Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War

by Paul D'Anieri

D'Anieri explores the dynamics within Ukraine, between Ukraine and Russia, and between Russia and the West, that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union and eventually led to war in 2014. Proceeding chronologically, this book shows how Ukraine's separation from Russia in 1991, at the time called a 'civilized divorce', led to what many are now calling 'a new Cold War'. He argues that the conflict has worsened because of three underlying factors - the security dilemma, the impact of democratization on geopolitics, and the incompatible goals of a post-Cold War Europe. Rather than a peaceful situation that was squandered, D'Anieri argues that these were deep-seated pre-existing disagreements that could not be bridged, with concerning implications for the resolution of the Ukraine conflict. The book also shows how this war fits into broader patterns of contemporary international conflict and should therefore appeal to researchers working on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia's relations with the West, and conflict and geopolitics more generally.

Genres: History, Russia, Ukraine, Nonfiction, Politics, War, Military Fiction

292 pages, Hardcover

First published October 31, 2019

About the author

Paul D’Anieri is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of California, Riverside.

Reviews

[Harish Namboothiri · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Full article is posted here

Ever since the Russia invaded into Ukrainian territory, I have read many articles, blog posts, opinion pieces and YouTube videos analysing the motives behind it. Most of them are obviously biased, more interested in assigning blame on any one party among the three that are involved and not particularly bothered about objectivity. I scanned several books written on the subject, to find at least a partially objective one that can help me understand the conflict.

I found such a book when I came up on Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce To Uncivil War by Paul D'anieri,  a political scientist who is an expert on Ukraine and Russia. The uncivil war referred in the title is not the present conflict. It is the one in 2014 in which Russia annexed Crimea after a protest in Ukraine that ousted its government, which Russia backed. In that sense, the book is incomplete by a very small degree for my purpose, but it can be still crucial in comprehending the current episode.

[Scriptor Ignotus · Rating 4 out of 5]

Update: Lord, have mercy.

At this moment, a Russian invasion of Ukraine seems virtually inevitable. Though Russia claims no intent of “aggressive” action toward Ukraine, it is steadily amassing troops at the border and making a number of demands from NATO that the latter is unwilling to countenance and the former is unwilling to abandon. Russia demands that the United States provide a legally-binding guarantee that Ukraine will never be permitted to join NATO, and that it limit military exercises in eastern NATO member states like Poland, Estonia, and Latvia. Russia will not tolerate the permanent incorporation of Ukraine—one of the three core Slavic states, alongside Belarus and Russia itself, that formed the Soviet Union in 1922—into the NATO/EU alliance structure, while the West will not allow the membership negotiations of that structure to be “vetoed” by an external power.

Russia has long viewed the subjection of Ukraine to its own sphere of influence to be nearly as vital a national security interest as if Ukraine were Russian territory; which, of course, it was from the eighteenth century until 1991, though less formally so during the Soviet era. Conversely, even the most Russophilic Ukrainian politicians have been consistently adamant in their assertions of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity; and according to survey data, a majority of the population supports greater cooperation with the EU, even after—or perhaps especially after—the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014 and its continued support for separatists in the Donbas.

With no obvious resolution in sight and the perception of high stakes by all sides, Europe appears to be on the brink of its largest and deadliest war since 1945, with dire implications for Ukraine, Europe, NATO, and the East-West divide. What specific goals Putin would aim to achieve with an invasion is the mystery of the hour, as Russia faced an unexpected degree of resistance in eastern Ukraine during its 2014 incursion and would only face more if it pushed further westward and attempted a prolonged occupation of a wide swath of a country of some 40 million people. Putin may want to further inflame eastern separatism, continuing a strategy of carving out pro-Russian exclaves in former Soviet countries which it employed in Moldova in 1992 and Georgia in 2008; or he may want a formal partition of Ukraine, which would necessitate a larger-scale invasion. Any more ambitious effort to seize all of Ukraine is unlikely to succeed but cannot be ruled out given the desperation felt in Russia at the likely prospect of an historically-crucial strategic asset swinging out of its orbit.

Paul D’Anieri provides a satisfactory primer on the historical roots of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, as well as on the issues at stake both within Ukraine and internationally, that will be helpful for a general readership seeking to better understand ongoing events. What he does not provide, however, is consolation. This account emphasizes the fact that the seeds of the present crisis—incompatible perceptions between the West and Russia regarding the post-cold war European security structure, and consequent disagreements about which side was violating the new status quo; the tug-of-war between Russia and Ukraine over the status of Crimea, Sevastopol, and the Black Sea fleet; Russia’s desire to retain its influence over Eastern Europe; and the Western assumption of a united and democratic European future—were all present in nascent form even before the USSR was formally dissolved; and over the past thirty years they have all converged into a Gordian knot that has gradually tightened around Ukraine.

In 1989, as the Cold War was thawing and Germany was reunifying, George H.W. Bush spoke of a “Europe whole and free,” comprised of a constellation of liberal-democratic nation-states integrated within a continental economic union, while Mikhail Gorbachev described “Europe as a common home,” wherein Russia would retain its great power status as the leader of a reformed (but not eliminated) Eastern Bloc. Twenty-five years later, these mutually incompatible visions would both be considered as axiomatic as ever by their respective advocates, and their inevitable collision would cut through Ukraine like a buzzsaw.

The European Union would see itself as a voluntary partnership of independent states that could incorporate new members based on the consent of their people, while Russia would view it from the outside as a monolithic power bloc that sponsored color revolutions within the former Warsaw Pact with the cynical aim of advancing the frontiers of the new European Empire—the successor of Hitler and Napoleon—and seeking ultimately to overthrow the government of Russia itself. Russia would attempt to deter NATO and EU expansion by its opposition to the NATO campaign against Serbia in the 1990s and its 2008 war with Georgia, but rather than affirming Russia’s veto power over European affairs, as it hoped, this would only increase the urgency with which Eastern Europe sought integration into the Western system, further alienating Russia. Add to this lethal brew the inevitable conflation of domestic political systems and geopolitical alignments, and the mere exercise of popular sovereignty in Ukraine, either in the form of elections or mass uprisings, would become an acute source of international conflict.

Thus it is easy to see how the Gordian knot is being pulled ever tighter, but lamentably difficult to imagine how it might be undone—except by the sword.

[Max Berendsen · Rating 5 out of 5]

Review to follow

[Caroline · Rating 5 out of 5]

I am not a historian but I found this to be an extremely comprehensive, clear, and balanced explanation of how the events between the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1990 and the seizure of Crimea ensuing war in southeast Ukraine in 2014 resulted from a long series of security issues and very different assessments by various parties of what the status quo was and what their actions meant. I recommend it very highly as background to the current situation.

Nothing can excuse the invasion of Ukraine in any way. The question is, why did Putin choose to do so? Do his 'justifications' have any basis in fact? D'Anieri (a professor at the University of California, Riverside) repeatedly circles among the major players over the course of 25 years to examine their economic and political choices in the context of their individual perceptions, situations, and values. His underlying premise is that Russia, Ukrained, Western Europe and the United States had very constrained options at any given point in time.

The themes that repeatedly come up are that the West pursued its support for democratic forces in independent states and extension of NATO without a realpolitik realization that Russia would find this threatening as it moved eastward. Similarly, Russia insisted on retaining its full Great Power status, with veto power of European decisions about issues such as NATO and EU membership, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in fact retains a 19th century Grand Alliance view of its security and rights. Of course it also views Ukraine as the historical basis of the Rus nation and cannot accept its independence. For both reasons it expected to retain Ukraine in its sphere of influence, and to eventually reintegrate it. Ukraine, for its part, played both sides off against the other in an attempt to get economic benefits without fully committing to east or west, or to making the reforms that would have allowed it to be fully accepted by the West or to free itself from the power of its own oligarchs. The oligarchs gained especially by cheap energy from Russia (as middle-men, buying cheap and selling high to consumers), and thus resisted adopting the anti-corruption measures demanded by the West.

Finally, Ukraine faces a regionally diverse political situation, with the south and east oriented toward Russia, and its north and west looking to the West. This limited the ability to forge consistent and integrated political and economic policies. Thus the drama of the Orange Revolution in 2004, various corrup elections and convictions, Yukochenko's conversion of a reasonably democratic government into an autocracy, and the 2013/14 Maiden occupation.

I've written a highly simplified version of a detailed and much more extensive review of the period in this book. It is somewhat academic, but does not presume any prior knowledge of the situation. Absolutely worth your while.

[Tim Martin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thorough, concise, relatively brief, at times rather dry, at times quite interesting, well-researched account of Russian, Ukrainian, European, and United States relations from the end of the Cold War and the independence of Ukraine up until the publication of the book (it is copyright 2019, though primarily the historical accounts of the book go through 2015) and an examination of the roots of the post-Cold War conflicts between Russia and Ukraine. I read the book with an eye towards the current 2022 conflict in Ukraine, why it occurred, was it unavoidable, and if the war is a prelude to further conflicts. In that sense the book succeeded quite well, with the author, though writing before the 2022 invasion, did in addressing the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Donetsk and Luhansk in the easternmost part of Ukraine in effect answered my questions quite well. Put succinctly, no, war was not inevitable (indeed the much more tense Cold War didn’t result in armed conflict, so certainly war was avoidable here, with the author giving examples of where Russia and Ukraine had also avoided conflict between 1991 and 2014 such as say Russian responses to Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution). However, the author showed that the possibility of war may be a bit overdetermined and whether or not Putin is in office, it is quite possible to continue or resume conflict in the future, with the author discussing how for instance Yeltsin faced pressure in Russia to at least take a much harder stance towards Ukraine than he in fact did (“a more democratic Russia may not have had a more benign attitude toward Ukraine”).

As early as page two, the author wrote that “simply waiting for Putin to depart the stage in Russia…will not bring reconciliation.” Much of the book is spent discussing the deep systemic differences between Ukraine and Russia, going into issues of Russian perceptions of Ukraine as being part of Russia, historical views of Russian claims to Ukrainian territory (such as but not limited to Crimea), long game views of how Russia believed Ukraine would inevitably end up tightly bounded politically, militarily, and economically with Russia, Russian views of being a great power with considerable local influence if not outright veto power over its neighbors actions while Europeans and Americans wanted Russia to become a more “normal” country that respects local sovereignty and internationally accepted borders, and again and again returned to the concept of a security dilemma, of how one country trying to make itself secure can either make its neighbors less secure (Ukraine joining the EU, NATO, and in general having closer ties with the West to become more secure makes Russia less secure whether in fact or in perception) or a country taking action to make itself secure can paradoxically do the opposite (Russia invading Ukraine in 2014 arguably made Russia itself less secure despite being done to in fact increase Russian security).

The author did a good job of laying out the many systemic issues keeping Russia and Ukraine apart. Many were interesting takes that I had not encountered previously, such as the role of oligarchs in Ukraine (who though not democratic, did favor a democratic government to protect their own interests, which Russia saw as threatening at least because a democratic Ukraine was a less-Russian-leaning Ukraine, but also because closer ties to Russia hurt Ukrainian oligarchs), how Russians viewed their role in Europe and the world going all the way back to World War II (“The defeated Germany accepted that its power was inherently threatening to its neighbors, while the victorious Soviet Union decided that it had earned the right to rule its neighbors”), of how average Russians viewed the “loss” of Ukraine (“The sense of something important being lost was profound. Vladimir Putin invoked this history to justify the seizure of Crimea in 2014”), and how Russian views over its failures to dictate events during the Orange Revolution was a transformative event (“This was our 9/11”) and how before then Russians had always assumed that “sooner or later Ukraine would return to the fold, the Orange Revolution raised the prospect that it might be lost permanently, and western influence was to blame.”

There is also in the book a lot of Ukrainian politics and history, some of it quite interesting such as the Orange Revolution, the 2013-2014 Euromaidan protests (complete with a map of Central Kyiv showing where various clashes occurred), the rise and fall and rise and fall of Viktor Yanukovych, and the international campaign to free the imprisoned Yuliya Tymoshenko, and some of it such as the granular particulars of Ukrainian parliamentary election results or the rise and fall of some of Ukraine’s political parties not quite so interesting.

Reading the book, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine kind of seems obvious. It also seems like Putin didn’t really learn any lessons from the 2014 invasion either (“In most of eastern and southern Ukraine, pro-Russian movements had failed to catch on, undermining the widely held belief that all Russophone Ukrainians identified with Russia and wanted to join it”).

It’s definitely an academic and not popular text, but I think anyone interested in the topic can benefit from reading it. It has extensive footnotes and each chapter closes with a nicely written and succinct conclusion.

[Mostafa · Rating 4 out of 5]

كتاب هام في رصد محطات الطريق الذي أفضى في النهاية إلى الغزو الروسي لأوكرانيا في عام 2022، هنا يهتم بول دانييري ليست بتأريخ الصراع بين البلديّن الذي بدأ منذ انهيار الاتحاد السوفييتي وانتهاء الحرب الباردة، بل برصد فلسفة الصراع ذاتها من خلال مناهج عدة تتناول علم العلاقات الدولية بين الدول.. كتب دانييري الكتاب ببرود الزواحف، فلا تكاد تنفلت من الكتاب إلى ذهنك أية فقرة يُعبر فيها الكتاب عن ميّله لأي فريق من فرق الصراع الثلاثة، روسيا أوكرانيا، أوروبا والولايات المتحدة.. تُعد فرضية دانييري الأساسية في الكتاب، هو أن تلك الحرب حربًا كان يمكن تفاديها -وهو هنا يقصد حرب 2014- لولا دور "الفاعل الشخصي-هيّومن فاكتور" حيث تُفرد على القادة في مناخ سواء ديمقراطي كان أو استبدادي سلطوي، مجموعة من الخيارات الضيّقة، وبناء عليه، انطلق دانييري إلى فرضيّته التنبؤية التي استحالت حقيقًة فيما بعد، إلى أن الأمور بين روسيا وأوكرانيا مؤداها في ظل صراع من سوء الفهم والتأويل، والمانوية التي تحكم عالم السياسة بين الواقعية الهجومية والواقعية الدفاعية، مؤداها في النهاية حربًا هجمية كتلك التي اندلعت في العام 2022.. لا أعتقد أن أي مهتم بشأن أوراسيا وأوروبا الشرقية وعالم ما بعد الحرب الباردة، يمكنه أن يستغني عن هذا الكتاب دون أن يشعر بنقصان معرفيّ وافتقاد رؤية هامة جدًا لتناول ذلك التاريخ المُلغم

[Timothy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Important now

I recommend this book for anyone who wants to dig deeper into what’s happening in Ukraine. It really explains the historical ties between Russia and Ukraine. The sources of much of the tensions in the area. And how the west and Russian hardliners, like Putin, view the prospect of NATO, the EU, and the rise of Democracy much differently. The first chapter gives you a complete overview of the points made in the book of which each subsequent chapter goes into greater detail. You’ll get a little more out of this than what you’re getting from the talking heads in the media.

[Jason Friedlander · Rating 5 out of 5]

Pretty good book on the history of Ukraine-Russia relations, especially over the past 30 years. Well worth a read for anyone curious about what’s currently going on there.

[Dmitry · Rating 2 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

Всегда ведь несли красоту
Созидали в сфере прекрасного
Результат бывал сентиментален
Светлое что-то подсказывал
Мы в нашем быту
Олицетворяли дружбу народов в действии
Гори ты в аду
Вся, блядь, прошивка эта советская

Автор пересказывает в хронологическом порядке исторические события, начиная с 1991 года и заканчивая событиями 2014. Однако как только мы в книге доходим до событий Оранжевой революции 2004, с этого места книга начинает очень сильно походить на пересказ СМИ. Автор пытается делать и свои собственные выводы, только от этого книга не становится менее похожей на сборник статей.

Вторая большая проблема книги заключается в том, что автор совершенно ничего не говорит о главной причине конфликта между Россией и Украиной. Автор хоть и вскользь упоминает о националистах на Майдане в 2014 году, но ошибается в причинах кризиса. Согласно автору, корни нынешнего конфликта нужно искать в 1991 году, когда так и не был решён конфликт вокруг Крыма. Тот же Алексей Арестович заявляет, что первый ход в этой конфронтации сделала Россия, когда попыталась в 90-х годах, то ли произвести первую попытку захвата Крыма то ли что-то в этом роде. Однако я не согласен с этими позициями. С моей точки зрения корни лежат в 2004 году, когда Ющенко зачем-то решил поднять тему Голодомора. Несмотря на то, что он заявлял, что это никак не связано с аналогией на текущую Россию, нужно быть полным идиотом, чтобы не увидеть такое сравнение СССР и РФ. Да, возможно Ющенко это сделал, потому что так принято в современной политике, когда одна доминирующая партия всегда проявляет оппозицию тому, за что голосует или что продвигает их главный соперник, т.е. другая доминирующая партия. Если Партия Регионов позиционирует себя как главного союзника России, то главная оппозиционная партия позиционирует себя в качестве союзника Европы. Как говорится, «если Евтушенко против колхозов, то тогда я за колхозы». Вот в этой истории произошло ровно то же самое. Проблемы бы в этом никакой не было бы, если бы соседом Украины не была бы диктаторская и неадекватная Россия, а хотя бы Казахстан. Беда состояла в том, что Россия решила принять эту, как говорят в футболе, подачу от Ющенко. Поэтому ответственность за начало сегодняшней трагедии лежит на политиках, как Украины, так и России (пусть и в разных пропорциях). С этого и начались все проблемы. Лично я думаю, что такое неадекватное действие со стороны РФ было связанно только с одним – найти внешнего врага, в противостоянии которому можно было объединить страну. Единственный момент в книге, где я согласен с автором, это в вопросе нерешённого крымского вопроса. Да, вопрос с Крымом нужно было решить ещё в 1991 году. Я не знаю как, но абсолютно уверен, что «большие дяди» с научными степенями определённо могли найти решение, которое устроило бы и украинскую сторону и российскую. Почему не решили? Да кто ж мог подумать, что Россия и Украина дойдут до такого события как открытое военное противостояние? Крым не являлся в России важным вопрос ни в 90-х, ни в 2000-х и даже в 2014 году мало кто о нём вспоминал. Так что «Чей Крым», является искусственной проблемой. Но у автора именно Крым и не «подконтрольная» Украина являются главными причинами военного конфликта. Я с этим не согласен и книга, хоть и пересказывает новостные сообщения тех лет, не является убедительной в этом вопросе (потому что поверхностна и просто пересказывает статьи в СМИ тех лет). Да, автор все события описывает верно, и к самому тексту у меня претензий нет. Претензия у меня к тому, куда направляет внимание читателей автор.

Итак, первая половина книги рассказывает о том, как Украина разоружалась в 1991 году. Далее идут малопонятные для меня события вокруг Крыма. Это тоже понятно, но как я сказал, всё это не являлось переломным моментом в отношениях между Россией и Украиной. Оранжевая Революция - вот тут уже и началась вся эта канитель. Каких-то особо интересных фактов я тут не обнаружил, ибо автор поверхностен. Далее идёт газовая война между РФ и Украиной и тут тоже же всё то же самое, что мы находим в СМИ за тот период. Причина газового конфликта мне до конца не ясна, но так как Россия такую политику пыталась использовать и в отношении Белоруссии (повышение цен за газ), то могу предположить, что причин газовой войны было несколько, включая сугубо финансовый вопрос. Эта история тёмная и непонятная как со стороны Украины, так и со стороны России. Ну а дальше возвращение Януковича и события Евромайдана.

Касательно Евромайдана в 2014 году нужно отдать должное автору, ибо он неплохо передаёт внутреннюю политику Януковича, когда тот пришёл к власти. Автор неплохо, хотя и поверхностно, описал построение Януковичем авторитарной власти. Впрочем, тот факт, что Янукович пытался быть (стать) диктатором для меня не является новостью, сюрпризом. Действия Януковича по разгону абсолютно безвредного для него митинга на Майдане выдаёт в нём человека глупого и недальновидного. Однако касаемо Евромайдана автор ничего не говорит о главном, т.е. о том, что вело ситуацию к кровавой развязке – противостоянии между западной Украиной и восточной и противопоставлении Европы и России в контексте украинского общества. Если изучать те события по этой книге возникнет ощущение, что никакой антироссийской повестки не было ни в 2004, ни в 2014. Да, были националисты, но они про Россию ничего не говорили. Более того, такое чувство, что автор вообще не в курсе противостояния между восточной Украиной и западной. Как я написал выше, я считаю это основной причиной. Я даже думаю, что если бы революцию делали бы сугубо на антиавторитарных лозунгах и никак не упоминали бы Россию, а также не имели такое сильное напряжение между восточной Украиной и западной, то никакого бы военного конфликта не было бы. Более того, я сильно сомневаюсь, что Россия была бы так сильно против вступления Украины в ЕС. Я понимаю, что мои слова могут быть увидены как попытка переложить всю ответственность за сегодняшнее с РФ на Украину, но смысл в том, что именно политики России и Украины (и отчасти ЕС и США) сделали всё возможное, чтобы война случилась. Короче говоря, получается, что политики обеих сторон не желали решать существующие конфликты ни в 90-х, которые были связаны с Крымом и Севастополем ни в 2004, которые были связаны с Голодомором и ролью СССР ни в 2014, когда Украину разделили на пророссийскую и проевропейскую.

Читая книгу я увидел то, чего не видел раньше: картину того как историю с Евромайданом видели из окон Кремля. Сначала выбрали Ющенко, за победой которого стояли западные страны (с точки зрения Кремля). Хорошо, Россия в итоге согласилась, но в отместку, предположительно, начала газовую войну (возможно в качестве спектакля для единения российского народа вокруг лидера). Далее приходит Янукович, с которым происходит неприятная ситуация - при дурацкой попытки разогнать митинг на Майдане в итоге разгоняют его партию и его самого. Но как это видится из Москвы? Во время Майдана вооружённые националисты (за которыми, с точки зрения Кремля, стоят ЕС и США) захватывают административные здания, оказывают сопротивление правоохранительным органам и таким образом вынуждают уйти законно избранного президента Януковича. Получается, что ставленник ЕС и США - Ющенко - досидел весь свой президентский срок, а Януковичу не дали (именно тут можно найти объяснение слов Путина, что «Россию обманули»). Далее, на востоке Украины участники анти-Майдана начинают копировать действия людей в Киеве, т.е. начинают захватывать административные здания, на что новая власть решает послать даже не Беркут, а сразу танки. Я думаю, именно так увидели ситуацию люди в Кремле. Запад же никак на это не отреагировал, т.е. никак не отреагировал на украинский аналог контртеррористической операции в Чечне или как обозначили её в Украине – АТО. После этого в Кремле решили действовать более открыто, ибо «Россию обманули». Опять же, причина этих трагических событий - нерешённые проблемы если не 1991, то 2004 года, которые, подобно снежному кому, лишь увеличивалась в размере и увеличивалась, достигнув пика в 2014 и 2022. И это тот случай, когда я согласен с автором, что нерешённый вопрос с Крымом и в целом, с российско-украинскими отношениями, привёл в итоге к большой войне. Однако я хочу подчеркнуть главное – в книге нет ничего про антироссийский дискурс, который начался в Украине с 2004 года. Автор этой книги всё сводит к геополитике и борьбе за независимость Украины от Москвы. Единственное что тут стоит отметить, это когда автор пишет, что Россия прямо заявила странам НАТО и Украине что она начнёт войну, если Украина вступит в НАТО, вследствие чего мне не понятно, почему были проигнорированы эти откровенные предупреждения со стороны РФ? Ведь в таком случаи нужно было либо начать переговоры по нормализации отношений с РФ и отказа от вступления в НАТО либо заниматься подготовкой к войне с Россией, т.е. минировать территорию, воздвигать фортификационные сооружения, создавать «зубы дракона» и пр. Украина пошла третьим путем, т.е. решила и дальше готовиться к вступлению в НАТО, полностью отказавшись от идеи подготовки к войне. Пожалуй, это самая безумная политика, которую я видел. Безумней только политика СССР и самой России.

The author retells historical events in chronological order, starting from 1991 and ending with the events of 2014. However, as soon as we get to the events of the Orange Revolution 2004, the book starts to look very much like a media retelling. The author tries to make his own conclusions, but this does not make the book any less like a collection of articles.

The second big problem with the book is that the author says nothing about the main reason for the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Although the author mentions, in passing, the nationalists on the Maidan in 2014, he is wrong about the causes of the crisis. According to the author, the roots of the current conflict should be sought in 1991, when the conflict over Crimea was not resolved. The same Alexei Arestovich states that Russia had made the first move in this confrontation when Russia tried in the 90s to make the first attempt to seize Crimea or something like that. However, I do not agree with these positions. From my point of view, the roots lie in 2004, when Yushchenko decided to bring up the Holodomor for some reason. Despite the fact that he claimed that it had nothing to do with the analogy to current Russia, one would have to be a complete idiot not to see such a comparison between the USSR and the Russian Federation. Yes, Yushchenko may have done it because that's the way modern politics works, where one dominant party always shows opposition to what their main rival, i.e., the other dominant party, votes for or promotes. If the Party of Regions positions itself as Russia's main ally, the main opposition party positions itself as Europe's ally. As the saying goes, "If Yevtushenko is against collective farms, then I am for collective farms". The same thing happened in this story. There would have been no problem if Ukraine's neighbor had not been the dictatorial and inadequate Russia, but at least Kazakhstan. The trouble was that Russia decided to accept this, as they say in soccer, pitch from Yushchenko. Therefore, the responsibility for the beginning of today's tragedy lies with the politicians of both Ukraine and Russia (albeit in different proportions). This is where all the problems started. Personally, I think that such an inadequate action on the part of the Russian Federation was connected only with one thing - to find an external enemy to unite the country against. The only point in the book where I agree with the author is on the unresolved Crimean issue. Yes, the Crimea issue should have been resolved back in 1991. I don't know how, but I'm sure that smart people with scientific degrees could definitely find a solution that would suit both the Ukrainian side and the Russian side. Why didn't they? Who would have thought that Russia and Ukraine would reach such an event as an open military confrontation? Crimea was not an important issue in Russia either in the 90s or in the 2000s, and even in 2014, few people remembered it. So "Whose Crimea" is an artificial problem. But for the author, it was Crimea and not "controlled" Ukraine that are the main reasons for the military conflict. I do not agree with this, and the book, although it retells news reports of those years, is not convincing in this matter (because it is superficial and simply retells articles in the media of those years). Yes, the author describes all the events correctly, and I have no complaints about the text itself. I have a complaint about where the author directs the readers' attention.

So, the first half of the book is about how Ukraine was disarmed in 1991. Then there are the events around Crimea, which are not very clear to me. This is also understandable, but as I said, none of this was a turning point in relations between Russia and Ukraine. The Orange Revolution - that's where the whole mess started. I did not find any particularly interesting facts here because the author is superficial. Then comes the gas war between Russia and Ukraine, and here, too, all the same things that we find in the media for that period. The reason for the gas conflict is not completely clear to me, but, since Russia tried to use the same policy for Belarus (an increase in gas prices), I can assume that there were several reasons for the gas war, including a purely financial issue. This story is dark and incomprehensible both on the part of Ukraine and Russia. And then the return of Yanukovych and the events of Euromaidan.

Regarding the Euromaidan in 2014, the author should be given credit, for he did a pretty good job of conveying the internal politics of Yanukovych when he came to power. The author does a good, albeit superficial, job of describing Yanukovych's construction of an authoritarian government. However, the fact that Yanukovych tried to become a dictator is not a surprise to me. Yanukovych's actions in dispersing the Maidan rally, which was harmless to him, made him look foolish and shortsighted. However, about Euromaidan, the author says nothing about the main thing, i.e., what led the situation to a bloody denouement - the confrontation between Western Ukraine and Eastern Ukraine and the opposition between Europe and Russia in the context of Ukrainian society. If you study those events according to this book, you will get the feeling that there was no anti-Russian agenda in 2004 or 2014. Yes, there were nationalists, but they did not say anything about Russia. Moreover, it feels like the author is not aware of the confrontation between eastern Ukraine and western Ukraine at all. As I wrote above, I think this is the main reason. I even think that if the revolution had been made purely on anti-authoritarian slogans, and would not have mentioned Russia in any way, and would not have had such a strong tension between eastern Ukraine and western Ukraine, there would not have been any military conflict. Moreover, I highly doubt that Russia would be so much against Ukraine joining the EU. I realize that my words can be seen as an attempt to shift all responsibility for today's war from Russia to Ukraine, but the point is that it was the politicians of Russia and Ukraine (and partly the EU and the US) who did everything possible to make the war happen. In short, it turns out that politicians on both sides were unwilling to resolve the existing conflicts neither in the 90s, which were related to Crimea and Sevastopol, nor in 2004, which were related to the Holodomor and the role of the USSR, nor in 2014 when Ukraine was divided into pro-Russian and pro-European.

Reading the book, I saw something I had not seen before - a picture of how the Euromaidan story was seen from the windows of the Kremlin. First, Yushchenko was elected, whose victory was backed by Western countries (from the Kremlin's point of view). OK, Russia eventually agreed, but in retaliation, supposedly started a gas war (perhaps as a spectacle to unite the Russian people around a leader). Then comes Yanukovych, with whom an unpleasant situation occurs - in a foolish attempt to disperse a rally on the Maidan, his party and himself are eventually dispersed. But how is this seen from Moscow? During the Maidan, armed nationalists (who, from the Kremlin's point of view, are backed by the EU and the U.S.) seized administrative buildings, resisted law enforcement, and thus forced the legally elected President Yanukovych to step down. It turns out that Yushchenko, a protégé of the EU and the US, sat out his entire presidential term, while Yanukovych was overthrown (this is where one can find an explanation for Putin's words that "Russia was deceived"). Further, in the east of Ukraine, the anti-Maidan participants begin to copy the actions of people in Kiev, i.e., they begin to seize administrative buildings, against which the new government decides to send not even Berkut but tanks. I think this is how people in the Kremlin saw the situation. The West did not react to it, i.e., did not react to the Ukrainian analog of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya, or as it is called in Ukraine - the ATO. After that, the Kremlin decided to act more openly because "Russia was deceived". Again, the reason for these tragic events is the unresolved problems, if not 1991, then 2004, which, like a snowball, only increased in size, reaching a peak in 2014 and 2022. This is the case when I agree with the author that the unresolved issue with Crimea and Russian-Ukrainian relations in general led to a big war. However, I want to emphasize the main thing - there is nothing in the book about the anti-Russian discourse that began in Ukraine in 2004. The author of this book reduces everything to geopolitics and the struggle for Ukraine's independence from Moscow. The only thing worth noting here is when the author writes that Russia has explicitly told NATO countries and Ukraine that it will start a war if Ukraine joins NATO, so I don't understand why these explicit warnings from Russia were ignored. After all, in such a case, it was necessary either to start negotiations on normalization of relations with Russia and refusal to join NATO or to prepare for war with Russia, i.e., to mine the territory, erect fortifications, create Dragon's teeth (fortifications), etc. Ukraine took the third way, i.e., decided to continue to prepare for NATO membership, abandoning the idea of preparing for war. This is probably the craziest policy I have seen. Only the policy of the USSR and Russia itself is more insane.

[Keenan · Rating 4 out of 5]

A clear and balanced look at the cultural, economic, and geopolitical forces that have shaped the relations between Ukraine and Russia since the end of the Cold War, necessarily also considering both these countries relationships with the West. The point is made over and over that the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of the Donbas region were not inevitable, but resulted instead from a confluence of factors, including corruption and protests in Ukraine, the encroachment of NATO, the support of the West for 'coloured revolutions', revanchism in Russia, tenuous agreements over things like gas pipelines and naval bases, and so much more. This book serves as an important primer not just on the events leading up to the initial 2014 invasion (note that the book was published in 2019) but of course on the far more aggressive and horrific war ongoing in 2022. With all the noise and realpolitik surrounding such a monumental event in human history, context is everything, and I'm grateful that scholars have put work into making that context approachable and understandable.

[Rafi · Rating 4 out of 5]

(It took me a long time to finish a book, it was a monumental journey. Depression rendered me unable to do anything besides nothing)

This is a great introduction to modern Ukrainian politics. If you scroll through my 2021 Reading List, you will see that I already read a book about the history of Ukraine. That book was very large in scope and was mainly to do with earlier Ukrainian history as opposed to the current geopolitical problems it faces. I would characterize it as a mainly geopolitical book about the problems Ukraine faces vis-a-vis Russia. However, this book almost seems like a journal article. It won't offer you any moment of peace or time to sink things in. I plan on supplementing this book with something else. Keep watch for some more books I will read this year related to Ukraine. My next stop is going to be Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know®

[Igor · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have only read the first chapter, "The sources of the conflit over Ukraine", and the last one, chapter 8 "Conclusion: Ukraine, Russia, and the West - from Cold War to Cold War". Each chapter is like an academic article.

Both chapters that I read are really well written. I have not read the rest because I do not like much this Internacional Relations' style. And I can say that because I am graduated in IR. So I know how it works.

The explanation and logic are clear and direct. Those two chapters were enough for me until now.

[Edz · Rating 4 out of 5]

A comprehensive look at the post-Cold War global system being put to the test by the tumultuous relations between a newly resurgent Russia and a globally established Western bloc over the conflict in Ukraine.

The book starts off with analyzing the main sources of the conflict in Ukraine as the "the result of deep “tectonic” forces as well as short-term triggers" (p.2), namely the great power status that Russia seeks to claim and maintain as well as the democratization/independence of countries such as Ukraine, all wrapped up in the traditional problem of international relations, the security dilemma. Coupled with the post-Cold War setting in which they found themselves, with the collapse of the USSR having brought a humiliating loss for the nascent Russian state, the status quo wanted to maintain a center of influence in its former “backyard”, which clashed with Ukraine’s desire for independence (e.g. nuclear disarmament in the 90s). Throughout Kuchma’s first term, Ukraine-Russia relations were improving amidst the turbulent Yeltsin presidency which was beset with unpopular economic reforms as well as constant agitation by nationalist leaders, culminating in the 1997 Friendship Treaty giving Russia control over its Black Sea Fleet and the pledge to respect Ukrainian sovereignty. However, the ongoing war in Yugoslavia was but the first in a series of events that would pit the West and Russia against each other in a Cold War-style standoff, reflecting different understandings of what the status quo should look like and how to maintain it as such. Just as we enter into the 2000s, Russia sees itself come under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, who initially extended his hand to the West in the case of 9/11 but fiercely criticized it in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq. Along with the second term of Kuchma being beleaguered by the Gongadze affair and his increasing consolidation of power, West-Russia relations would be put to the test once more when the Orange Revolution of 2004 would see two candidates face off with foreign backing from each side, leading to a defeat for the pro-Russian contingent. Afterwards, with Yushchenko as president who unsuccessfully tried to get the EU’s favor by trying to implement reforms as a means to get access to the European bloc, NATO steps in to offer a “Membership Action Plan” to Ukraine which rattled Russia, seeing it as an affirmation of its fears concerning NATO expansion, in addition to the “Eastern Partnership” that would develop subsequently (and countered with Russian proposals). Come Yanukovych in power, who fits the stereotype of a corrupt politician (as is often the case in Ukraine unfortunately) quite to the letter (e.g consolidation of power, personal enrichment of his “family” etc.), and Putin’s switch from president to prime minister, we witness a further deterioration in West-Russia relations exemplified by the diverse actions taken to the upheaval in Libya and the Arab Spring generally, with Western states wholeheartedly supporting them while Russia vehemently opposed them. All of that was to culminate in the fateful events of the Euromaidan uprising in 2013-14, where Yanukovych’s reluctance to sign the AA with the EU kicked off a series of mass protests in Kiev which gradually got more violent and made stricter demands, leading to his overthrow and the installment of a new government in his stead. This only set the stage for a counter-uprising mainly in the Donbass region, where pro-Russian rebels seized government buildings as a reaction to the events in the west of the country, only to be met with a declaration of war in the name of the ATO, ongoing for almost a decade until recently when Russia launched a full scale invasion of Ukraine. The book ends with a note on the explanatory power of causes for conflict, citing the need to be cautious of assigning blame to any one particular actor since they act in the midst of domestic constraints as well as international relations (e.g Crimea could’ve been a well thought out plan in advance or a quick reaction to a deteriorating situation).

This was a fun read in that it really gets straight to the point to explain almost all there is to know in regards to the Ukraine conflict, both in terms of international relations as well as domestic politics.
The overarching narrative of there being fundamental disagreements regarding what the post-Cold War status quo should resemble hits the nail on the head, although it could do with a bit more emphasis on the role of local oligarchs in the development of Ukrainian politics for instance (see Yuliya Yurchenko’s “Ukraine and the Empire of Capital: From Marketization to Armed Conflict” for a detailed analysis of the interplay between local and international capital in driving politics in Ukraine). Additionally, I feel that the author reveals his bias a bit too openly in regards to the discussion of the events in Maidan (which is almost inevitable), when he hints at the Maidan sniper massacre being committed by Berkut, while not taking into account the work of Ivan Katchanovski regarding his comprehensive analysis of the available evidence, in which he makes admittedly politically inconvenient conclusions regarding who was responsible (see his work (PDF) The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: Revelations from Trials and Investigation | Ivan Katchanovski - Academia.edu for an extensive look at the available evidence revealed from trials and investigations in order to assess which of the parties involved was most likely responsible for the bloodbath of late February).

[Fabian Modin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Incredibly lucid and informed historical analysis of the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia.
Highly recommended for anyone interested in the issue or in general the ongoing ideological and geopolitical struggle between legitimacy of a ideologically pluralistic worldview and democracy as well as the post cold war status quo.

[John · Rating 5 out of 5]

The book gave this reader a thorough, considered and eye-opening education on the intractable issues at the root of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 — which equally lie behind this year’s Russian invasion of Ukraine.

D’Anieri introduces and structures the book along the lines that are de rigeur in academia, which initially worried me the book would be heavy going public recasting of an academic thesis. However, once stuck into the first couple of chapters, I found myself engrossed. D’Anieri’s careful chronological description of the history of Russia-Ukraine-EU-US relations since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, interspersed with occasional references to socio-political theory, takes on the page-turning nature of a thriller which had begun by revealing the murder scene but not the murderer. It turns out to be an intractable mutual suicide pact.

Unfortunately it is impossible to avoid the book’s conclusion: a peaceful resolution is very very unlikely because what Russia and the West want are fundamentally incompatible, and a sustainable compromise requires one or the other to accept losing something vitally important to them and which is anchored in their different respective core values. Russia wants to be still considered a world power with a continuing controlling oversight over the Central European nations that formed the ex-USSR in order to buttress what it perceives as it’s national security; Europe sees the continent’s security being best underwritten by these same nations adopting independent liberal democracies, strengthening the rule of law, and free to choose to join multi-national institutions such as NATO and the European Union. The West’s challenge is the difficulty in ascertaining what compromise would ever satisfy Russia; Russia’s challenge is that for the those newly independent nations the West appears to offer the set of political and economic values that more naturally allow room for that independence (and territorial integrity) and counters Russia’s new and old forms of influence.

It is possible to read the book as a gradual, yet tragically inevitable 30-year descent from a genuine Russia-West attempt to construct a new common post-Cold War vision of a cooperative Europe-wide political structure, via a progressive erosion of mutual trust, to finally reach the 2022 hardening into sharply demarcated war between the West’s political system of democratic values and Russia’s (et al) system favouring autocracy … with Ukraine caught in the middle.

The book, published in 2019, concludes with the accurate prediction that “until Russia accepts the West’s vision for Europe or the West accepts Russia’s, the conflict will endure.” With these two visions being unreconcilable, to this reader it seems we are careering towards an Iron Curtain 2.0: a hard border diving Europe between the two political systems, and maybe leaving Ukraine divided in two down the Dnieper river — leaving everyone deeply unhappy. The alternative seems even worse: the horrible attritional military conflict draws in other nations and becomes a “world war”.

[Mark Nichols · Rating 5 out of 5]

A clear, scholarly, and - I suggest - impartial consideration of history from the fall o the Soviet Union to just after the invasion in 2022, updated from the first edition (which I understand stopped at 2019).

It is so interesting to see how decisions tend to reflect historical perspectives, and how the modern situation represents the consequences of those perspectives.

I was looking for something to help explain how on earth two countries in Europe, right next to each other, with deep historical connections, might find themselves in a hot war involving invasion. Thanks to D'Anieri it all now makes sense, and the complexities of a solution are now also plain.

The analysis of underlying causes represented in this book forces us to be pessimistic about the chances of resolving either the Ukraine-Russia conflict or the broader conflict between Russia and the West anytime soon... all of the underlying causes discussed in this book remain in place and have been exacerbated by the war itself, which has strengthened mutual perceptions of aggressiveness and badfaith and has dramatically increased the willingness of the West and Russia to confrnt one another. (p. 320).

As an aside, one thing I am becoming more acutely aware of in current international politics: lies must be called out. There is no excuse for deception. The biggest liar is generally on the wrong side of right. Doubling down is merely doubling the lie. Democracies must have no truck for lies.

[NCHS Library]

From the Publisher
The dynamics within Ukraine, between Ukraine and Russia, and between Russia and the West, that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union and eventually led to war in 2014. Proceeding chronologically, this book shows how Ukraine's separation from Russia in 1991, at the time called a 'civilized divorce', led to what many are now calling 'a new Cold War'. He argues that the conflict has worsened because of three underlying factors the security dilemma, the impact of democratization on geopolitics, and the incompatible goals of a post-Cold War Europe. Rather than a peaceful situation that was squandered, D'Anieri argues that these were deep-seated pre-existing disagreements that could not be bridged, with concerning implications for the resolution of the Ukraine conflict. The book also shows how this war fits into broader patterns of contemporary international conflict and should therefore appeal to researchers working on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia's relations with the West, and conflict and geopolitics more generally.

[Dennis Murphy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War by Paul D'Anieri is a fantastic survey of the recent history of the bilateral relationship between Russia and Ukraine. It covers a large range of materials, briefly touching upon most of the major events. I found D'Anieri to be a very capable distiller of material and his own judgments, when they appear, were usually quite sensible. If I have a problem with the book, it is that the narrative is dropped perhaps at the most interesting and least understood portion of the war. That is, after the dust settles in 2015. I had hoped for more material on that period, but given the nature of my work, I'll likely be filling in that period myself at some point. Good show, Paul. I'll eagerly read a sequel once its done.

[Sam Macalus · Rating 4 out of 5]

D’Anieri provides meaningful chronology and insight leading up to the current war in Ukraine, starting with misaligned expectation between the West and Russia immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union. While at times dense and sometimes repetitive, this book effectively describes the geopolitical environment contextualizing the Russian invasion of Crimea and military action in the Donetsk/Luhansk oblasts leading up to the current war. While the book ultimately concludes that war was avoidable (both earlier in Crimea and perhaps by extension, now), it highlights the respective stakes and political complexities in this conflict for Ukraine, Russia, the EU, NATO, CIS, and the United States.

[Harald G. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Short, well written and well researched history of the Russia-Ukraine conflict from the dissolution of the Soviet union around 1990 to 2018. First and last chapter is using an International Relations/Political Science perspective, the rest is a historical explanation and interpretation of the political events leading up to the war in 2014. Not so much focus on economy and culture, except when influenced the politics. The book's style reads like an extended editorial from The Economist. The author's point of view is from the Ukrainian leadership.

[PG Pariseau · Rating 5 out of 5]

Only goes up to 2015-16, but an excellent summary and analysis of the relationship and its breakdown. Not a stylistic page-turner, but packed with information as it points out the dilemmas faced by both sides as they dealt with the exigencies of strategic and domestic demands. Would love to read an updated account by this author.

[Erlan Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Required Reading on The Ukraine-Russia Conflict. Excellent Overview on Ukrainian Leaders from Kravchuk to Yanukovych.

I wish the post-2014 situation was covered in more depth, especially the difference between Zelensky and Poroshenko. A tad redundant and dense on specific points, but overall did not hamper my reading.

[Nád!a · Rating 5 out of 5]

"(...) a nossa ideia é alimentar os lobos e proteger as ovelhas. Queremos que a Rússia esteja satisfeita e que a Ucrânia se mantenha independente e inteira. Alcançar apenas um destes objetivos demonstrou ser difícil. Alcançar os dois, agora parece impossível."

[Miku S · Rating 5 out of 5]

Valuable read for anyone wanting to get a clearer sense of why the conflict started, offering a well-rounded perspective on the conflict between the countries. The book follows a straightforward, chronological approach, which makes it easy to follow the timeline of the events.

Hope the war ends soon. Wishing all the best for Ukrainians.

[Merjem · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great overview of Russia-Ukraine dynamics over past 3 almost 4 decades now. Book ends just around the events of 2022 full scale invasion.
I recommend this book to anyone interested in understanding this region, Russia's understanding of safety, NATO expansion, etc.

[Kevin Christiansen · Rating 4 out of 5]

A nice discussion of the history of Ukraine and Russia. Helpful perspective in light of the current war.

[Amber Nicole · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a phenomenal analysis which definitely ended up being quite predictive in where the conflict was headed. If you want my full thoughts, see my highlighted notes & comments.

[Matt Lanza · Rating 5 out of 5]

An absolute must read if you want to have a nuanced understanding of the current situation between Russia, Ukraine and the world.

[Erin Manson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Might as well make Paul the co author of my dissertation now

[Dale · Rating 4 out of 5]

An outstanding history that provides context to the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Tracks in great detail from the end of the Cold War to today.