ONE OF SKINNER'S MOST SIGNIFICANT EXPOSITIONS
Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904-1990) was an American psychologist, social philosopher, and author. He was a Professor of Psychology at Harvard University from 1958 until his retirement in 1974, and perhaps the most influential behaviorist of the 20th century. His most famous books are 'Verbal Behavior,' 'Beyond Freedom & Dignity' and 'Walden Two.'
He wrote in the first chapter of this 1953 book, “The methods of science have been enormously successful wherever they have been tried. Let us them apply them to human affairs… It is necessary only to bring our understanding of human nature up to the same point…. If we can observe human behavior carefully from an objective point of view and come to understand it for what it is, we may be able to adopt a more sensible course of action… It is possible that science has come to the rescue and that order will eventually be achieved in the field of human affairs… There is one difficulty, however. The application of science to human behavior is not as simple as it seems… If we are to use the methods of science in the field of human affairs, we must assume that behavior is lawful and determined. We must expect to discover that what a man does is the result of specifiable conditions and that once these conditions have been discovered, we can anticipate and to some extent determine his actions.” (Pg. 5-6)
He asserts, “Our current practices do not represent any well-defined theoretical position. They are, in fact, thoroughly confused. At times we appear to regard a man[s behavior as spontaneous and responsible. At other times we recognize that inner determination is at least not complete, that the individual is not always to be held to account… We sometimes exonerate a man by pointing to ‘extenuating circumstances.’ We no longer blame the uneducated for their ignorance or call the unemployed lazy… But we have not gone all the way. We regard the common man as the product of his environment, yet we reserve the right to give personal credit to great men for their achievements…” (Pg. 8)
He continues, “All of this suggests that we are in a transition. We have not wholly abandoned the traditional philosophy of human nature; at the same time we are far from adopting a scientific point of view without reservation. We have accepted the assumption of determinism in part; yet we allow our sympathies, our first allegiances, and our personal aspirations to rise to the defense of the traditional view… theories affect practices. A scientific conception of human behavior dictates one practice, a philosophy of personal freedom another… We shall… remain ineffective in solving these problems until we adopt a consistent point of view.” (Pg. 9)
He goes on, “We cannot really evaluate the issue until we understand the alternatives. The traditional view of human nature in Western culture is well known. The conception of a free-responsible individual is embedded in our language and pervades our practices, codes, and beliefs…. Very few people have any notion of the extent to which a science of human behavior is indeed possible. In what way can the behavior of the individual or groups of individuals be predicted and controlled? What are laws of behavior like? … It is only when we have answered these questions, at least in a preliminary fashion, that we may consider the implications of a science of human behavior with respect to either a theory of human nature or the management of human affairs.” (Pg. 9-10)
He asks, “To what extent is it helpful to be told, 'He drinks because he is thirsty'? If to be thirsty means nothing more than to have a tendency to drink, this is mere redundancy. If it means that he drinks because of a state of thirst, an inner causal event is invoked. If this state is purely inferential ... it cannot serve as an explanation." (Pg. 33)
He asserts, “The objection to inner states is not that they do not exist, but that they are not relevant in a functional analysis. We cannot account for the behavior of any system while remaining wholly inside it; eventually we must turn to forces operating upon the organism from without.” (Pg. 35)
He states, “The process of conditioning also has survival value. Since the environment changes from generation to generation… appropriate reflex responses cannot always develop as inherited mechanisms… Since nature cannot foresee… that an object with a particular appearance will be edible, the evolutionary process can only provide a mechanism by which the individual will ACQUIRE responses to particular features of a given environment. After they have been encountered, their inherited behavior leaves off, the inherited modifiability of the process of conditioning takes over.” (Pg. 55)
After describing his work with pigeons, he explains, “food is the ‘reinforcer’ and presenting food when a response is emitted is the ‘reinforcement.’ The ‘operant’ is defined by the property upon which reinforcement is contingent---the height to which the [pigeon’s] head must be raised, the change in frequency with which the head is lifted to this height is the process of OPERANT CONDITIONING.” (Pg. 66)
He acknowledges, “A biological explanation of reinforcing power is perhaps as far as we can go in saying why an event is reinforcing. Such an explanation is probably of little help in a functional analysis, for it does not provide us with any way of identifying a reinforcing stimulus as such before we have tested its reinforcing power upon a given organism. We must therefore be content with a survey in terms of the effects of stimuli upon behavior.” (Pg. 84)
He further explains, “We first define a positive reinforcer as any stimulus the PRESENTATION of which strengthens the behavior upon which it is made contingent. We define a negative reinforcer (an aversive stimulus) as any stimulus the WITHDRAWAL of which strengthens behavior.” (Pg. 185)
He states, "Trait-names begin as adjectives--'intelligent,' 'aggressive,' 'disorganized,'... and so on... But at no point in such a series do we make contact with any event outside the behavior itself which justifies the claim of a causal connection." (Pg. 202)
He also admits, "We cannot account for suicide as a simple response... No one jumps into a brook to bring his life to an end because the same behavior had a similar consequence in the past... Fortunately we need not decide this issue to make the present point." (Pg. 223)
He contends, “an analysis which appeals to external variables makes the assumptions of an inner originating and determining agent unnecessary. The scientific advantages of such an analysis are many, but the practical advantages may well be even more important. Traditional conception of what is happening when an individual controls himself has never been successful as an educational device. It is of little help to tell a man to use his ‘will power’ or his ‘self-control.' Such an exhortation may make self-control slightly more probable by establishing additional aversive consequences of failure to control, but it does not help anyone to understand the actual processes.” (Pg 241)
He asserts, “The scientist humbly admits that … he defers to [the] world of mind and consciousness---for which another mode of inquiry is assumed to be required. Such a point of view is by no means inevitable, but is part of the cultural heritage from which science has emerged. It obviously stands in the way of a unified account of nature. The contribution which a science of behavior can make in suggesting an alternative point of view is perhaps one of its most important achievements." (Pg. 258)
He argues, “A description of behavior which has not been executed appears to depend upon private events only. For example, a man may say, ‘I was … going home at three o’clock,’ though he did not go. Here the controlling stimuli are not only private, they appear to have no public accompaniments… How can the verbal community establish responses of this sort? A possible explanation is that the terms are established as part of a repertoire when the individual is behaving publicly. Private stimuli… then gain the necessary degree of control.” (Pg. 262)
He states, “Our survey … did not reveal any means of setting up a discriminative response to privacy AS SUCH. A world of experience which is by definition available only to the individual, wholly without public accompaniment, could never become the discriminative occasion for self-description." (Pg. 280)
This book will interest those studying Skinner and behaviorism, but I am personally glad that they are both rather passé today.