被统治的艺术：中华帝国晚期的日常政治

by Michael Szonyi, 宋怡明, 钟逸明 (Translator)

本书以明代沿海卫所为背景，剖析在明朝世袭军户制度下军户家庭与官府的互动，着重描述和总结了承担兵役义务的军户如何趋利避害，制订出种种策略以优化自身处境。他们既未公然蔑视权威，亦非俯首帖耳，而是在反抗与服从的“中间地带”运作，以期将需要付出的代价降到最低，同时使利益最大化。

本书分三大部分，分别讲述了福建军户在原籍、卫所和军屯的生活。本书的一大特色在于，运用了大量家谱、地方志、口述史等民间资料，讲述了许多发生在军户生活中有趣的故事。真实而鲜活的案例，辅以严谨、细致的考辨，构成了这本讲述百姓自身历史的社会史著作。

Genres: China, History, Politics, Nonfiction, Asia

392 pages, Hardcover

Published December 1, 2019

Reviews

[Eressea · Rating 4 out of 5]

中途插單進來讀的書
看到明史相關的書總是讓我想到萬曆十五年
本書作者對黃仁宇的評價挺高的，稱其為明史大家
我還以為洋人不怎麼看重黃耶~

雖然這本書一樣是硬邦邦的學術論文
但跟破譯邊疆比起來，好讀很多
一則又一則族譜裡的家史很有趣
讓我又想好好看自家的族譜了

看這些軍戶利用制度漏洞，最大化家族利益
真是非常有既視感
不禁又想起黃仁宇說古代中國統治需要的極權超越時代太多
技術跟不上，只好畫個間架讓地方各顯神通
所以在數目字上無法管理也是必然的結果
雖然本書作者不認同需求與技術無法匹配的論點
但也同意明清政府只在大處著眼
至於細節如何達成則不是官府關心的
也才有本書的種種故事

其餘的東西太過陌生，也寫不出啥像樣的評論
比較驚訝的是原來明清做為稅收的戶和人口的戶是分開的
一個戶的稅可以有一堆家族來負擔
另一個是新竹大姓鄭家原來是明代軍戶之後

那些作者田調來的私人族譜
原文顯然都翻成英文，譯者還是找出原文重新放在中譯本裡
想必花了很大的功夫吧?
這有心的譯者，還把河蟹的地方都好心標上星號XD
這樣"陽奉陰違"也能出版我真是搞不懂老共的想法啊

可惜我買的是電子書對不上頁碼
不完全統計中亞版星號位置如下
3681
4135
5093
5171
5213

承蒙書友指引，找了原文來看
但跟電機類英文比起來
這種文史書的英文對我來說太難了
實在是有看沒懂Orz
對照書名，這種審查方式也是挺諷刺的
或可稱為後清帝國的日常政治XD

[Eressea · Rating 4 out of 5]

雖然讀過簡體版
雖然譯者相同
再看一次繁體版還是像沒看過一樣
不過整體來說感想跟看完簡體版差不多

本書是激起我讀自家族譜的動力
但族譜實在太無聊了
無聊到本書我都看兩遍了族譜還是看不完
族譜讀到宗族重要人物的封誥
及家族成員與地方官的各種唱和就實在受不了哩
更不用說後面以樹狀圖展開的各房成員姓名小傳了
既然本書主講軍戶
我讀的時候就特別注意本族可考的祖宗是什麼身份
雖然家族在明清兩代都是民戶
譜內仍然收錄了一大堆土地紛爭的判例或契約
明顯就是留著以後吵架用的相罵本
倒是跟本書講的軍戶與明帝國互動有許多類似之處~

[Rolin · Rating 4 out of 5]

interesting framework of using economic notions of regulatory arbitrage, utility maximization etc to describe a social history

its claims as a self-admitted microhistory seem a bit overblown but still an enjoyable read —especially the parts about pirates.

[晓木曰兮历史系 Chinese · Rating 4 out of 5]

For China in the imperial era, there have always been two diametrically opposed judgments. One emphasizes that it is a "big government" and the government does nothing; the other considers it to be a "small government" and uses only relatively small ones. A group of bureaucrats effectively operated a huge empire, and the so-called "imperial power does not go down to the county" is widely spread, which seems to indicate that ordinary people living in grassroots communities rarely need to deal with the state in reality.

Now, Canadian Sinologist Song Yiming has overturned the above two assumptions at the same time, presenting a far more complex and in-depth picture: On the one hand, even ordinary people living in remote areas need to deal with the ubiquitous country in various ways. Power; but on the other hand, they do not only have two choices of obedience or resistance. On the contrary, they can use all the contradictions and gaps in the formal system to transform them into favorable factors in their lives, and this means The country cannot carry out its intentions to the full. The most vivid expression of this kind of two-way game is not the term "Yang Feng Yin violates" that only appeared in the Ming Dynasty, but "there are policies at the top and countermeasures at the bottom".

This special system history is not concerned with the statutory articles recorded in the literature, but "how ordinary people live under an imperfect system." Here he chose a specific group of Ming Dynasty: military households, that is, those families that must perform military service for generations according to regulations. Most previous studies have noticed that the military household system becomes more unsustainable as the military household population grows and social changes, future generations may not be willing to serve as soldiers, nor may they be suitable for military service. Later, the quality of military personnel declined, and deserters were repeatedly banned. , Or pay for someone to replace it, causing endless problems. Undoubtedly, this is often regarded as an unpopular policy, but this "ruled art" reveals another side through the perspective of local documents such as genealogy: these ordinary people are struggling to deal with the formal system at the same time. In "tightly seize the opportunity provided by the state."

Therefore, “ruled art” at first glance talks about a passive state, but actually focuses on their initiative. From the perspective of such common people’s politics, ordinary people are also the subject of historical events. Not only do they have the ability to create their own history, but they also evaluate the costs of various choices through deliberate weighing of pros and cons, and try their best to reduce Maximize your own interests. It is true that country-specific obligations must be fulfilled, but they can still be fulfilled conditionally and selectively. There are many ways here: the first is "concentration", that is, one person is responsible for the service of the entire family, and this person can even be hired as a substitute; the second is "rotation", that is, people take turns within the family to take care of it. .

It is not difficult to see that in the eyes of these people, service is not so much a glorious mission or a profession, as it is a gratuitous obligation. Bao Dake once said in "Forty Years of Western China" that before liberation, many people in Tibetan areas regarded government-run schools and compulsory education as the same kind of conscription as military conscription. As a result, there was a ridiculous phenomenon: Parents of wealthy families paid to hire serf children to go to school instead of their children.

However, the people of the Ming Dynasty did not just cope with it passively. They soon discovered that the status of military households also had its own advantages: just because military households had already undertaken military service, they were exempted from the obligation to "pay the emperor’s food" like civilian households, otherwise it would constitute Double taxation, so as long as the whole family has someone to perform military service, there is no burden, and therefore they are unwilling to leave the military. This kind of exemption from military service has become more and more advantageous in the future; not only that, they can also take advantage of the benefits of the military. , It’s easier than others to access navigation technology and ships, and even profit from illegal trade, especially those responsible for controlling and banning illegal maritime trade are their own people, and this is precisely because they are close to state agencies.

It is worth adding that military households are not the most vulnerable group in the entire governance structure. So how do ordinary people (private households) and untouchables learn the "art of being ruled"? From their point of view, those military households hiring people to serve as substitutes are certainly a countermeasure for the government, but the problem is that those who are hired as substitutes also have their own abacus. Why can’t they use the way military households deal with the state to deal with the military? The household? Not only that, military households almost always appear as a cohesive community of interests when dealing with military service. This in itself strengthens their ability to resist risks. However, this means that internal fairness and ethics are very important, otherwise it will be detrimental. To unite, but in this way, how can individuals benefit themselves within the family?

For everyone at the time, this was a complex multi-level repeated game. It is precisely because of the various gaps or contradictions between the institutional rules and the actual situation that these people can make use of these differences for profit, which is the so-called "system arbitrage." This kind of folk wisdom to "take a loophole" is extremely common in Chinese society. If Western "rational people" are cultivated under the market order, then the Chinese are cultivated under the political environment. However, one question is: in this way, the operation of this system seems to be full of loopholes, so why can it be maintained? This may require us to change our perspective and take a look at the "art of domination".

Simply put, when Ming Taizu Zhu Yuanzhang designed this system, his focus was not on its efficiency, but on how to maintain social operations at a low cost. In essence, the idea of ​​this order is actually a Utopia of Confucian politics, assuming that the villagers are self-sufficient, and disputes can be resolved by the clan without the court’s intervention. The military strength is also transferred by specialized military households. You can support yourself, so you can boast that "I raise a million soldiers, and it doesn't cost the people a grain of rice." This looks very beautiful, but the biggest challenge it encounters is that future generations will inevitably have a variety of new situations and new problems, and this is precisely because society has developed forward, and at this time the tights of the "ancestral law" make It is difficult for people to adjust dynamically.

The result is very paradoxical: the original intention of this system was designed to save expenses and reduce the burden on the people, but in the end it produced unintended consequences, which may not only eventually increase the burden on the people, but also weaken the efficiency of the organization. , Unable to cope with the subsequent major crisis. This involves another question: why the government does not want to plug the loopholes, is it impossible or unwilling?

The reason here is very complicated. Generally speaking, ordinary people do not seek to overthrow the system, but only adapt to it and use it as much as possible. The government also knows that if you want to maintain the operation of the system at a low cost, you can only help. One eye is closed, because meticulous execution will intensify conflicts and pay a higher price. Even training and maintaining a professional and efficient team of executives is very expensive in itself-for a country that has not yet been modernized, To do so is not only worth the loss, unnecessary, and even impossible.

Proudhon, an anarchist in the 19th century, once famously predicted Foucault’s views in the future. He said this: "To be ruled is to be targeted by creations without knowledge and virtue, to be monitored and spied on. To be regulated, indoctrinated, preached, registered and named, estimated, predicted, censored, and ordered. To be governed means to be recorded, counted, and valued in every procedure, communication, and action , Was ordered, banned, reformed, regulated, and corrected.” However, it is not difficult to see that in Ming China, state governance has not yet implemented such a powerful and terrifying rational force. Even in principle, it is true. There is a lot of room for bargaining. This "art of domination" is very different from what Foucault said, rather it is a kind of collusion: the people are using the government, but the government is actually using the people, and it is a great success because it hardly paid anything. At the price, people are willing to use the language of the country and accept institutional arrangements-this is what Gramsci calls "hegemony", that is, relying on the authority of ideology to consolidate power through the willing cooperation of people.

This is why the Chinese often say that “systems are dead and people are alive” and “no matter how good the system is, it depends on people”. This certainly means that the Chinese lack the awareness of rules, but it also means that people believe in any rule. There is room. The scene described by the American journalist Hedrick Smith in "The Russians" also applies to Chinese society: "It was a typical Russian scene: the hospital authorities specified a set of unnecessary and complicated rules and regulations. The Russians are trying to exploit the loopholes in these systems.” In this way, people do not say that the system is bad, but try to make use of these systems. In fact, the military households in the Ming Dynasty left these records, which in itself meant that, in their view, these informal political strategies for exploiting loopholes were completely legal.

In Chinese society, drilling through loopholes in rules has even developed into a specialized profession. Today, firms such as accountants and lawyers have helped employers make better use of rules. This is understandable under the premise of lawfulness. The problem is not that the common people exploit the loopholes in the rules, but the institutional arbitrage encourages illegal loopholes, backdoors, and power rent-seeking, without the development of mature technical experts under the premise of the legal framework and the rules of the game. The ensuing question is, is this a historical phenomenon in the transitional period, or a universal and structural social problem? Of course, even if it is widespread, it will undoubtedly be more serious during the transition period, because "transition" means more "opportunities" at the time of the transition between the old and the new. However, if this is a historical phenomenon, then with the modernization and improvement of the institutional framework, this should at least theoretically be eliminated.

In his book, Song Yiming seems to regard how ordinary people use the system's ability as a "weapon of the weak." His focus is not on criticizing these practices, but on how to understand them. From this perspective, “ruled art” is actually “art that is not ruled”. It is a clever deal with a realistic meaning across the ages, as the Indian scholar Pasha Chatterjee once said. "In addition to the abstract promise of popular sovereignty, most people in the world are inventing new ways, according to which they can choose how they should be governed.... The people learn and at the same time force their rulers Learn how they are willing to be ruled.... This is a good ethical proof of democracy." However, to be precise, this "ruled art" does not necessarily contain revolutionary power, it can also become A conservative collusion, which in turn caused many structural abuses.

It should be said that this is a double-edged sword: it not only gives ordinary people the choice when faced with the pressure of power, they can rationally weigh how to interact with it, but it also allows the Chinese to use their wisdom and wisdom on how to exploit loopholes. , And lack of awareness of rules and respect for the law. More importantly, living in such a closed system for a long time and evolving an institutional personality makes the Chinese extremely adept at adapting and even taking advantage of loopholes in the rules, but correspondingly they lack the critical spirit and respect for creating new rules and changing them. The contract spirit of the rules. This is the double legacy left over to this day.

[Samuel · Rating 5 out of 5]

讲述非正式组织如何利用制度为自身谋利的范式，值得深思。

[𓇗 𓅮 · Rating 4 out of 5]

看了逃避统治的艺术再看被统治的艺术，形势果然逼人走向自求多福；关于明朝军户的日常政治行为，正如被删节部分的星号标记一样。基于东南沿海地区族谱和县志黄册的卫所制度和军户日常政治研究，明代特质之世袭职业 自适应秩序及祖宗不变之法，军户含义的多重性；军户的解籍化与再籍化，勾军压力下原籍军户集中代役补偿和轮替策略及潜在的逃兵风险，卫所军户分支与原籍的勾连和交易；沿海卫所明朝贸易体制下与倭寇的一体两面，卫所军户与在地民户的联姻融合 卫学建立和方言岛；军屯军户的双轨制田亩不透明交易及常规判例，湖头侯山游神军户民户的宗教融合；清朝军户遗民合资注册新民籍虚拟共同先祖；明代东南的商业化和商品化，早期现代化国家央地控制能力差异及相似性。

[Naked Fish · Rating 4 out of 5]

以小见大的又一范本。从军户在不同circumstances的生存智慧出发，结合“everyday politics”的概念，对明朝历史的一些既有理解提出挑战或做出修正（contract，lineage，withdrawal of the state，commercial revolution）。Conclusion显示野心，尝试归纳一般意义上premodern state中state-society relations的特点（regulatory arbitrage)，最后对Mitchell “state effect”的概念进行升华，the presence of state是地方统治的必要资源和一些社会现象的源头。重读发现理论完全误用...

[Shawn_H · Rating 4 out of 5]

The tale begins thus: in the Ming dynasty, to secure a steady supply of soldiers, the state bound certain households to perpetual military service. A father’s duty passed to his eldest son at his death; if that son fell, the next in line must don the armor. Yet what of families without a grown heir, or with no sons at all? In such cases, two clans might unite as co‐military households, a living insurance policy against the absence of a fighting man.

So it was that the venerable Yan family joined with the Zhu household. The Yan bore the primary burden: their fourth son marched off to war and perished in a distant land; the second son followed, only to desert; the eldest set out, but died before reaching the front; at last, their third son endured twenty-five years of service in Yunnan—only to fall in foreign soil. With no male of age left, the Yan clan stood bereft. What then?

The Zhu kin stepped forward to supply a substitute. Yet each time a vacancy arose, imperial envoys descended to impress youths into service, much to the families’ chagrin. In their wisdom, the two households devised a plan: one man from the Zhu line would serve reliably, if both clans would contribute funds to sustain him. Thus was born a “Military Service Fund”—all male members paid a levy, and from its coffers the substitute received his annual stipend, allowing him to serve honorably without fear of flight or destitution.

So ingenious a scheme warranted a formal contract, carefully inscribed in their genealogy. On one occasion, the appointed soldier demanded higher pay and threatened desertion, prompting yet another revision of the agreement—a testament to their resolve and shrewd negotiation.

This book, set against the canvas of the military-household system, sifts through score upon score of clan records, excavating from ordinary lives the subtle cunning by which Ming commoners outwitted the state, safeguarded their kin, and preserved their lineage.

Its author, Professor Song, is himself a foreign scholar whose childhood in China—his father having served as an expert advisor—etched an enduring bond. He reminds us, in the spirit of Churchill, that “the farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.” Here, in these meticulous portraits of real people and their ingenious pacts, we glimpse both the depths of history and the prospects of our own future.

[Nathan Albright · Rating 5 out of 5]

This author explores something that I would like to read a lot more of and that is a seldom-discussed area (at least in my purview) regarding questions of authority. What is the art of being governed? Is there an art to being governed at all, and if there is, what would it look like? The author makes a good case here for the existence of the art of being governed and discusses why this is the case in the matter of regulatory arbitrage. In fact, this looks a lot like the way I behaved as a child growing up in a complex family. Knowing how to discuss about what matters, seeking to deal with competing power centers sometimes at odds with each other, this is what the book details, and it looks a lot like the way that a child navigates in the family, shrewdly deciding who is the first to hear good news or bad news, what sort of requests should be made to which parents, and the like. It is a fascinating discussion, and I found this book to be a very impressive example of the powerful knowledge and insight one can gain from seemingly dull genealogies and written discussions about Chinese law during the Ming dynasty. This book ought to be a good lesson to future researchers that there is a great deal one can learn when one asks why something is written down in the first place.

This book is a bit more than 200 pages long but it covers a fascinating and often neglected aspect of social history, and that is social history where government authorities are viewed from below, in the behavior and everyday strategies of people to cope with and maneuver the laws and institutions in place over them through regulatory arbitrage. The book begins with illustrations, a discussion of the families included in the book, and an introduction that discusses the loss of three sons to the Ming army and a look at everyday politics during the Ming dynasty. After that there is a look at everyday politics in the village (I), with a discussion of family strategies in dealing with conscription and military service and the disposition of rank and property (1) as well as a look at how proper maintenance of family ties with their relatives can silence local bullies through the recognition of kin and responsibilities (2). After that there is a discussion of the art of being governed in the Ming guard itself (II), with a discussion of the collaboration between soldiers and smugglers in coastal Southern China (3) and the founding of a new school for the support of the political and social ambitions of the children of hereditary guards (4). After that there is a discussion of military colonies (III) through a look at the regulatory arbitrage strategies in such colonies (5) as well as the management of social relations between soldier-farmers and non-military local civilians (6) in temple and religious life. Finally, the author examines the persistence of the legacies of the Ming military system that have long persisted (IV, 7), after which there is a conclusion, acknowledgements, glossary, notes, a bibliography, illustration sources, and an index.

This book is a good example of why it is that historical research of seemingly esoteric and random places is so vitally interesting. The subject matter in this book consists of various Ming families that were hereditary soldiers, but the author's insight demonstrates that these families sought to maximize their benefits from being of service to the state while simultaneously spreading out the costs of service in such a way that the family as a whole profited a great deal while minimizing the costs of service. Best of all, this book demonstrates that even after hereditary service ceased to be a phenomenon of Chinese military planning in the aftermath of the Qing takeover, they still managed to maintain a privileged local position through land ownership and the shrewd handling of tax obligations and control of local religious and social institutions. The author demonstrates that patterns of marriage and property holding relating to Ming military service have endured to the present day even though the Ming dynasty itself fell in the 17th century. The persistence of social patterns on the ground and in life is something that a reader can really muse and reflect on, and I have no doubt that I will seek out further examinations of the art of being governed and muse on the subject myself.

[Sf9088 · Rating 4 out of 5]

视角挺有意思，与其说是历史学，更像是社会学写作。作者对史料的解读和日常政治的理解主要参照当代中国研究，所以一本历史书居然也有许多删节。 用明代史料来看民众与国家的互动。在资源有限的早期现代国家，政府倾向于以非正式体制作为统治工具，降低成本以维持系统运作。在一个权力逐渐开始集中的社会，民众有更多机会在日常生活中接触到国家权力，《金瓶梅》里时人对法律格外熟悉，为的是掌握规则后得以利用制度。当时的许多行动策略在今天仍然能找到对应。 虽然作者竭力印证这种日常策略的延续性，但族谱/地方志透露的信息毕竟有限，感觉一些解读取决于作者对中国地方政治的固有理解。有些材料感觉是努力实地收集了，但并没有太多印证意义，全写上之后……至少读起来很生动。 总的来说虽然材料略显不足，还是非常精彩的历史社会学研究，很有启发。

[Vincent Fong · Rating 4 out of 5]

Second book on Late Imperial China, after 1587: A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline.

Good introduction on the social functioning of China, such a big area which couldn't be efficiently "governed by rules" under ancient technological background.

[Henry · Rating 3 out of 5]

The people's living lives centuries ago are just cases in complicated history. Genealogy isn't the literal meaning. It has many objective purposes for dealing with everyday life. The approaches used in Ming also could be seen in Qing and even modern life.

[Chyi · Rating 4 out of 5]

该书是宋怡明长年累月亲自跑田野，收集了大量地方志、族谱、碑刻及口述史料，结合微观视角与宏观分析，探讨明代军户群体“日常政治”的专著。宋怡明通过一个个鲜活的案例，讲述明代百姓与国家打交道的策略，使“底层得以发声”。作为被统治者的军户，利用制度与法令中的模糊地带，进行“制度套利”，实现自身利益的最大化，展现了“被统治的艺术”。这套“玩国家”的策略，或者说“弱者的武器”，并非明代中国所独��。作为弱者的我们，不光要学会“逃避统治的艺术”，“被统治的艺术”有时也不可或缺。

[Terry · Rating 4 out of 5]

very interesting angle and great research. Surprisingly from an US scholar.

[Yuran · Rating 5 out of 5]

把日常政治中行动者的策略总结为几种模式。尽管故事本身不复杂，讲述方式却很有启发性，这种多元行动者的视角似乎也是学界潮流，我很喜欢。

[Tianxiao · Rating 5 out of 5]

没读过英文原版，但是在读这本中文版的过程中，隐约感觉到了一种“被统治的艺术”，去豆瓣上验证了一下果然如此。

[Muyu]

@2020-01-29 10:41:12

[Littlebasin · Rating 5 out of 5]

完全服从和揭竿而起之间，总有一些空间，百姓利用这样的空间使自己活得不那么悲惨。这个空间越大，社会就越具活力。怎奈随着技术的进步，这个空间反而越来越小了。作者做学问的扎实和稳健令人感佩。

[Jeff Mou · Rating 5 out of 5]

Interesting while academically rigorous book