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The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of the Madhyamika System
Reprint of the second edition in hardcover with dust jacket. From the library of author Terrence Penelhum with an inscription to him on the front endpaper (not the authors). 372 pp. Footnotes, glossary, apendix, index. An injury to the top of the text block on the foredge has caused some crimping to about fifty pages of text. The jacket has a sticker stain on the front panel, some short tears and a bit of soiling. Good/Good.
372 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1960
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
December 9, 2013
This classic study of Madhyamaka philosophy by Murti belongs to an earlier era of interpretation of this central philosophy of Mahayana Buddhism, an era which has been superseded by more accurate translations and interpretations of Nagarjuna and his writings. Nonetheless, Murti provides some interesting context of how Madhyamaka arose out of debates with other schools of Indian philosophy such as the Samkhya and Nyaya-Vaisesika. Recommended for students who are interested in the western exegetical evolution of what is no doubt one of the most important philosophical schools in the world, past and present.
September 6, 2022
Before I started reading this book, I already knew that its thesis - that the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism upholds an absolutist philosophy not entirely dissimilar to the philosophy of Advaita Vedanta - is seen as outdated these days, in which there predominates, on the contrary, the thesis that the Madhyamaka is above all an agnostic, skeptical or anti-metaphysical school. But seeing this book repeatedly cited in later works as a reference to very interesting theses in Buddhism made it hard to resist the temptation to read it. And truth be told, I am very grateful that this was the first book on Buddhist philosophy that I read from beginning to end. The author expounds the ideas of the Madhyamaka school with the faith and conviction of a true believer and with the erudition and rigor of a professor widely versed in both Indian and Western philosophy. In addition to the vigorous exposition of Madhyamaka, I am also grateful for the many comparisons with philosophical systems of which I had little knowledge, such as Jainism and the thought of FH Bradley. Extensive comparisons with the philosophies of Kant, Hegel, the Abhidharma, the Yogacara and, of course, Advaita Vedanta are also expounded in the book.
Now, the author's thesis is extremely subtle and difficult to grasp. Perhaps, however, the difficulty is not just the fault of the Madhyamaka's sophistication and the paradoxes that its dialectical philosophy brings home, but the fact that the author tries to fit the Madhyamaka into a mold in which it does not really fit, namely, that of a philosophy of the Absolute. And, in this, the author ends up leading himself to some very blatant contradictions.
At one point, he says, for example, that the Absolute can be contemplated immediately once the philosopher purifies his intellect of the conceptual dichotomies that distort reality; but, in another, he is forced to recognize that Kant, who likewise exposes the categories of Transcendental Reason as being subjective and not characteristic of reality, never contemplated an Absolute such as the author attributes to the Madhyamaka. Kant's thing-in-itself is just an unknown, a question mark. And this is natural, because the mere awareness that the intellect distorts reality should not lead us to a positive, more certain knowledge of a greater reality. If the mere denial of the objectivity of concepts had this positive side, then pre-conceptual beings such as babies and animals should be in possession of this Absolutist knowledge, of Nirvana.
The author, of course, maintains nothing of the sort. In fact, he quite rightly describes Madhyamaka as a philosophy of other philosophies, as a metaphilosophy. But this alone should make clear the synthetic and secondary character of the Madhyamaka. If there had not been the speculative metaphysics of earlier Indian systems, the Madhyamaka would not have arisen. Far from being an apprehension of an absolute reality, therefore, the Madhyamika philosophy is in fact completely relative to the other philosophies of India. And, by Madhyamaka's logic, the relative is, in the final analysis, non-existent, empty.
None of this proves that the Madhyamaka contradicts itself. On the contrary, the Madhyamaka makes it clear that Samsara and Nirvana are completely dependent on each other, that neither represents an ultimate reality, and that, therefore, the intellect apprehends nothing of substance. This is consistent with the current position that Madhyamaka philosophy is at core skeptical or anti-metaphysical, but not with the author's position that all Buddhism, including Madhyamaka, venerates Nirvana as the ultimate ontological reality.
There are other indications that the Madhyamaka cannot be a philosophy of the Absolute. Buddhism historically rejects the idea that the world can have a single cause, since, if everything had its origin in a single reality, one completely equal to itself, how could the universe we see with our eyes, with all its differences and diversity of phenomena, arise? For if the cause is one and equal to itself, the same should be true of the effects. The Madhyamaka never abandoned this early Buddhist argument. In fact, Madhyamikas such as Santaraksita actually deployed it to deny all sorts of cosmological single-causes, be it the God of the theists, the consciousness of the idealists, the primal matter of the Samkhya school -- or the Absolute of the Advaita Vedanta (Brahman).
Madhyamaka's agnosticism becomes clear when one looks at the Catuskoti, the school's method of dialectical exposition. The Catuskoti denies not only the many positions of other philosophical schools, but also the negation of those positions (the fourth term of the Catuskoti). All possible philosophical theses are incorrect, including the one that denies all positions.
In fact, many scholars think that Nagarjuna threw himself into philosophical debate, not because knowledge of Nirvana depends on dialectical criticism of other philosophies, as the author thinks, but to show to other Buddhist philosophers that nothing positive or negative can be proved by speculative reason and thus force them to abandon philosophical debate altogether, so that they could free themselves from the attachment to particular points of view (whatever they may be) and from the anxieties of eristic dispute, and finally enter the practical world, to fulfill their obligation to lead all creatures to Nirvana.
The author is aware of some of these objections and at times tries to cover the gaps found in his thesis, which he does with enormous rhetorical talent and inventiveness of argument. But, I think that, deep down, he was aware that some of these difficulties were impossible to resolve without abandoning the thesis that Madhyamaka is a philosophy of the Absolute: a thesis to which he seems to be attached even at a personal level, as is clear in the last pages of the book. The position that the Madhyamaka was skeptical must have seemed to him too poor and lifeless compared to the star-bright glow of the Absolutist conception that was in vogue in his day. But it is noteworthy that, although he masterfully composes numerous comparisons of Madhyamaka with realist, idealist, absolutist and relativist philosophies, he never tries to distinguish it from a skeptical philosophy.
Now, the author's thesis is extremely subtle and difficult to grasp. Perhaps, however, the difficulty is not just the fault of the Madhyamaka's sophistication and the paradoxes that its dialectical philosophy brings home, but the fact that the author tries to fit the Madhyamaka into a mold in which it does not really fit, namely, that of a philosophy of the Absolute. And, in this, the author ends up leading himself to some very blatant contradictions.
At one point, he says, for example, that the Absolute can be contemplated immediately once the philosopher purifies his intellect of the conceptual dichotomies that distort reality; but, in another, he is forced to recognize that Kant, who likewise exposes the categories of Transcendental Reason as being subjective and not characteristic of reality, never contemplated an Absolute such as the author attributes to the Madhyamaka. Kant's thing-in-itself is just an unknown, a question mark. And this is natural, because the mere awareness that the intellect distorts reality should not lead us to a positive, more certain knowledge of a greater reality. If the mere denial of the objectivity of concepts had this positive side, then pre-conceptual beings such as babies and animals should be in possession of this Absolutist knowledge, of Nirvana.
The author, of course, maintains nothing of the sort. In fact, he quite rightly describes Madhyamaka as a philosophy of other philosophies, as a metaphilosophy. But this alone should make clear the synthetic and secondary character of the Madhyamaka. If there had not been the speculative metaphysics of earlier Indian systems, the Madhyamaka would not have arisen. Far from being an apprehension of an absolute reality, therefore, the Madhyamika philosophy is in fact completely relative to the other philosophies of India. And, by Madhyamaka's logic, the relative is, in the final analysis, non-existent, empty.
None of this proves that the Madhyamaka contradicts itself. On the contrary, the Madhyamaka makes it clear that Samsara and Nirvana are completely dependent on each other, that neither represents an ultimate reality, and that, therefore, the intellect apprehends nothing of substance. This is consistent with the current position that Madhyamaka philosophy is at core skeptical or anti-metaphysical, but not with the author's position that all Buddhism, including Madhyamaka, venerates Nirvana as the ultimate ontological reality.
There are other indications that the Madhyamaka cannot be a philosophy of the Absolute. Buddhism historically rejects the idea that the world can have a single cause, since, if everything had its origin in a single reality, one completely equal to itself, how could the universe we see with our eyes, with all its differences and diversity of phenomena, arise? For if the cause is one and equal to itself, the same should be true of the effects. The Madhyamaka never abandoned this early Buddhist argument. In fact, Madhyamikas such as Santaraksita actually deployed it to deny all sorts of cosmological single-causes, be it the God of the theists, the consciousness of the idealists, the primal matter of the Samkhya school -- or the Absolute of the Advaita Vedanta (Brahman).
Madhyamaka's agnosticism becomes clear when one looks at the Catuskoti, the school's method of dialectical exposition. The Catuskoti denies not only the many positions of other philosophical schools, but also the negation of those positions (the fourth term of the Catuskoti). All possible philosophical theses are incorrect, including the one that denies all positions.
In fact, many scholars think that Nagarjuna threw himself into philosophical debate, not because knowledge of Nirvana depends on dialectical criticism of other philosophies, as the author thinks, but to show to other Buddhist philosophers that nothing positive or negative can be proved by speculative reason and thus force them to abandon philosophical debate altogether, so that they could free themselves from the attachment to particular points of view (whatever they may be) and from the anxieties of eristic dispute, and finally enter the practical world, to fulfill their obligation to lead all creatures to Nirvana.
The author is aware of some of these objections and at times tries to cover the gaps found in his thesis, which he does with enormous rhetorical talent and inventiveness of argument. But, I think that, deep down, he was aware that some of these difficulties were impossible to resolve without abandoning the thesis that Madhyamaka is a philosophy of the Absolute: a thesis to which he seems to be attached even at a personal level, as is clear in the last pages of the book. The position that the Madhyamaka was skeptical must have seemed to him too poor and lifeless compared to the star-bright glow of the Absolutist conception that was in vogue in his day. But it is noteworthy that, although he masterfully composes numerous comparisons of Madhyamaka with realist, idealist, absolutist and relativist philosophies, he never tries to distinguish it from a skeptical philosophy.
November 26, 2021
This book is criticized, probably justly, for the euro-centrism of its approach, which draws considerably on comparisons to European idealist philosophy, Murti having been educated at Oxford. More recent studies are much more attuned to the linguistic and cultural subtleties of Nāgārjuna and the Madhyamaka. Murti had much in common with other interpreters of the earlier 20th century, notably Schterbatsky and in some ways D.T. Suzuki, with whom he shares the somewhat theosophical attitude that characterised that time.
Nevertheless, it was a profoundly important book for me at the time I read it, because it provided a way into Buddhist philosophy that resonated with my other reading and with what I was learning about meditation at the time. Apart from anything else, it gave me a life-long appreciation of Kant, which I might never have otherwise attained. Alongside it, I read Nāgārjuna's Philosophy by K. Venkata Ramanan, based mainly on translation and commentary of the Chinese edition of the MMK. Together they provide a good overveiw, in my opinion, and even if some of the criticisms of Murti are justified.
Nevertheless, it was a profoundly important book for me at the time I read it, because it provided a way into Buddhist philosophy that resonated with my other reading and with what I was learning about meditation at the time. Apart from anything else, it gave me a life-long appreciation of Kant, which I might never have otherwise attained. Alongside it, I read Nāgārjuna's Philosophy by K. Venkata Ramanan, based mainly on translation and commentary of the Chinese edition of the MMK. Together they provide a good overveiw, in my opinion, and even if some of the criticisms of Murti are justified.
August 12, 2016
One more hit at Kant before we go..."Paradoxically, criticism in Kant is in the service of dogmatism." (p. 301)
"The scientific method of explanation, through hypothesis and verification by appeal to sense-experience, necessarily restricts the scope of science to the empirical.
Speculative metaphysic has certainly freed itself of this limitation...[however]...Each philosophical system selects a particular pattern and views reality from that standpoint; it becomes a view (a drsti), a position...a view is one-sided (ekantavada) and cannot give us the whole reality....we have no a priori or other means of deciding in favour of one."
(p. 335)
"The student of philosophy can only suggest that the Madhyamika Absolutism can serve as the basis for a possible world-culture."
(p. 341)
"The scientific method of explanation, through hypothesis and verification by appeal to sense-experience, necessarily restricts the scope of science to the empirical.
Speculative metaphysic has certainly freed itself of this limitation...[however]...Each philosophical system selects a particular pattern and views reality from that standpoint; it becomes a view (a drsti), a position...a view is one-sided (ekantavada) and cannot give us the whole reality....we have no a priori or other means of deciding in favour of one."
(p. 335)
"The student of philosophy can only suggest that the Madhyamika Absolutism can serve as the basis for a possible world-culture."
(p. 341)
April 26, 2015
A comprehensive study of the dialectic philosophy of Nāgārjuna. I don't know enough about classical Indian thought to fully comprehend the subtleties of Murti's explications, but I came away from the book with a better understanding of the Madhyamaka and its unique approach to metaphysics. Especially helpful were the author's comparisons with Kant and Hegel, who wrestled with similar problems regarding the limits of reason.
June 25, 2015
Some nice chapters in the middle, and also the concluding section is good. Still, the book’s style and presentation seem already quite outfashioned.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews