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中国1945：中国革命与美国的抉择
1945年是中国抗日战争最终胜利之年，也是中国国内政治形势风云变幻的一年。对日作战的胜利并没有给中国带来最终的和平，内战的阴影开始在中国上空笼罩，原本就复杂的国共两党关系更因美国和苏联的介入而增加了更多变数。《即将到来的美中冲突》作者理查德·伯恩斯坦用引人入胜的笔调描述了这个美国与中国关系的转折之年，他认为，这一年发生的事情，不仅彻底改变了中美之间的关系，也永远地改变了东西方关系的走向。
在《中国1945》一书中，作者从1944年年底至1945年年初的畹町战役写起，然后回顾了中国在二战中做出的巨大牺牲和贡献，接着对二战中美国政府的对华政策及变化、中国通们对美国对华政策的建议及争论等诸多内容进行了考察，讲述了有关1945年所发生的急剧变化的令人难以置信的故事，精辟地分析了其中纷繁杂乱的构成要素，如美国外交官、军事领导人和舆论制造者之间的明争暗斗，以及为影响中国未来走向的各种力量之间的交锋，等等。作者，在1945年所发生的事情，不仅彻底改变了中美之间的关系，也永远地改变了东西方关系的走向。
作者在书中挑战了我们熟悉的现代中美关系起源的看法。他认为，以下两种观点，即与共产党人合作能避免中国一边倒向苏联，或者给予蒋介石政府更多支持能够避免其垮台并能建立一个亲美国的中国政府，进而可以避免之后朝鲜战争和越南战争发生的观点都是错误的，决定中国未来结局的绝不是美国政策，而是存在于中国这片土地上的自身的力量，并且，拥有巨大但并非无限的实力的美国，从来就没有对中国实施决定性的控制。
在《中国1945》一书中，作者从1944年年底至1945年年初的畹町战役写起，然后回顾了中国在二战中做出的巨大牺牲和贡献，接着对二战中美国政府的对华政策及变化、中国通们对美国对华政策的建议及争论等诸多内容进行了考察，讲述了有关1945年所发生的急剧变化的令人难以置信的故事，精辟地分析了其中纷繁杂乱的构成要素，如美国外交官、军事领导人和舆论制造者之间的明争暗斗，以及为影响中国未来走向的各种力量之间的交锋，等等。作者，在1945年所发生的事情，不仅彻底改变了中美之间的关系，也永远地改变了东西方关系的走向。
作者在书中挑战了我们熟悉的现代中美关系起源的看法。他认为，以下两种观点，即与共产党人合作能避免中国一边倒向苏联，或者给予蒋介石政府更多支持能够避免其垮台并能建立一个亲美国的中国政府，进而可以避免之后朝鲜战争和越南战争发生的观点都是错误的，决定中国未来结局的绝不是美国政策，而是存在于中国这片土地上的自身的力量，并且，拥有巨大但并非无限的实力的美国，从来就没有对中国实施决定性的控制。
480 pages, Hardcover
First published November 4, 2014
52 people are currently reading
670 people want to read
About the author
Richard Bernstein
45 books30 followersRichard Paul Bernstein was an American journalist, columnist, and author. He wrote the Letter from America column for the International Herald Tribune. He was a book critic at The New York Times and a foreign correspondent for both Time magazine and The New York Times in Europe and Asia.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 38 reviews
March 18, 2015
I was captured by the books bold title “China 1945” knowing full well the historical link.
Prior to World War II China was a divided country with Mao Tse-tung heading the Communist Party paired against Chang Kai-shek leading the National Peoples Party. China’s day in history was put on hold due to Japan’s expanded dominance of boldly occupying Chinese territory. Once WWII was declared America led by General Stilwell and General Chennault’s “Flying Tigers” assisted all of China with the common goal of dislodging the Japanese warriors.
In February 1945 the Yalta conference was held with Allied partners Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin in secretive meetings. When the summit ended Roosevelt was confident he had a trusted partner in Stalin. Weeks later the Marines ousted the Japanese from the Pacific island of Iwo Jima and in August when the atomic bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki the Japanese Empire folded bringing WWII to an end.
With WWII over American military men and women headed home for much relief and victory celebrations. However in China the new Japanese void set the stage for a Chinese civil war beginning in the autumn of 1945. As in so many political struggles the desire for personal power was a key element. In this case it was Mao versus Chang. American service personnel in China would wait for directions from their nations new Commander-in-Chief President Truman as to how to support Chang.
It’s well known history that Mao and his Communist Party won the Chinese war as Mao bonded with Stalin, his neighboring Russian leader. This aggressive allegiance prompted a new era between America and Russia known as the Cold War. The author questions if America could have altered history by playing a different role to achieve democracy in the Far East. America won WWII and Communism expanded in Asia. For some it’s good cocktail conversation centered around 1945. Maybe it was just time for China to seek its own identity.
Prior to World War II China was a divided country with Mao Tse-tung heading the Communist Party paired against Chang Kai-shek leading the National Peoples Party. China’s day in history was put on hold due to Japan’s expanded dominance of boldly occupying Chinese territory. Once WWII was declared America led by General Stilwell and General Chennault’s “Flying Tigers” assisted all of China with the common goal of dislodging the Japanese warriors.
In February 1945 the Yalta conference was held with Allied partners Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin in secretive meetings. When the summit ended Roosevelt was confident he had a trusted partner in Stalin. Weeks later the Marines ousted the Japanese from the Pacific island of Iwo Jima and in August when the atomic bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki the Japanese Empire folded bringing WWII to an end.
With WWII over American military men and women headed home for much relief and victory celebrations. However in China the new Japanese void set the stage for a Chinese civil war beginning in the autumn of 1945. As in so many political struggles the desire for personal power was a key element. In this case it was Mao versus Chang. American service personnel in China would wait for directions from their nations new Commander-in-Chief President Truman as to how to support Chang.
It’s well known history that Mao and his Communist Party won the Chinese war as Mao bonded with Stalin, his neighboring Russian leader. This aggressive allegiance prompted a new era between America and Russia known as the Cold War. The author questions if America could have altered history by playing a different role to achieve democracy in the Far East. America won WWII and Communism expanded in Asia. For some it’s good cocktail conversation centered around 1945. Maybe it was just time for China to seek its own identity.
March 7, 2015
Very good, but couldn't quite give it a fifth star.
First, yes, 1945 was the "key" year precisely because Stalin invaded Manchuria as part of entering the war against Japan, and established the old Russian hegemony that Japan had ended in 1905. That was a key to Mao's win.
But, Bernstein covers more than that. A full one-third of the book is, if not pre-1937, at least pre-1941. And, parts of it, such as the Marshall Mission, are post-1945. All of this is good, and necessary. However, it means the title isn't quite accurate, especially on the subheader.
"America's Fateful Choice" really didn't happen until 1946. That's when Marshall's Mission clearly wasn't going to succeed, and we faced the choice of whether to do what we actually did — give Chiang reasonable backing but no blank check, versus giving him a quasi-Vietnam blank check, versus cutting a deal with Mao sooner, versus trying to knock both of their heads together even more forcefully, which is an option Bernstein doesn't even mention.
That said, while 1946, not 1945, was the year of America's choices, it's arguable that neither year may have been the most crucial, from a purely Chinese perspective.
Instead, try 1936, because of an incident mentioned in this book.
The Xian incident is where Chiang was arrested by Marshal Zhang Xueliang, a former warlord of Manchuria, and Commander of the North Eastern Army. Zhang and other Kuomintang generals forced Chiang into a second National Front with the Communists.
However, it could have turned out far differently. Zhang reportedly originally planned to hand Chiang over to Mao. Mao would then presumably have executed him. However, when he asked Stalin for official permission, Uncle Joe said no.
Why? He feared a Japanese attack against the USSR. He knew a China strong enough to at least partially defend itself lessened that possibility, and he didn't think a China with Chiang removed, which likely would have left the KMT dissolving back into warlordism and Mao's Communists by default as the government of China, could have resisted Japan at all.
And, he was right.
Let's say Mao killed Chiang, and the KMT then fell apart. Japan, of course, did move south from Manchuria just months later, and Mao's Communists, who over the next eight years inflated for Western audiences the degree of their resistance to Japan, would have indeed been on the spot. And they likely would have wound up with the same opprobrium as Chiang's Nationalists.
That said, and speaking of this, while we had no easy options with China, Bernstein gets two things very right:
1. Nobody (at least in the US) "lost" China. Mao and Stalin won it.
2. The old China hands, while right about our tough choices, were naively wrong in extremis about the Chinese Communist Party.
On my critiques, besides changing the header and subheader of the book's title, Bernstein would have served readers well with an additional 50-100 pages.
First, yes, 1945 was the "key" year precisely because Stalin invaded Manchuria as part of entering the war against Japan, and established the old Russian hegemony that Japan had ended in 1905. That was a key to Mao's win.
But, Bernstein covers more than that. A full one-third of the book is, if not pre-1937, at least pre-1941. And, parts of it, such as the Marshall Mission, are post-1945. All of this is good, and necessary. However, it means the title isn't quite accurate, especially on the subheader.
"America's Fateful Choice" really didn't happen until 1946. That's when Marshall's Mission clearly wasn't going to succeed, and we faced the choice of whether to do what we actually did — give Chiang reasonable backing but no blank check, versus giving him a quasi-Vietnam blank check, versus cutting a deal with Mao sooner, versus trying to knock both of their heads together even more forcefully, which is an option Bernstein doesn't even mention.
That said, while 1946, not 1945, was the year of America's choices, it's arguable that neither year may have been the most crucial, from a purely Chinese perspective.
Instead, try 1936, because of an incident mentioned in this book.
The Xian incident is where Chiang was arrested by Marshal Zhang Xueliang, a former warlord of Manchuria, and Commander of the North Eastern Army. Zhang and other Kuomintang generals forced Chiang into a second National Front with the Communists.
However, it could have turned out far differently. Zhang reportedly originally planned to hand Chiang over to Mao. Mao would then presumably have executed him. However, when he asked Stalin for official permission, Uncle Joe said no.
Why? He feared a Japanese attack against the USSR. He knew a China strong enough to at least partially defend itself lessened that possibility, and he didn't think a China with Chiang removed, which likely would have left the KMT dissolving back into warlordism and Mao's Communists by default as the government of China, could have resisted Japan at all.
And, he was right.
Let's say Mao killed Chiang, and the KMT then fell apart. Japan, of course, did move south from Manchuria just months later, and Mao's Communists, who over the next eight years inflated for Western audiences the degree of their resistance to Japan, would have indeed been on the spot. And they likely would have wound up with the same opprobrium as Chiang's Nationalists.
That said, and speaking of this, while we had no easy options with China, Bernstein gets two things very right:
1. Nobody (at least in the US) "lost" China. Mao and Stalin won it.
2. The old China hands, while right about our tough choices, were naively wrong in extremis about the Chinese Communist Party.
On my critiques, besides changing the header and subheader of the book's title, Bernstein would have served readers well with an additional 50-100 pages.
February 7, 2015
A scholarly look at the U.S. policies in China prior to the ultimate takeover by the Chinese Communist Party. The old political battle about "who lost China" brought much chaos and fear into U.S. policy making in the years after the success of Mao. Bernstein covers the foibles of U.S. policy in China, but does so without attempting to push forward a political agenda on the "Who lost China" question. He actually writes a book that manages to look at facts objectively, a rarity in today's world of ideological polemics. This approach has Bernstein frankly pointing to the ridiculous policies brought by FDR Ambassador Patrick Hurley, who became known for arriving on a scene and emitting a loud Choctaw war whoop, including once when he arrived to meet Mao. Hurley can be considered to be the father of the position that "disloyal" State Department China hands caused Chiang Kai-shek to lose the Chinese civil war. Hurley being over his head, and his inherent limitations, are pointed out forcefully. But Bernstein does not give a free ride to those very same China hands, pointing out that while there may have been a bit more substance to their positions (vis a vis Hurley) ultimately they were, to a large degree, taken in by Mao. "In subsequent years, many of the China analysts admitted that the view they had of this matter during the war was tinged with more than a bit of wishful thinking. “I obviously underestimated the commitment of the Chinese Communist ruling party at that time to ideology and the dexterity with which Mao and company manipulated it,” Davies was to write. “As I see it now, in the clear light of hindsight,” David Barrett confessed in 1969, when Mao’s China was engulfed in the vast purge known as the Cultural Revolution, shouting venomous epithets at the United States, “the mistake I made in 1944 was in not considering the Chinese Communists as enemies of the United States."
The complexity of decisions, with the U.S. looking first to defeat the Japanese and not at the postwar ramifications for China, are laid out in clear and understandable terms. Bernstein lays out what I consider to be larger truths that extend beyond U.S. policy making in China during this period. We will see some of the same mistakes in later years, in Indo-China and elsewhere.
"Drumright’s stance was typical of much policy thinking in the American government then and later. The power realities of a situation, even when understood, tended to be subordinated to what “ought to be done,” what should be done because of precedents, commitments, moral compulsions, sentiment, and that great catchall, “national security.” The factor of cost of a policy was thus often slighted."
Yes he most certainly is very perceptive in that observation. Bernstein also gives us a fair and balanced view of Chiang Kai-shek, pointing to his personal weaknesses, but also correctly highlighting the systemic limitations that Chiang operated under. For Chiang had to make decisions that, in the longer term, doomed his ultimate chances of survival, but in the shorter term were unavoidable. Bernstein is hard-headed and realistic in his evaluation of Chairman Mao, always offering a glimpse at the alternatives available, but ultimately judging him to be both a hard core revolutionary and committed acolyte of Josef Stalin. He looks at the Yalta Agreement, and points out how Stalin used the U.S. desire to have him enter the war against Japan to secure Manchuria, and tilt the ultimate balance of forces in favor of Mao, and against Chiang.
A book that is worth a read for those folks looking for a factually based evaluation of U.S. policy that actually looks at both sides of an argument, a rarity in this day and age. Bernstein has done an outstanding job.
The complexity of decisions, with the U.S. looking first to defeat the Japanese and not at the postwar ramifications for China, are laid out in clear and understandable terms. Bernstein lays out what I consider to be larger truths that extend beyond U.S. policy making in China during this period. We will see some of the same mistakes in later years, in Indo-China and elsewhere.
"Drumright’s stance was typical of much policy thinking in the American government then and later. The power realities of a situation, even when understood, tended to be subordinated to what “ought to be done,” what should be done because of precedents, commitments, moral compulsions, sentiment, and that great catchall, “national security.” The factor of cost of a policy was thus often slighted."
Yes he most certainly is very perceptive in that observation. Bernstein also gives us a fair and balanced view of Chiang Kai-shek, pointing to his personal weaknesses, but also correctly highlighting the systemic limitations that Chiang operated under. For Chiang had to make decisions that, in the longer term, doomed his ultimate chances of survival, but in the shorter term were unavoidable. Bernstein is hard-headed and realistic in his evaluation of Chairman Mao, always offering a glimpse at the alternatives available, but ultimately judging him to be both a hard core revolutionary and committed acolyte of Josef Stalin. He looks at the Yalta Agreement, and points out how Stalin used the U.S. desire to have him enter the war against Japan to secure Manchuria, and tilt the ultimate balance of forces in favor of Mao, and against Chiang.
A book that is worth a read for those folks looking for a factually based evaluation of U.S. policy that actually looks at both sides of an argument, a rarity in this day and age. Bernstein has done an outstanding job.
March 12, 2019
This one took me longer than usual, but not because it wasn’t worth the read. It was really helpful, and very balanced, I thought.
This book takes seriously the axiom that those ignorant of history are doomed to repeat its mistakes. The examination of the interconnecting relationships and events leading up to the rise to power of Mao, and how other world leaders were involved, was excellent. Bernstein ensures that you don’t miss the fundamental dynamics at play in each situation. A good example of this is when Russia parked hundreds of thousands of troops on the Manchurian border. Bernstein helps the reader really understand how having those troops there really affected the dynamic of the internal and external politics of Mao and Chiang. The author also did a remarkable job showing how Ambassador Hurley misread the intentions of his subordinates, and how those subordinates’ actions were so easily misread, as well as how their actions were used as a tool in the hands of Mao.
I thought the picture the author painted of Mao, and how he gradually and slyly changed his political posture and vocabulary, was very interesting. There was also an interesting dynamic between Mao and Stalin, and Mao’s awareness of where the balance of power stood - not only between him and Stalin, but also between him and Chiang, and between him and the US etc - was stunning in its self-awareness.
Lots to be gleaned from this 400 pager, dense with analysis and adroit political observations.
This book takes seriously the axiom that those ignorant of history are doomed to repeat its mistakes. The examination of the interconnecting relationships and events leading up to the rise to power of Mao, and how other world leaders were involved, was excellent. Bernstein ensures that you don’t miss the fundamental dynamics at play in each situation. A good example of this is when Russia parked hundreds of thousands of troops on the Manchurian border. Bernstein helps the reader really understand how having those troops there really affected the dynamic of the internal and external politics of Mao and Chiang. The author also did a remarkable job showing how Ambassador Hurley misread the intentions of his subordinates, and how those subordinates’ actions were so easily misread, as well as how their actions were used as a tool in the hands of Mao.
I thought the picture the author painted of Mao, and how he gradually and slyly changed his political posture and vocabulary, was very interesting. There was also an interesting dynamic between Mao and Stalin, and Mao’s awareness of where the balance of power stood - not only between him and Stalin, but also between him and Chiang, and between him and the US etc - was stunning in its self-awareness.
Lots to be gleaned from this 400 pager, dense with analysis and adroit political observations.
June 24, 2018
Well researched and thorough, Bernstein focuses his research on the turning point, mostly (though not completely) conveniently contained within the calendar year 1945, on when Washington soured on the Chiang Kai-shek government, and when the Yenan-based Communists gained the momentum they would use to sweep into power at the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War. The focus of his work is on the personalities on the US side, Ambassador Hadley, the China hands in the US Embassy, and the China policymakers back in Washington, and how they interacted with the Chinese centers of power. China 1945 at points is dense, but always readable, and is a fantastic addition to the body of historical analysis of US-China relations.
Perhaps best of all, Bernstein opts out of the classic blame game of "who lost China", and instead focuses on the personalities and biases of the Americans in the story. In doing so, however, he pulls no punches, and throws more than a few tomatoes at some of the players who were either overly headstrong, or willing to don the rose-tinted glasses in evaluating the motivations of their Chinese counterparts. Best of all, Bernstein gives appropriate attention to the role of Stalin and the Soviet Union, an element which is often overlooked int eh historical narrative. In all, this is a must-read for students of the history.
Perhaps best of all, Bernstein opts out of the classic blame game of "who lost China", and instead focuses on the personalities and biases of the Americans in the story. In doing so, however, he pulls no punches, and throws more than a few tomatoes at some of the players who were either overly headstrong, or willing to don the rose-tinted glasses in evaluating the motivations of their Chinese counterparts. Best of all, Bernstein gives appropriate attention to the role of Stalin and the Soviet Union, an element which is often overlooked int eh historical narrative. In all, this is a must-read for students of the history.
September 13, 2017
Incredibly detailed book on a pivotal year in U.S. relations with China. Bernstein's book narrowly focuses on 1945 to examine how conditions deteriorated so quickly for U.S. and China relations. Why did China fall to the Communists? With journalistic attention to detail, Bernstein provides rich portraits of many of the principal characters, particularly U.S. envoys, ambassadors, and other State Department employees.
So who screwed the pooch? Was it Hurley? Marshall? Chiang? FDR at Yalta? The answer (c'mon, not a spoiler): Stalin. (Yalta didn't help, though.) Most people, except right-wing nutjobs, already knew that.
So if you're ever in a bar arguing with a nutjob about how China fell to the Communists, please recommend this definitive book. Then go drink with someone more sensible. Life's too short.
So who screwed the pooch? Was it Hurley? Marshall? Chiang? FDR at Yalta? The answer (c'mon, not a spoiler): Stalin. (Yalta didn't help, though.) Most people, except right-wing nutjobs, already knew that.
So if you're ever in a bar arguing with a nutjob about how China fell to the Communists, please recommend this definitive book. Then go drink with someone more sensible. Life's too short.
February 15, 2015
I really tried to get through this entire book, but it was such a tough read, that I only could skim the second half of the book. The topic would seem to be interesting, perhaps less detail and fewer pages would have been of more interest to me.
August 15, 2017
This is one of those cases where in reading this book I felt a bit like I was beating a dead horse, as I've already read so many books about the Chinese war with Japan and subsequent Chinese civil war. However, I think I can confidently say that this was the best book I have read about the period by a wide margin (but to be fair, this may simply be because most of the other books I read discussed this time period as part of a bigger story, and hence weren't able to go into as much depth).
One of the things that this book emphasized heavily and which I didn't understand previously is the role of Stalin and the Soviet Union in Mao's takeover of China. The author repeatedly referred to secret radio communications between Mao and Stalin taking place throughout the entire Sino-Japanese war, and throughout the civil war afterwards. Apparently, these were unknown until recently - I wish the author had been a little bit more clear about how these communications came into the public realm and where they can be found. In these communications, it is obvious that Mao is the submissive party and Stalin the dominant one. There are multiple occasions on which Mao is all set to do something but Stalin forces him not to (an example is one point in the middle of the war when Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Chinese nationalists, is captured. Mao wants to execute him, but Stalin forces him to instead make Chiang agree to a temporary alliance with the communists. Stalin is acting out of self-interest - he wants a Chinese united front to act as a bulwark against Japan. He's busy fighting Germany and doesn't want to have to fight Japan at the same time. Ironically, had Chiang simply not honoured this agreement, made under duress, the moment he was let free, he might have defeated the communists and China today might be very different).
But what the book really makes clear and which other books I have read did not, is exactly how the civil war played out once Japan was defeated. Before reading this book I didn't understand how significant the Soviet occupation of Manchuria at the end of WWII was to the eventual victory of the Chinese communists. At nearly exactly the same time as the atomic bombs were dropped on Japan (but a few days before the surrender of Japan), the Soviet Union invaded Japan's stronghold in Manchuria (a blanket term for the three or four provinces in China's northeast - if China is a shaped like a rooster, then Manchuria is the head). They then looted the area - and while there is no proof that this happened - it seems very likely that much of the arms they took from the captured Japanese soldiers ended up in the hands of the Chinese communists. At the very least, the Soviets made it easy for the communists to infiltrate Manchuria and provided them with a powerful home base from which to fight the Chinese nationalists, where they shared a large border with the USSR through which they could be resupplied by Stalin, and through which they could retreat to safety if necessary. The irony of all of this is that Roosevelt, the president of the United States at the time, asked Stalin to invade Manchuria, which Stalin said he was willing to do in exchange for certain concessions on Roosevelt's part. Roosevelt thought this would be necessary to end the war in the Pacific, but ironically since by that time the atomic bombs had already been dropped there was likely no effect at all on Japan's decision to surrender, and instead the net effect was to lead to the defeat of the Chinese nationalists, whom Roosevelt had been backing.
Another thing that was different about this book was its portrayal of Chiang Kai-shek. Most books that I've read have painted a picture of him as a corrupt, incompetent loser. A moron who was so bad at waging war that he managed to be defeated by a peasant army despite receiving more than half a billion US dollars in aid from America. This book, by contrast, paints Chiang in a more sympathetic light. Whereas many books demonize Chiang for hoarding weapons and refusing to fight the Japanese in order to keep his forces intact for the coming civil war - without really examining why this is bad - this bookpoints out that actually, this may well have been the strategy that made the most sense under the circumstances. The book included several references to Chiang's diary and I have to admit, by the end, I felt for the guy.
One of the things that this book emphasized heavily and which I didn't understand previously is the role of Stalin and the Soviet Union in Mao's takeover of China. The author repeatedly referred to secret radio communications between Mao and Stalin taking place throughout the entire Sino-Japanese war, and throughout the civil war afterwards. Apparently, these were unknown until recently - I wish the author had been a little bit more clear about how these communications came into the public realm and where they can be found. In these communications, it is obvious that Mao is the submissive party and Stalin the dominant one. There are multiple occasions on which Mao is all set to do something but Stalin forces him not to (an example is one point in the middle of the war when Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Chinese nationalists, is captured. Mao wants to execute him, but Stalin forces him to instead make Chiang agree to a temporary alliance with the communists. Stalin is acting out of self-interest - he wants a Chinese united front to act as a bulwark against Japan. He's busy fighting Germany and doesn't want to have to fight Japan at the same time. Ironically, had Chiang simply not honoured this agreement, made under duress, the moment he was let free, he might have defeated the communists and China today might be very different).
But what the book really makes clear and which other books I have read did not, is exactly how the civil war played out once Japan was defeated. Before reading this book I didn't understand how significant the Soviet occupation of Manchuria at the end of WWII was to the eventual victory of the Chinese communists. At nearly exactly the same time as the atomic bombs were dropped on Japan (but a few days before the surrender of Japan), the Soviet Union invaded Japan's stronghold in Manchuria (a blanket term for the three or four provinces in China's northeast - if China is a shaped like a rooster, then Manchuria is the head). They then looted the area - and while there is no proof that this happened - it seems very likely that much of the arms they took from the captured Japanese soldiers ended up in the hands of the Chinese communists. At the very least, the Soviets made it easy for the communists to infiltrate Manchuria and provided them with a powerful home base from which to fight the Chinese nationalists, where they shared a large border with the USSR through which they could be resupplied by Stalin, and through which they could retreat to safety if necessary. The irony of all of this is that Roosevelt, the president of the United States at the time, asked Stalin to invade Manchuria, which Stalin said he was willing to do in exchange for certain concessions on Roosevelt's part. Roosevelt thought this would be necessary to end the war in the Pacific, but ironically since by that time the atomic bombs had already been dropped there was likely no effect at all on Japan's decision to surrender, and instead the net effect was to lead to the defeat of the Chinese nationalists, whom Roosevelt had been backing.
Another thing that was different about this book was its portrayal of Chiang Kai-shek. Most books that I've read have painted a picture of him as a corrupt, incompetent loser. A moron who was so bad at waging war that he managed to be defeated by a peasant army despite receiving more than half a billion US dollars in aid from America. This book, by contrast, paints Chiang in a more sympathetic light. Whereas many books demonize Chiang for hoarding weapons and refusing to fight the Japanese in order to keep his forces intact for the coming civil war - without really examining why this is bad - this bookpoints out that actually, this may well have been the strategy that made the most sense under the circumstances. The book included several references to Chiang's diary and I have to admit, by the end, I felt for the guy.
June 3, 2020
One of the best China history books by a westerner. The author has a seemingly neutral but actually he prefers Chiang, of course as FDR says "he might be a bastard but he is our bastard." I also will add to this: "Chiang might be a bastard but he is a better bastard than Mao." So I do like/enjoy the author's various details in his book about Mao's cheating tactics/oppresion/cruelty/silly propaganda during CCP vs KMT's talks/fightings near the end of Japan war. The verious AMerican efforts from Stilwell to Hurley to Marshall to bring peace in a post-WW2 China are honorable and also in vain since 1) westerners dont really know what chinese are trully thinking or planning for, 2) American policy makers are not determined or really committed to supporting Chiang at any costs, 3) Stalin's role esp what he wanted at Yalta, and 4) CCP's deep ideological root of anti-capitalism and hence no way to be friendly to US even if US was taking a nuetral position in history towards CCP.
So this book tells a well-known history (to most of chinese from high school education) from various perspectives. It teaches readers that history is not that simple although it seems destined to a result. There are always some randomness in there. Say, what if Japan didnt invade China in 1937 but in 1938 (by then very like CCP will be driven out of China)?
So this book tells a well-known history (to most of chinese from high school education) from various perspectives. It teaches readers that history is not that simple although it seems destined to a result. There are always some randomness in there. Say, what if Japan didnt invade China in 1937 but in 1938 (by then very like CCP will be driven out of China)?
November 26, 2021
This is an interesting book but, at times, I found it difficult to follow the course of events, although that may have been due more to the vagaries and fluidity of the situation in China than to the author's handling of this story. However, I think the story was hard to follow in part because the author spent a good bit of time telling it through dispatches and reports by American military and diplomatic personnel in China. Perhaps the time line/course of events would have been easier to follow if the author had paused from time to time and provided a short summary of what had happened thus far before launching into further events. The book is generally well written and always interesting, even if a bit depressing about what Mao Tse-tung was doing to weed out and punish dissent in the CCP - the Chinese Communist Party, which was, of course, a foreshadowing of what he was going to do to the country as a whole.
May 8, 2018
A gripping narrative about the relationship between Americans (citizens and government) towards the Communist Chinese and the Nationalist Government. While some parts may appear tedious, the eventual answer is that China could not be saved because of several factors, chiefly Mao, who was the unreasonable man and determined revolutionary who would never make peace with Chiang. A cautionary tale about how governments should not be seduced into thinking that backing revolutionary groups lead to better outcomes than the incumbent, as the former can make all sorts of promises but have no skin in the game.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
August 8, 2019
An interesting account of China's years of danger, particularly as it illuminates the continuing failures of U.S. foreign diplomacy. However, it's rather fragmentary and long-winded at times. I don't know how much relevance the China hands' personal backgrounds and actions have at certain points, and after Hurley's introduction the book starts to suffer from a drought of stories to tell.
Therefore I can't say it's riveting from the beginning to the end, but at least the first half and conclusion provide much food for thought.
Therefore I can't say it's riveting from the beginning to the end, but at least the first half and conclusion provide much food for thought.
January 28, 2023
Another book by a US journalist pretending to be a historian. There will always be a number of history book like this, where the author attempts to rewrite history to suit pre-conceived American notions.
Where Bernstein gets his sources from we do not know? He doesn't use numbered references. Perhaps his best connection with China is that he is married to a Chinese, no doubt a rabid anti-communist one.
For a better account by a serious historian I would recommend instead the book FORGOTTEN ALLY by Rana Mitter.
Where Bernstein gets his sources from we do not know? He doesn't use numbered references. Perhaps his best connection with China is that he is married to a Chinese, no doubt a rabid anti-communist one.
For a better account by a serious historian I would recommend instead the book FORGOTTEN ALLY by Rana Mitter.
July 24, 2018
Excellent work on the history of China during and immediately after World War 2, with a special emphasis on 1941-1947. The author is evenhanded in his criticism of US China policy, faulting liberals for their naïveté towards Stalin and Mao, and conservatives for their deification of Chiang kai-shek.
January 8, 2022
I picked this book up hoping to learn more about the time my grandfather spent in China as one of the 55,000 marines stationed there at the end of WWII. While I learned very little about that, I was fascinated with learning about just how involved the US was in the leadup to the Community takeover of China. A very interesting book about a little known era of US history.
May 18, 2019
This book was amazingly informative and changed my view of China's history. I intend to re-read it.
March 19, 2021
a real smack a roonie! hit the spot, like a good bagel. nah for real tho very interesting piece of american history that never gets talked about. very well written and researched.
August 29, 2021
总结得蛮好的，斯大林与毛泽东的权力欲望造就这一切
July 15, 2023
A fascinating book, very well researched and written, the best book I've read covering this period of Chinese history and US foreign policy.
Read
November 13, 2024历史思考带了更多可能性，而不是决定性
April 13, 2025
well crafted.
August 9, 2018
repetitive with facts and conclusions.
leaps over the start of the post-WWII civil war to the communists' triumph.
leaps over the start of the post-WWII civil war to the communists' triumph.
February 16, 2017
An interesting take on the decisions made in 1945 that set the tone for U.S.-China relations for years, and begs the question - could things have gone differently.
Remember that the U.S. objective was to beat Japan, whereas the objective of Mao and Chiang was to position to beat each other (though Bernstein also claims that Chiang could have refused to fight the Japanese in 1938 and wiped out the communists)
We made a lot about opening the Burma Road, but Churchill recommended against it, saying that it would be like "eating a porcupine quill by quill."
Bernstein maintains that the Chinese fought well against the Japanese, and held out longer than almost anyone expected.
Bernstein questions the conventional U.S. wisdom that Stilwell wanted more action, and Chiang was hesitant. Asks whether the Chiang "defense in depth" would have worked better - sucked Japan deeper into China.
Never easy to determine exactly what the communists wanted (and did they know themselves?), and we suffered from the standard U.S. tendency toward optimism.
Ignoring advice from Harriman and Kennan, FDR promises Stalin Manchuria in order to induce USSR into war vs. Japan.
Remember that the U.S. objective was to beat Japan, whereas the objective of Mao and Chiang was to position to beat each other (though Bernstein also claims that Chiang could have refused to fight the Japanese in 1938 and wiped out the communists)
We made a lot about opening the Burma Road, but Churchill recommended against it, saying that it would be like "eating a porcupine quill by quill."
Bernstein maintains that the Chinese fought well against the Japanese, and held out longer than almost anyone expected.
Bernstein questions the conventional U.S. wisdom that Stilwell wanted more action, and Chiang was hesitant. Asks whether the Chiang "defense in depth" would have worked better - sucked Japan deeper into China.
Never easy to determine exactly what the communists wanted (and did they know themselves?), and we suffered from the standard U.S. tendency toward optimism.
Ignoring advice from Harriman and Kennan, FDR promises Stalin Manchuria in order to induce USSR into war vs. Japan.
April 19, 2019
The book, quite naturally, is mainly concerned with the strategic maneuvering among the Chinese KMT, Chinese Communists, USSR, and the United States that took place following the Japanese surrender after WWII. To some degree, it is a corrective to the conventional wisdom that the U.S. "lost" China to the Communists. Bernstein is also intent on countering the notion that the Nationalists/KMT were only a minor participant in the effort to resist Japan's invasion of and colonialist impulses in China. In service to the latter, Bernstein does some minor rehabilitation of Chiang Kai-Shek, an effort taken up in recent years by a number of historians, often by drawing contrasts to Mao Zedong.
But in the end, there is an air in inevitability to the 1949 Communist victory, in contrast to the subtitle of the book: "America's Fateful Choice." In fact, what Bernstein repeatedly makes clear is that there was very little that the U.S. could have done without embracing one of two -- unpalatable -- extremes: full-scale military support of the KMT or a complete withdrawal from China. Instead, the US consistently found itself in the muddled middle: some money and arms to the KMT; some tentative outreach to the Communists. Much of the book is devoted to demonstrating the limited range of viable options for US policymakers and the idealistic blind spots of virtually every participant (politicians underestimating the support for the Communists and State Department diplomats overestimating Mao's commitment democracy, for example).
The book provides a close up look at a pivotal moment in history. It is nicely written and there are some fascinating characters here (Patrick Hurley; Mao Zedong). It is worth reading for a snapshot look at modern Chinese history that explains some of the long-standing rifts that dominated Cold War history. A good general introduction to an important subject, although not breaking any new ground.
But in the end, there is an air in inevitability to the 1949 Communist victory, in contrast to the subtitle of the book: "America's Fateful Choice." In fact, what Bernstein repeatedly makes clear is that there was very little that the U.S. could have done without embracing one of two -- unpalatable -- extremes: full-scale military support of the KMT or a complete withdrawal from China. Instead, the US consistently found itself in the muddled middle: some money and arms to the KMT; some tentative outreach to the Communists. Much of the book is devoted to demonstrating the limited range of viable options for US policymakers and the idealistic blind spots of virtually every participant (politicians underestimating the support for the Communists and State Department diplomats overestimating Mao's commitment democracy, for example).
The book provides a close up look at a pivotal moment in history. It is nicely written and there are some fascinating characters here (Patrick Hurley; Mao Zedong). It is worth reading for a snapshot look at modern Chinese history that explains some of the long-standing rifts that dominated Cold War history. A good general introduction to an important subject, although not breaking any new ground.
January 31, 2015
Richard Bernstein China 1945 Mao’s Revolution and America’s fateful choice is an engaging account of how China went Communist and the role that America played in the process. The title is actually misleading to an extent as the book actually covers the unique dual war situation that developed in China throughout the 1930’s and 1940’s as China was invaded by Japan while they were moving towards civil war between the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists lead by Mao Zedong. The United States backed Chiang, even as evidence piled up that Chiang was perhaps just as brutal as Mao.
I really feel like the events chronicled in this book could be applied to several modern conflicts that the United States has involved themselves in—either by force or necessity. The views of seasoned China hands who could sense that the winds of change were blowing in China were ignored and the people themselves sidelined, in favor of the views of naïve idealists who thought that they could single-handedly through brute force of will conquer the complex web of problems that China of the 1930’s and 1940’s was experiencing.
This pattern has frankly continued to repeat itself in the ensuing decades over and over again. I am recommending this book because it is an excellent history complete with personalities and characters that leap off the page and burn into one’s memory from wild cowboy type oilmen to the more stately career diplomats, to the grand figures of Mao and Chiang both fighting for their vision of a nation by any means necessary. It is a fantastic reading experience ripe with lessons still unlearned today.
I really feel like the events chronicled in this book could be applied to several modern conflicts that the United States has involved themselves in—either by force or necessity. The views of seasoned China hands who could sense that the winds of change were blowing in China were ignored and the people themselves sidelined, in favor of the views of naïve idealists who thought that they could single-handedly through brute force of will conquer the complex web of problems that China of the 1930’s and 1940’s was experiencing.
This pattern has frankly continued to repeat itself in the ensuing decades over and over again. I am recommending this book because it is an excellent history complete with personalities and characters that leap off the page and burn into one’s memory from wild cowboy type oilmen to the more stately career diplomats, to the grand figures of Mao and Chiang both fighting for their vision of a nation by any means necessary. It is a fantastic reading experience ripe with lessons still unlearned today.
June 8, 2016
Clear, lucid, and interesting account, although it ends a little suddenly. That said, I felt Bernstein was a bit too soft on Chiang Kai-Shek (basically endeavoring to excuse all his human rights abuses by appeals to whataboutism) and a little excessively quick to dismiss criticisms of American designs in China (the facile description of the open door policy as altruistic is perhaps a case in point, as is the insistence in putting "imperialism" in scare quotes when describing the Communist interpretation of US actions).
Bernstein's main novel argument, that Mao was too much of an ideologue to ever have normalized or cooperative relations with the United States before the Sino-Soviet split, is not very convincingly argued. After all, the US at no point acted as a neutral broker -- Bernstein appeals to Mao's speeches and writings here even while dismissing other parts of the same as self-evident nonsense.
Ideological blind spots aside, worth reading.
Bernstein's main novel argument, that Mao was too much of an ideologue to ever have normalized or cooperative relations with the United States before the Sino-Soviet split, is not very convincingly argued. After all, the US at no point acted as a neutral broker -- Bernstein appeals to Mao's speeches and writings here even while dismissing other parts of the same as self-evident nonsense.
Ideological blind spots aside, worth reading.
January 2, 2021
美国调停失败的根本原因在于苏联的介入、中国历来缺乏分享权力的政治传统以及国民党政府的内在缺陷，并令其陷入当时那个时间节点上的两难困境。最终，中国人民做出了他们自己也无从了解后果的可怕选择。
February 5, 2015
An authoritative, compelling history of a pivotal time in U.S. history.
Richard Bernstein’s new book, China 1945, is a fascinating look at an episode in American history that more people need to know about. Though I have long been a student of China and the history of America’s role in China during WWII, my understanding of this time and place is now deeper as a result of reading this book. I found the author’s treatment of the Nationalists, Communists, American Foreign Service officers and other major players of the time to be objective, insightful and accurate. I would recommend this book to both professional scholars and the average history buff alike!
Richard Bernstein’s new book, China 1945, is a fascinating look at an episode in American history that more people need to know about. Though I have long been a student of China and the history of America’s role in China during WWII, my understanding of this time and place is now deeper as a result of reading this book. I found the author’s treatment of the Nationalists, Communists, American Foreign Service officers and other major players of the time to be objective, insightful and accurate. I would recommend this book to both professional scholars and the average history buff alike!
February 16, 2015
Intense and thorough account of how the United States blew goodwill with Mao Tse Tung and helped create a communist state in China by 1949. The Chinese were very well disposed towards the US during WWII and Chinese soldiers and people often protected US soldiers from the Japanese during the Occupation. But loyalty to Chain Kai Shek and the attempt to prevent Mao from taking over China was a wrong headed policy that not only created animosity for many years, but led to two wars in Korea and Vietnam. This book has a lot of great detail on how that happened and the decisions made by both parties affected the outcome.
May 16, 2017
In terms of Eastern and Western relations, 1945 was a key year, especially when it comes to China. The country was torn, the main divider being dictator and tyrant, Mao Tse-tung. This book thoroughly explains the conflicts within China as well as those with other countries.
I gave this book a four out of five stars due to its attention to detail pertaining to the topic. However, some ideas may become muddy if the reader does not have an extensive knowledge on other countries' roles in WWII.
I would recommend this book to those interested in WWII politics and Chinese history.
I gave this book a four out of five stars due to its attention to detail pertaining to the topic. However, some ideas may become muddy if the reader does not have an extensive knowledge on other countries' roles in WWII.
I would recommend this book to those interested in WWII politics and Chinese history.
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