What happens when partisanship is pushed to its extreme? In With Ballots and Bullets, Nathan P. Kalmoe combines historical and political science approaches to provide new insight into the American Civil War and deepen contemporary understandings of mass partisanship. The book reveals the fundamental role of partisanship in shaping the dynamics and legacies of the Civil War, drawing on an original analysis of newspapers and geo-coded data on voting returns and soldier enlistments, as well as retrospective surveys. Kalmoe shows that partisan identities motivated mass violence by ordinary citizens, not extremists, when activated by leaders and legitimated by the state. Similar processes also enabled partisans to rationalize staggering war casualties into predetermined vote choices, shaping durable political habits and memory after the war's end. Findings explain much about nineteenth century American politics, but the book also yields lessons for today, revealing the latent capacity of political leaders to mobilize violence.
In our deepest and most violent crises, can American citizens leave their partisan camps to unite for the greater good of the nation? In some ways, yes; in other ways, no. Nathan P. Kalmoe writes of this problem in With Ballots and Bullets: Partisanship and Violence in the American Civil War. While the war was won by the Union—surely a strike against the argument of an inability to overcome political differences—it was ultimately a partisan war, proved in many fashions by Kalmoe.
Kalmoe covers the northern political environment of the civil war (even a bit afterwards), what affected it, and how. To gauge public opinion, Kalmoe examines state and midterm elections and incorporates an innovative random sample of Northern newspapers. The similarities in partisan characteristics might stun some readers, despite the author’s somewhat drab style. Partisan vote stability in extraordinary circumstances? Yep. The lobbing of dehumanizing language to describe opponents? Of course. Low-level political violence? They had it in spades. Two findings in particular will rattle common perceptions of Civil War political history: Lincoln’s mostly clear and comfortable path to re-election, even during the darkest days of the war in spring/summer 1864 when the President himself braced for defeat; and the Democratic Party’s gradual turn away from the war per the writings of partisan newspapers and opinion leaders. I think Kalmoe—almost desperately—wants readers to understand that when making decisions about politics, we often “follow the leader” and are influenced more than almost any other factor by their messages.
I will try not to spoil all of what’s enclosed in this book, but I suggest beforehand that you have a cursory knowledge of inference procedures or some of Kalmoe’s statistical tests (which are the proverbial bedrock slabs of the book) will confuse you. The North did win the Civil War, but nearly lost and failed to exterminate chattel slavery because of the polarization of the opposition party. A cautionary tale?
I really enjoyed the thesis and evidence in this book and found that the conclusion was quite prescient when discussing the events of 1/6/21. I found that some of the political science lingo made the text hard to follow at times, particularly since I am used to reading history monographs with less data analysis.
The ultimate conclusion that the Civil War was driven primarily on political, partisan grounds by soldiers and that things like desertion and dedication to the war effort in the North can be traced back to ideology is ultimately sound judging by the data.