of the history of arms control...extremely thorough and well-researched. Highly recommend for those working or interested in the field!
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews