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هابز و آزادی جمهوریخواهانه
Quentin Skinner is one of the foremost historians in the world, and in Hobbes and Republican Liberty he offers a dazzling comparison of two rival theories about the nature of human liberty. The first originated in classical antiquity, and lay at the heart of the Roman republican tradition of public life. Thomas Hobbes was the most formidable enemy of this pattern of thought, and his successive attempts to discredit it constitute a truly epochal moment in the history of Anglophone political thought. Hobbes and Republican Liberty develops several of the themes announced by Quentin Skinner in his celebrated inaugural lecture on Liberty before Liberalism of 1997. Cogent, engaged, accessible, and indeed exhilarating, this new book will appeal to readers of history, politics, and philosophy at all levels from upper-undergraduate upwards, and provides an excellent introduction to the work of one of the most celebrated thinkers of our time.
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First published January 1, 2004
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About the author
Quentin Skinner
95 books132 followersEducated at Caius College, Cambridge, where he was elected to a Fellowship upon obtaining a double-starred first in History, Quentin Skinner accepted, however, a teaching Fellowship at Christ's College, Cambridge, where he taught until 2008, except for four years in the 1970s spent at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. In 1978 he was appointed to the chair of Political Science at Cambridge University, and subsequently regarded as one of the two principal members (along with J.G.A. Pocock) of the influential 'Cambridge School' of the history of political thought, best known for its attention to the 'languages' of political thought.
Skinner's primary interest in the 1970s and 1980s was the modern idea of the state, which resulted in two of his most highly regarded works, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume I: The Renaissance and The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume II: The Age of Reformation.
Skinner's primary interest in the 1970s and 1980s was the modern idea of the state, which resulted in two of his most highly regarded works, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume I: The Renaissance and The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume II: The Age of Reformation.
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
April 20, 2020
Interesting but to my mind didn't sufficiently engage the question of what Hobbes was seeking to do with his radically novel approach, and in particular why he chose to model human liberty on material corpuscles. I'm getting this more from Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life.
February 23, 2025
Typical Skinnerian way of doing intellectual history, at its most brilliant and most limiting. Ellen Wood's Marxist critique of this book is well worth reading: https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v30/n....
March 17, 2013
Skinner provides a solid exposition of the evolution of Hobbes' conception of the nature of liberty from is earlier books The Elemens of Law and De Cive through to his final statement of his views in Leviathan. Hobbes, as Skinner shows, wrote in opposition to what is nowadays know as the "republican" understanding of liberty (Skinner prefers the term "neo-roman," since its origins trace back to classical Rome). According to this understanding of liberty, freedom can only exist in a free state and requires the absence of arbitrary power; no one can be free as long as the possibility exists they can be reduced to slavery by the exercise of arbitrary power.
Hobbes ridiculed this view, arguing that the only genuine measure of freedom is the presence or absence of restraints to one's ability to act. According to Hobbes, therefore, one can be just as free in an absolute monarchy as in a commonwealth. Hobbes was, as Skinner shows, conducting a fierce polemic against the champions of republican liberty, many of whom supported the parliamentary side in the English Civil War. This aspect of Skinner's analysis is paradigmatic of the so-called Cambridge school of interpretation, which places heavy emphasis on the intellectual, political, and other contexts in which texts are written. Skinner doesn't go overboard with it, though; the contextual material provides mostly shading and detail, it doesn't dominate his analysis.
One particular strength is his use of emblems, images which presented ideas in visual form, to demonstrate how these ideas were propagated in non-literary form. Skinner's use of these illustrations allows him to add another dimension to his study, a dimension that is often neglected in this sort of intellectual history.
Where Skinner falls short is in his treatment of republican liberty. Skinner is a partisan of the neo-roman conception of liberty, which demands non-domination in addition to non-interference. Focusing too much on the contemporary debate would no doubt detract from his focus on Hobbes, and make the book longer than its surprisingly compact - and fluid, quickly-traversed - 216 pages. But Skinner doesn't really draw out the views of Hobbes' opponents, either. They are there mainly to provide context, to show what Hobbes was against.
The other problem with Skinner's treatment of republican liberty is the concept itself. The notion is bollocks, to put it bluntly. Hordes and legions of scholars in the twentieth century have sacrificed holocausts of trees defending and indicting, if not Hobbes, then the Hobbesian vision of liberty. The locus of this debate is Isaiah Berlin's essay "Two Concepts of Liberty," the single most important writing about liberty in the English language of the last hundred years. (Berlin was in many ways merely reviving Benjamin Constant's distinction between ancient and modern liberty.) Skinner takes it for granted that republican liberty not only exists, but was perceived as such by its champions in the early modern period. But I've never seen a discussion that demonstrates conclusively that republican liberty is anything more than a mirage cooked up by twentieth-century academics looking for an alternative to, and outlet for their dissatisfaction with, liberalism. Skinner certainly doesn't provide that here, but then that's not his purpose; he would merely point to his other, positive writings on the subject. (For example, his earlier book Liberty before Liberalism.) Be that as it may, using history as a vehicle for one's political views is not scholarship, it's polemic and propaganda. In that sense, at least, Skinner is an able student of Hobbes.
Thursday, March 14, 2013
Hobbes ridiculed this view, arguing that the only genuine measure of freedom is the presence or absence of restraints to one's ability to act. According to Hobbes, therefore, one can be just as free in an absolute monarchy as in a commonwealth. Hobbes was, as Skinner shows, conducting a fierce polemic against the champions of republican liberty, many of whom supported the parliamentary side in the English Civil War. This aspect of Skinner's analysis is paradigmatic of the so-called Cambridge school of interpretation, which places heavy emphasis on the intellectual, political, and other contexts in which texts are written. Skinner doesn't go overboard with it, though; the contextual material provides mostly shading and detail, it doesn't dominate his analysis.
One particular strength is his use of emblems, images which presented ideas in visual form, to demonstrate how these ideas were propagated in non-literary form. Skinner's use of these illustrations allows him to add another dimension to his study, a dimension that is often neglected in this sort of intellectual history.
Where Skinner falls short is in his treatment of republican liberty. Skinner is a partisan of the neo-roman conception of liberty, which demands non-domination in addition to non-interference. Focusing too much on the contemporary debate would no doubt detract from his focus on Hobbes, and make the book longer than its surprisingly compact - and fluid, quickly-traversed - 216 pages. But Skinner doesn't really draw out the views of Hobbes' opponents, either. They are there mainly to provide context, to show what Hobbes was against.
The other problem with Skinner's treatment of republican liberty is the concept itself. The notion is bollocks, to put it bluntly. Hordes and legions of scholars in the twentieth century have sacrificed holocausts of trees defending and indicting, if not Hobbes, then the Hobbesian vision of liberty. The locus of this debate is Isaiah Berlin's essay "Two Concepts of Liberty," the single most important writing about liberty in the English language of the last hundred years. (Berlin was in many ways merely reviving Benjamin Constant's distinction between ancient and modern liberty.) Skinner takes it for granted that republican liberty not only exists, but was perceived as such by its champions in the early modern period. But I've never seen a discussion that demonstrates conclusively that republican liberty is anything more than a mirage cooked up by twentieth-century academics looking for an alternative to, and outlet for their dissatisfaction with, liberalism. Skinner certainly doesn't provide that here, but then that's not his purpose; he would merely point to his other, positive writings on the subject. (For example, his earlier book Liberty before Liberalism.) Be that as it may, using history as a vehicle for one's political views is not scholarship, it's polemic and propaganda. In that sense, at least, Skinner is an able student of Hobbes.
Thursday, March 14, 2013
June 14, 2020
O objetivo de Skinner é contrastar duas teorias sobre a liberdade humana: republicana e hobbesiana. No primeiro capítulo, o autor apresenta a biografia de Hobbes e seu projeto de uma teoria sobre o movimento humano a partir de três elementos: o corpo, o homem e o cidadão.
Na obra de Hobbes, Os elementos da lei natural e política, o autor diz que a liberdade é agir conforme o ser humano delibera. Porém, agir sob coação ou sob as paixões é agir livremente também. A liberdade de natureza é um direito de fazer tudo o que se quer. Contudo, para ter paz com todos, é preciso um pacto que limite a liberdade de todos, submetendo-se a um soberano que encabeça o corpo político fictamente criado através de um contrato. Se permanecer algum elemento de liberdade, foi pela permissão do soberano. Mas ele pode revogar esse elemento.
Nessa obra, as preocupações de Hobbes eram três versões constitucionalistas: monarquia constitucional, misto entre monarquia e outros Poderes, e teoria republicana. À monarquia mista, Hobbes diz que não se pode abandonar parte do poder e conservar o restante. À monarquia constitucional, Hobbes argumenta que se o soberano é limitado, logo não é um soberano. À teoria republicana, Hobbes diz que não se pode fugir de se sujeitar ao soberano, mesmo que esse seja uma lei ratificada por todos os pares.
No capítulo quatro, Skinner argumenta que em Do Cidadão, Hobbes trabalha os argumentos de Elementos... e acrescenta um conceito de liberdade que abrange o homem e a natureza. Liberdade é movimento, ausência de impedimentos externos e arbitrários. O cidadão preserva sua liberdade naquilo que não é definido pelo soberano, podendo movimentar-se ou exercer sua liberdade naquilo que não é restringido previamente.
No capítulo cinco, Skinner trata do pensamento de Hobbes em o Leviatã. Primeiramente, Hobbes não coaduna com a tese republicana de que ser livre é não ter impedimento nenhum. E define de forma clara o que é o homem livre: liberdade é a ausência de impedimentos externos para agir segundo a própria vontade, mas a liberdade não implica ausência de dependência de um soberano. Ou seja, a liberdade é fazer o que se quer, na dependência ou restrito à vontade prévia do soberano.
No estado natural, tem-se o medo de ser submetido à ação maldosa de outrem. Por meio de um contrato, parte da liberdade é dada a um soberano que garante o exercício da verdadeira liberdade em uma sociedade: uma liberdade limitada de todos, mas protegida. Porém, por esse contrato não se transferem direitos inalienáveis, como o direito à autodefesa e à liberdade religiosa. E também o homem continua a preservar sua capacidade livre de obedecer ou desobedecer as leis, ainda que haja consequências.
No último capítulo, Skinner debate o tema da liberdade e obrigação política em Hobbes. Depois da morte do Rei, a Inglaterra virou uma República, em 1649. Hobbes incentiva que os cidadãos se submetam ao novo governo.
Segundo Hobbes, o soberano é a cabeça da República ou Estado. O soberano é uma pessoa ou assembleia que dirige o corpo ficto do Leviatã, materializando a vontade dos cidadãos. Para isso, deve concentrar os poderes civil e espiritual para garantir proteção e obediência política.
Portanto, para Hobbes, o Leviatã garante a ausência de impedimento externo à liberdade, isto é, uma monarquia absoluta pode garantir tanta ou mais liberdade que uma República ou Estado livre.
Na obra de Hobbes, Os elementos da lei natural e política, o autor diz que a liberdade é agir conforme o ser humano delibera. Porém, agir sob coação ou sob as paixões é agir livremente também. A liberdade de natureza é um direito de fazer tudo o que se quer. Contudo, para ter paz com todos, é preciso um pacto que limite a liberdade de todos, submetendo-se a um soberano que encabeça o corpo político fictamente criado através de um contrato. Se permanecer algum elemento de liberdade, foi pela permissão do soberano. Mas ele pode revogar esse elemento.
Nessa obra, as preocupações de Hobbes eram três versões constitucionalistas: monarquia constitucional, misto entre monarquia e outros Poderes, e teoria republicana. À monarquia mista, Hobbes diz que não se pode abandonar parte do poder e conservar o restante. À monarquia constitucional, Hobbes argumenta que se o soberano é limitado, logo não é um soberano. À teoria republicana, Hobbes diz que não se pode fugir de se sujeitar ao soberano, mesmo que esse seja uma lei ratificada por todos os pares.
No capítulo quatro, Skinner argumenta que em Do Cidadão, Hobbes trabalha os argumentos de Elementos... e acrescenta um conceito de liberdade que abrange o homem e a natureza. Liberdade é movimento, ausência de impedimentos externos e arbitrários. O cidadão preserva sua liberdade naquilo que não é definido pelo soberano, podendo movimentar-se ou exercer sua liberdade naquilo que não é restringido previamente.
No capítulo cinco, Skinner trata do pensamento de Hobbes em o Leviatã. Primeiramente, Hobbes não coaduna com a tese republicana de que ser livre é não ter impedimento nenhum. E define de forma clara o que é o homem livre: liberdade é a ausência de impedimentos externos para agir segundo a própria vontade, mas a liberdade não implica ausência de dependência de um soberano. Ou seja, a liberdade é fazer o que se quer, na dependência ou restrito à vontade prévia do soberano.
No estado natural, tem-se o medo de ser submetido à ação maldosa de outrem. Por meio de um contrato, parte da liberdade é dada a um soberano que garante o exercício da verdadeira liberdade em uma sociedade: uma liberdade limitada de todos, mas protegida. Porém, por esse contrato não se transferem direitos inalienáveis, como o direito à autodefesa e à liberdade religiosa. E também o homem continua a preservar sua capacidade livre de obedecer ou desobedecer as leis, ainda que haja consequências.
No último capítulo, Skinner debate o tema da liberdade e obrigação política em Hobbes. Depois da morte do Rei, a Inglaterra virou uma República, em 1649. Hobbes incentiva que os cidadãos se submetam ao novo governo.
Segundo Hobbes, o soberano é a cabeça da República ou Estado. O soberano é uma pessoa ou assembleia que dirige o corpo ficto do Leviatã, materializando a vontade dos cidadãos. Para isso, deve concentrar os poderes civil e espiritual para garantir proteção e obediência política.
Portanto, para Hobbes, o Leviatã garante a ausência de impedimento externo à liberdade, isto é, uma monarquia absoluta pode garantir tanta ou mais liberdade que uma República ou Estado livre.
December 16, 2019
اسکینر استاد تاریخ اندیشه سیاسی در این کتاب دو بیان متفاوت از آزادی را در یک مرور تاریخی شرح میدهد. نگرش اول جمهوری خواهان و پارلمانتاریستهایی که از قدرت گیری بیش ازحد چالز اول پادشاه انگلستان نگران بودند و تلاش میکردند قدرت پادشاه را محدود کنند و نگرش دوم متعلق به توماس هابز که سعی میکرد روبروی دیدگاه جمهوری خواهان بایستد. تلقی جمهوری خواهی از آزادی آن را محدود به قانون میکرد. از نظر جمهوری خواهان آزادی تنها در چهارچوب قانون معنا میافت و انسان مجاز به انجام هر عملی نبود. در طرف مقابل هابز معتقد به آزادی منفی بود و استدلال میکرد که در حکومت های مطلقه سلطنتی افراد نه تنها همچنان صاحب آزادی هستند بلکه در نظام های سلطنتیِ مطلقه است که آزادی به معنای واقعی در آن وجود دارد. زمانه ی هابز پر آشوب بود و خود بارها به طنز و جدی به این نکته اشاره کرده بود که او و ترس همزاد همدیگرند. برای هابز هیچ چیز مهم تر از صیانت ازنفس و حفظ امنیت در جامعه نبود به همین جهت میگوید همین که انسانها از وضع طبیعی که در آن قانونی وجود ندارد و همه در حال جنگند خارج شدند باید قدردادن باشند. هابز شهروندان را تبعه حکومت میداند و معتقد است آنها هیچ حقی با حاکمی که بر آنها حکم میکند ندارند. استدلالی که باعث مخالفت جمهوری خواهان شد و او در پاسخ کتاب معروفش لویاتان را نوشت. هابز در این کتاب توضیح میدهد به دو علت انسانها در حکومتهای مطلقه همچنان آزادند اول به این دلیل که هیچ چیز مهمتر ازجان انسانها نیست بنابراین هر زمان که حاکم امنیت را تامین نکرد میتوانند علیه او قیام کنند. دومین دلیل هابز این بود که هیچ حکومتی نمیتواند در همه زمینه ها قانونگذاری کند و همیشه عرصه ای برای شهرواندان باقی میماند که در آن آزادی کامل دارند.
October 10, 2020
Skinner's thesis is that what differentiates Hobbes from Republican thinkers is that he doesn't think that living in a particular regime will make you any less free, since freedom is defined as the absence of physical obstacles to motion. The first two chapters are a bit boring but Skinner's constant attention to the details of Hobbes's text as well as to the evolution of his thought is pleasurable and sometimes admirable.
December 31, 2023
This book is quite interesting but it is rather repetitive, it could've been 2 (or maybe even 3) times shorter. Solid 4 stars!
As a side note Dr. Quentin Skinner, the author of the book, has a lot of interesting lectures on Hobbes that can be watched on YouTube
As a side note Dr. Quentin Skinner, the author of the book, has a lot of interesting lectures on Hobbes that can be watched on YouTube
November 10, 2008
A clear and concise telling of how Hobbes views liberty and how his view changed over the course of his life. I read this for the class I'm teaching on Hobbes.
August 13, 2017
O que é um homem livre? Somente é possível ser livre numa República? Skinner disseca os argumentos fundamentais do conceito de LIBERDADE na obra de Thomas Hobbes, mostrando como o autor constrói sua teoria tendo em vista os debates com os defensores da chamada liberdade republicana.
Livro rápido, acessível e enriquecedor.
Livro rápido, acessível e enriquecedor.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews