Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942

by H.P. Willmott

The respected British military historian H. P. Willmott presents the first of a three-volume appraisal of the strategic policies of the countries involved in the Pacific War. Remarkable in its scope and depth of research, his thoughtful analysis covers the whole range of political, economic, military, and naval activity in the Pacific. This first volume comprehensively covers events between December 1941 and April 1942, concluding with the Doolittle Raid on April 18. When published in hardcover in 1982, the book was hailed as an eloquent portrayal of great empires on trial that no one should miss. Willmott's stimulating and original approach to the subject remains unmatched even today.

Genres: History, World War II, Nonfiction, Military History

512 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1982

About the author

Hedley Paul Willmott (H.P. Willmott) was a widely published military historian, author, former Senior Lecturer at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and a fellow of the Royal Historical Society. He has written extensively on modern naval and military history.
He had retired and lived till his death in Surrey, England.

(source: http://www.goodreads.com/author/edit/... & http://www.potomacbooksinc.com/Books/...)

Reviews

[Chin Joo · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a book that tries to address the problem with the frequent singular emphasis on individual theatres in the Pacific War. The British perspective of the war at the end of 1941 in the Far East is invariably on the Malayan Campaign and the subsequent fall of Singapore. The American view starts with the attack on Pearl Habor and in terms of land campaign, is centred on the Philippines. There are two other theatres that are given less attention, the Burma Campaign and the war in the Dutch East Indies. To the author, these are not individual campaigns but are linked particularly in the eyes of the Japanese as one big operation. And in order to get a better idea of the tremendous success of the Japanese, one has to look at their multiple engagements together. With this book the author tries to give the reader a broader and more complete view of the war in the Far East once Japan unleashed its military might in the region.

In the early chapters the author explored the question of why Japan went to war in the Far East. Not much was spent on Japan's involvement in China and Manchuria despite these being the major factors which first induced Japan's imperialism and then necessitated her to move south to the South East Asia, and finally condemning her to a war with the United States of America which she had no hope of winning. The author's detailed investigation of the situations of the allies in detail (Great Britain, the US and the Dutch; the French having the dubious honour of being more of a collaborator of the Axis). I, being Singaporean, naturally paid most attention to the situation in Malaya and Singapore and here, the author gave a most damning appraisal of the British in the inter-war years. Not only was there much complacency, the reality of a cash-strapped Treasury ensured that the naval base would not be fully operational by the time the war started. And when the war did start, the constraints on all sides ensured that when the chiefs of staff realised the impossibility of sending the fleet to defend Malaya, "they turned to air power in order to economize on troops, and in the end they sent troops to economize on aircraft" (pg. 105). To the author, Singapore was lost before the war even started.

The Americans fared better in the Philippines, putting up a spirited fight that lasted months after Singapore was lost. The main criticism was on MacArthur who boasted much but did not have the results to show for it. The Dutch, with what was left of their home, were most under-manned but stout-hearted in the defence of what they had left. Throughout the book, the author, a British, reserved the most scathing criticism for the British; less for those who did the fighting but more for the decision makers in Whitehall and also Wavell. There were many occasions when I felt the author overdid the sarcasm (for example on pg. 221, 229, 322, 404) but he probably felt strongly enough about it.

That aside, the writing throughout the book is thoroughly enjoyable. This is not a short book, standing close to 500 pages, yet at no point was I bored. The battles were described with an equal dose of energy and frustration, the author's own analyses throughout the book were engaging and well considered. This is not a book that skims the surface and tries to pass off as a go-to book for the war in the Pacific; the details provided in the book at the various fronts attest to the breadth of knowledge the author possesses.

The title made it clear the book ends its coverage at April 1942, now generally regarded as the point beyond which the Japanese started tasting defeat. It was by no means clear then, and at the end of the book, the author tried to assess the various options open to both the Japanese and the Allies. This final chapter is well-worth reading, for the scenarios considered by the author might actually have happened. This book is highly recommended especially if one is looking for a book that gives a good survey of the months immediately after Japan made it 'southward advance'. It may just be the best book I read for the year.

[Erik Graff · Rating 4 out of 5]

Willmott is a British military historian who, at the time of publication, taught at the Royal Military Academy in England. This shows in his attention to tactical detail, a topic of little interest to me. Most interesting from my non-military standpoint is his opinionated treatment of strategic, military and political, considerations of the main players: Japan, UK, USA, Australia and the Dutch. Here I was unsurprised by his criticisms of MacArthur, surprised by those directed at Churchill.

Although the strategies of all main players are treated, Willmott's focus is on the Japanese and there particularly on their heyday which he chooses to terminate with the Doolittle bombings rather than with the battles of the Coral Sea or Midway. A concluding chapter asks what, if anything, the Japanese might have done to 'win' on their terms, a virtual impossibility, economically speaking, given the overwhelming potential of the USA. Here his exposition of the Japanese domestic and military mindsets is most illuminating.

[Sean Chick · Rating 4 out of 5]

As an examination of the strategies pursued by the various Allied nations, including options and reasons for action, this book is peerless. The direct and even-handed prose works well. He even gives a plausible scenario where Japan could have won the war, while still conceding it was a long shot. Of Britain, his words are harsh, from the bungled defense of Malaya to the strategic fumblings of Churchill, Wavell, and nearly everyone involved. That said, his description of actual military operations, particularly on the ground, is dry and not helped by the below average maps. The personalities are not discussed save for some iconoclastic (at least for the time) assessments of MacArthur and Yamamoto. The result is a classic book, a near masterpiece, but not quite there.

[Jim Golmon · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an extraordinary recounting of the earliest phases of the World War II in the Pacific. It traces the background and origins of the conflict, and concludes with the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo (4/18/1942) that occurred at the height of Japan's early domination.
Willmott is extremely thorough and demonstrates a tremendous grasp of both high level strategy and the detailed tactics of all of the main theaters of operations through April 1942.

Willmott is a military historian who taught at the Department of War Studies and International Affairs at Sandhurst, England when this book was published. He does not suffer fools gladly, and also has an occasional sarcastic streak that I found to be a terrific addition to the recounting of such grim events.

To cite but one instance of this, on Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines, he wrote: "MacArthur was given his nation's highest award [the Congressional Medal of Honor] for his conduct of the battle. In some armies a general who allowed his air force to be destroyed on the ground after nine hours' warning time and who led his army into an area he had neglected to stock (after having failed to honor his promise of defeating the enemy) would have been shot." Willmott does note that MacArthur's subsequent triumphs later on in the war does much to ameliorate this.

I've read many books on the Pacific War; this is hands down the finest. I look forward to the sequel -- The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Strategies, Jan. to June, 1942.

[Tony 08 · Rating 5 out of 5]

Attention, chef d'œuvre !
H.P. WILLMOTT nous livre là une très fine analyse des stratégies de l'empire japonais et des démocraties occidentales...dans un jeu de dupes...où le premier sait qu'il va perdre la guerre à terme et où le second tente, vainement la plupart du temps, d'en gagner...
Le Japon, acculé, n'a d'autre choix que d'aller à la guerre...grande spécialité des démocraties que de pousser l'impérialiste à la faute...pour assumer ensuite une guerre totale au nom du droit...permettant ainsi l'éviction du rival économique au nom de la morale.
La précision diabolique de la planification de l'expansion japonaise est impressionnante !

[Alan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Wilmott, one of most eminent, and one of my favorite, historians of the Pacific War, offers up two different books here. The first, and by far more interesting, is a geopolitical analysis of competing empires (Japan, the British Empire, the Dutch Indies and the US mainly) and the strategies they adopted before and at the beginning of the Pacific War. The second is a rather dry narrative of the battles that occurred once this competition ignited into full war in 1941. Had he reduced the level of detail in the latter and used it to simply support the former, I would have enjoyed this volume much more than I did. Still, the insight on how and why the course of events unfolded (why Singapore inevitably fell, why the Pearl Harbor attack was an ill conceived, and ultimately failed, strategy, why the Japanese felt little choice but to take on the two most powerful navies) makes this history well worth the effort. It is billed as volume one of a trilogy. My daughter bought me volume two (The Barrier and the Javelin), but I cannot sort out if there is a third.

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

A well-crafted and extensive strategic analysis of Japan's decision to go to war in 1941, the strategy of her campaign of conquests and those of her opponents: the USA, UK and the Netherlands. This is the first of a trilogy on the early part of WWII in the Pacific. All in all, Willmott covers every aspect of this vast sea/air/land campaign, why it was so successful in the short run and so disastrous for the "victors" in the long run. The book reads like the text of a staff study, albeit a well-written one, not unaccompanied by a sense of humor. I would say this work is required if you're serious about understanding the Second World War in the Pacific. Am looking forward to the second volume.

[Bill V · Rating 5 out of 5]

The book is thorough and very well written. It deals with some campaigns that are almost never dealt with or just touched upon, such as Hong Kong and the Bataan peninsula. It also deals with the subject matter more from the Japanese perspective than other comparable books have done.
There are a few misspellings which interestingly enough are repeated in the soft cover reprint of this title. That being said, they don't detract from how well this book is put together.

[Jeff · Rating 5 out of 5]

Recently back in print, this book provides an excellent, detailed assessment of the historical path that led Japan to war in the Pacific, and the opening months of combat in Philippines and SE Asia. It also examines the national, strategic aspects of the war and argues that Japan was in no way strategically equipped to win the war it started. Highly recommeded for serious history buffs.

[Martin Chlebek · Rating 4 out of 5]

Some informations are outdated in the light of recent research but still worth reading for it's overall overview and explanation of japanese and allied strategies.