Book: The Great Terror: A Reassessment
Author: Robert Conquest
Publisher: Oxford University Press Inc; Reprint edition (21 November 1991)
Language: English
Paperback: 570 pages
Item Weight: 794 g
Dimensions: 23.34 x 3.78 x 15.39 cm
Price: 5397/-
Take the case of Kirov.
The author writes, “Late in the afternoon of 1 December 1934, the young assassin Leonid Nikolayev entered the Smolny, headquarters of the Communist Party in Leningrad. The few hours of the city’s thin winter daylight were over, and it was quite dark.
The lights of the former aristocratic girls’ school, from which Lenin had organized the “ten days that shook the world,” shone out over its colonnade and gardens, and eastward up the icy Neva. The outer guard examined Nikolayev’s pass, which was in order, and let him in without trouble. In the interior, the guard posts were unmanned, and Nikolayev wandered down the ornate passages until he found the third-floor corridor on to which Sergei Kirov’s office opened.
He waited tolerantly outside.
Kirov was at home preparing a report on the November plenum of the Central Committee, from which he had just returned. He was to deliver it to the aktiv of the Leningrad Party in the Tavride Palace that evening, and was not expected at the Smolny.
However, he arrived there at about 4:00 P.M., and after speaking to his trusted aide, Leningrad’s Second Secretary Mikhail Chudov, and others, he walked on towards his own office just after 4:30.1 Nikolayev moved from a corner, shot him in the back with a Nagan revolver, and then collapsed beside him.
At the sound of the shot, Party officials came running along the corridor. They were astonished at the absence of guards. Even Kirov’s chief bodyguard, Borisov, who according to standing instructions should have been with him, was nowhere to be seen, though he had accompanied Kirov as far as the Smolny’s front door.
This killing has every right to be called the crime of the century. Over the next four years, hundreds of Soviet citizens, including the most prominent political leaders of the Revolution, were shot for direct responsibility for the assassination, and literally millions of others went to their deaths for complicity in one or another part of the vast conspiracy which allegedly lay behind it. Kirov’s death, in fact, was the keystone of the entire edifice of terror and suffering by which Stalin secured his grip on the Soviet peoples…..”
After this book was written, for at least two decades, Conquest’s tome was the state-of-the-art description or the years 1937–38.
But, starting in about 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union’s final ruler, launched glasnost, the policy of ‘openness’, and the first real open dialogue on the crimes of Stalinism inside the USSR.
Partly due to that discussion, the Soviet Union itself collapsed a few years later.
In succeeding years, Soviet archives opened for the first time to both Russian and foreign historians. Consequently, quite a bit more has been learned about Stalin, about the 1930s, and in particular about the years 1937–38. It became possible to write about Stalinism in different and more precise ways, using sources that were not available in 1968.
What it only did was to substantiate 99 percent of the views of the author.
The three-part narrative has been divided into fiftenn chapters and an Epilogue.
Book I, entitled ‘THE PURGE BEGINS’ is divided into the following five sections:
1. Stalin Prepares
2. The Kirov Murder
3. Architect of Terror
4. Old Bolsheviks Confess
5. The Problem of Confession
Book II, entitled ‘THE YEZHOV YEARS’ is divided into the following nine sections:
6. Last Stand
7. Assault on the Army
8. The Party Crushed
9. Nations in Torment
10. On the Cultural Front
11. In the Labor Camps
12. The Great Trial
13. The Foreign Element
14. Climax
Book III, entitled ‘AFTERMATH’ contains a singular section, viz.
15. Heritage of Terror
The Epilogue is entitled as, ‘The Terror Today’
Though one has heard that ‘History is not a burden on the memory but an enlightenment of the soul’, history indeed bears the burden of the past.
One must bear in mind that ‘The Great Terror’ of 1936 to 1938 did not come out of the blue. Like any other historical phenomenon, it had its roots in the past.
It would no doubt be deceptive to argue that it followed unavoidably from the nature of Soviet society and of the Communist Party. It was itself a means of enforcing aggressive change upon that society and that party. But all the same, it could not have been launched except against the unusually distinctive background of Bolshevik rule; and its special characteristics, some of them barely believable to foreign minds, derive from a specific tradition.
The dominating ideas of the Stalin period, the evolution of the oppositionists, the very confessions in the great show trials, can hardly be followed without considering not so much the whole Soviet past as the development of the Party, the consolidation of the dictatorship, the movements of faction, the rise of individuals, and the materialization of extreme economic policies.
After the death of Lenin in January 1924, there was a struggle for power. Among those who aspired to succeed Lenin was Trotsky, a brilliant Jew who had participated in the revolution of 1905 and was exiled for a long period. Having rejoined Lenin in 1917, he was a gifted orator and a powerful writer who with “the flame of fire” aroused the people to revolutionary fervour. He was the organiser of the Red Army and was rightly called the ‘Russian Carnot’.
Joseph Stalin on the contrary, the son of a cobbler, was a Bolshevik since 1903. He fought the Czarist autocracy and was exiled to Siberia. He became a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party. In 1919, he became the General Secretary of the Central Party Committee. The main difference between Stalin and Trotsky was that while Stalin stood for “socialism in a single country”. Trotsky stood for a “permanent” world revolution.
In the historic contest, Stalin was triumphant and Trotsky was expelled from the Communist Party in 1927 and exiled. On 20 August 1940, Trotsky was murdered under questioning circumstances in Mexico.
During the years 1935-38, there was a sequence of breathtaking trials in Russia.
Most of the old guard of the Bolshevik Party and some Generals of the Red Army were accused of high treason, tried and disposed of.
In January 1935, Zinoviev, the organiser and head of the Third International and Kamenev, Vice-President of the Union Council of People’s Commissars, were arrested and charged with the offence of conspiring to murder Stalin with the help of the German secret police.
Zinoviev was sentenced to ten years’ incarceration and Kamenev to five years’ incarceration.
In August 1936 they were re-tried before the Supreme Military Tribunal and sentenced to be shot. In January 1937, charges of conspiracy to assist foreign aggressors in an attack on the Soviet Union were brought against Radek, a former leader of the Third International, Sokolnikov, former Soviet Ambassador in London and Piatakov.
In June 1937, Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven Red Army Generals were convicted and sentenced to death. In the same year, thousands of persons in all walks of life were arrested and punished. Many famous Bolsheviks, who were the heroes of the Revolution like Borodin and Bela Kun, were imprisoned or deported or deposed.
Even the military judges themselves were eventually liquidated. Six out of the eight military judges who tried the Red Army Generals in 1937 were degraded by the end of 1938. In March 1938, the remaining “old Bolsheviks” were tried and purged. Rykov, Bukharin, Rakovsky and Yagoda were among them.
It is contended that the above-mentioned purges were the outcome of the determination of Stalin and his close associates to concentrate all power in their own hands at all costs.
“If this is true, the purges take their place in the physiological history of single party totalitarian dictatorship as further evidence that the nemesis of monolithic parties is self-destruction and the price of absolute power is absolute corruption…Only when the entire old guard had been destroyed would Stalin feel secure.” Isaac Deutscher, the biographer of Stalin, writes that the chief motive of Stalin was “to destroy the men who represented the potentiality of alternative Government, perhaps not of one but of several alternative Governments.
With the long story of Trotskite opposition in mind, Stalin took no chances. His enemies had to die as traitors not martyrs; hence the grossly exaggerated charges and the insatiable thirst for confession.”
What happened in Russia under Stalin could not be understood or estimated in any commonsensical fashion, if by common sense we mean notions that sound reasonable and natural to the democratic Westerner.
Many of the misunderstandings which appeared in Britain and America during the Great Trials were due to chauvinism, prejudice and intolerance—not necessarily to prejudice supportive of the Soviet regime or of Stalin, but at least prejudice in regard to certain events or interpretations of them as intrinsically improbable.
The Great Trials were, and it should have been plain at the time, nothing but large-scale frame-ups.
But it was unusually difficult for many in the West to credit this, to believe that a State could actually perpetrate on a vast scale such a cheap and third-rate system of dishonesty.
Bernard Shaw typically remarked, “I find it just as hard to believe that [Stalin] is a vulgar gangster as that Trotsky is an assassin.”
Most probably, he would not have been surprised at some such events in quite highly organized societies like Imperial Rome or Renaissance Florence. But the Soviet State appeared to have a certain impersonality, and not clearly to lend itself to actions determined not so much by political ideas as by the overt personal plotting which had afflicted those earlier regimes.
There was another powerful factor.
Both opponents of and sympathizers with the Russian Revolution thought of the Communists as a group of “dedicated” (or “fanatical”) men whose faults or virtues were at any rate incompatible with common crime—something like the Jesuits of the Counter-Reformation.
England has had little recent experience of revolutionary movements, and this idea persists. It is the type of general notion which the uninformed are likely to assume simply out of ignorance, and it has not lost its obscuring power to this day.
Men like Stalin, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Molotov, and Yagoda had been members of the underground Bolshevik Party in the time of its illegal struggle against Tsardom. Whatever their faults, they had thus established at least enough bona fides to exempt them from the suspicion that they did in fact behave as they are now known to have done.
Even now, doubtless, there are those in the West who find it hard to swallow the notion of the top leaders of the Soviet Communist Party writing obscene and brutal comments on the appeals for mercy of the men they knew to be thoroughly innocent.
The mistake was, in fact, in the idea held in this country about revolutionary movements. In practice, they not only are joined by simon-pure idealists, but also consist of a hodgepodge of members in whom the idealist component is accompanied by all sorts of motivations—vanity, power seeking, and mere freakishness.
Perhaps the commonest reaction was to believe that the case against the accused in the trials was exaggerated, rather than false in every respect. This formula enabled those who subscribed to it to strike what they felt to be a decent commonsensical balance. In fact, it was simply a mediocre compromise between truth and falsehood, between right and wrong.
And the trials were at least directed against rivals of Stalin. The idea that Stalin had himself organized the murder of Kirov, on the face of it his closest ally and supporter—a murder in strictly criminal style—would have been rejected as absurd.
When it was suggested by a few ex-oppositionists and defectors, who knew more about the circumstances than most people, it was hardly thought worth discussing.
Such attitudes showed a basic misunderstanding of the range of political possibility in a nondemocratic culture. More particularly, they showed a failure to grasp Soviet circumstances and, above all, a misjudgment about Stalin personally.
For Stalin’s political genius consisted specifically in this: he recognized no constraints, either moral or intellectual, in his methods of securing power.
A classic, this book!!