Antony Beevor's work is a wonderful overview of the battle for Berlin.
In the final year of the Second World War, Joseph Stalin wanted the Red Army to occupy Berlin first, and there was a very strong reason for this wish. In May 1942, he had summoned Lavrenty Beria and the leading atomic physicists to his villa. He was furious to have heard through spies that the United States and Britain were working on a uranium bomb. Over the next three years, the Soviet nuclear research programme, soon codenamed Operation Borodino, was dramatically accelerated with detailed research information from the Manhattan Project provided by Communist sympathizers. Beria himself took over supervision of the work and eventually brought Professor Igor Kurchatov’s team of scientists under complete NKVD control. The Soviet programme’s main handicap, however, was a lack of uranium, reveals Beevor. No deposits had been identified yet in the Soviet Union. Therefore, Stalin and Beria’s greatest hope of getting the project moving ahead rapidly lay in seizing German supplies of uranium before the Western Allies got to them.
According to Beevor, there have never been any doubt in the minds of the Nazi leadership that the fight for Berlin would be the climax of the war. "The National Socialists," Goebbels had always insisted, "will either win together in Berlin or die together in Berlin." He also used to paraphrase Karl Marx, declaring that "whoever possesses Berlin possesses Germany." "Stalin, on the other hand, undoubtedly knew the rest of Marx’s quote: ‘And whoever controls Germany, controls Europe,'" adds Beevor.
The American war leaders, however, were clearly unfamiliar with such European sayings. They – at that stage – simply did not view Europe in strategic terms. They had a limited objective: to win the war against Germany quickly, with as few casualties as possible, and then concentrate on Japan. General Dwight Eisenhower – like President Truman, the chiefs of staff, and other senior officials – failed to look ahead and completely misread Stalin’s character, argues Beevor. This exasperated British colleagues and led to the main rift in the western alliance. Some British officers even referred to Eisenhower’s deference to Stalin as "Have a Go, Joe", a call used by London prostitutes when soliciting American soldiers.
On 2 March, Eisenhower signalled to Major General John R. Deane, the US liaison officer in Moscow, "In view of the great progress of the Soviet offensive, is there likely to be any major change in Soviet plans from those explained to Tedder [on 15 January]?" He then asked whether there would be a lull in operations mid-March to mid-May. But Deane found it impossible to obtain any reliable information from General Antonov, the Soviet chief of staff. (And when finally the Soviets did state their intentions, they deliberately misled Eisenhower to conceal their determination to seize Berlin first.)
As Beevor reveals, in the difference of views over strategy, American personalities unavoidably clashed. While General Montgomery, for instance, favored a single, "full-blooded" thrust towards Berlin, Eisenhower suspected that his demands were prompted solely by "prima donna ambitions." He weighted an attack southwards partly because he was convinced that Hitler would withdraw his armies to Bavaria and northwestern Austria for a last-ditch defence of the Alpine Fortress. He conceded later in his memoirs that Berlin was "politically and psychologically important as the symbol of remaining German power", but he believed that "it was not the logical nor the most desirable objective for the forces of the Western Allies". As Beevor explains, Eisenhower justified this decision on the grounds that the Red Army on the Oder was much closer and the logistic effort would have meant holding up his central and southern armies, and his objective of meeting up with the Red Army to "split Germany in two".
Six days earlier, Winston Churchill had hoped that "our armies will advance against little or no opposition and will reach the Elbe, or even Berlin, before the Bear". Now he was thoroughly dismayed. It seemed to him as if Eisenhower was far too concerned with placating Stalin because the Soviet authorities were angry about an accidental shooting of several Soviet aircrafts by American fighters.
Ironically, despite their efforts, it was the Americans who provoked the biggest row with the Soviet Union at this time: when Allen Dulles of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) had been approached by SS Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff about an armistice in north Italy, the Soviet leadership’s demands to participate in the talks were rejected in case Wolff might break them off. This, asserts Beevor, was a blunder. The Soviet Union was understandably alarmed, and Stalin began to fear a separate peace on the Western Front even more. "His recurrent nightmare," writes the author, "was a revived Wehrmacht supplied by the Americans."
The Soviet dictator also suspected that the huge numbers of Wehrmacht troops surrendering to the Americans and British in the west of Germany revealed not just their fear of becoming prisoners of the Red Army but also a deliberate attempt to open up the Western Front to allow the Americans and British to reach Berlin first. In fact, the reason for such large surrenders at that time was Hitler’s refusal to allow any withdrawal. If he had brought his armies back to defend the Rhine after the Ardennes débâcle, explains Beevor, the Allies would have faced a very hard task. But he did not, and this allowed them to trap so many divisions west of the Rhine. "We owed much to Hitler," Eisenhower commented later.
Meanwhile, Churchill felt strongly that until Stalin’s post-war intentions in central Europe became clearer, the West had to grab "every good card available for bargaining with him". Recent reports of what was happening in Poland, with mass arrests of prominent figures who might not support Soviet rule, strongly suggested that Stalin had no intention of allowing an independent government to develop; Molotov had also become extremely aggressive. The British Prime Minister's earlier confidence based on Stalin’s lack of interference in Greece had now started to disintegrate. He suspected that both he and Roosevelt had been the victims of "a massive confidence trick". As Beevor explains, Churchill still did not seem to realize that Stalin judged others by himself. It would appear that he had acted on the principle that Churchill, after all his comments at Yalta about having to face the House of Commons over the subject of Poland, had simply needed "a bit of democratic gloss to keep any critics quiet until everything was irreversibly settled." Stalin now appeared to be angered by the Prime Minister's renewed complaints over the Soviet Union’s behaviour in Poland.
In any case, Eisenhower's view that Berlin itself was "no longer a particularly important objective" demonstrated, according to Beevor, "an astonishing naivety." Yet, the irony was that Ike's decision to avoid Berlin was almost certainly the right one, albeit for the wrong reasons. For Stalin, the Red Army’s capture of The Third Reich's capital was far too important a matter. "If any forces from the Western Allies had crossed the Elbe and headed for Berlin, they would almost certainly have found themselves warned off by the Soviet air force, and artillery if in range," comments Beevor. Stalin would have had no compunction in condemning the Western Allies and accusing them of criminal "adventurism". While Eisenhower gravely underestimated the importance of Berlin, Churchill, on the other hand, underestimated both Stalin’s determination to secure the city at any price and the genuine moral outrage which would have greeted any western attempt "to seize the Red Army’s prize from under its nose".
At the end of March, the Stavka in Moscow put the finishing touches to the plan for "the Berlin operation". Marshal Zhukov, who was to be responsible for seizing Berlin, shared Stalin’s fears that the Germans would open their front to the British and Americans. His fear only intensified when Stalin showed him a letter from a "foreign well-wisher" tipping off the Soviet leadership about secret negotiations between the Western Allies and the Nazis. While it did explain that the Americans and British had refused the German proposal of a separate peace, the possibility of the Germans opening the route to Berlin still "could not be ruled out". "Well, what have you got to say?’ said Stalin. Not waiting for a reply, he said, " I think Roosevelt won’t violate the Yalta agreement, but as for Churchill… that one’s capable of anything."
Equipped with such notions, Stalin, General Antonov, and Foreign Affairs Commissar Molotov met with the US ambassador, Averell Harriman, and his British counterpart, Sir Archibald Clerk Kerr, on March 31 in Kremlin. Stalin talked about virtually every front except the crucial Oder (along which the Soviet onslaught on Berlin would be launched). He enthusiastically approved of Eisenhower's plan of an attack southwards, commenting that it was a good one "in that it accomplished the most important objective of dividing Germany in half".
However, the very next morning the Soviet dictator received Marshals Zhukov and Konev in his study in Kremlin and showed them a telegram, presumably sent by one of the Red Army liaison officers at SHAEF headquarters. The message claimed that – in fact – General Montgomery would head for Berlin and that General Patton’s Third Army would also divert from its advance towards Leipzig and Dresden to attack Berlin from the south. The Stavka had already heard of the plan to drop parachute divisions on Berlin in the event of a sudden collapse of the Nazi regime. All of this, reasoned Stalin, evidently combined into an Allied plot to seize Berlin first under the pretense of assisting the Red Army. ("One cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that Stalin had the telegram faked to put pressure on both Zhukov and Konev," remarks Beevor.)
"Well, then," Stalin asked the two marshals after the telegram was read. "Who is going to take Berlin: are we or are the Allies?"
"It is we who shall take Berlin,’ Konev replied immediately, "and we will take it before the Allies."
When Stalin asked how Konev intended to accomplish this, the marshal replied that Comrade Stalin "needn't worry". His desire to beat Zhukov to Berlin was unmistakable and Stalin, who liked to engender rivalry among his subordinates, was clearly satisfied.
As Beevor further narrates, soon afterwards General Antonov presented the overall plan; then Konev and Zhukov presented theirs, and the Stavka started working in great haste, fearing that the Allies would be quicker than Soviet troops in taking Berlin.
They had much to coordinate: the operation to capture the city involved 2.5 million men, 41,600 guns and mortars, 6,250 tanks and self-propelled guns and 7,500 aircraft. No doubt, asserts Beevor, Stalin took satisfaction in the fact he was concentrating a far more powerful mechanized force to seize the capital of the Reich than Hitler had deployed to invade the whole of the Soviet Union.
Meanwhile, the Soviet dictator also continued leading his Western Allies by their noses – after the main conference on April 1, he replied to the American supreme commander that his plan "completely coincided" with the plans of the Red Army, and assured his trusting ally that "Berlin has lost its former strategic importance" and that the Soviet command would send only second-rate forces against it. The Red Army, continued he, would be delivering its main blow to the south, to join up with the Western Allies; the advance of the main forces would start approximately in the second half of May, but this plan "may undergo certain alterations, depending on circumstances."
Little did the Allies know what a Berlin operation "the genius commander-in-chief, Comrade Stalin," (as the political department of the 1st Ukrainian Front had called him) had prepared for them... "It was," observes Beevor with a tinge of humor, "the greatest April Fool in modern history."
Every time I pick up a book by Antony Beevor I can't help but be completely astonished by his masterful recreation of dialogues, sketching of portraits of eminent historical figures, and wonderfully detailed descriptions. It is impossible to efficiently summarize "BERLIN: The Downfall" in a single review. While my favorite parts of the book are the ones dealing with the political schemes "at the top" and the battle's logistics, (which is probably obvious from my review), the work doesn't overlook neither the Nazi commanders' point of view, which by this stage of the war could be perfectly summarized by Guderian's reply to Hitler's assurances that the Eastern Front "had never possessed such a strong reserve" ("The Eastern Front is like a house of cards. If the front is broken through at one point all the rest will collapse."), nor the battle for Berlin itself or the suffering of ordinary Berliners, gaunt from short rations and stress and pestered by Allied air raids and Goebbels' propaganda. Beevor spares no horrific details, such as, for example, the mass rape of German women by Soviet soldiers in the Reich's capital. A chapter is even devoted to Hitler's last refuge, the bunker, to Eva Braun, and to Goebbels and his family's suicide; although I've read about this episode more than once, I have to say that none of the authors' I'm familiar with has depicted those scenes as cinematically as Beevor.
A graphically, compellingly written and brilliantly researched book on the Wehrmacht's downfall, the battle for Berlin.