The End of the Twentieth Century and the End of the Modern Age

by John Lukacs

Historian John Lukacs's brilliant new book offers a provocative summing-up of the twentieth century, that age of iron which began with the guns of August in 1914 and ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. Distinguished by its author's masterly style and command of detail, The End of the Twentieth Century is a startling examination of where we are today, how we got here, and where we are headed. Centering on Europe, America, and the relations between the two, Lukacs argues that the major battle of our time has been waged between forms of nationalism rather than between communism and democracy; that the great watershed events have been the two world wars, not the Russian Revolution; and that the century's radical revolutionary was neither Lenin nor Chairman Mao but Adolf Hitler. The book puts into sharp perspective such events as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the civil war raging in what was Yugoslavia, and the resurgence of right-wing politics in a reunited Germany. Rather than the end of history, we are now witnessing the end of the modern era, and what awaits us is not the triumphal reign of liberal democracy but a troubled time that may echo much that is most questionable in our age. Informed by the precision and insight that have made Lukacs a leading historian, The End of the Twentieth Century is a reckoning both personal and professional - at once a brilliant rebuttal to Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and an outstanding, if sobering, work of historical mediation.

Genres: History, Nonfiction

291 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1993

About the author

Lukacs was born in Budapest to a Roman Catholic father and Jewish mother. His parents divorced before the Second World War. During the Second World War he was forced to serve in a Hungarian labour battalion for Jews. During the German occupation of Hungary in 1944-45 he evaded deportation to the death camps, and survived the siege of Budapest. In 1946, as it became clear that Hungary was going to be a repressive Communist regime, he fled to the United States. In the early 1950s however, Lukacs wrote several articles in Commonweal criticizing the approach taken by Senator Joseph McCarthy, whom he described as a vulgar demagogue.[1]

Lukacs sees populism as the greatest threat to civilization. By his own description, he considers himself to be a reactionary. He claims that populism is the essence of both National Socialism and Communism. He denies that there is such a thing as generic fascism, noting for example that the differences between the political regimes of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy are greater than their similarities.[2]

A major theme in Lukacs's writing is his agreement with the assertion by the French historian Alexis de Tocqueville that aristocratic elites have been replaced by democratic elites, which obtain power via an appeal to the masses. In his 2002 book, At the End of an Age, Lukacs argued that the modern/bourgeois age, which began around the time of the Renaissance, is coming to an end.[3] The rise of populism and the decline of elitism is the theme of his experimental work, A Thread of Years (1998), a series of vignettes set in each year of the 20th century from 1900 to 1998, tracing the abandonment of gentlemanly conduct and the rise of vulgarity in American culture. Lukacs defends traditional Western civilization against what he sees as the leveling and debasing effects of mass culture.

By his own admission a dedicated Anglophile, Lukacs’s favorite historical figure is Winston Churchill, whom he considers to be the greatest statesman of the 20th century, and the savior of not only Great Britain, but also of Western civilization. A recurring theme in his writing is the duel between Winston Churchill and Adolf Hitler for mastery of the world. The struggle between them, whom Lukacs sees as the archetypical reactionary and the archetypical revolutionary, is the major theme of The Last European War (1976), The Duel (1991), Five Days in London (1999) and 2008's Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat, a book about Churchill’s first major speech as Prime Minister. Lukacs argues that Great Britain (and by extension the British Empire) could not defeat Germany by itself, winning required the entry of the United States and the Soviet Union, but he contends that Churchill, by ensuring that Germany failed to win the war in 1940, laid the groundwork for an Allied victory.

Lukacs holds strong isolationist beliefs, and unusually for an anti-Communist émigré, "airs surprisingly critical views of the Cold War from a unique conservative perspective."[4] Lukacs claims that the Soviet Union was a feeble power on the verge of collapse, and contended that the Cold War was an unnecessary waste of American treasure and life. Likewise, Lukacs has also condemned the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

In his 1997 book, George F. Kennan and the Origins of Containment, 1944-1946, a collection of letters between Lukacs and his close friend George F. Kennan exchanged in 1994-1995, Lukacs and Kennan criticized the New Left claim that the Cold War was caused by the United States. Lukacs argued however that although it was Joseph Stalin who was largely responsible for the beginning of the Cold War, the administration of Dwight Eisenhower missed a chance for ending the Cold War in 1953 after Stalin's death, and as a consequence the Cold War went on for many more decades.

Reviews

[Kuszma · Rating 4 out of 5]

"Európa... Európa... magyar vagyok és amerikai. De amerikainak is, magyarnak is: európai."

Ez egyszerre volt a legirritálóbb és a legmegkapóbb Lukacs-kötet, amit valaha olvastam. Minkét elem abból fakad, hogy a szerző most nem történészi minőségében nyilatkozik meg, hanem egyfajta váteszként. Nem történelmi tényekkel bíbelődik, nem azokból von le következtetést, hanem a benyomasaiból. És ugye a benyomások sokkal inkább ki vannak téve a világnézet torzító hatásának, mint a tények - következésképp szöveggé formálva jóval sérülékenyebbek is.

Van ebben a kötetben káprázatos meglátás bőven - Lukacs már '91-ben érzékeli a magyar politikai rendszerben megbúvó autoriter tendenciákat, a felszín alatt bugyborékoló nacionalista ideológiát. Megérzi továbbá, hogy a bevándolás lesz a következő évtizedek legmarkánsabb problémaköre - jóval azelőtt, hogy a szíriai háború eszkalálta volna a kérdést. Ugyanakkor az ezzel kapcsolatos kultúrparanoiáit néha kissé elnagyoltnak érzem. És nem tudok mit kezdeni azzal a katyvasszal sem, amit Oroszország jövője kapcsán tár elém*.

Szóval vegyesfelvágott a kötet, merő ambivalencia - de termékeny ambivalencia. Nem csak azért, mert tele van igazán érdekes történelmi anekdotákkal** meg inspiráló gondolatfutamokkal. Hanem mert személyes. Nyilván amikor egy író személyes, akkor óhatatlanul olyat is megtudunk róla, ami jobb lett vón, ha homályban marad. Itt van például Lukacs irodalmi ízlése, ami valahol ott ragadt a XIX. században. Számára a XX. századi próza a haldoklás maga, London és Hemingway pedig "másodvonalbeli" írók***. Pffff, hát. Ugyanakkor az ilyen kategorikusan kijelentett marhaságok után jön egy passzus, ahol a szerző leírja, hogyan keveredett vitába valakivel a magyarok "barátságtalanságáról" - és hogyan jutott arra a következtetésre, hogy bár zsigerileg képtelen egyetérteni vitapartnerével, de mivel tudja, milyen okos ember a másik, ezért biztos, hogy igaza kell legyen valamennyire. Ez - szerintem - szép. Olyan európai.

A legjobb részei a kötetnek talán azok, ahol Lukacs közvetlenül, mintegy naplószerűen leírja azokat a történéseket, amelyek aztán a benyomások forrásai lettek. Ezek a passzusok irodalmi értelemben finomak - azt kell mondjam, hiába pocsék Lukács irodalmi ízlése, a prózája klasszikus és tiszta. Néha egészen sokatmondó párhuzamokat tud megjelentetni - személyes kedvencem, amikor elkíséri Magyarországra barátját, Varga Bélát, akit meghívtak beszédet tartani a Parlament alakuló ülésére. Jár-kel az országban, figyeli a születőben lévő magyar demokráciát, ami ünnepélyes külsőségek mögé rejtené alapvető hiányosságait. És közben hazagondol ("haza", ez nála többértelmű szó) Pennsylvaniába, ahol le kéne nyírni a füvet, és el kéne menni a település közgyűlésébe is, megvívni a piszlicsáré harcokat az állami intézményekkel, akiknek feltett szándékuk lebetonozni mindent, amit csak érnek. Az egyik oldalon a nagy szavak demokráciája, a szónoklatoké arról, hogy végre szabadok lettünk. Nem megcsináljuk a szabadságot - hanem azok lettünk, punktum. A másik oldalon a demokrácia valósága: a közösségi együttműködés, ahol az intézményekkel folytatott állandó és békés konfrontáció tartja életben a demokratikus gondolatot. Ahol a szabadság nem ajándék, ami jár nekünk, hanem folyamatos tevékenység. Ide kéne eljutni.

* Az oroszokkal kapcsolatos (néha ellentmondásos) próféciái egy Bismarck-i mondatba futnak ki, miszerint a XXI. század kulcsmomentuma talán az lesz, hogy az oroszok végső soron fehérek. No most tény, hogy a századból még sok van hátra, de jelen helyzetben nem tudom, miért kéne örüljek annak, hogy Putyin fehér. Tőlem lehetne zöld, lila vagy skótkockás is, csak kushadjon végre.
** Ezek közül nem kevéssel már találkoztunk persze más Lukacs-művekben. Különösen azokkal, amelyek Churchillt fényezik.
*** "Másodvonalbeli", ééérted. Tehát nem az van, hogy "nem tetszik", "szerintem nem jó", hanem objektíve a második vonalban van. Mintha az irodalmat is olyan moccanatlan kategóriákba lehetne szorítani, mint a fizikai törvényszerűségeket.

[Liquidlasagna · Rating 3 out of 5]

sorta almost interesting in places and really lousy in places
but his predictions are somewhat fascinating


being compared to Fukuyama is never a good thing... by the way

but this is a good question
why does the end of the century have anything to do with the end of other things?

could just be geopolitics and technological growth
it could be oil and energy issues
it could be the lack of investment in education and good jobs for everyone

and Fu-kuku-yama is never a good thing to be compared to....
never be a neocon futurist and then run away from your political identity

to me a neocon is reckless foreign policy
and a futurist is usually a lot of reckless optimism

[Paul W · Rating 2 out of 5]

Nationalism, not Communism, was the main political force in the twentieth century. While much of the political narrative of the second half of the twentieth century was focused on the consequences of the rivalry between the USA and the USSR and their satellites, Lukacs argues that it was actually nationalism that has been the main political force during this period and because this was not realised by a succession of US presidents the Cold War lasted longer then it should have.
Lukacs notes that Tocqueville, writing in 1852, cautioned that "The insane fear of socialism throws the bourgeois headlong into the arms of despotism". This proved prophetic as the US’s fear of Communist expansion and the Domino theory, meant they provided support to despots in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Lukacs also argues that the rise of nationalism, rather than Communism, drove political changes in Africa: ‘the ideas and the appeal of anti-colonialism (more precisely, tribal nationalism) have been more enduring than the idea of the proletarian revolution of the international working class...’
The creation of new states following the dissolution of the USSR in the 1990s, echoed the creation of a dozen "independent" states in Eastern Europe after World War I following the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Lukcas argues that the instability the latter was a causal factor of the second world war: ‘Both world wars broke out in Eastern Europe, but the Second World War broke out because of Eastern Europe.’ (p98)
Understanding the history of the twentieth century is important as the history of the twenty-first century is shaped by current events including Russia’s actions in 2014 in the Ukraine and threats to the Baltic States in 2015. Lukacs, somewhat prophetically, notes that ‘The great question is that of the Ukrainians. I find it difficult to believe that their full sovereignty would be acceptable to the Russians, that they will let them go entirely. There is the involved problem of millions of Russians living within the Ukraine, as is the case also in the Baltic states.’ (p73) He goes on to note that ‘If the Russians cannot cajole them [the newly independent states of the USSR] back into some kind of federation or confederation with Russia, will the Russians resort to force to bring some of them back, or at least keep them politically in line (not to speak of the purpose of protecting millions of Russians living in this "republic")? (p64) And he reminds the reader of Bismarck’s sage counsel that "Russia is never as strong — or as weak — as she seems" (p69)
In discussing the European Union experiment Lukacs insightfully comments that "for one thing—and it may be the essential one— there is no authority, no instrument to enforce these agreements, laws and regulations if one or another of the member states would reject or refuse to abide by them.’ (p254)
Despite identifying nationalism as the main political force, Lukacs does not discuss the growing nationalism in middle east or the rise of China and Chinese nationalism. Writing during the transition of the USSR into the Commonwealth of Independent States, but before its disaggregation into multiple states, Lukacs notes that "If anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficacy of the Party as a political instrument, Soviet Russian might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies". These same factors impact the Chinese ‘empire’ today however this is left unexplored. Lukcas opens the door to, but does not explore, a number of other interesting and challenging ideas.
His (brief) comments on the changing political landscape are more relevant than ever in the US and Australia of 2015. Lukacs notes that there is a danger ‘inherent in the increasing inefficiency of and the subsequent impatience with parliamentary rule..’ One consequence is the "tyranny of the majority" in the form of the democratic party-state. ‘The other allied danger is the inclination of the ruling party to do everything to maintain its majority…’ (p262) He comments briefly that ‘The confusion of state and government is an American phenomenon. It is evident especially among Republicans and "conservatives" who argue incessantly against Big Government, while at the same time they are the most fervent advocates of the extension of the powers of the state…’ (p260). And warns that one of the consequent dangers is the subordination of qualified independent people in the state bureaucracy by people whose main qualification is their loyalty to the government party and their contempt for its opposition’; ‘parliamentary and liberal (and also conservative) democracy means, or ought to mean, the respect for the rights of minorities, including the government’s opposition…’ (p260) These topics are critical and deserved much greater exploration and comment.
With the growing debate on climate change and sustainable growth, Lukas comments that ‘Near the end of the twentieth century—indeed, near the end of the so-called Modern Age—two dangerous circumstances threaten the world. One is the institutionalized pressure for material and economic ‘growth’—contrary to stability and threatening nature itself. The other is the existence of the populist inclinations of nationalism—contrary to a greater and better understanding among people… One is the thrust for increasing wealth; the other, for tribal power.’ (p289) This is another important issue which does not receive the attention it deserves.
Lukacs asserts that the existence of the US depended on the condition that the prevalent majority of its inhabitants spoke English and contrasts this to European whose citizens speak and think in different languages. But he fails to provide any supporting arguments for this assertion, draw any conclusion from this or comment on the consequences for US nationalism of the rapid growth of Spanish speakers. He notes, without exploration that ‘unquestionable and unquestioned respect for the sovereignty of states is essentially a monarchical and aristocratic phenomenon, surviving into the democratic age.’ (p252)
The great distraction from an otherwise engaging book is Lukac’s self-indulgent detour through his return to Hungary -this adds nothing to the central idea, and crowds out areas that would have benefited from greater comment. Lukacs premise promised much potential. As Lukacs notes ‘Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century the most powerful political force in the world is nationalism still.’ (p208) However in his seeming haste to rush to print during the break-up of the Soviet Union, Lukacs leaves his reader with some broad questions to which he provides only a shallow analysis. The central tenets of this book are powerful - and the events of the last quarter century would be fertile ground for a revised and updated edition. However in its current format - part history and part memoir - ultimately this book fails at both.

[Joshua Johnson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Lukacs is prophetic. He foresaw much of what has come to pass, and predicted much of what is likely to, way back at the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the GHWB presidency. I think here and there he is unnecessarily conclusory in his arguments and hasty in his judgments, and he also betrays his origin by his focus on Eastern/Central Europe; however he is for all that quite insightful. Worth reading.

[Timur · Rating 2 out of 5]

Başlarında gayet keyif almama rağmen çok dağınık ve non-sistematik bir değerlendirme ve fikir yazısı topluluğu olmuş.

[Teoman TURKOGLU · Rating 1 out of 5]

Rezillik.