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Suffering-Focused Ethics: Defense and Implications
The reduction of suffering deserves special priority. Many ethical views support this claim, yet so far these have not been presented in a single place. Suffering-Focused Ethics provides the most comprehensive presentation of suffering-focused arguments and views to date, including a moral realist case for minimizing extreme suffering. The book then explores the all-important issue of how we can best reduce suffering in practice, and outlines a coherent and pragmatic path forward.
454 pages, Kindle Edition
First published May 29, 2020
90 people are currently reading
335 people want to read
About the author
Magnus Vinding
27 books85 followersMagnus Vinding is the author of Speciesism: Why It Is Wrong and the Implications of Rejecting It (2015), Reflections on Intelligence (2016), You Are Them (2017), Effective Altruism: How Can We Best Help Others? (2018), Suffering-Focused Ethics: Defense and Implications (2020), Reasoned Politics (2022), Essays on Suffering-Focused Ethics (2022), and Essays on UFOs and Related Conjectures (2024).
His next book will be Compassionate Purpose: Personal Inspiration for a Better World.
His next book will be Compassionate Purpose: Personal Inspiration for a Better World.
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Displaying 1 - 27 of 27 reviews
July 23, 2024
I struggle to recall a time that I was so excited to read, finish, and share my views about a given book. While I read this during a busy period in life, I was comforted in that I also felt the obligation to take my time with it, allowing the necessary content-based osmosis to have its full effect on my long-held, classical utilitarian ideals. The most daunting task is, undoubtedly, that of writing a review that does this book a fraction of the justice that I think it truly deserves. Luckily, as I type this initial sentiment, I can feel the review begin to write itself. Hell yeah.
While my views on practical ethics were admittedly vulnerable prior to beginning this book, largely due to my exposure to Vinding's and Tomasik's previous work, it was well before the final page turn that there was little doubt left in my mind that I had come across one of the most important works in the field of practical ethics. I say such from both a personal and fairly confident impersonal perspective, as this book seems to fill a niche that many, such as myself, never realized was left so wide open. Granted, this book also does not shy away from relaying just how many other relevant works are available, most of which are now hanging out on the browser tabs spread across my chrome window, too small to tell which is which. So fair warning, checking this must-read book off your list will come at the steep price of adding countless others..
I still reserve questions regarding the few pages on moral realism and the move from normative personal actions (rationality) to normative impersonal 'ethics'. However, the succinct arguments put forth were some of the best I've seen, accurately capturing the 'intrinsic normative nature' of suffering itself, and it brings Vinding's book 'Moral Truths: The Foundation of Ethics' right up to the edge of my radar (along with many of the other referenced works in this section). I'm extremely curious to see his further arguments justifying this move from agent-relative to agent-neutral normativity, as Parfit's (also referenced) arguments are the best I've been able to find thus far. I think that I genuinely want to have my mind changed on the issue, as the effects would likely be substantial, bolstering all the more the impact this book would have on me (and in turn on others).
Further, I have a few unanswered questions surrounding the nuances of the ostensible lexical differences that may exist along the nonlinear spectrum of suffering, which I think could be better addressed by refining where exactly I fall with respect to the 'anti-hurt' view of happiness. Along with such, it brings into question the extent to which initiatives that aim to increase happiness, and in turn simultaneously replace instances of suffering, should best be analyzed in practice. This likely requires more work on my own, and perhaps some conversation with like-minded individuals.
I legitimately feel I could break this book down chapter by chapter and highlight how virtually every section served its own crucial purpose in terms of argument and/or practical advice for those who are on board with the general conclusion, but at this point it's easier if you just read the book. Perhaps as a final comment, as I would be remiss to leave it out, I will mention the focus on the paramount importance of 'cooperation' that Vinding so successfully elucidates. For an ethical philosophy and general topic area that seems to have its fair share of 'colorful adherents', his emphasis on humility, uncertainty, and working with those of differing views were an intellectual and behavior-inspiring breath of fresh air.
In closing this rant about this meritorious work, it's possible that some of the points I noted here may seem laden with philosophical jargon, but I can't emphasize enough how lucidly explained and thoroughly argued these topics are throughout the book, making it digestible to even the most novice of us readers. The logical flow, combined with the robust style of argumentation (akin to that of Benatar's), where the acceptance of an individual argument is not necessary to render the general conclusion true, likely makes this book extremely persuasive to people of a multitude of intellectual backgrounds. That conclusion being, that 'we should grant the reduction of suffering particular importance' in the way we live our lives.
All in all, this is my new go-to book to recommend as a guideline to my own view of practical ethics, to the point where I would consider it a favor if someone I know reads it and lets me know. What's more, the idea that a topic as seemingly morose as 'suffering-focused ethics' can leave a reader genuinely excited about the gained insights and path moving forward is a feat in and of itself.
While my views on practical ethics were admittedly vulnerable prior to beginning this book, largely due to my exposure to Vinding's and Tomasik's previous work, it was well before the final page turn that there was little doubt left in my mind that I had come across one of the most important works in the field of practical ethics. I say such from both a personal and fairly confident impersonal perspective, as this book seems to fill a niche that many, such as myself, never realized was left so wide open. Granted, this book also does not shy away from relaying just how many other relevant works are available, most of which are now hanging out on the browser tabs spread across my chrome window, too small to tell which is which. So fair warning, checking this must-read book off your list will come at the steep price of adding countless others..
I still reserve questions regarding the few pages on moral realism and the move from normative personal actions (rationality) to normative impersonal 'ethics'. However, the succinct arguments put forth were some of the best I've seen, accurately capturing the 'intrinsic normative nature' of suffering itself, and it brings Vinding's book 'Moral Truths: The Foundation of Ethics' right up to the edge of my radar (along with many of the other referenced works in this section). I'm extremely curious to see his further arguments justifying this move from agent-relative to agent-neutral normativity, as Parfit's (also referenced) arguments are the best I've been able to find thus far. I think that I genuinely want to have my mind changed on the issue, as the effects would likely be substantial, bolstering all the more the impact this book would have on me (and in turn on others).
Further, I have a few unanswered questions surrounding the nuances of the ostensible lexical differences that may exist along the nonlinear spectrum of suffering, which I think could be better addressed by refining where exactly I fall with respect to the 'anti-hurt' view of happiness. Along with such, it brings into question the extent to which initiatives that aim to increase happiness, and in turn simultaneously replace instances of suffering, should best be analyzed in practice. This likely requires more work on my own, and perhaps some conversation with like-minded individuals.
I legitimately feel I could break this book down chapter by chapter and highlight how virtually every section served its own crucial purpose in terms of argument and/or practical advice for those who are on board with the general conclusion, but at this point it's easier if you just read the book. Perhaps as a final comment, as I would be remiss to leave it out, I will mention the focus on the paramount importance of 'cooperation' that Vinding so successfully elucidates. For an ethical philosophy and general topic area that seems to have its fair share of 'colorful adherents', his emphasis on humility, uncertainty, and working with those of differing views were an intellectual and behavior-inspiring breath of fresh air.
In closing this rant about this meritorious work, it's possible that some of the points I noted here may seem laden with philosophical jargon, but I can't emphasize enough how lucidly explained and thoroughly argued these topics are throughout the book, making it digestible to even the most novice of us readers. The logical flow, combined with the robust style of argumentation (akin to that of Benatar's), where the acceptance of an individual argument is not necessary to render the general conclusion true, likely makes this book extremely persuasive to people of a multitude of intellectual backgrounds. That conclusion being, that 'we should grant the reduction of suffering particular importance' in the way we live our lives.
All in all, this is my new go-to book to recommend as a guideline to my own view of practical ethics, to the point where I would consider it a favor if someone I know reads it and lets me know. What's more, the idea that a topic as seemingly morose as 'suffering-focused ethics' can leave a reader genuinely excited about the gained insights and path moving forward is a feat in and of itself.
September 10, 2020
This book would have been stronger if space dedicated to sporadic quotes from philosophers were reallocated to deeper dives into the arguments. Perhaps the counterarguments merited more thorough attention, though in Vinding's defense, the alternatives to this view are so engrained in our culture that a book on suffering-focused ethics arguably doesn't need to pay them more lip service. And as powerful as the empirical claims about the depths of suffering on this planet are, it's unclear that they technically contribute to the philosophical arguments about how bad such suffering is - a classical utilitarian, or non-consequentialist for that matter, could agree that the worst physical and mental pains are worse than the pleasures are good.
However, these critiques aside, I commend Vinding for arguing so thoroughly for views that give the topic of suffering, and its ethical significance, the serious treatment it deserves. There are many moral intuitions we hold, most of which I think are reinforced not so much by normative force, but by social cohesion and evolutionary pressures. Suffering is unique, though. It's the only object of moral evaluation whose importance I can't deny, indeed whose denial strikes me as nothing short of callous. As Brian Tomasik puts it: "Morality for me is about crying out at the horrors of the universe and pleading for them to stop."
My summary of what I think are the strongest cases for SFE, which this book presents:
1. We consider it bad to create bad lives, but not bad to not create good lives.
2. From the perspective of the experiencer, there's nothing wrong with a state free of suffering. We judge the absence of extraneous goods negatively as third parties because we want them, but a non-suffering being has no wants.
3. The apparent value of happiness for its own sake is explainable by the palliative, instrumental value of happiness. Happiness frees us from suffering, like a vacuum cleaning up dust, but beyond the point of such freedom we have no need for more.
4. We observe that causing pain to one person for the pleasure of another is unacceptable. This alone leads to many of the practical implications of SFE, but our future selves are arguably people other than ourselves as well. So we ought not harm them for our later selves' joy, over and above what is necessary for relief of suffering.
5. There are a plethora of biasing factors that explain why we find some of the consequences of prioritizing suffering so counterintuitive. Is it really any wonder that evolved beings would have incentive to believe that existence is intrinsically worth enduring so many harms?
It's fascinating yet unfortunate that while the importance of at least the worst forms of misery is widely agreed upon, our practical priorities so flagrantly contradict this. We exploit farmed animals on an unfathomable scale for our own frivolous taste, and ignore the emergencies faced by wild animals because they're "natural." We call for our species to head to the stars, when this amounts to turning ourselves into the gods rightly criticized by the Problem of Evil. We largely deny the right to painless death. And some of the most brilliant of our minds seem more concerned with ensuring that there is a future than ensuring this future is humane. I hope the message of this book achieves the latter.
However, these critiques aside, I commend Vinding for arguing so thoroughly for views that give the topic of suffering, and its ethical significance, the serious treatment it deserves. There are many moral intuitions we hold, most of which I think are reinforced not so much by normative force, but by social cohesion and evolutionary pressures. Suffering is unique, though. It's the only object of moral evaluation whose importance I can't deny, indeed whose denial strikes me as nothing short of callous. As Brian Tomasik puts it: "Morality for me is about crying out at the horrors of the universe and pleading for them to stop."
My summary of what I think are the strongest cases for SFE, which this book presents:
1. We consider it bad to create bad lives, but not bad to not create good lives.
2. From the perspective of the experiencer, there's nothing wrong with a state free of suffering. We judge the absence of extraneous goods negatively as third parties because we want them, but a non-suffering being has no wants.
3. The apparent value of happiness for its own sake is explainable by the palliative, instrumental value of happiness. Happiness frees us from suffering, like a vacuum cleaning up dust, but beyond the point of such freedom we have no need for more.
4. We observe that causing pain to one person for the pleasure of another is unacceptable. This alone leads to many of the practical implications of SFE, but our future selves are arguably people other than ourselves as well. So we ought not harm them for our later selves' joy, over and above what is necessary for relief of suffering.
5. There are a plethora of biasing factors that explain why we find some of the consequences of prioritizing suffering so counterintuitive. Is it really any wonder that evolved beings would have incentive to believe that existence is intrinsically worth enduring so many harms?
It's fascinating yet unfortunate that while the importance of at least the worst forms of misery is widely agreed upon, our practical priorities so flagrantly contradict this. We exploit farmed animals on an unfathomable scale for our own frivolous taste, and ignore the emergencies faced by wild animals because they're "natural." We call for our species to head to the stars, when this amounts to turning ourselves into the gods rightly criticized by the Problem of Evil. We largely deny the right to painless death. And some of the most brilliant of our minds seem more concerned with ensuring that there is a future than ensuring this future is humane. I hope the message of this book achieves the latter.
June 25, 2020
Full disclosure: I know the author personally.
Ever since I can remember, I have held the conviction that suffering is intrinsically bad and can not be outweighed. I just never had the theoretical framework or vocabulary to express my views: words would just fail me on this subject. But thanks to Magnus, this is no longer true.
Suffering-Focused Ethics is written in a manner that makes it accessible to even an inexperienced reader of philosophy, while also being concise and to-the-point. Magnus has written a convincing book on a highly controversial subject that most people shy away from. He remains charitable and nuanced throughout the book, displaying intellectual honesty and humility to a degree that is rarely seen.
I cannot possibly express with words what Suffering-Focused Ethics means to me, nor do I feel I can I write a review that does it any justice. I am just so deeply grateful for this book.
Ever since I can remember, I have held the conviction that suffering is intrinsically bad and can not be outweighed. I just never had the theoretical framework or vocabulary to express my views: words would just fail me on this subject. But thanks to Magnus, this is no longer true.
Suffering-Focused Ethics is written in a manner that makes it accessible to even an inexperienced reader of philosophy, while also being concise and to-the-point. Magnus has written a convincing book on a highly controversial subject that most people shy away from. He remains charitable and nuanced throughout the book, displaying intellectual honesty and humility to a degree that is rarely seen.
I cannot possibly express with words what Suffering-Focused Ethics means to me, nor do I feel I can I write a review that does it any justice. I am just so deeply grateful for this book.
May 13, 2021
Life changing
October 28, 2021
2020.06.26–2020.07.14,
2021.09.24–2021.09.27
An accessible and extensive introduction to suffering-focused ethics. The book already contains responses to the usual objections and common misconceptions (e.g., in Chapter 8). To prevent discussions from going in endless circles, it would be great if people read it. (Now also available as an Audible audiobook, free Kindle e-book, and free pdf hosted by the author: https://magnusvinding.files.wordpress...)
Contents
Vinding M (2020) (08:51) Suffering-Focused Ethics - Defense and Implications
Introduction
• 0.1 A Demanding Obligation Obscured by Omission Bias?
• 0.2 The Stakes Are Astronomical
• 0.3 Outline of the Book
• 0.4 What I Am Not Saying
• 0.5 An Opportunity for Reflection
Part I: The Case for Suffering-Focused Ethics
01. Asymmetries Between Happiness and Suffering
• 1.1 Asymmetries in Population Ethics
• 1.2 Asymmetries in Quantity
• 1.3 Asymmetries in Ease of Realization
• 1.4 Asymmetries in Quality
• 1.5 Asymmetries in Knowledge
02. Happiness as the Absence of Suffering
• 2.1 Anti-Hurt and Perfectionist Axiology
• 2.2 Suffering as Tied to Desire
• 2.3 Distinguishing Different Anti-Hurt Views
• 2.4 Implausible Implications?
• 2.5 Are Anti-Hurt Views Bleak?
03. Creating Happiness at the Price of Suffering Is Wrong
• 3.1 Convergent Arguments
• 3.2 Intra- and Interpersonal Claims
• 3.3 The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas
• 3.4 What About Small Amounts of Suffering?
04. The Principle of Sympathy for Intense Suffering
• 4.1 Motivation and Outline
• 4.2 Common-Sense Support
• 4.3 The Horrendous Support
• 4.4 A Clarifying Note
• 4.5 Objections
05. A Moral Realist Case for Minimizing Extreme Suffering
• 5.1 The Map Is Not the Territory
• 5.2 Does Moral Realism Matter?
• 5.3 The Nature of My Argument
• 5.4 Suffering Is Inherently Disvaluable
• 5.5 Extreme Suffering Has Supreme Normative Force
• 5.6 Extreme Versus Non-Extreme Suffering
06. Other Arguments for Focusing on Suffering
• 6.1 Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism
• 6.2 Other Values More Plausibly Have Diminishing Returns
• 6.3 Impartiality
• 6.4 Deontic Asymmetry
• 6.5 The Golden Rule
• 6.6 The Categorical Imperative
• 6.7 Contractualism
• 6.8 Rights-Based Ethics
• 6.9 Tradeoff-Forbidding Deontology
• 6.10 Universal Kinship
• 6.11 “Do No Harm”
• 6.12 Compassion as a Core Value
07. Biases Against Focusing on Suffering
• 7.1 Can We Be Biased Against Values?
• 7.2 Contemplating Extreme Suffering Is Painful
• 7.3 Cognitive Biases Conspiring
• 7.4 We Underestimate the Badness of Suffering
• 7.5 We Underestimate Our Ability to Reduce Suffering
• 7.6 Novelty Bias and Numbness to the Scope of Suffering
• 7.7 Perpetrator Bias
• 7.8 The Just World Fallacy
• 7.9 An Optimistic Psychology Built by Evolution
• 7.10 The Pleasure-Desire Bias
• 7.11 Existence Bias
• 7.12 Social Signaling: Show Your Best, Hide Your Worst
• 7.13 Suffering Is Abstract
• 7.14 A Brief Introspective Experiment
• 7.15 Counterbiases?
08. Objections Against Focusing on Suffering
• 8.1 The views defended here are absurd because they imply we should seek to end all sentient life.
• 8.2 Giving so much weight to suffering seems to imply that death would be a good thing, and that death is something we should want to occur sooner rather than later. Yet most people do not want to die.
• 8.3 The views defended here do not seem to respect personal autonomy and liberty.
• 8.4 Reducing suffering only seems overridingly important to us while we experience it. When we do not suffer, other things seem equally or more important. Why should suffering be granted a special status? For example, many people will also, in the moment of eating potato chips, downplay or disregard the importance of other things, such as their health, their figure, the bad feelings that may ensue, etc. Yet we do not consider this a good reason to deem potato-chip eating especially important. Likewise, we should not consider the reduction of suffering overridingly important just because we experience it as such in the moment.
• 8.5 It seems strange to deny a symmetry between happiness and suffering. Why should happiness of a given intensity not be considered as morally good as suffering of the same intensity should be considered morally bad?
• 8.6 The strong focus on suffering argued for here is missing something important: the world is getting better. We have seen poverty decline rapidly over the last few decades, and humanity’s understanding and wealth are increasing at a near-exponential pace. In particular, the science and engineering of happiness has only just begun, and it may well be that these endeavors will eventually enable us to create forms of happiness far greater than anything any currently living sentient mind is able to experience. Such states of happiness could have greater moral weight than even the most extreme forms of suffering that biological evolution has created, and our civilization could some day bring about astronomical numbers of beings experiencing such happiness. It would be a myopic shame if we allowed the comparative bleakness of today’s world to prevent us from working toward the creation of such a truly awesome future.
• 8.7 The view that it is more important to reduce suffering than to increase happiness plausibly derives from the prioritarian view, according to which it is more important to help beings the worse off they are, rather than the view that suffering per se is more important than happiness.
• 8.8 A paradise without any suffering and full of happiness and meaning is surely better than absolute nothingness.
• 8.9 Most people would say that a mere pinprick can be outweighed by a large amount of happiness.
• 8.10 The claim that extreme suffering is worse than any amount of mild suffering seems strange and implausible. For if we have a state of extreme suffering that occurs for a certain duration, it seems that a slightly less intense state of suffering extended for a much longer duration would be worse. This is presumably true at all levels of suffering: for a given duration of any intensity of suffering, some slightly less intense suffering extended for a sufficiently long duration would be worse. In this way, we can construct a sequence in which intense suffering is gradually exchanged for longer durations of less intense suffering, and in which we eventually get a vast duration of mild suffering that is worse than a short duration of extreme suffering. And since mild suffering can always be outweighed by happiness, it follows that extreme suffering can be outweighed by happiness.
• 8.11 The view that it is more important to prevent some amount of extreme suffering than any amount of mild suffering seems implausible because it implies we should just ignore all mild suffering in practice.
• 8.12 It seems implausible to assign supreme moral disvalue to just a single second of the most extreme suffering.
• 8.13 What about the importance of creating lives that are meaningful and virtuous? Is this not also important, and indeed potentially more important than reducing suffering?
• 8.14 What about spiritual experiences and the attainment of spiritual or contemplative insights?
• 8.15 It would likely have dangerous consequences if people accepted the views presented here. These views may well lead to more suffering rather than less
• 8.16 Most people do not agree that life is mostly suffering. The view defended here merely seems to be depression presented as a moral truth.
• 8.17 Very few people have held the views presented here. Does this not speak against these views?
• 8.18 How can we consider the reduction of suffering a foremost priority when it is impossible to measure suffering in the first place?
• 8.19 The focus on reducing suffering advocated here overlooks the vital functions that pain and suffering serve.
• 8.20 Should we not maintain some humility on questions concerning ethics? After all, our knowledge of the world is rather limited.
Part II: How Can We Best Reduce Suffering?
09. Uncertainty Is Big
• 9.1 Uncertainty: Our Inescapable Predicament
• 9.2 Beware Underestimating Uncertainty
• 9.3 Be Prudent
• 9.4 The Silver Bullet Delusion
• 9.5 Optimizing on Many Levels
• 9.6 Reducing Suffering Does Not Change Everything
• 9.7 Adhering to Firm Principles
• 9.8 Introducing Key Concepts
• • 9.8.1 Marginal Influence
• • 9.8.2 Expected Value Thinking
• • 9.8.3 The Importance of the Long-Term Future
10. We Should Be Cooperative
• 10.1 Cooperation: A Positive-Sum Prospect
• 10.2 Why Do We Not Cooperate?
• 10.3 Additional Reasons to Cooperate
• 10.4 Cooperating with Empirical Disagreements
• 10.5 How to Promote Cooperation?
11. Non-Human Animals and Expansion of the Moral Circle
• 11.1 Rejecting Speciesism
• 11.2 Wild-Animal Suffering
• 11.3 Ending the Exploitation of Non-Human Animals
• 11.4 Expanding Moral Consideration Beyond (Live) Animals
• 11.5 Biases
• 11.6 Caveats
12. Promoting Concern for Suffering
• 12.1 Why It Seems Promising
• 12.2 What Promoting Concern for Suffering Means
• 12.3 Is It Uncooperative?
• 12.4 Is It Better Still to Focus on Technology?
• 12.5 How to Increase Concern for Suffering?
13. The Abolitionist Project
• 13.1 A Theoretical Possibility: Convergent Arguments
• 13.2 Practical Implications
• 13.3 Proportion Bias Revisited
• 13.4 Other Pitfalls
14. Reducing S-Risks
• 14.1 Astronomical Negative Potential
• 14.2 Space Expansion May Be Catastrophic by Default
• 14.3 The Astronomical Atrocity Problem
• 14.4 S-Risk Reduction: Neglected and Tractable
• 14.5 How Can We Reduce S-Risks?
15. Donating to Reduce Suffering
• 15.1 The Case for Prioritizing Monetary Donations
• 15.2 Promising Ways to Donate
• 15.3 Beware Naive Views on Donations
16. Researching the Question
• 16.1 A Hard-Nosed Research Project
• 16.2 Open Research Questions
• • 16.2.1 Social Dynamics and Suffering
• • 16.2.2 S-Risk Reduction
• • 16.2.3 The Structure of Reality and Its Implications for Suffering
17. The Importance of Self-Investment
• 17.1 Self-Care: A Top Priority
• 17.2 Investing in Future Abilities and Influence
• 17.3 Avoiding Social Failure
18. What You Can Do
• 18.1 Join the Community
• 18.2 Donate to the Cause
• 18.3 Learn More
• 18.4 Inform Others About Suffering-Focused Ethics and Practice
• 18.5 Reflect on Your Career
Recommended Websites
• abolitionist.com
• algosphere.org
• animal-ethics.org
• centerforreducingsuffering.org
• ea-foundation.org
• hedweb.com
• longtermrisk.org
• magnusvinding.com
• preventsuffering.org
• reducing-suffering.org
• simonknutsson.com
• s-risks.org
• suffering-focused-ethics.surge.sh
Acknowledgments
Notes
Bibliography
2021.09.24–2021.09.27
An accessible and extensive introduction to suffering-focused ethics. The book already contains responses to the usual objections and common misconceptions (e.g., in Chapter 8). To prevent discussions from going in endless circles, it would be great if people read it. (Now also available as an Audible audiobook, free Kindle e-book, and free pdf hosted by the author: https://magnusvinding.files.wordpress...)
Contents
Vinding M (2020) (08:51) Suffering-Focused Ethics - Defense and Implications
Introduction
• 0.1 A Demanding Obligation Obscured by Omission Bias?
• 0.2 The Stakes Are Astronomical
• 0.3 Outline of the Book
• 0.4 What I Am Not Saying
• 0.5 An Opportunity for Reflection
Part I: The Case for Suffering-Focused Ethics
01. Asymmetries Between Happiness and Suffering
• 1.1 Asymmetries in Population Ethics
• 1.2 Asymmetries in Quantity
• 1.3 Asymmetries in Ease of Realization
• 1.4 Asymmetries in Quality
• 1.5 Asymmetries in Knowledge
02. Happiness as the Absence of Suffering
• 2.1 Anti-Hurt and Perfectionist Axiology
• 2.2 Suffering as Tied to Desire
• 2.3 Distinguishing Different Anti-Hurt Views
• 2.4 Implausible Implications?
• 2.5 Are Anti-Hurt Views Bleak?
03. Creating Happiness at the Price of Suffering Is Wrong
• 3.1 Convergent Arguments
• 3.2 Intra- and Interpersonal Claims
• 3.3 The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas
• 3.4 What About Small Amounts of Suffering?
04. The Principle of Sympathy for Intense Suffering
• 4.1 Motivation and Outline
• 4.2 Common-Sense Support
• 4.3 The Horrendous Support
• 4.4 A Clarifying Note
• 4.5 Objections
05. A Moral Realist Case for Minimizing Extreme Suffering
• 5.1 The Map Is Not the Territory
• 5.2 Does Moral Realism Matter?
• 5.3 The Nature of My Argument
• 5.4 Suffering Is Inherently Disvaluable
• 5.5 Extreme Suffering Has Supreme Normative Force
• 5.6 Extreme Versus Non-Extreme Suffering
06. Other Arguments for Focusing on Suffering
• 6.1 Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism
• 6.2 Other Values More Plausibly Have Diminishing Returns
• 6.3 Impartiality
• 6.4 Deontic Asymmetry
• 6.5 The Golden Rule
• 6.6 The Categorical Imperative
• 6.7 Contractualism
• 6.8 Rights-Based Ethics
• 6.9 Tradeoff-Forbidding Deontology
• 6.10 Universal Kinship
• 6.11 “Do No Harm”
• 6.12 Compassion as a Core Value
07. Biases Against Focusing on Suffering
• 7.1 Can We Be Biased Against Values?
• 7.2 Contemplating Extreme Suffering Is Painful
• 7.3 Cognitive Biases Conspiring
• 7.4 We Underestimate the Badness of Suffering
• 7.5 We Underestimate Our Ability to Reduce Suffering
• 7.6 Novelty Bias and Numbness to the Scope of Suffering
• 7.7 Perpetrator Bias
• 7.8 The Just World Fallacy
• 7.9 An Optimistic Psychology Built by Evolution
• 7.10 The Pleasure-Desire Bias
• 7.11 Existence Bias
• 7.12 Social Signaling: Show Your Best, Hide Your Worst
• 7.13 Suffering Is Abstract
• 7.14 A Brief Introspective Experiment
• 7.15 Counterbiases?
08. Objections Against Focusing on Suffering
• 8.1 The views defended here are absurd because they imply we should seek to end all sentient life.
• 8.2 Giving so much weight to suffering seems to imply that death would be a good thing, and that death is something we should want to occur sooner rather than later. Yet most people do not want to die.
• 8.3 The views defended here do not seem to respect personal autonomy and liberty.
• 8.4 Reducing suffering only seems overridingly important to us while we experience it. When we do not suffer, other things seem equally or more important. Why should suffering be granted a special status? For example, many people will also, in the moment of eating potato chips, downplay or disregard the importance of other things, such as their health, their figure, the bad feelings that may ensue, etc. Yet we do not consider this a good reason to deem potato-chip eating especially important. Likewise, we should not consider the reduction of suffering overridingly important just because we experience it as such in the moment.
• 8.5 It seems strange to deny a symmetry between happiness and suffering. Why should happiness of a given intensity not be considered as morally good as suffering of the same intensity should be considered morally bad?
• 8.6 The strong focus on suffering argued for here is missing something important: the world is getting better. We have seen poverty decline rapidly over the last few decades, and humanity’s understanding and wealth are increasing at a near-exponential pace. In particular, the science and engineering of happiness has only just begun, and it may well be that these endeavors will eventually enable us to create forms of happiness far greater than anything any currently living sentient mind is able to experience. Such states of happiness could have greater moral weight than even the most extreme forms of suffering that biological evolution has created, and our civilization could some day bring about astronomical numbers of beings experiencing such happiness. It would be a myopic shame if we allowed the comparative bleakness of today’s world to prevent us from working toward the creation of such a truly awesome future.
• 8.7 The view that it is more important to reduce suffering than to increase happiness plausibly derives from the prioritarian view, according to which it is more important to help beings the worse off they are, rather than the view that suffering per se is more important than happiness.
• 8.8 A paradise without any suffering and full of happiness and meaning is surely better than absolute nothingness.
• 8.9 Most people would say that a mere pinprick can be outweighed by a large amount of happiness.
• 8.10 The claim that extreme suffering is worse than any amount of mild suffering seems strange and implausible. For if we have a state of extreme suffering that occurs for a certain duration, it seems that a slightly less intense state of suffering extended for a much longer duration would be worse. This is presumably true at all levels of suffering: for a given duration of any intensity of suffering, some slightly less intense suffering extended for a sufficiently long duration would be worse. In this way, we can construct a sequence in which intense suffering is gradually exchanged for longer durations of less intense suffering, and in which we eventually get a vast duration of mild suffering that is worse than a short duration of extreme suffering. And since mild suffering can always be outweighed by happiness, it follows that extreme suffering can be outweighed by happiness.
• 8.11 The view that it is more important to prevent some amount of extreme suffering than any amount of mild suffering seems implausible because it implies we should just ignore all mild suffering in practice.
• 8.12 It seems implausible to assign supreme moral disvalue to just a single second of the most extreme suffering.
• 8.13 What about the importance of creating lives that are meaningful and virtuous? Is this not also important, and indeed potentially more important than reducing suffering?
• 8.14 What about spiritual experiences and the attainment of spiritual or contemplative insights?
• 8.15 It would likely have dangerous consequences if people accepted the views presented here. These views may well lead to more suffering rather than less
• 8.16 Most people do not agree that life is mostly suffering. The view defended here merely seems to be depression presented as a moral truth.
• 8.17 Very few people have held the views presented here. Does this not speak against these views?
• 8.18 How can we consider the reduction of suffering a foremost priority when it is impossible to measure suffering in the first place?
• 8.19 The focus on reducing suffering advocated here overlooks the vital functions that pain and suffering serve.
• 8.20 Should we not maintain some humility on questions concerning ethics? After all, our knowledge of the world is rather limited.
Part II: How Can We Best Reduce Suffering?
09. Uncertainty Is Big
• 9.1 Uncertainty: Our Inescapable Predicament
• 9.2 Beware Underestimating Uncertainty
• 9.3 Be Prudent
• 9.4 The Silver Bullet Delusion
• 9.5 Optimizing on Many Levels
• 9.6 Reducing Suffering Does Not Change Everything
• 9.7 Adhering to Firm Principles
• 9.8 Introducing Key Concepts
• • 9.8.1 Marginal Influence
• • 9.8.2 Expected Value Thinking
• • 9.8.3 The Importance of the Long-Term Future
10. We Should Be Cooperative
• 10.1 Cooperation: A Positive-Sum Prospect
• 10.2 Why Do We Not Cooperate?
• 10.3 Additional Reasons to Cooperate
• 10.4 Cooperating with Empirical Disagreements
• 10.5 How to Promote Cooperation?
11. Non-Human Animals and Expansion of the Moral Circle
• 11.1 Rejecting Speciesism
• 11.2 Wild-Animal Suffering
• 11.3 Ending the Exploitation of Non-Human Animals
• 11.4 Expanding Moral Consideration Beyond (Live) Animals
• 11.5 Biases
• 11.6 Caveats
12. Promoting Concern for Suffering
• 12.1 Why It Seems Promising
• 12.2 What Promoting Concern for Suffering Means
• 12.3 Is It Uncooperative?
• 12.4 Is It Better Still to Focus on Technology?
• 12.5 How to Increase Concern for Suffering?
13. The Abolitionist Project
• 13.1 A Theoretical Possibility: Convergent Arguments
• 13.2 Practical Implications
• 13.3 Proportion Bias Revisited
• 13.4 Other Pitfalls
14. Reducing S-Risks
• 14.1 Astronomical Negative Potential
• 14.2 Space Expansion May Be Catastrophic by Default
• 14.3 The Astronomical Atrocity Problem
• 14.4 S-Risk Reduction: Neglected and Tractable
• 14.5 How Can We Reduce S-Risks?
15. Donating to Reduce Suffering
• 15.1 The Case for Prioritizing Monetary Donations
• 15.2 Promising Ways to Donate
• 15.3 Beware Naive Views on Donations
16. Researching the Question
• 16.1 A Hard-Nosed Research Project
• 16.2 Open Research Questions
• • 16.2.1 Social Dynamics and Suffering
• • 16.2.2 S-Risk Reduction
• • 16.2.3 The Structure of Reality and Its Implications for Suffering
17. The Importance of Self-Investment
• 17.1 Self-Care: A Top Priority
• 17.2 Investing in Future Abilities and Influence
• 17.3 Avoiding Social Failure
18. What You Can Do
• 18.1 Join the Community
• 18.2 Donate to the Cause
• 18.3 Learn More
• 18.4 Inform Others About Suffering-Focused Ethics and Practice
• 18.5 Reflect on Your Career
Recommended Websites
• abolitionist.com
• algosphere.org
• animal-ethics.org
• centerforreducingsuffering.org
• ea-foundation.org
• hedweb.com
• longtermrisk.org
• magnusvinding.com
• preventsuffering.org
• reducing-suffering.org
• simonknutsson.com
• s-risks.org
• suffering-focused-ethics.surge.sh
Acknowledgments
Notes
Bibliography
August 29, 2021
I have read few philosophical ethics books that are as convincing as this one. As the title implies, the book focuses on the importance and necessity of reducing, preventing and alleviating suffering.
The author shows that prioritizing extreme suffering is of the highest moral importance, and the arguments that are provided for it are theoretically and logically very sound, and also consistent with common sense.
The book further claims that suffering deserves special priority and that it is morally better to reduce suffering, than it is to increase happiness, since (extreme) suffering is always bad and unoutweighable. This is shown not only with philosophical arguments, but also by good reference to emperical sciences and convincing anekdotes. Furthermore, the book shows how the case for reducing extreme suffering is consistent with most, if not all, ethical (and even some religious) traditions.
The argument that it is better to reduce suffering so that the being that suffers is goes to a neutral state, than it is to increase one's wellbeing from a neutral state to a very happy state, or state of bliss and that creating happiness at the price of suffering is very wrong.
The urgency of the book is also felt by it showing how much suffering there currently is, especially if one takes into account all sentient beings, and not only humans. The tragic fact of contemporary life, we see, is that we exploit and kill more than 60 billion land animals and more than a hundred billion fish, meaning that "we kill more than twenty times as many sentuent beings in this way every day than the number of humans killed in wars in the entire 20th century." This is all the more tragic when one realizes that the animals subjected to factory farming increases at an exponetial rate of twenty times the number of existing humans, every year.
Another focus area of this book is the (longterm) future. It is convincingly shown that we have reasons to suspect that there are many future scenario's that will likely contain more extreme suffering than is found today, especially when we colonize space. The way we treat animals now might be indicative of how we treat other forms of life in the future.
In the second part of this book, the author argues for what one can do to reduce suffering, such as research on how to reduce suffering in all relevant scientific fields and humanities, donating to cause areas and organisations that effectively reduce suffering, among others.
The most robust thing we might do, and this something we can all contribute to, is to contribute to promoting our concern (and sympathy) for suffering.
I conclude with claiming that anyone who wants to help reduce suffering, should read this book.
The author shows that prioritizing extreme suffering is of the highest moral importance, and the arguments that are provided for it are theoretically and logically very sound, and also consistent with common sense.
The book further claims that suffering deserves special priority and that it is morally better to reduce suffering, than it is to increase happiness, since (extreme) suffering is always bad and unoutweighable. This is shown not only with philosophical arguments, but also by good reference to emperical sciences and convincing anekdotes. Furthermore, the book shows how the case for reducing extreme suffering is consistent with most, if not all, ethical (and even some religious) traditions.
The argument that it is better to reduce suffering so that the being that suffers is goes to a neutral state, than it is to increase one's wellbeing from a neutral state to a very happy state, or state of bliss and that creating happiness at the price of suffering is very wrong.
The urgency of the book is also felt by it showing how much suffering there currently is, especially if one takes into account all sentient beings, and not only humans. The tragic fact of contemporary life, we see, is that we exploit and kill more than 60 billion land animals and more than a hundred billion fish, meaning that "we kill more than twenty times as many sentuent beings in this way every day than the number of humans killed in wars in the entire 20th century." This is all the more tragic when one realizes that the animals subjected to factory farming increases at an exponetial rate of twenty times the number of existing humans, every year.
Another focus area of this book is the (longterm) future. It is convincingly shown that we have reasons to suspect that there are many future scenario's that will likely contain more extreme suffering than is found today, especially when we colonize space. The way we treat animals now might be indicative of how we treat other forms of life in the future.
In the second part of this book, the author argues for what one can do to reduce suffering, such as research on how to reduce suffering in all relevant scientific fields and humanities, donating to cause areas and organisations that effectively reduce suffering, among others.
The most robust thing we might do, and this something we can all contribute to, is to contribute to promoting our concern (and sympathy) for suffering.
I conclude with claiming that anyone who wants to help reduce suffering, should read this book.
June 2, 2020
SFE is a challenging read, given its subject matter, but it's an incredibly important one.
There is a lot of suffering in the world and it can be difficult to think about in a comprehensive, considerate way, without becoming overwhelmed. Magnus achieves this with calm, level-headed clarity. In fact, I've never encountered such a thoughtful, critically robust, bird's eye view reflection on the ethical commitment to address suffering.
From evaluating the underlying biases and epistemology of our questions about suffering, to exploring what we may do to address it in the grand scheme. All of which is carefully considered and contrasted, examining multiple perspectives and value-systems.
The work is grounded not only in robust argumentation, but backed up by historical reference and lineage of the ideas across multiple cultures and schools of thought.
The reduction of suffering is arguably the most urgent, most meaningful long-term project to prioritize and pursue. Having such a thoughtful reflection available to guide our thinking and action toward this goal is a gift.
Thank you, Magnus.
There is a lot of suffering in the world and it can be difficult to think about in a comprehensive, considerate way, without becoming overwhelmed. Magnus achieves this with calm, level-headed clarity. In fact, I've never encountered such a thoughtful, critically robust, bird's eye view reflection on the ethical commitment to address suffering.
From evaluating the underlying biases and epistemology of our questions about suffering, to exploring what we may do to address it in the grand scheme. All of which is carefully considered and contrasted, examining multiple perspectives and value-systems.
The work is grounded not only in robust argumentation, but backed up by historical reference and lineage of the ideas across multiple cultures and schools of thought.
The reduction of suffering is arguably the most urgent, most meaningful long-term project to prioritize and pursue. Having such a thoughtful reflection available to guide our thinking and action toward this goal is a gift.
Thank you, Magnus.
June 21, 2021
Phenomenal. This book chews me up and spits me out. Updated me in a more negative direction, where before I was more flourishing focused.
Will certainly reread the first half, the second half doesnt have much new if you're already indoctrinated into EA (but does a lot if you arent).
Will certainly reread the first half, the second half doesnt have much new if you're already indoctrinated into EA (but does a lot if you arent).
Read
March 29, 2023The book is available for free in various digital formats:
https://magnusvinding.com/2020/05/31/...
https://magnusvinding.com/2020/05/31/...
April 25, 2023
A superbook and a must read for anyone interested let alone active in the space of effective altruism and general ethic and moral discussions. The book is surprisingly pretty easy reading and is brilliantly succinct and well written.
My ultimate takeaway is that it's the absence of suffering that leads to maximising well-being and that's what we should focus on.
Another great recommendation by my friend @Dan Hageman.
My ultimate takeaway is that it's the absence of suffering that leads to maximising well-being and that's what we should focus on.
Another great recommendation by my friend @Dan Hageman.
April 22, 2021
Hopefully I will come back to this book over and over again in my life and take action according to it's conclusions.
March 19, 2021
"And while it is true that this principle has the implication that it would have been better if the world had never existed, I think the fault here is to be found in the world, not the principle."
I agree with the main message of this book - that minimizing suffering in the world should be our highest priority - and I like Vinding's approach of trying to muster support from as many different perspectives as possible, rather than hanging the whole argument on a single line of logic. The most effective chapter is probably the fourth, which is simply a list of horrific events contemplated in detail. The fifth chapter may be my favorite, though, as it's the clearest statement I've seen in print of my favorite argument for moral realism.
Vinding spends a fair amount of space on arguments that pleasure has no intrinsic value, or at least that any amount of extreme suffering outweighs even an infinite amount of pleasure. I don't find these arguments convincing, but they do provoke some interesting discussions.
I was expecting more from the second part of the book, which focuses on practical application. The most concrete action Vinding discusses in detail is to promote animal welfare; a focus on that issue should be unsurprising for anyone familiar with the depth and scale of the atrocities perpetrated by our food production industries, though he also emphasizes the suffering of wild animals. Beyond that, though, his primary advice is simply to try to convince more people (and governments) to prioritize reduction of suffering, and to devote resources to studying the best ways to reduce suffering. That feels frustratingly abstract, but he does make some persuasive points.
September 22, 2020
A thoroughly argued manifesto for suffering based ethics that challenged many of my intuitive ethics (not least my anthropocentricity). One of a handful of books that I would call worldview shaping for me.
December 28, 2020
This book seems very important. I endorsed a suffering-focused view before, but Vinding does a great job of collecting many relevant facts and arguments. The book is exceptionally well researched and Vinding tries hard to anticipate counter-arguments and takes them seriously. The book is also well structured and easy to follow despite being very dense.
June 22, 2020
This book is like a philosophical 3.way between Michelle Foucault, David Pierce and Magnus Vinding. Highly enlightening and very sexy!
It does end pretty open-ended so I hope for a sequel in the next coming decades.
It does end pretty open-ended so I hope for a sequel in the next coming decades.
January 3, 2021
Not convincing: went from thinking that suffering should be a high ethical priority to doubting the soundness of this school of thought.
Prioritizing suffering over all else reduces to a very simplistic, 1-dimensional approach. In section 5.5, the author offers a thought experiment about whether anything (e.g. a quantity of knowledge) categorically outweighs relieving an experience of extreme suffering, and ultimately concludes that nothing does on an objective level. This is wrong, and can be contradicted by famous examples of intentional sacrifice such as the acceptance of torture by Jesus in Christianity and the Buddhist monk Thích Quảng Đức's self-immolation. Whether one agrees with their beliefs is immaterial; the point is only that there exist well-known cases across diverse cultures of accepting suffering as a direct means to higher priorities, which undermines the author's claim of objective correctness in the opposite.
To counter with another thought experiment: if we had livestock that could not suffer (like the cow in The Restaurant at the End of the Universe by Douglas Adams), would it be morally acceptable to butcher and eat them? And to extend this even further, if we could change humans through some means to be incapable of suffering or to even enjoy it, would it be acceptable to send them to war or torture them for fun? According to the author's suffering-focused ethics, this would be acceptable. But something about this is clearly still wrong on some fundamental level, because only addressing suffering is not enough.
Prioritizing suffering over all else reduces to a very simplistic, 1-dimensional approach. In section 5.5, the author offers a thought experiment about whether anything (e.g. a quantity of knowledge) categorically outweighs relieving an experience of extreme suffering, and ultimately concludes that nothing does on an objective level. This is wrong, and can be contradicted by famous examples of intentional sacrifice such as the acceptance of torture by Jesus in Christianity and the Buddhist monk Thích Quảng Đức's self-immolation. Whether one agrees with their beliefs is immaterial; the point is only that there exist well-known cases across diverse cultures of accepting suffering as a direct means to higher priorities, which undermines the author's claim of objective correctness in the opposite.
To counter with another thought experiment: if we had livestock that could not suffer (like the cow in The Restaurant at the End of the Universe by Douglas Adams), would it be morally acceptable to butcher and eat them? And to extend this even further, if we could change humans through some means to be incapable of suffering or to even enjoy it, would it be acceptable to send them to war or torture them for fun? According to the author's suffering-focused ethics, this would be acceptable. But something about this is clearly still wrong on some fundamental level, because only addressing suffering is not enough.
January 23, 2023
Magnus Vinding's book provides an excellent introduction to suffering-focused ethics. In part I, he makes a moral realist case for prioritizing the reduction of suffering, and discusses potential biases and objections against it. In part II, he explores how we can best reduce suffering, emphasizing the need to be prudent and pragmatic in the face of epistemic uncertainty and cultural norms, to be cooperative and impartial with both present and future sentient beings in mind, and to join communities to help yourself helping others.
April 22, 2022
I highly recommend this book. It is very well thought out and well written, and provides great arguments for the importance of reducing extreme suffering, along with advice on how to effectively do so. While I already agreed with most of the author's moral views going into it, the book provided additional motivation and ideas for me to more effectively pursue the goal of suffering reduction. It also introduces the reader to many people and organizations dedicated to this cause.
December 9, 2025
An important book on a very important topic - that of how we should weight suffering, and considerations around weighting separately/higher than positive experiences. Interesting ideas, could have done with some tighter editing and also followed things through further to deeper conclusions, in addition to covering pragmatic middle grounds - would have helped understand the implications better. That said, lack of good quality writing on this topic - and I'm glad this book exists.
January 25, 2023
[Audiobook] Incredibly interesting and impactful. I recommend consuming this in written form as it has some complicated and dense topics not particularly well suited for semi-distracted audiobook listening. I will revisit in written form.
November 18, 2023
This book is "suffering-focused ethics". It is a fascinating book discussing suffering, ethics and morality and would be good for anyone who wants a deeper, philosophical read. I received a free copy of this book via Booksprout and am voluntarily leaving a review.
November 6, 2020
Nicht komplett gelesen.
June 6, 2023
One of the top 5 most influential pieces of literature on my personal life philosophy.
September 16, 2024
Life changing book
September 12, 2025
I'm really into the idea of negative utilitarianism—focusing on reducing pain rather than maximizing pleasure. Personally, I think the absence of pleasure isn’t nearly as bad as actually experiencing pain. I was also thinking about an article I read on PhilPapers recently. I love reading this kind of stuff!
“A thousand pleasures are not worth a single pain”
https://philarchive.org/rec/SIMATP-2
https://www.simonknutsson.com/thought...
https://www.amirrorclear.net/academic...
“A thousand pleasures are not worth a single pain”
https://philarchive.org/rec/SIMATP-2
https://www.simonknutsson.com/thought...
https://www.amirrorclear.net/academic...
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 7, 2020
Very rough read for me. Vindig’s writing style may have been part of it, although I fully concede I find most moral philosophy difficult. The first section dragged particularly, all the more so because I agree that extreme suffering takes moral priority, so the 1001 proofs, while potentially useful to other readers, merely compounded my boredom.
Part 2, which attempted to explain how to practically reduce suffering, leaned very hard on outreach (which I sympathize with) and research. But I confess I am, to some extent, baffled by the idea of « research » into suffering. Suffering, to me, is an emotional state that occurs as a result of something. One can not reduce suffering, I think, except by reducing or eliminating the causes of that suffering. These causes are of course varied and complex, and not necessarily all easily comparable. I am skeptical of generalized approaches to reducing suffering. (I don’t really buy the idea of « suffering in general ».) As a result, I think the most effective way to reduce suffering involves picking a cause with a suffering component you’re passionate about (medicine, public policy, animal welfare, etc) and dedicating yourself to it.
I disagreed with a lot of Vindig’s book, and it was a slog to get through, but his core claim that we should prioritize reducing extreme suffering (especially over happiness promotion for individuals who are already content) resonated well with me.
PS - I also really disliked the graphic scenes of violence and sadism described at intervals in this book. I understand other readers might need the proof, but I did not need to hear about horrific torture to be convinced of the intensity of some forms of suffering, and would have preferred he keep such discussion to the footnotes.
Part 2, which attempted to explain how to practically reduce suffering, leaned very hard on outreach (which I sympathize with) and research. But I confess I am, to some extent, baffled by the idea of « research » into suffering. Suffering, to me, is an emotional state that occurs as a result of something. One can not reduce suffering, I think, except by reducing or eliminating the causes of that suffering. These causes are of course varied and complex, and not necessarily all easily comparable. I am skeptical of generalized approaches to reducing suffering. (I don’t really buy the idea of « suffering in general ».) As a result, I think the most effective way to reduce suffering involves picking a cause with a suffering component you’re passionate about (medicine, public policy, animal welfare, etc) and dedicating yourself to it.
I disagreed with a lot of Vindig’s book, and it was a slog to get through, but his core claim that we should prioritize reducing extreme suffering (especially over happiness promotion for individuals who are already content) resonated well with me.
PS - I also really disliked the graphic scenes of violence and sadism described at intervals in this book. I understand other readers might need the proof, but I did not need to hear about horrific torture to be convinced of the intensity of some forms of suffering, and would have preferred he keep such discussion to the footnotes.
September 21, 2024
Probably the most moving, compelling, and important book I've ever read. It changed my world view and will probably change what I aim to do with my life. I found it to be a very enjoyable read/audiobook - I really like Magnus' writing style. It’s full of useful and interesting information, even if you don’t agree with the author’s point of view (I was a classical utilitarian before reading this book, but now find myself very convinced by a lot of the author's arguments).
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