Was the role of the United States in the Second World War an essentially idealistic one, a crusading struggle to conquer the dark forces of German fascism and Japanese militarism? Was it an unequivocally "good" war?
Historian Jacques Pauwels questions this orthodox view of America's participation in World War Two. In his view, the United States was not the disinterested champion of democracy in the face of dictatorship: its role in the war was determined, rather, by the interests of its corporations and of its social, economic and political elites. His analysis explicitly addresses many of the myths that have since been fostered about the U.S. decision to enter the war alongside the Soviet Union, the U.K. and Canada, and against Nazi Germany.
The Myth of the Good War offers a fresh and provocative look at the role of the USA in World War Two. It spent four months on the nonfiction bestseller lists in Europe in 2000, and has since been translated into German, Spanish and French.
A deep question the author immediately asks is “Why did US policymakers not eradicate all forms of fascism in Germany and elsewhere after 1945? Why did they choose to oppose the anti-fascists instead?” Great stuff inside: “Quite a few generals including Eisenhower, Marshall and Patton were just as convinced as the Nazi’s of the superiority of the white race.” Hoover wanted the Soviet Union “crushed” – but one should also know that Hoover had lost “extensive Russian oil holdings during the communist revolution”. Oops… Germany was moving towards a closed economy in the 30’s and that meant there goes the U.S. profit because at one point during WWII, Ford and GM were producing one half of Hitler’s Tanks! Stalin sees near the end of the war how the Western Allies are bankrolling fascism in Greece, Italy, and France against the people’s wishes. Stalin also saw politically he was therefore given carte blanche with the countries near him, Romania and Bulgaria. The U.S. was upset Warsaw was also going communist, but it knew it was doing worse: the U.S. supported nasty dictatorships in China, Greece and Turkey. Stalin was surprisingly a realist; when he didn’t ask for much at Yalta, it was because he knew he could not afford to do so. The Bombing of Dresden happened after high command knew it could achieve nothing – and so was an utterly senseless slaughter of civilians in the middle of a “Good War”. Dresden was “obliterated” in order to “intimidate the Soviets” - an RAF memorandum (p.148) basically stating the “total devastation of the center of a vast city” in Germany during the war would be a CandyGram to Russia saying Hi, this is what we Allies can do to you. charming… Later in this book, it shows that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were also in effect CandyGrams by Truman to Russia saying Hi, this is what we, the U.S., can do to you too. And to Japan, with Hiroshima, Truman was in effect saying hurry and surrender or Russia will enter the Pacific War and I’ve have to cut them in on the spoils! Supporting fact: “One day after the soviet declaration of war, on August 9, 1945 a second bomb was dropped on …on Nagasaki.”
In 1945, a Gallup Poll said 55% of Americans want to retain the Russians as an ally after the War. This shows you the enormous role propaganda would play in creating a national fearmongering Cold War climate in only the next three years. Liberal economist Paul Samuelson worried a return to the peace economy would put “an abrupt end to the wartime boom”. The U.S. had under the Hawley-Smoot Act, raised its tariffs to a whopping 50% and these could easily be lifted to show nations of the world what American Capitalism could achieve over Communism, without resort to needlessly violent upcoming decades, but that was not to be. This book discusses the diplomatic reasonableness of Stalin in Finland and even China. The author believes the Iron Curtain would never have happened without Truman’s threat of “Atomic Diplomacy” or if Stalin didn’t rightfully see the cards all unfairly stacked against the country that alone paid 20 million lives for the biggest war of all time. The author believes planners felt war had to continue to keep to economy going, and that Russia was the best target – if you could simply get most of those 55% of Americans to turn tail on their Soviet Allies by PR (involving even Clark Clifford) that would make Edward Bernays proud. The added benefit of the Cold War soon became obvious, under fighting Communism you could take out all advocates for social change you didn’t like on the Left by mere implication! And without evidence, any person or anything could be labelled un-American. For the author, the Cold War was a war to end all alternatives to Capitalism. As American planners know well, the more the Soviets had to make weapons for the useless Cold War, the less cash and time they had to create socialism or meet basic needs. When the Soviet Union finally dissolved, the world has discovered that, without competition from Russia, world wages plummeted because the global competition for the hearts and minds of the poor has simply disappeared. This great book also discusses the U.S. intellectual plunder of the Nazis after WWII. After WWII, the Russians got none of the benefits, drawings and files of the Germans that the U.S. walked away with. This book shows the dirty secret: to take out Fascism, you must take out Capitalism, of which, Fascism is merely a subset. This message was waylaid by famous Hitler biographers like Alan Bullock who minimized the socioeconomic explanations in favor for the “Gangster Fascism” theories. As a result, Hitler is shown as only a bad apple, and please don’t look at the obvious role of Capitalism in his rise. Soldiers stated in Aachen Germany, in ’44 that they would take over anti-fascist controlled towns and put fascists back in power. Good War? If WWII was really a fight against Fascism, then why didn’t the U.S. fight the fascists in Spain?
This definitely exceeded my expectations. Because it's focused on the US role in WWII, I chose to read a companion text with it to try and round out the study of the war. But after having read both this and World War II in Global Perspective I can confidently say this is the only book you need to examine the war.
It's a meticulous breakdown of the motivations for the war, the business interests of U.S. companies with Nazi Germany, and myth-busting about the actions of the U.S. and its Allies, particularly about entering the war, wanting to weaken the Soviet Union, and the real reason for dropping the atomic bombs. Pauwels really is a tremendous historian who sets out to give the USSR and Stalin their rightful credit for taking on the Nazi war machine.
Een marxistische tegengeschiedenis die boos maakt, zelfs bij deze al relatief belezen marxist. Met een ruim assortiment aan bronnen toont Pauwels aan hoe de interesses van de Amerikaanse heersende klasse over het algemeen netjes stroomlijnden met die van nazi-Duitsland, met uitzondering van de vier jaar waarin het overeind houden van broodwinner Groot-Brittannië, de handelsverhouding tot de Sovjet-Unie en het al te protectionistische nazi-beleid de überkapitalistische kolos in een confrontatie met die laatste manoeuvreerde. De zogenaamd agressieve en ondemocratische uitbreiding van de Sovjet-invloedssfeer komt in een volledig ander daglicht te staan wanneer De Mythe de gesaboteerde herstelbetalingen (die Duitsland aan de som van meer dan honderd miljard dollar de SU verschuldigd was) en het politieke spelletje waarmee de Verenigde Staten de overheden en sociale bewegingen in West- en Zuid-Europa fnuikt belicht. Aan de verstrengeling van de nazi-economie en Amerikaanse industrie weidde Pauwels zijn Big Business met Nazi-Duitsland, maar ook hierin staat voldoende stof tot nadenken.
Alhoewel de focus natuurlijk elders lag doet dit boek me erg denken aan Arno Mayers De Hakenkruistocht: nazi-Duitsland komt aan bod, niet als metafysisch en duivels martelland (wat het natuurlijk ook was) maar als een "rationeel" rad binnen een groter kapitalistisch systeem. De vaak geciteerde Michael Parenti heeft duidelijk sterk bijgedragen aan deze lezingen, maar ook andere historici als Noam Chomsky, Annie Lacroix-Riz en Howard Zinn passeren de revue. Ik heb slechts twee perifere bedenkingen:
- steunen op 'historicus' David Irving om de bombardementen op Dresden te schetsen genereert dan wel imposant cijfermateriaal maar is ideologisch een erg twijfelachtige keuze, zeker daar deze bron in het boek zelf niet gecontextualiseerd wordt (wat met Antony Sutton in Big Business bijvoorbeeld wel gebeurt).
- net zoals De Hakenkruistocht bedient Pauwels' werk zich niet van voetnoten. De eindnoten die wél inbegrepen zijn maken het werk een stuk makkelijker na te lezen dan dat van Mayer, maar het geheel blijft wat lomp en onoverzichtelijk.
Ongeacht deze twee anekdotes blijft De Mythe een formidabel werk. De fascistische recensent hieronder die erin slaagt Pauwels' feiten te aanvaarden maar alsnog de Amerikaanse politiek, die eruit bestond de meest elementaire democratie, waardigheid en mensenrechten voor miljoenen mensen te perverteren, goed te keuren op basis van wat burgerlijke geschiedschrijving, mag veilig genegeerd worden.
Eerst het positieve, het boek maakt komaf met de patriottisch-Angelsaksische literatuur die de Tweede Wereldoorlog voordoet als een strijd van goed tegen kwaad, van democratie tegen dictatuur. Dresden, Tokio, Nagasaki en Hiroshima zijn de schandvlekken die de geschiedenis nooit van het blazoen zal kunnen verwijderen.
Maar het boek stelt ernstig teleur door wat het verzwijgt. Hoe het verhaal van 1939-1945 vertellen zonder te beginnen bij de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Vele historici spreken al over de Dertigjarige Europese Burgeroorlog. Het smeulende vuur tijdens de roerige jaren twintig en dertig in Duitsland is onbegrijpelijk zonder Versailles en Weimar (zie boeken van Adam Tooze, Christopher Clark, Niall Ferguson, Patrick Buchanan). Hierover niets bij Pauwels.
Ook niets te vinden over de band tussen Duitsland en Sovjet-Unie na Locarno, de twee verliezers van 1925. Of nog belangrijker, het niet-aanvalspact tussen nazi-Duitsland en Sovjet-Unie dat twee jaar standhield (1939-1941).
De reden van deze historische nalatigheid is natuurlijk eenvoudig: de auteur heeft communistische sympathieën en schuift onder het tapijt wat tegenstrijdig is met de politiek-correcte geschiedschrijving op marxistische leest. Uitgeverij EPO (huisuitgeverij van de maoïstische Partij van de Arbeid) ziet het graag gebeuren.
Verwacht je dus aan tegenstrijdigheden waarbij West-Europa (terecht) als een militaire voorpost van de VSA wordt beschouwd ten tijde van de Koude Oorlog, maar de manipulatie en annexatie van Oost-Europa door Stalin als een geopolitieke buffer tegen het imperialistische Westen dient. Of evenmin een woord over de massamoord door Stalin op de miljoenen Russische krijgsgevangenen die met pennentrek door Churchill en Roosevelt in Jalta werden uitgeleverd (zie "Victims of Yalta" door Nikolai Tolstoj).
De enige reden waarom Duitse wetenschappers (Werner von Braun) en militairen (SS'ers in het Franse Vreemdelingenlegioen) werden toegelaten door VSA en Sovjet-Unie was omdat elke kracht telde om de krachtmeting na 1945 te winnen. Ook de Sovjet-Unie zag veel door de vingers in de DDR van oud-nazi's of "verbrande" wetenschappers. Verbaast het intussen dat Pauwels ook hier weer blind is aan zijn linkeroog?
Een boek dat geschreven is zonder enig wetenschappelijk evenwicht en vele hiaten vertoont, kan bezwaarlijk enige meerwaarde bieden aan het historische debat. Een zwaar gemiste kans!
Great eyeopener. Takes some effort compared to the continuous eyecandy but gives a factbased view to counterbalance the heroic fiction. Sheds a sharper light on the PNAC and the current military operations that just go on and on even though no smoking gun was found.
This was an earth-shattering conflict which has shaped our modern world order in every way imaginable. Yet, despite such important and the tremendous amount of scholarship and attention that this time in our history receives, far too few know virtually nothing about the true affairs that governed the Second World War.
As the US embarks on a "war on terrorism" that is more about resources and corporate profits than freedom. It is increasingly more difficult to accept the notion that World War 2, America's quintessential "good war" was determined far more by elite interests than idealistic motives.
This book is a remarkably clear and challenging account that explains the Second World War, what cause it, why it unfolded as it did, and who emerged the real victor. There are dirty truths in this book behind historical tragedies like Dieppe, Hiroshima, and Pearl Harbour that will inspire outrage, but the documentation and reasoning is sharply-argued and well-researched.
Historian Jacques Pauwels questions this orthodox view of America's participation in World War Two. In his view, the United States was not the disinterested champion of democracy in the face of dictatorship: its role in the war was determined, rather, by the interests of its corporations and of its social, economic and political elites. His analysis explicitly addresses many of the myths that have since been fostered about the U.S. decision to enter the war alongside the Soviet Union, the U.K. and Canada, and against Nazi Germany.
The Myth of the Good War offers a fresh and provocative look at the role of the USA in World War Two. It spent four months on the nonfiction bestseller lists in Europe in 2000, and has since been translated into German, Spanish and French. (less)
Pauwels es parte de la nueva escuela de historiadores que rompe la elitesca historiografía y los paradigmas impuestos por la política norteamericana y aliados. Naturalmente se les tacha de «revisionistas» en un sentido peyorativo o con el fin de desprestigiarles. La obra, en efecto, está bien documentada y da una nueva perspectiva, ya manejada por algunos historiadores, de los intereses de Washington en la guerra y la cruzada contra la URSS. A fin de cuentas, es un buen libro y merece una lectura para todo aquel que esté incurso en la historiografía.
07/10 Une bonne idée en général, mais largement gâchée par toutes sortes d'exagérations et confusions constantes de faits réels et considérations hypothétiques, parfois tirées par les cheveux. En outre, voir la source de confrontation existentielle entre les pays de l'Ouest et la Russie dans la divergence idéologique des systèmes semble pour le moins un peu simpliste, la Russie n'était pas communiste en temps de la guerre de Crimée (1853 - 56) , et elle n'en est maintenant - alors quoi ?
intentionally mimicks the style of pop history bestsellers that created the myth to begin with so the occasional editorializing adjectives and conjecture sometimes grates. still in top 10 necessary reading to deprogram and a succinct counter history that gives the current era much needed clarity.