Ukraine’s Nuclear Disarmament: A History

by Yuri Kostenko, Svitlana Krasynska (Translator), Lidia Wolanskyj (Translator)

In December 1994, Ukraine gave up the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world and signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, having received assurances that its sovereignty would be respected and secured by Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Based on original and heretofore unavailable documents, Yuri Kostenko’s account of the negotiations between Ukraine, Russia, and the US reveals for the first time the internal debates of the Ukrainian government as well as the pressure exerted upon it by its international partners.

Kostenko presents an insider’s view on the issue of nuclear disarmament and raises the question of whether the complete and immediate dismantlement of the country’s enormous nuclear arsenal was strategically the right decision, especially in view of the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia, one of the guarantors of Ukraine’s sovereignty under denuclearization.

Genres: History, Ukraine, Politics, Nonfiction, Russian History

360 pages, Hardcover

First published January 5, 2021

Reviews

[Mihai Zodian · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ukraine gave up the nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union in the 1990s. There is common agreement that this left it vulnerable in the face of the Russian aggressions of 2014 and 2022. Yuri Kostenko was part of the legislature and was involved in drafting legislation and in the negotiations, and he argued that Ukraine got a bad deal. I recommend this work to the reader interested in contemporary international relations.

Translated in 2023, the book comprises several parts. An introduction by Paul J. D'Anieri takes the reader into the heart of the matter. The longest section is about Yuri Kostenko's recollection of the Ukraine nuclear dossier. He added a collection of documents, mostly treaties and agreements about this issue.

The 1990s deal was Ukraine's denuclearization in exchange for pious promises of sovereignty and pacifism. The issue of the Budapest Protocol and its security assurances is still thorny. Yuri Kostenko explained that the post-communist elite wanted a piece of paper that would allow it to claim victory. The final form, of December 1994, was based on the Russian position and assumed that the major powers won't use force to uphold the document.

A complex of external and internal causes led Ukraine to abandon the inherited nuclear arsenal. Russia was very assertive in its policy to gain the whole former Soviet arsenal. Moscow and Washington cooperated closely in order to achieve this result. The Ukrainian decision-makers were educated in a tradition of obedience, especially in the executive branch, according to Yuri Kostenko.

The author argued for a position of effective disarmament. That meant more autonomy in the elimination of nuclear weapons, stronger links between Ukraine and the West, and a more competent political elite. His position is more complex than the ideas expressed by other critics of the nuclear deal, such as John J. Mearsheimer. Probably the debates about the wisdom of Ukraine's denuclearization will continue.

[Liquidlasagna · Rating 4 out of 5]

Yuri Kostenko has written a superb book explaining why Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in the mid-1990s, leaving itself without a deterrent against Russia.

He shows in fascinating detail that pressure from Moscow and Washington left Ukraine with little choice but to surrender its nuclear arsenal.

Kostenko directly ties that fateful decision to the war that broke out between Russia and Ukraine in 2014, in which Ukraine was largely defenseless and the United States, which had promised to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty, sat on the sidelines.

The implicit message of Ukraine’s Nuclear Disarmament is clear: there is no substitute for a nuclear deterrent when you live in a dangerous neighborhood.

John J. Mearsheimer, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago, and author of Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities