"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy

by Ernest R. May

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Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, American

240 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1973

About the author

Ernest Richard May was an American historian of international relations whose 14 published books include analyses of American involvement in World War I and the causes of the fall of France during World War II. His 1997 book The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis became the primary sources of the 2000 film Thirteen Days that viewed the crisis from the perspective of American political leaders. He served on the 9/11 Commission and highlighted the failures of the government intelligence agencies. May taught full time on the faculty of Harvard University for 55 years, until his death.

Reviews

[John Daly · Rating 4 out of 5]

May has thought deeply about the use of history by those in the White House concerned with foreign policy. He recognizes that analogies can help their thinking, but only if properly chosen and used. The analogies can be useful in understanding a foreign country, foreign events, domestic politics, or even the U.S. bureaucracy. I like the idea of an advisory committee of historians on foreign policy (in addition to the existing one on the State Department's writing of foreign policy history from U.S. records).

[Mark Singer · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent primer on how American foreign policy after World War II was influenced by misunderstanding of past events. This was a required reading for a course on the Cold War taught by Waldo Heinrichs at Temple University in 1982.

[Chad Manske · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a well-written and thought-provoking short book by a former distinguished American historian. In the preface, Professor May cites three theses which he hopes to prove: one, "that framers of foreign policy are often influenced by beliefs about what history teaches or portends"; two, “that policy-makers ordinarily use history badly"; three, "that policy-makers can, if they will, use history more discriminatingly. The book is divided into two parts, the first consisting of four case studies around Roosevelt's prosecution of the Second World War and his efforts to build a new world order, Truman's decision in 1947 to aid Greece and Turkey; Truman's reactions to the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950, and Kennedy's and Johnson's decisions to defend South Vietnam with American arms. Part two of the book includes an analysis of the Johnson Administration's decision to bomb North Vietnam, a chapter entitled "Prediction: U. S. Foreign Policy in the Next Decade," and a final chapter in which the author pleads the case for professional historians being better used by foreign policy makers in the future. The most interesting part of the book, in my view, is the analysis of the four episodes in American diplomacy cited above. Professor May makes a persuasive case for the view that Roosevelt’s preparation for the postwar world was heavily influenced by his fear of a return to isolationist sentiment similar to what occurred in the 1920s. Roosevelt faulted Wilson for failing in 1918-19 to bring the Senate fully into the policy formulation regarding the League of Nations and other postwar planning, and he made great efforts to avoid that "lesson" of history in planning for the United Nations and other such proposals. The author also presents a convincing case that Truman was heavily influenced in his decisions in 1947 and in 1950 by his perception of what happened in the 1930's, when the Western powers did not challenge Germany, Italy or Japan in their aggressions until it was too late. The chapter on predictions about U. S. foreign policy in the next decade does not measure up in scholarship to the earlier part of the book. To be scholarly about predicting the future, the historian would need to employ some of the analytical tools of the political scientist in order to assess what the international environment might look like in the 1980s and what changes might take place in American society by then. Here the author speculates about what the future might hold simply on the basis of his reading of the United States' behavior in the world since World War II. The historian's predictive powers are probably no better than those of political scientists or of competent journalists even though he has a clearer understanding of the past. What Professor May's study shows is that even history may not serve as a very good guide to understanding the future during periods of revolutionary change. In any case, this chapter lacks both documentation and convincing analysis. Despite these few drawbacks, the book is worth reading!

[Tommy · Rating 3 out of 5]

Attempts to document ways in which policy makers have used their limited pop historical understandings to legitimize their actions. All this is based on the limited available public documents of the early 1970s, which require revision in light of the more information available today of course. The idea "serious" historians advising decision makers will result in better decisions is questionable but I can get behind the value of historical political lexicology. Some rather unimaginative predictions for what the future had in store.

[Chow · Rating 4 out of 5]

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