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The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History
For five centuries, the State has evolved according to epoch-making cycles of war and peace. But now our world has changed irrevocably. What faces us in this era of fear and uncertainty? How do we protect ourselves against war machines that can penetrate the defenses of any state? Visionary and prophetic, The Shield of Achilles looks back at history, at the “Long War” of 1914-1990, and at the the death of the nation-state and the birth of a new kind of conflict without precedent.
960 pages, Paperback
First published May 14, 2002
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1937 people want to read
About the author
Philip Bobbitt
21 books53 followersPhilip Chase Bobbitt is an American author, academic, and public servant who has lectured in the United Kingdom. He is best known for work on military strategy and constitutional law and theory, and as the author of Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (1982), The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (2002) and Terror and Consent: the Wars for the Twenty-first Century (2008).
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March 17, 2016The perfect book to take on a long train ride. Bobbitt's strength is in his ability to paint the Big Picture, specifically the evolution of the state, and how we're now passing into the era of the market state.
He supports his thesis with a staggering mass of detail which I found somewhat problematical the farther back he went (Castlereagh the great visionary? Really? What about Kosciusko? Or for that matter, Talleyrand and Metternich, and how a great deal of the face of modern Europe was envisioned by the first before Napoleon crowned himself Emperor, and the latter ten years later at Vienna?)
The problem with Big Picture thinking is that the conclusions can seem too neat, and history has a way of demonstrating how very messy it is. Given that, the last half of the book is terrific, as he examines the alteration of paradigm over the twentieth century conflicts--the first half of which he calls the Long War. It ends with a coda supplied after the events of 9/11, striking a warning note.
He supports his thesis with a staggering mass of detail which I found somewhat problematical the farther back he went (Castlereagh the great visionary? Really? What about Kosciusko? Or for that matter, Talleyrand and Metternich, and how a great deal of the face of modern Europe was envisioned by the first before Napoleon crowned himself Emperor, and the latter ten years later at Vienna?)
The problem with Big Picture thinking is that the conclusions can seem too neat, and history has a way of demonstrating how very messy it is. Given that, the last half of the book is terrific, as he examines the alteration of paradigm over the twentieth century conflicts--the first half of which he calls the Long War. It ends with a coda supplied after the events of 9/11, striking a warning note.
March 21, 2008
Pulled out 'The Shield' recently and re-read some sections - Bobbitt is an interesting character, a constitutional lawyer and historian. I heard him speak at the Stanford Law and Ethics Forum a few weeks ago on 'Terror and Consent' which is also the title of his new book. The 'Shield' is of door-stop dimensions, but it had (for me) great value. He traces the dynamic, evolutionary relationship between the internal, constitutional order of states and the external challenges of strategy and war, beginning in the 15th century He argues that the effectiveness of internal mechanisms of order is proven (or not) in the Darwinian arena of foreign affairs. For example the so called 'long war'- all the conflicts between 1914 and the Peace of Paris in 1990 were (in his terms) an epochal war between the constitutional orders of fascism,communism and democracy. We are now, according to Bobbitt, in the beginning phases of a new epochal war, the war on terror, the first in which it will not require a state to destroy a state and which will force constitutional changes to survive the challenge. Gotta love a big picture guy. But he could use a brevity focused editor. Recommended- but be prepared to skim!
June 8, 2008
Although the author occasionally has some interesting ideas, he has the bad habit of mistaking assertion for argument, a chronic lack of evidence for his points and a rambling, badly-organized style of writing.
November 4, 2012
Bobbitt the historian tells us the story of the modern state, while Bobbitt the expert in strategic planning links this story to changes in military technology which in turn were bound to change military strategy. So we learn how military requirements produced new kinds of state: the “princely state” (1494 – 1648), the “kingly state” that merged into the “territorial state” (1648 – 1776), the “state-nation” (1776 – 1914), and the “nation-state” in what Bobbitt calls the “Long War” (1914 – 1990). How far this analysis is valid and persuasive is a matter for historians to debate. What is interesting in the present context is Bobbitt’s conclusion: just as the state-nation had to be replaced by the nation-state, so the nation-state, in the 21st century, will be superseded by what Bobbitt calls the “market-state”. It does not matter whether Bobbitt likes or recommends this market-state (he does). Whether we like it or not, this new type of state is what history will bring about.
If you want a really fast introduction to the book’s entire argument, ponder those plates for five minutes, then leap to Bobbitt’s summary of three scenarios on pp. 721-2, and then vault to the climax of the argument on pp. 773-5.
xxi Opening lines: “We are at a moment in world affairs when the essential ideas that govern statecraft must change . . . owing to advances in international telecommunications, rapid computation, and weapons of mass destruction.”
This book “is principally concerned with the relationship between strategy and legal order.”
xxvi “A great epochal war has just ended. The various competing systems of the contemporary nation-state (fascism, communism, parliamentarianism) that fought that war all took their legitimacy from the promise to better the material welfare of their citizens. The market-state offers a different covenant: It will maximize the opportunity of its people.”
If you want a really fast introduction to the book’s entire argument, ponder those plates for five minutes, then leap to Bobbitt’s summary of three scenarios on pp. 721-2, and then vault to the climax of the argument on pp. 773-5.
xxi Opening lines: “We are at a moment in world affairs when the essential ideas that govern statecraft must change . . . owing to advances in international telecommunications, rapid computation, and weapons of mass destruction.”
This book “is principally concerned with the relationship between strategy and legal order.”
xxvi “A great epochal war has just ended. The various competing systems of the contemporary nation-state (fascism, communism, parliamentarianism) that fought that war all took their legitimacy from the promise to better the material welfare of their citizens. The market-state offers a different covenant: It will maximize the opportunity of its people.”
November 5, 2014
Certain world leaders over the last dozen years have been in thrall to the theories and arguments that historian and political adviser Phillip Bobbitt formed in this mammoth book, published in 2002.
Why?
There is only one way to find out - to read the thing, which is quite a challenge as, not only could you find an alternative use for it as a prop for the shortened leg on a large-sized table, you could actually use it for a small-sized table on its own.
In the Introduction, Bobbitt establishes his aims clearly to identify the emergence of the the 'market-state' as the newest form of state, superseding the nation-state of the 20th century, much as that form had superseded the imperial-state of the 19th, and so on through six epochs all the way back to the very emergence of the very idea of State in 15th century.
He asserts that Law, Strategy and History are interconnected prerequisites for the constitutional legitimacy needed for a State, a vague but obvious fact on the face of it.
But Bobbitt has what he considers to be a new thesis to argue, so of course he has to make this claim as though he is the first person to think this, chiding other thinkers with the usual academic childishness such writers can't resist.
In Book 1, 'States of War', he presents a plausible explanation of how an epoch of war (termed the Long War) that started in 1914 only actually ended in 1990 with the Paris Treaty, for only then did the battle for constitutional legitimacy between communism, fascism and parliamentarianism conclude with the end of the Soviet state.
Military histories are provided for the previous five epochs he recognizes, all of which will be familiar to anyone who has studied history - almost specifically european history that is - at any depth.
Then he moves onto his definition of the current epoch and its 'market-states', which have come into being as a direct result of 3 causes: globalization, mass computation and WMDs.
At its simplest, his market-state definition is this: 'The State will maximize the opportunity of its citizens'. The belief is that the state will achieve this by doing less, relying more increasingly on corporations and NGOS (Non-governmental organisations| to get the job done for us (you know, such as banks, because they can be trusted to provide opportunity for the citizenry at large, right?)
He sees three such types of state: mercantile (national, interventionist), managerial (less centralized, partly interventionist) and entrepreneurial (internationalist, rarely interventionist).
I think you can guess which of these he favors.
He ends his book on war by stating that the US approach to war is outdated, that 'our current strategy owes more to General Ulysses Grant than to General Colin Powell'.
A new epoch calls for a new strategy. Terrorism is now the enemy, and the proliferation of WMDs to 'rogue' states must be stopped, something the UN will not do but NATO may, or similar, ad-hoc coalitions (such as the soon to be Coalition of theWitless Willing).
Book 2 addresses the international law of the society of states that has changed across the six epochs as a result of the peace conferences that has set the agenda after crucial conflicts have ended. (e.g. Westphalia established the Kingly State, Vienna the State-nation etc)
As with the historical sections of Book 1, he could have done without this clutter, though it does flesh out his thesis. This includes a lengthy history of the evolution of the proceeding form of government that he feels the market-state has replaced, the nation-state.
Also included is focus afforded to non-elected political adviser to Woodrow Wilson, Edward M. House; an analogy between the famous 'Kitty Genovese' incident familiar to all student psychologists; and the wars in the former Yugoslavian countries.
I know that jurisprudence and international law are subjects difficult to make engaging, but he could have made a better stab at it. This is the biggest problem with the bulk of the book and the inclusion of so much background - he simply doesn't write interestingly enough to keep you reading (which is why I read the first 350 pages in Oct 2012, then left it for two years until Oct 2014 to read the rest).
His take of Gorbachev's policies and intentions that proved the catalyst for the collapse of the USSR are somewhat dubious, suggesting that he had no real desire to move towards the eventual outcomes but rather blundered into them.
I still say that he and the USSR could have resorted to arms at any stage of the fragmentation of its state, but decided not to. That fact is more important than the negative effects of some misguided short-term economic reforms.
However, he is excellent on the subject of nuclear proliferation, making a clear and compelling case for the obligations that continue to define US policy, explaining why constitutionally unstable states or states with openly aggressive geopolitical aims should not be permitted to have them, and the benefits of ensuring that Germany and Japan continue to resist the need to develop their own nuclear programs instead of relying on American deterrence.
By far the most interesting part is the end, where he moves substantially onto the present and to scenarios from 'Possible Worlds', dependent on the choice of market-states chosen.
His extrapolations have already been proved largely incorrect in the years since publication, but they are all still highly possible, while he is very even-handed in the good and bad that could result from either of the three market-state models.
That is to say, the future under either of the three models looks like a hideous shit-storm whichever way.
At one stage he insists that leading politicians need to talk plainly about their strategy, discarding 'emotive' and essentially meaningless rhetoric, which we can all agree with.
Yet at another stage he merely shrugs his shoulders at the examples of hypocrisy in states, as though its their right to talk and behave in ways that pour scorn on their own constitutions (i.e. Guantanamo, American assistance for a military coup in Egypt?).
I know that this is the reality, but Bobbitt is doing more here than just pointing out the facts, he is offering an argument for how the state should act. So if double-standards are fine, why should politicians be other than the glib Public Relations advisers they have become?
I would argue that it is the very nature of the market-state itself that has made them that way. If those politicians want a state where the market actually controls everything, how can they possibly be anything but emasculated frontmen for the market?
A final word on war leaves the reader in no doubt that it is here to stay:
'We must choose which sort of war we will fight, regardless of what are its causes, to set the terms of the peace we want.'
The market-states he obviously favors, those of the US and the UK, have already chosen that war - the erroneously retaliatory and unlawful one in Irag, which Bobbitt supported.
We can already see the knock-on effect this has had in the middle-east, where several states have seen themselves come under attack from within. Tellingly, the rebels are not fighting to establish market-states on the models of the US or the UK.
Far from it.
In conclusion then, as is frequent with such theory based political works, Bobbitt's thesis could actually have been written on the back of a stamp, but it pays to pad it out to the point of obesity with potted histories of various peace treaties and biographies of political advisors and theorists on international law - where a plodding style encumbers him - as it does to crown it with a grand classical allusion, regardless of how appropriate.
All in all though, it still reads like an all-purpose apology for America to act how it wants in the world, regardless of the supposed advice being offered to a society of states in general.
Though the history is largely euro-centric, he does confirm that the US will be substantially used as a model for the market-state, appropriately enough I suppose.
But he also aims to give an 'objective' account of the countries history and influence, only to continually confuse just who he is referring to when he says "our", or "we", from the Introduction onwards.
If his intention is to persuade other market-states to follow the American lead into the new epoch, then, rather like the foreign policies of George W. Bush, he doesn't do a very good job.
If instead, as I see it, his intention is to say "It's my way or the highway", he makes a compelling case.
Why?
There is only one way to find out - to read the thing, which is quite a challenge as, not only could you find an alternative use for it as a prop for the shortened leg on a large-sized table, you could actually use it for a small-sized table on its own.
In the Introduction, Bobbitt establishes his aims clearly to identify the emergence of the the 'market-state' as the newest form of state, superseding the nation-state of the 20th century, much as that form had superseded the imperial-state of the 19th, and so on through six epochs all the way back to the very emergence of the very idea of State in 15th century.
He asserts that Law, Strategy and History are interconnected prerequisites for the constitutional legitimacy needed for a State, a vague but obvious fact on the face of it.
But Bobbitt has what he considers to be a new thesis to argue, so of course he has to make this claim as though he is the first person to think this, chiding other thinkers with the usual academic childishness such writers can't resist.
In Book 1, 'States of War', he presents a plausible explanation of how an epoch of war (termed the Long War) that started in 1914 only actually ended in 1990 with the Paris Treaty, for only then did the battle for constitutional legitimacy between communism, fascism and parliamentarianism conclude with the end of the Soviet state.
Military histories are provided for the previous five epochs he recognizes, all of which will be familiar to anyone who has studied history - almost specifically european history that is - at any depth.
Then he moves onto his definition of the current epoch and its 'market-states', which have come into being as a direct result of 3 causes: globalization, mass computation and WMDs.
At its simplest, his market-state definition is this: 'The State will maximize the opportunity of its citizens'. The belief is that the state will achieve this by doing less, relying more increasingly on corporations and NGOS (Non-governmental organisations| to get the job done for us (you know, such as banks, because they can be trusted to provide opportunity for the citizenry at large, right?)
He sees three such types of state: mercantile (national, interventionist), managerial (less centralized, partly interventionist) and entrepreneurial (internationalist, rarely interventionist).
I think you can guess which of these he favors.
He ends his book on war by stating that the US approach to war is outdated, that 'our current strategy owes more to General Ulysses Grant than to General Colin Powell'.
A new epoch calls for a new strategy. Terrorism is now the enemy, and the proliferation of WMDs to 'rogue' states must be stopped, something the UN will not do but NATO may, or similar, ad-hoc coalitions (such as the soon to be Coalition of the
Book 2 addresses the international law of the society of states that has changed across the six epochs as a result of the peace conferences that has set the agenda after crucial conflicts have ended. (e.g. Westphalia established the Kingly State, Vienna the State-nation etc)
As with the historical sections of Book 1, he could have done without this clutter, though it does flesh out his thesis. This includes a lengthy history of the evolution of the proceeding form of government that he feels the market-state has replaced, the nation-state.
Also included is focus afforded to non-elected political adviser to Woodrow Wilson, Edward M. House; an analogy between the famous 'Kitty Genovese' incident familiar to all student psychologists; and the wars in the former Yugoslavian countries.
I know that jurisprudence and international law are subjects difficult to make engaging, but he could have made a better stab at it. This is the biggest problem with the bulk of the book and the inclusion of so much background - he simply doesn't write interestingly enough to keep you reading (which is why I read the first 350 pages in Oct 2012, then left it for two years until Oct 2014 to read the rest).
His take of Gorbachev's policies and intentions that proved the catalyst for the collapse of the USSR are somewhat dubious, suggesting that he had no real desire to move towards the eventual outcomes but rather blundered into them.
I still say that he and the USSR could have resorted to arms at any stage of the fragmentation of its state, but decided not to. That fact is more important than the negative effects of some misguided short-term economic reforms.
However, he is excellent on the subject of nuclear proliferation, making a clear and compelling case for the obligations that continue to define US policy, explaining why constitutionally unstable states or states with openly aggressive geopolitical aims should not be permitted to have them, and the benefits of ensuring that Germany and Japan continue to resist the need to develop their own nuclear programs instead of relying on American deterrence.
By far the most interesting part is the end, where he moves substantially onto the present and to scenarios from 'Possible Worlds', dependent on the choice of market-states chosen.
His extrapolations have already been proved largely incorrect in the years since publication, but they are all still highly possible, while he is very even-handed in the good and bad that could result from either of the three market-state models.
That is to say, the future under either of the three models looks like a hideous shit-storm whichever way.
At one stage he insists that leading politicians need to talk plainly about their strategy, discarding 'emotive' and essentially meaningless rhetoric, which we can all agree with.
Yet at another stage he merely shrugs his shoulders at the examples of hypocrisy in states, as though its their right to talk and behave in ways that pour scorn on their own constitutions (i.e. Guantanamo, American assistance for a military coup in Egypt?).
I know that this is the reality, but Bobbitt is doing more here than just pointing out the facts, he is offering an argument for how the state should act. So if double-standards are fine, why should politicians be other than the glib Public Relations advisers they have become?
I would argue that it is the very nature of the market-state itself that has made them that way. If those politicians want a state where the market actually controls everything, how can they possibly be anything but emasculated frontmen for the market?
A final word on war leaves the reader in no doubt that it is here to stay:
'We must choose which sort of war we will fight, regardless of what are its causes, to set the terms of the peace we want.'
The market-states he obviously favors, those of the US and the UK, have already chosen that war - the erroneously retaliatory and unlawful one in Irag, which Bobbitt supported.
We can already see the knock-on effect this has had in the middle-east, where several states have seen themselves come under attack from within. Tellingly, the rebels are not fighting to establish market-states on the models of the US or the UK.
Far from it.
In conclusion then, as is frequent with such theory based political works, Bobbitt's thesis could actually have been written on the back of a stamp, but it pays to pad it out to the point of obesity with potted histories of various peace treaties and biographies of political advisors and theorists on international law - where a plodding style encumbers him - as it does to crown it with a grand classical allusion, regardless of how appropriate.
All in all though, it still reads like an all-purpose apology for America to act how it wants in the world, regardless of the supposed advice being offered to a society of states in general.
Though the history is largely euro-centric, he does confirm that the US will be substantially used as a model for the market-state, appropriately enough I suppose.
But he also aims to give an 'objective' account of the countries history and influence, only to continually confuse just who he is referring to when he says "our", or "we", from the Introduction onwards.
If his intention is to persuade other market-states to follow the American lead into the new epoch, then, rather like the foreign policies of George W. Bush, he doesn't do a very good job.
If instead, as I see it, his intention is to say "It's my way or the highway", he makes a compelling case.
Want to read
July 7, 2019{Not a Review}
======++++++======
Seen in Paul Monk's review of Hugh White's https://www.theaustralian.com.au/arts... How To Defend Australia https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/4...
Paul Monk was the head of the 'China desk' at the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO). So he probably knows what he's talking about and think's Hugh White is full of it (which we knew anyway and I agree). Seems the DIO has churned out some half-decent analysts afterall ;-p
======++++++======
Seen in Paul Monk's review of Hugh White's https://www.theaustralian.com.au/arts... How To Defend Australia https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/4...
Paul Monk was the head of the 'China desk' at the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO). So he probably knows what he's talking about and think's Hugh White is full of it (which we knew anyway and I agree). Seems the DIO has churned out some half-decent analysts afterall ;-p
September 15, 2021
Although dated, Bobbitt’s work, a scholarly treatment of statecraft, can help the pro-life world understand how Big Tech could corrupt the market-states, which, the author argues, is replacing nation-states.
Reading Bobbitt’s work is equivalent to a semester (or two) of college credit without the leftist lunacy that most colleges and universities now interject with their distortions of “social justice” (gender equality, which distorts heterosexual normativity; bashing the United States, which they think is the Satan of nations; or affirming racist groups like Black Lives Matter). Thus, the general reader will delight in whipping out his or her smartphone to learn more about historical events and persons mentioned in the text or defining polysyllabic and rarely-used words, like the wonderfully mellifluous “vertiginous” (703).
Pro-life readers will especially appreciate being able to “connect the dots” of Bobbitt’s study with current events two decades later, and the epiphany that they will receive should motivate them to even greater action than reading Senator Josh Hawley’s exposé of Big Tech, demonstrated in his masterly book The Tyranny of Big Tech (Regnery, 2021).
Of course, while Bobbitt’s book is dated, all readers will appreciate his discussion of five developments that challenge the sovereignty of nation-states (xxii); or his commentary on cutting regulations and taxes (241), which will lead the reader to conclude ineluctably that President Trump was right on those topics and that the inept Joe Biden and his fellow anti-American Democrats are wrong in their $3.5 trillion tax increases; or the “the six modalities of U.S. constitutional law” (660).
Bobbitt’s work has at least one glaring omission of an important person who made world history. There is no mention of St. John Paul II and his role in the discussion of the collapse of communism in Europe (61), nor is the saint mentioned in the discussion of Poland’s labor union Solidarnosc (622). There isn’t even an index entry for John Paul II. I trust that Bobbitt doesn’t think that it was only President Reagan or Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who worked to end Communism in Europe.
While some items in Bobbitt’s work, since it is dated, must be disregarded, such as the woefully outdated internet information (788), more items must be corrected or updated. Reading that “The democratic, capitalist, and parliamentary state no longer faces great-power threats” (8) is cringeworthy; Communist China was an enemy of the United States in 2002 as it is now, even more so, as President Trump showed us during his administration. Regarding his comments on the Second Amendment, a vital update is needed because of the destruction and death caused by Antifa domestic terrorists (237). Similarly, there should be an update regarding enemy states; the claim that “None really threaten [sic] us” (268) is naïve when we Americans know that Communist China wishes to destroy American intellectual and political power or that the Taliban has seized an entire nation from which international terrorism has a base, no thanks to the inept Joe Biden.
Furthermore, since “corporations” in 2021 include the more powerful social media companies created by leftist billionaires who mine our personal data for their bank accounts, several of Bobbitt’s statements about corporations and their involvement in the market-state need revision.
For example, Bobbitt’s claim that “Business corporations cannot try people and jail them” (337) needs to be corrected. Big Tech social media companies try (as in determine the political correctness of users’ opinions) and then jail (as in ban, block, censor, or quarantine) users if the leftist social media companies don’t like what is posted.
Similarly, Bobbitt’s claim that Nazi ideology as a governmental form has vanished from the globe is woefully premature: “The disgust and horror experienced by civilized people everywhere [over Nazi death camps] effectively removed fascism from the list of possible choices that nations might consider in forming states and marginalized it forever to the dormitory rooms of misfits” (610). Abortions performed in “clinics” run by companies like the monolithic Planned Parenthood are the death camps of today, and the Nazi “misfits” of the 1940s are today’s Antifa domestic terrorists, financed by Democratic Party operatives.
Moreover, the claim that feminism “has thus far been quite marginal” (658) is either utterly naïve or blatantly ignorant. Anti-life feminism, the kind that, unlike pro-life feminism, supports abortion, has managed to coerce corporations and governments to support abortion with donations (from the corporations) and tax dollars (from the governments) all in the name of “equality”, a corruption of the Western ideal so that the unborn child’s life is not equal to that of the mother and his or her father.
As a corollary, if Bobbitt cannot recognize anti-life feminism’s impact on the globe, then no wonder he can assert the tiresome and misleading statistic that AIDS is the “leading cause of death among Americans under the age of twenty-one” (709) and not perceive or be bold enough to state that abortion is the number one killer of youth.
Instead of faulting his research, contemporary readers can use Bobbitt’s commentary about the market-state to see how Big Tech is trying to corrupt (hopefully, not already has corrupted) the market-state. According to Bobbitt, “the market-state promises instead to maximize the opportunity of the people and thus tends to privatize many state activities and to make voting and representative government less influential and more responsive to the market” [211]. If this definition is true, then Big Tech would love the market-state because it’s all about money: “the market-state is largely indifferent to the norms of justice, or for that matter to any particular set of moral values so long as law does not act as an impediment to economic competition” (230).
Bobbitt’s commentary about political leaders in the new market-state is almost prophetic. “I speculate that leadership for this move [“to encourage the development of entrepreneurial states”] is likelier to come from the leaders of multinational corporations and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) than from leaders of the national security apparatus and the political establishment” (337). While it would be disastrous to think that Mark Zuckerberg (Facebook) or Jack Dorsey (Twitter) are those “leaders”, I think a better example of such a leader who can function in the new worldview and who supports the pro-life movement was and is President Donald Trump. How desperately we need more leaders like him to counter the leftist ones in Big Tech who would destroy Western civilization!
Fortunately, Bobbitt clearly identifies the Achilles’ heel(s) of the market-state: “the market-state’s inherent weaknesses—its lack of community, its extreme meritocracy, its essential materialism and indifference to heroism, spirituality, and tradition” (290). Thus, if Big Tech thinks it can flourish in such a political arrangement, its constituent companies (the leftist Amazon, Facebook, Google, Twitter, etc.) would need to battle billions of people who oppose materialism, who aim to be heroes, who are spiritual, and who believe and follow tradition.
Finally, Bobbitt specifies some areas where the market-state could promote anti-life ideas, so pro-lifers must be vigilant against Big Tech’s/corporations’ efforts to harm or kill human beings. He recognizes that the market-state may ration health care by determining “to whom to give life-saving medical care” (710). In a futuristic scenario of one category of the market-state, Bobbitt conjectures that “anti-abortion laws […] all vanished” (735) and, in another scenario, “assisted suicide […] organ harvesting” occur (736; italics in original in both cases). A final example of a scenario for a future market-state lists “population control” as a “constitutional condition for a society of market-states” (802).
At 888 lugubrious pages, Bobbitt’s work is challenging to read, yet necessary to understand how the Big Tech billionaires could distort our twenty-first century.
Reader warning! Since Amazon collaborates with cancel culture zealots and bans conservative and pro-life books, buy this book on any service other than Amazon. (Why give your hard-earned pro-life dollars to a company that censors books?) Instead, buy this book directly from the publisher (https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/bo...) or from some other venue.
Reading Bobbitt’s work is equivalent to a semester (or two) of college credit without the leftist lunacy that most colleges and universities now interject with their distortions of “social justice” (gender equality, which distorts heterosexual normativity; bashing the United States, which they think is the Satan of nations; or affirming racist groups like Black Lives Matter). Thus, the general reader will delight in whipping out his or her smartphone to learn more about historical events and persons mentioned in the text or defining polysyllabic and rarely-used words, like the wonderfully mellifluous “vertiginous” (703).
Pro-life readers will especially appreciate being able to “connect the dots” of Bobbitt’s study with current events two decades later, and the epiphany that they will receive should motivate them to even greater action than reading Senator Josh Hawley’s exposé of Big Tech, demonstrated in his masterly book The Tyranny of Big Tech (Regnery, 2021).
Of course, while Bobbitt’s book is dated, all readers will appreciate his discussion of five developments that challenge the sovereignty of nation-states (xxii); or his commentary on cutting regulations and taxes (241), which will lead the reader to conclude ineluctably that President Trump was right on those topics and that the inept Joe Biden and his fellow anti-American Democrats are wrong in their $3.5 trillion tax increases; or the “the six modalities of U.S. constitutional law” (660).
Bobbitt’s work has at least one glaring omission of an important person who made world history. There is no mention of St. John Paul II and his role in the discussion of the collapse of communism in Europe (61), nor is the saint mentioned in the discussion of Poland’s labor union Solidarnosc (622). There isn’t even an index entry for John Paul II. I trust that Bobbitt doesn’t think that it was only President Reagan or Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who worked to end Communism in Europe.
While some items in Bobbitt’s work, since it is dated, must be disregarded, such as the woefully outdated internet information (788), more items must be corrected or updated. Reading that “The democratic, capitalist, and parliamentary state no longer faces great-power threats” (8) is cringeworthy; Communist China was an enemy of the United States in 2002 as it is now, even more so, as President Trump showed us during his administration. Regarding his comments on the Second Amendment, a vital update is needed because of the destruction and death caused by Antifa domestic terrorists (237). Similarly, there should be an update regarding enemy states; the claim that “None really threaten [sic] us” (268) is naïve when we Americans know that Communist China wishes to destroy American intellectual and political power or that the Taliban has seized an entire nation from which international terrorism has a base, no thanks to the inept Joe Biden.
Furthermore, since “corporations” in 2021 include the more powerful social media companies created by leftist billionaires who mine our personal data for their bank accounts, several of Bobbitt’s statements about corporations and their involvement in the market-state need revision.
For example, Bobbitt’s claim that “Business corporations cannot try people and jail them” (337) needs to be corrected. Big Tech social media companies try (as in determine the political correctness of users’ opinions) and then jail (as in ban, block, censor, or quarantine) users if the leftist social media companies don’t like what is posted.
Similarly, Bobbitt’s claim that Nazi ideology as a governmental form has vanished from the globe is woefully premature: “The disgust and horror experienced by civilized people everywhere [over Nazi death camps] effectively removed fascism from the list of possible choices that nations might consider in forming states and marginalized it forever to the dormitory rooms of misfits” (610). Abortions performed in “clinics” run by companies like the monolithic Planned Parenthood are the death camps of today, and the Nazi “misfits” of the 1940s are today’s Antifa domestic terrorists, financed by Democratic Party operatives.
Moreover, the claim that feminism “has thus far been quite marginal” (658) is either utterly naïve or blatantly ignorant. Anti-life feminism, the kind that, unlike pro-life feminism, supports abortion, has managed to coerce corporations and governments to support abortion with donations (from the corporations) and tax dollars (from the governments) all in the name of “equality”, a corruption of the Western ideal so that the unborn child’s life is not equal to that of the mother and his or her father.
As a corollary, if Bobbitt cannot recognize anti-life feminism’s impact on the globe, then no wonder he can assert the tiresome and misleading statistic that AIDS is the “leading cause of death among Americans under the age of twenty-one” (709) and not perceive or be bold enough to state that abortion is the number one killer of youth.
Instead of faulting his research, contemporary readers can use Bobbitt’s commentary about the market-state to see how Big Tech is trying to corrupt (hopefully, not already has corrupted) the market-state. According to Bobbitt, “the market-state promises instead to maximize the opportunity of the people and thus tends to privatize many state activities and to make voting and representative government less influential and more responsive to the market” [211]. If this definition is true, then Big Tech would love the market-state because it’s all about money: “the market-state is largely indifferent to the norms of justice, or for that matter to any particular set of moral values so long as law does not act as an impediment to economic competition” (230).
Bobbitt’s commentary about political leaders in the new market-state is almost prophetic. “I speculate that leadership for this move [“to encourage the development of entrepreneurial states”] is likelier to come from the leaders of multinational corporations and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) than from leaders of the national security apparatus and the political establishment” (337). While it would be disastrous to think that Mark Zuckerberg (Facebook) or Jack Dorsey (Twitter) are those “leaders”, I think a better example of such a leader who can function in the new worldview and who supports the pro-life movement was and is President Donald Trump. How desperately we need more leaders like him to counter the leftist ones in Big Tech who would destroy Western civilization!
Fortunately, Bobbitt clearly identifies the Achilles’ heel(s) of the market-state: “the market-state’s inherent weaknesses—its lack of community, its extreme meritocracy, its essential materialism and indifference to heroism, spirituality, and tradition” (290). Thus, if Big Tech thinks it can flourish in such a political arrangement, its constituent companies (the leftist Amazon, Facebook, Google, Twitter, etc.) would need to battle billions of people who oppose materialism, who aim to be heroes, who are spiritual, and who believe and follow tradition.
Finally, Bobbitt specifies some areas where the market-state could promote anti-life ideas, so pro-lifers must be vigilant against Big Tech’s/corporations’ efforts to harm or kill human beings. He recognizes that the market-state may ration health care by determining “to whom to give life-saving medical care” (710). In a futuristic scenario of one category of the market-state, Bobbitt conjectures that “anti-abortion laws […] all vanished” (735) and, in another scenario, “assisted suicide […] organ harvesting” occur (736; italics in original in both cases). A final example of a scenario for a future market-state lists “population control” as a “constitutional condition for a society of market-states” (802).
At 888 lugubrious pages, Bobbitt’s work is challenging to read, yet necessary to understand how the Big Tech billionaires could distort our twenty-first century.
Reader warning! Since Amazon collaborates with cancel culture zealots and bans conservative and pro-life books, buy this book on any service other than Amazon. (Why give your hard-earned pro-life dollars to a company that censors books?) Instead, buy this book directly from the publisher (https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/bo...) or from some other venue.
April 12, 2012
This is a remarkable work -- if only for its sheer ambition and the grace with which it is pursued. Setting into meaningful dialogue military/strategic history and political/constitutional history, Bobbitt traces the changing dominant forms of the "state" from its Renaissance founding (princely states) through to what he argues is the recent (or perhaps still occurring) demise of the 20th-century manifestation (nation states). So the historical narrative is not intended only to enrich our understanding of the past and to provide much-needed perspective for today's challenges, both of which it does in spades. It also sets up his more provocative and unabashedly speculative proposal: that we are living not just in the waning of the nation state but in the early formative stages of its successor, what he calls the "market state." One is tempted to review this book on the plausibility of this proposal regarding the market state, and this in turn tempts one to judge such ideas according to what one believes (desires, wishes, hopes...) the state to be or to become. But this is not the real value of the book, in my opinion. Whether Bobbitt "gets it right" or not is somewhat besides the point, for he has done an enormous service by setting the most trenchant and bewildering challenges of 21st century sociopolitical life in the midst of an integrated historical narrative that leaves this reader, at least, feeling better equipped to THINK further and more responsibly about our present and our possible futures. And specific political debates take on a new salience in this context, even as they show themselves to be ever less reducible to simple solutions (especially ones rooted in old ideologies, left or right or other). I look forward to reading his sequel, Terror and Consent: The Wars of the 21st Century, which promises to address the speculative futures of the market state in more detail (yet I will also be eager to ask how the economic events from 2008 onward may affect his work, Terror and Consent being published in 2008). In the end, it is a book to read carefully, to ponder broadly, and then to set aside in order to participate more intelligently and fully in the political work of life together. That Bobbitt writes elegantly and synthesizes everything from poetry to policy to warfare to theory so beautifully makes the experience all the more rewarding and compelling.
February 20, 2025
Philip Bobbitt’s The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History (2002) is an ambitious and interdisciplinary work that seeks to redefine our understanding of historical change, particularly in relation to warfare, law, and the state. Combining history, political theory, and international relations, Bobbitt presents a grand narrative in which he argues that the evolution of warfare and constitutional order are deeply intertwined, shaping the development of modern states and their international interactions. The book is both a historical analysis and a theoretical framework for understanding the geopolitical transformations of the 20th and 21st centuries.
Bobbitt’s central thesis is that throughout history, shifts in the nature of warfare have driven transformations in the constitutional order of states. He argues that these transformations occur in distinct phases, where dominant forms of military conflict lead to corresponding changes in governance structures and international legal frameworks. According to Bobbitt, the modern era has seen the rise and fall of different constitutional orders, from princely states and kingly states to nation-states and, more recently, what he calls “market states.”
The book is divided into two major parts. The first section provides a historical analysis of war and state formation, emphasizing the connection between major conflicts (such as the Napoleonic Wars, World Wars, and Cold War) and the reconfiguration of state structures. The second section introduces Bobbitt’s concept of the “market state,” which he argues is replacing the traditional nation-state. In this emerging order, states prioritize economic competitiveness and individual opportunity over the social-welfare functions traditionally associated with the nation-state.
Bobbitt asserts that the global transition from the nation-state to the market state is driven by technological advancements, economic globalization, and changes in the nature of warfare—particularly the shift from conventional state-based conflicts to asymmetric warfare, terrorism, and cyber warfare. He suggests that this transition has profound implications for international law, security policy, and democratic governance.
Bobbitt employs a broad historical lens, synthesizing insights from military history, constitutional law, and political philosophy. His argument is deeply influenced by the realist tradition in international relations, particularly the idea that power dynamics and strategic necessity drive historical change. At the same time, his analysis incorporates legal and institutional perspectives, making the book a unique interdisciplinary contribution.
One of the book’s strengths is its detailed historical case studies, which illustrate how different forms of warfare have shaped state structures. For example, Bobbitt examines how the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) established the modern state system following the Thirty Years’ War and how the world wars of the 20th century necessitated the creation of welfare states. His discussion of the Cold War highlights how nuclear deterrence led to the emergence of new legal and diplomatic norms that constrained interstate conflict.
However, Bobbitt’s sweeping historical scope has drawn criticism for its deterministic tendencies. While he provides compelling correlations between war and state transformation, some scholars argue that his framework oversimplifies the complexity of political and social change by attributing too much causal weight to military factors. Additionally, his predictions about the rise of the market state remain speculative, with some questioning whether his proposed model fully accounts for the resurgence of nationalist and populist movements in the 21st century.
The Shield of Achilles has been widely praised for its intellectual depth and originality. Scholars and policymakers alike have found Bobbitt’s synthesis of history, law, and strategy to be a valuable contribution to discussions on statecraft and international order. His argument that war and law are mutually constitutive processes offers a fresh perspective on historical change, challenging more traditional accounts that treat warfare as an external disruption to state development.
However, some critics have pointed out the book’s dense and sometimes inaccessible prose, which can make it challenging for readers unfamiliar with legal and strategic theory. Others have raised concerns about the book’s policy implications. If Bobbitt is correct that the nation-state is in decline and that market states will prioritize efficiency and economic growth over social welfare, what does this mean for democracy, sovereignty, and human rights? Critics worry that his analysis implicitly justifies the erosion of traditional democratic norms in favor of technocratic governance and corporate influence.
Another point of contention is Bobbitt’s treatment of contemporary security threats. While he correctly anticipates the growing role of terrorism and cyber warfare, some scholars argue that his focus on the transition to the market state underestimates the resilience of traditional nation-states. The resurgence of nationalism, the geopolitical assertiveness of major powers like China and Russia, and the persistence of state-centric conflicts suggest that the nation-state may not be as obsolete as Bobbitt suggests.
Despite these critiques, The Shield of Achilles remains highly relevant in discussions of international security, governance, and state evolution. The book’s insights into the changing nature of war have proven prescient, particularly in light of the post-9/11 security landscape, the proliferation of hybrid warfare, and the increasing role of private actors in global governance. Bobbitt’s concept of the market state also raises important questions about the future of democracy and the role of states in regulating economic and technological change.
As globalization continues to reshape political and economic systems, the tensions Bobbitt identifies—between security and liberty, efficiency and democracy, national sovereignty and global governance—remain central to contemporary debates. Whether or not one fully agrees with his framework, his analysis offers a valuable lens through which to examine the evolving relationship between war, law, and state power.
The Shield of Achilles is a monumental work that offers a compelling, if controversial, theory of historical change. By linking military conflict to constitutional evolution, Bobbitt provides a unique perspective on the development of the modern state and its future trajectory. While the book’s grand historical narrative and predictions about the market state invite debate, its interdisciplinary approach makes it an essential read for scholars of history, political science, and international relations. Whether one agrees with Bobbitt’s conclusions or not, his work challenges conventional wisdom and provides a framework for understanding the complex interplay between war, law, and state transformation in the modern world.
GPT
Bobbitt’s central thesis is that throughout history, shifts in the nature of warfare have driven transformations in the constitutional order of states. He argues that these transformations occur in distinct phases, where dominant forms of military conflict lead to corresponding changes in governance structures and international legal frameworks. According to Bobbitt, the modern era has seen the rise and fall of different constitutional orders, from princely states and kingly states to nation-states and, more recently, what he calls “market states.”
The book is divided into two major parts. The first section provides a historical analysis of war and state formation, emphasizing the connection between major conflicts (such as the Napoleonic Wars, World Wars, and Cold War) and the reconfiguration of state structures. The second section introduces Bobbitt’s concept of the “market state,” which he argues is replacing the traditional nation-state. In this emerging order, states prioritize economic competitiveness and individual opportunity over the social-welfare functions traditionally associated with the nation-state.
Bobbitt asserts that the global transition from the nation-state to the market state is driven by technological advancements, economic globalization, and changes in the nature of warfare—particularly the shift from conventional state-based conflicts to asymmetric warfare, terrorism, and cyber warfare. He suggests that this transition has profound implications for international law, security policy, and democratic governance.
Bobbitt employs a broad historical lens, synthesizing insights from military history, constitutional law, and political philosophy. His argument is deeply influenced by the realist tradition in international relations, particularly the idea that power dynamics and strategic necessity drive historical change. At the same time, his analysis incorporates legal and institutional perspectives, making the book a unique interdisciplinary contribution.
One of the book’s strengths is its detailed historical case studies, which illustrate how different forms of warfare have shaped state structures. For example, Bobbitt examines how the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) established the modern state system following the Thirty Years’ War and how the world wars of the 20th century necessitated the creation of welfare states. His discussion of the Cold War highlights how nuclear deterrence led to the emergence of new legal and diplomatic norms that constrained interstate conflict.
However, Bobbitt’s sweeping historical scope has drawn criticism for its deterministic tendencies. While he provides compelling correlations between war and state transformation, some scholars argue that his framework oversimplifies the complexity of political and social change by attributing too much causal weight to military factors. Additionally, his predictions about the rise of the market state remain speculative, with some questioning whether his proposed model fully accounts for the resurgence of nationalist and populist movements in the 21st century.
The Shield of Achilles has been widely praised for its intellectual depth and originality. Scholars and policymakers alike have found Bobbitt’s synthesis of history, law, and strategy to be a valuable contribution to discussions on statecraft and international order. His argument that war and law are mutually constitutive processes offers a fresh perspective on historical change, challenging more traditional accounts that treat warfare as an external disruption to state development.
However, some critics have pointed out the book’s dense and sometimes inaccessible prose, which can make it challenging for readers unfamiliar with legal and strategic theory. Others have raised concerns about the book’s policy implications. If Bobbitt is correct that the nation-state is in decline and that market states will prioritize efficiency and economic growth over social welfare, what does this mean for democracy, sovereignty, and human rights? Critics worry that his analysis implicitly justifies the erosion of traditional democratic norms in favor of technocratic governance and corporate influence.
Another point of contention is Bobbitt’s treatment of contemporary security threats. While he correctly anticipates the growing role of terrorism and cyber warfare, some scholars argue that his focus on the transition to the market state underestimates the resilience of traditional nation-states. The resurgence of nationalism, the geopolitical assertiveness of major powers like China and Russia, and the persistence of state-centric conflicts suggest that the nation-state may not be as obsolete as Bobbitt suggests.
Despite these critiques, The Shield of Achilles remains highly relevant in discussions of international security, governance, and state evolution. The book’s insights into the changing nature of war have proven prescient, particularly in light of the post-9/11 security landscape, the proliferation of hybrid warfare, and the increasing role of private actors in global governance. Bobbitt’s concept of the market state also raises important questions about the future of democracy and the role of states in regulating economic and technological change.
As globalization continues to reshape political and economic systems, the tensions Bobbitt identifies—between security and liberty, efficiency and democracy, national sovereignty and global governance—remain central to contemporary debates. Whether or not one fully agrees with his framework, his analysis offers a valuable lens through which to examine the evolving relationship between war, law, and state power.
The Shield of Achilles is a monumental work that offers a compelling, if controversial, theory of historical change. By linking military conflict to constitutional evolution, Bobbitt provides a unique perspective on the development of the modern state and its future trajectory. While the book’s grand historical narrative and predictions about the market state invite debate, its interdisciplinary approach makes it an essential read for scholars of history, political science, and international relations. Whether one agrees with Bobbitt’s conclusions or not, his work challenges conventional wisdom and provides a framework for understanding the complex interplay between war, law, and state transformation in the modern world.
GPT
February 16, 2015
The Shield of Achilles is a tome. In that sense it reflects the source for it's title, Homer's elaborate and lengthy description of Achilles' shield in the Iliad. I read this book as part of my research on a paper in which I argued that transnational legal orders are facilitating a reorientation of individual identities and therefore political change. Because of this, I was reading for very specific information and my opinion may be skewed for that reason. Philip Bobbitt's analysis is incredible. He argues persuasively the relationship between war and changes in the orientation of the state (re: government or its corollary) and citizens. Bobbitt utilizes a cross-disciplinary approach, engaging history, law, politics, economics, and psychology, to explain humanity in a way that each discipline has attempted and fallen short. Not since Toynbee's A Study of History have I been so impressed with a comprehensive approach to explaining us.
While the book is phenomenal, Bobbitt's conclusions are not necessarily good. His argues that we are transition from the "nation-state" orientation to the "market-state". A market-state is concerned chiefly with protecting wealth and open markets. It is engaged in what I would describe as a perversion of capitalism ala Disaster Capitalism. Given the record wealth inequality around the world and the financial, political, and environmental devastation wrought by regulatory capture there is a lot of recent events that lends credence to his conclusion.
As I said, I read this book for a specific purpose. However, I found it so good that I plan to reread the hulking 800 page text to approach it without predispositions or agendas. A willingness to reread is truthfully the highest recommendation that one can give for any book.
While the book is phenomenal, Bobbitt's conclusions are not necessarily good. His argues that we are transition from the "nation-state" orientation to the "market-state". A market-state is concerned chiefly with protecting wealth and open markets. It is engaged in what I would describe as a perversion of capitalism ala Disaster Capitalism. Given the record wealth inequality around the world and the financial, political, and environmental devastation wrought by regulatory capture there is a lot of recent events that lends credence to his conclusion.
As I said, I read this book for a specific purpose. However, I found it so good that I plan to reread the hulking 800 page text to approach it without predispositions or agendas. A willingness to reread is truthfully the highest recommendation that one can give for any book.
September 23, 2010
Well, I've finally finished this tome. I read this on the Amazon Kindle 3 (iPad and Touch as well) and this thing has 23,074 locations (get used to the new system it's the future...probably...because it is more accurate).
Achilles was a good book but not a great book. Problems for me were that it was over written, fractious, largely speculative, and somewhat dated (having mostly been written before 9/11).
Essentially it is two books rolled into one. Another of its problems. The first book is concerned with the history of the Long or Epochal War...transformative wars which change the nature of states as they are fought. 1914-90 is a good example of this. The second book is about the evolution of the state and the argument that a new type of state is emerging.
Presently we are living at the fag end of the Nation State (which offers its people a better life) and are growing into the Market State (which attempts to offer its people better opportunities).
These two books are inadequately merged into a central thesis so the reader is left with a jarring experience.
In parts the book is brilliant and at other parts cliche...this unevenness was another issue for me...but the brilliant parts managed to give this book three stars instead of two. In truth I wished to give it two but it deserves the three.
Is it worth read? Tough question. I believe the book on the Epochal War is very worthwhile but the book on the evolution of the State less so.
Am glad to be free of this book...but it was worth the time...though, ultimately, unconvincing.
Achilles was a good book but not a great book. Problems for me were that it was over written, fractious, largely speculative, and somewhat dated (having mostly been written before 9/11).
Essentially it is two books rolled into one. Another of its problems. The first book is concerned with the history of the Long or Epochal War...transformative wars which change the nature of states as they are fought. 1914-90 is a good example of this. The second book is about the evolution of the state and the argument that a new type of state is emerging.
Presently we are living at the fag end of the Nation State (which offers its people a better life) and are growing into the Market State (which attempts to offer its people better opportunities).
These two books are inadequately merged into a central thesis so the reader is left with a jarring experience.
In parts the book is brilliant and at other parts cliche...this unevenness was another issue for me...but the brilliant parts managed to give this book three stars instead of two. In truth I wished to give it two but it deserves the three.
Is it worth read? Tough question. I believe the book on the Epochal War is very worthwhile but the book on the evolution of the State less so.
Am glad to be free of this book...but it was worth the time...though, ultimately, unconvincing.
March 12, 2010
Sweeping . . . that's the best one-word review I can offer . . . just sweeping, as Dr. Bobbitt traces the basic history of the whole concept of the nation-state from inception to circa 2001. And he does so in prose that is as compelling as a novel in places, believe it or not. I started reading this book in 2004 in the midst of a horrible Floridian hurricane and found myself not wanting to put it down or leave my apartment. The chapter on Colonel House and his legacy in statecraft is worth the price of the book alone, to say nothing of the rest of it. If you want a great introduction to modern statecraft and how contemporary Western nations think and work, this is the best place I can think of in one book to start out on that education. It's long and dense, but again, the author is a very skilled writer and keeps your interest all the way through.
October 8, 2011
The breadth and depth of this book is astonishing. Bobbitt explains why the 20th Century was one "Long War" fought between Fascism, Communism and Parliamentarism. The latter won.
But the more important point is the void created by the lack of the cold war, and how that confuses countries in terms of how to react to new problems of terror, dictators, food crises or even climate change.
Offers views on NATO, UN, EU etc.
Tough read with enormous detail in history from 1400's to now.
But the more important point is the void created by the lack of the cold war, and how that confuses countries in terms of how to react to new problems of terror, dictators, food crises or even climate change.
Offers views on NATO, UN, EU etc.
Tough read with enormous detail in history from 1400's to now.
February 7, 2010
If Schama's 'Citizens' is the best history book I've read with a narrow focus, this is the best one with a broader focus.
The weaknesses almost all lie in the 2nd half of the book, which is not as strong as the first. The chapter on House I felt could have been eliminated all together.
But the first half is so enriching and eye opening. So many things came together for me about the last 500 years of western history as I read this.
The weaknesses almost all lie in the 2nd half of the book, which is not as strong as the first. The chapter on House I felt could have been eliminated all together.
But the first half is so enriching and eye opening. So many things came together for me about the last 500 years of western history as I read this.
March 31, 2010
It has the potential to open and change your persepective if you can handle the scope and the depth of the work. One of the best books Ive ever picked up. If your interested in war and history give this book a try
January 24, 2013
Cool book. I'm currently reading about how the great treaties of the world have contributed our current international state: Augsburg, Westfallia, Peace of Paris, etc.
September 26, 2023
A very long and heavy read by a consitutional legal scholar. I have heard this book described as "magisterial," and that certainly fits. In it, Philip Bobbitt formulates a theory of the evolution of the state as proceeding through periodic “epochal wars” which redefine the constitutional order. As each new form of the state is legitimized by the outcome of the war, the seeds are planted for the growth of the form which will come to replace it. Thus he describes a kind of historical cycle, emerging from the interplay between law (order within a society) and strategy (order between societies). He lays out a history of epochal wars and the different kinds of states that were formed, from the "Princely States" of the Renaissance to the powerful nation states of the World War era. Each new form of the state comes with changes in international law as well. Bobbitt is well versed in these topics, and the lay reader may find his arguments complicated (I know I did), making this book a challenging but fascinating read. Bobbitt postulates that post-Cold War we are now seeing a new kind of constitutional order emerge - the "market state" - which has the goal of maximizing economic opportunity for its citizens while defending them from dangerous infiltrators such as terrorist attackers (the book came out shortly after 9/11). Clearly Bobbitt was grokking the zeitgeist when he wrote this, but the question of how well his theory of a "market state" holds water remains an open one, in my opinion. Further evolution of the constitutional order may be coming, is what I'm saying. But in any event a name is just a name, so call the Coming World Order the Rise of the Market State, if you will. History is only visible in hindsight anyway, and even then its image is murky.
December 13, 2018
I actually read this book about 15 years ago I mention it because it was my first time to learn how important the contributions make by President Bush (41) and his secretary of state, Jim Baker. This has all come to light with the funeral services and clebrations of the life if htis presiedent.
The book gives an interesting perspective on history. For example he regards WI, WWII, Korea, Viet Nam to not be separate wars. Rather they constitute the "long war" which started in 1914 in Sarajevo, and ended with the fall of Soviet Russia's empire in 1992.
I am reminded of a joke. A knight mounts his horse and bids farewell to his wife saying "Good bye, I'm off to fight in the seven years war". She replies "at least it's not the hundred years war!. Of course, no one knew the length and starting and ending dates for these wars until they were seen with the perspective of history.
All said, this is a well written and interesting book for people interested in history.
The book gives an interesting perspective on history. For example he regards WI, WWII, Korea, Viet Nam to not be separate wars. Rather they constitute the "long war" which started in 1914 in Sarajevo, and ended with the fall of Soviet Russia's empire in 1992.
I am reminded of a joke. A knight mounts his horse and bids farewell to his wife saying "Good bye, I'm off to fight in the seven years war". She replies "at least it's not the hundred years war!. Of course, no one knew the length and starting and ending dates for these wars until they were seen with the perspective of history.
All said, this is a well written and interesting book for people interested in history.
December 28, 2017
Can’t rate this highly enough. A fine historical interpretation of why power structures have changed over time, leading to the rise of the Nation State; how they might evolve in the future and what might be the catalyst.
November 20, 2018
Traces the evolution of states, beginning from princely through kingly, nation and then market states. Though a dense, difficult read, the premise is so intriguing that I found myself engrossed. Also, got a nice primer and review of early European history in the process.
July 23, 2019
Vast in scope and prophetic with the insight it offers, this treatise ties between how we fight and what we believe. Not for the faint hearted - This book pulls the veneer away from civilization to show the power play beneath. It's a fascinating, but wordy piece of work.
Read
May 29, 2021Book as a lot of details and history.
September 20, 2022
This book fundamentally changed how I think about history and international relations. The only reason it is not 5 stars is its length—at 823 pages, it is occasionally repetitive and baggy.
October 27, 2024
Taught me a lot about macro thinking.
December 17, 2023
I am a former law student of Philip's. I pointed out to him in casual conversation that his central thesis in both "The Shield of Achilles" and "Terror and Consent" was essentially that of Hans Delbrück in his multi-volume "History of the Art of War.” In sum, both Philip and Delbrück assert (correctly, in my opinion) that the development of both the legal constitution of states and the art of war - strategy and battlefield tactics - has been mutually-affecting throughout history. Instead of engaging in a deeper conversation on this topic, which he is purportedly an expert in, he gave a glib response: "Why would a lawyer need to know that?" Practicing attorneys recognize the value of strategic planning, not to mention theories of constitutional change. But the real question is why Philip couldn’t hold a casual conversation on these topics nor give a single mention of Delbrück in his entire corpus despite being an academic and policy expert allegedly trained at Oxford by Michael Howard. We’ll get back to answering that specific query.
Not being familiar with Delbrück while writing about the relationship between constitutional and military history is a big deal, like if an English Literature PhD had never heard of Shakespeare. By contrast, Michael Howard, who Philip allegedly studied military history under at Oxford, discusses in great detail Delbrück’s influence on his own approach to military history in the preface to “War in European History.” And Delbrück’s focus on constitutionalism, derived from the juridical method of Theodor Mommsen, is closer to Philip’s in “The Shield of Achilles” onward than it is to Howard’s. Delbrück’s absence in Philip’s work, especially given my conversation with him, is egregious enough to call his academic credentials into question.
Understanding our dear be-knighted Philip and Delbrück's points of departure offers valuable insights into the psychosis currently gripping Anglophone elites. Most importantly, they differ insofar as Delbrück intended the argument he presented in his rigorously academic survey of military history, the first such study, as an addendum to the collective works of German classicist, historian, and jurist Theodor Mommsen. Thus, Delbrück acknowledged the central, even primary, role of political economy in the development and shift of the legal constitutions of states and, therefore, also the development of the art of war. Following Delbrück, Howard discusses the influence of economic mobilization on the art of war, specifically grand strategy, in exacting detail. By contrast, Philip explicitly argues against the central role of political economy for vulgar and largely un-interrogated ideological and psychological reasons.
For Philip, by contrast, war and coercive violence alone drive history and constitutional change. Thus, Philip - a professed liberal Democrat and champion of "states of consent” - is to the right of leading Kaiserreich liberals just prior to the outbreak of World War I.
But honestly I have a hard time parsing what Philip's droning on about in his turgid and tortuous style, which is therefore torturous to readers as most reviewers have noted. And every academic and policy-maker I've spoken to about him is equally flummoxed.
The story of how Philip achieved his vaunted station despite being fatally wrong on Iraq, NATO expansion up to Russia’s border paired with American withdrawal from the Cold War arms control regime, and virtually every major foreign policy decision of the last four decades takes us beyond the scope of this review. But his uncle killing millions in Indonesia and Indochina - on behalf of Goodyear; Freeport-McMorRan; and Royal Dutch Shell, to which Philip has deep personal ties (googlably learning scenario planning personally under Pierre Wack in London) - features heavily. George Kennan was correct in his Fulbright Hearing testimony that the Johnson Admin miscalculated when it escalated in Vietnam after successfully pulling off a coup and mass killing in Indonesia, but that’s nevertheless why we were in Southeast Asia and why we must now suffer Philip’s phantasmic “success” in public life. Had Kennedy not been assassinated and his planned visit to Jakarta gone through, Shell would have lost just over half its proven reserves, likely not surviving past the 1970s. Philip being trained in scenario planning by Shell's head of strategic planning, Pierre Wack, is like how serial killers are drawn to return to their grisly crime scenes, but with millions of more bodies. I guess Mommsen, Delbrück, and Howard were right about economics mattering after all. For humanity’s sake, Phillip and his entire rootin’-tootin’, mass-murderin’ clan should f- off.
Read Delbrück's "History of the Art of War” and Michael Howard instead.
Not being familiar with Delbrück while writing about the relationship between constitutional and military history is a big deal, like if an English Literature PhD had never heard of Shakespeare. By contrast, Michael Howard, who Philip allegedly studied military history under at Oxford, discusses in great detail Delbrück’s influence on his own approach to military history in the preface to “War in European History.” And Delbrück’s focus on constitutionalism, derived from the juridical method of Theodor Mommsen, is closer to Philip’s in “The Shield of Achilles” onward than it is to Howard’s. Delbrück’s absence in Philip’s work, especially given my conversation with him, is egregious enough to call his academic credentials into question.
Understanding our dear be-knighted Philip and Delbrück's points of departure offers valuable insights into the psychosis currently gripping Anglophone elites. Most importantly, they differ insofar as Delbrück intended the argument he presented in his rigorously academic survey of military history, the first such study, as an addendum to the collective works of German classicist, historian, and jurist Theodor Mommsen. Thus, Delbrück acknowledged the central, even primary, role of political economy in the development and shift of the legal constitutions of states and, therefore, also the development of the art of war. Following Delbrück, Howard discusses the influence of economic mobilization on the art of war, specifically grand strategy, in exacting detail. By contrast, Philip explicitly argues against the central role of political economy for vulgar and largely un-interrogated ideological and psychological reasons.
For Philip, by contrast, war and coercive violence alone drive history and constitutional change. Thus, Philip - a professed liberal Democrat and champion of "states of consent” - is to the right of leading Kaiserreich liberals just prior to the outbreak of World War I.
But honestly I have a hard time parsing what Philip's droning on about in his turgid and tortuous style, which is therefore torturous to readers as most reviewers have noted. And every academic and policy-maker I've spoken to about him is equally flummoxed.
The story of how Philip achieved his vaunted station despite being fatally wrong on Iraq, NATO expansion up to Russia’s border paired with American withdrawal from the Cold War arms control regime, and virtually every major foreign policy decision of the last four decades takes us beyond the scope of this review. But his uncle killing millions in Indonesia and Indochina - on behalf of Goodyear; Freeport-McMorRan; and Royal Dutch Shell, to which Philip has deep personal ties (googlably learning scenario planning personally under Pierre Wack in London) - features heavily. George Kennan was correct in his Fulbright Hearing testimony that the Johnson Admin miscalculated when it escalated in Vietnam after successfully pulling off a coup and mass killing in Indonesia, but that’s nevertheless why we were in Southeast Asia and why we must now suffer Philip’s phantasmic “success” in public life. Had Kennedy not been assassinated and his planned visit to Jakarta gone through, Shell would have lost just over half its proven reserves, likely not surviving past the 1970s. Philip being trained in scenario planning by Shell's head of strategic planning, Pierre Wack, is like how serial killers are drawn to return to their grisly crime scenes, but with millions of more bodies. I guess Mommsen, Delbrück, and Howard were right about economics mattering after all. For humanity’s sake, Phillip and his entire rootin’-tootin’, mass-murderin’ clan should f- off.
Read Delbrück's "History of the Art of War” and Michael Howard instead.
December 19, 2012
I thought that this book might be my white whale, but I finally caught up to it. Purchased, 2002. Began reading, 2002, 2005, and 2012. Finished, 2012. Phew.
A dense examination of the interplay between law, war, and the constitutional ordering of the state. The first book focuses on the history of the modern state, and the periods of war and peace that led to paradigm shifts in way states were conceived of and behaved. Much attention is given to the Long War, Bobbit's name for the 75ish years of struggle that lasted from 1914 to 1990.
The second book turns to the international society of states, and to the epoch-making peaces that periodically mark the end of one constitutional form and the advent of another.
Bobbit contends that the nation-state, born of the late 19th century and maturing in the conflicts of the 20th -- which saw parlimentarianism triumph over fascism and communism -- is withering away, unable to face the various technological challenges of the 21st century. In its place, a market-state will arise, and is already arising. What shape it will take is still in play, and depends on the choices we make today.
I found much, and perhaps most, of Bobbit's argument persuasive, and think that the book aged well. Indeed, I imagine that I got more out of the segment on possible futures in 2012 than I might have in 2002.
Highly recommended for those with an interest in military matters, the law, or geopolitics. It's not an easy read, but I think it's a worthwhile investment of your time.
A dense examination of the interplay between law, war, and the constitutional ordering of the state. The first book focuses on the history of the modern state, and the periods of war and peace that led to paradigm shifts in way states were conceived of and behaved. Much attention is given to the Long War, Bobbit's name for the 75ish years of struggle that lasted from 1914 to 1990.
The second book turns to the international society of states, and to the epoch-making peaces that periodically mark the end of one constitutional form and the advent of another.
Bobbit contends that the nation-state, born of the late 19th century and maturing in the conflicts of the 20th -- which saw parlimentarianism triumph over fascism and communism -- is withering away, unable to face the various technological challenges of the 21st century. In its place, a market-state will arise, and is already arising. What shape it will take is still in play, and depends on the choices we make today.
I found much, and perhaps most, of Bobbit's argument persuasive, and think that the book aged well. Indeed, I imagine that I got more out of the segment on possible futures in 2012 than I might have in 2002.
Highly recommended for those with an interest in military matters, the law, or geopolitics. It's not an easy read, but I think it's a worthwhile investment of your time.
September 27, 2011
The Shield of Achilles by Philip Bobbit was an interesting look at the history and culture of war in western society. I basically focused on Book I: State of War. I didn’t have time to finish it since I was in SE Asia, and I haven’t decided whether or not to tackle Book II: States of Peace. Bobbit has an impressive knowledge of military innovation through strategy and technology. He is equally knowledgeable about constitutional law and its history. He presents an interesting analysis of what he calls “the long war” (1919-1990). I particularly found Part III The Historic Consequences of the Long War interesting for his analysis of The Strategic Choices (of the Market State). He comes across as hawkish and it wouldn’t surprise me if he was a supporter of the Bush administration’s foreign policy with his attitudes toward war and foreign policy.
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November 3, 2019A bit of a slog, but worth it. An eye-opener for me. It's distressing to read so persuasive a prediction of nuclear weapons proliferation and that states are evolving away from their objective of improving citizens' welfare. On the other hand, do-good initiatives informed by his analysis will be more likely to actually do good. Right after finishing this, I read about Kroll Inc., a very profitable international fraud busting company that seems the kind of organization necessary for Bobbitt's more rosy scenarios. Mr. Kroll says that corruption, while pervasive enough for him to make lots of money, is declining.
November 19, 2013
This is an excellent book. The author's thesis is that there is a dynamic relationship between strategic and legal development, such that changes in the strategic environment drive constitutional changes in states and the evolution of state's constitutions change the strategic environment. As a consequence history has moved through various stages which correspond to the development of modern states, with each stage centered on an "epochal war" (often a series of conflicts) which separates the successful constitutional form from the unsuccessful.
It is long, dense and academic, but well worth the slog.
It is long, dense and academic, but well worth the slog.
July 14, 2015
A tome of a read but well worth the effort, Bobbitt poses an intriguing link between the development of military strategy/technology and the development of legal states. The net is cast wide and covers an enormous amount of information, and generally Bobbitt manages to hold it all together and has a good writing style to keep the reader on the journey. Thought provoking and written before the events of 9/11 and recent Middle Eastern history, some of his possible future developments do seem to be happening.
A comprehensive read and you'll need to wear your thinking head but well worth it.
A comprehensive read and you'll need to wear your thinking head but well worth it.
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