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560 pages, Hardcover
Published January 26, 2021
The resulting influence of religious thinking on modern economic thinking, right from its origins, established resonances that then persisted, albeit in evolving form as the economic context changed, the questions economists asked shifted, and the analytical tools at their disposal expanded, right through the twentieth century. Although for the most part we are not consciously aware of them—this is why their consequences seem puzzling whenever we stumble across them—especially in America these lasting resonances with religious thinking continue to shape our current-day discussion of economic issues and our public debate over questions of economic policy. (p. x)
The central argument of this book is that our ideas about economics and economic policy have long-standing roots in religious thinking.
… the creators of modern economics lived … when belief in predestination was in retreat among English-speaking Protestants. I argue that what opened the way for the early economists’ insight into the beneficial consequences of individually motivated initiative carried out in competitive markets was the expanded vision of the human character and its possibilities that the movement away from predestinarian Calvinism fostered. Further, this benign sense of our human potential, enabled by the historic transition in religious thinking that first preceded and then accompanied it, has continued to influence the trajectory of modern Western economic thinking ever since.
A more optimistic way of thinking about the practical consequences of self-interest, especially in the economic sphere, first emerged late in the seventeenth century, in France. Oddly, the fount from which this optimism developed was a group within the Roman Catholic Church that took a harshly negative view of the human character. The Jansenists—followers of the Dutch-Belgian bishop Cornelius Jansen, who had been active in Paris as well—were Augustinians, committed to St. Augustine’s view of the centrality of sin in human existence. But Augustine also held that the behavior spurred by sin is, in some degree, the remedy for sin. Man’s socially destructive impulses are partly held in check, he thought, by other human desires that are also the consequence of his sinful nature. As a result, men have some ability, albeit limited, to live together peaceably. (Augustine similarly saw human institutions such as marriage, slavery, private property, and the state as partial remedies for pervasive sinfulness.)
Aristotle had suggested that higher living standards foster democracy. [Aristotle, Politics, Bk. 6, Ch. 5, 375.] Hume now argued that a higher material standard of living promotes “industry, knowledge and humanity,” and ultimately liberty. [Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts,” 302; 313; 306] Higher living standards brought the spread of science, improved prospects for self-government, more benevolent behavior, and more polite manners. The theme of material progress leading to moral improvement ran throughout his later History of England, and in time it became a centerpiece of Enlightenment thinking.
Wholly apart from the danger to our moral character, Smith offered a sophisticated psychological argument for thinking that many people are misguided not just in their desire for specific objects they might buy but even in their aspiration for a higher material standard of living overall. The reason, he believed, is that they fail to anticipate that getting used to some new living standard—either higher or lower—will change the way they see matters. “The great source of both the misery and disorders of human life,” he wrote, “seems to arise from over-rating the difference between one permanent situation and another”: between riches and poverty, as well as between obscurity and having a public reputation. To the contrary, it was a never-failing certainty that all men, sooner or later, will accommodate themselves to whatever becomes their permanent situation. Because of this human capacity to adapt to whatever life brings us, his beloved stoics had been right that “between one permanent situation and another there was, with regard to real happiness, no essential difference.”
Calvin went on to define original sin, which all humans acquired from Adam’s sin, as “a hereditary depravity and corruption of our nature, diffused into all parts of the soul.” Nor was original sin a matter of our being punished for what was merely our ancestors’ error. “This is not liability for another’s transgression,” Calvin insisted. “We through his transgression have become entangled in the curse…not only has punishment fallen upon us from Adam, but a contagion imparted by him resides in us.”
Locke’s tract on the Reasonableness of Christianity, published just the next year, was part of this attack on the Calvinist doctrines of depravity and predestination. Locke acknowledged the centrality to Christianity of the biblical story of the Fall, but he rejected outright the claim that Adam and Eve’s failing contaminated all humans forevermore. “It is obvious to any one, who reads the New Testament,” he began, “that the doctrine of redemption…is founded on the supposition of Adam’s fall. To understand, therefore, what we are restored to by Jesus Christ, we must consider what the scripture shows we lost by Adam.”
Beyond arguing from his own close reading of scripture, Locke also brought his expertise as a political theorist to bear on the question. Drawing on Hobbes’s well-known discussion in Leviathan of what justified one person’s standing as a representative of someone else—an issue that had been at the center of the conflict between king and Parliament in the 1640s (and that would figure again in the debates leading up to the American Revolution)—Locke asked what made Adam a legitimate representative of the entire human race to such an extent that his sin could affect all of his progeny. In advancing the doctrine of depravity, Calvin had written that “Adam was not merely the progenitor but, as it were, the root of human nature; and that therefore in his corruption mankind deserved to be vitiated.”