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All Against All: The Long Winter of 1933 and the Origins of the Second World War
MP3 CD Format A narrative history, cinematic in scope, of a process that was taking shape in the winter of 1933 as domestic passions around the world colluded to drive governments towards a war few of them wanted and none of them could control. All Against All is the story of the season our world changed from postwar to prewar again. It is a book about the power of bad ideas--exploring why, during a single winter, between November 1932 and April 1933, so much went so wrong. Historian Paul Jankowski reveals that it was collective mentalities and popular beliefs that drove this crucial period that sent nations on the path to war, as much as any rational calculus called ""national interest."" Over these six months, collective delusions filled the air. Whether in liberal or authoritarian regimes, mass participation and the crowd mentality ascended. Hitler came to power; Japan invaded Jehol and left the League of Nations; Mussolini looked towards Africa; Roosevelt was elected; France changed governments three times; and the victors of 1918 fell out acrimoniously over war debts, arms, currency, tariffs, and Germany. New hopes flickered but not for a world economic conference was planned, only to collapse when the US went its own way. All Against All reconstructs a series of seemingly disparate happenings whose connections can only be appraised in retrospect. As he weaves together the stories of the influences that conspired to lead the world to war, Jankowski offers a cautionary tale relevant for western democracies today. The rising threat from dictatorial regimes and the ideological challenge presented by communism and fascism gave the 1930s a unique face, just as global environmental and demographic crises are coloring our own. While we do not know for certain where these crises will take us, we do know that those of the 1930s culminated in the Second World War.
1 pages, Audio CD
First published April 28, 2020
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About the author
Paul Jankowski
9 books4 followersPaul Jankowski is an American historian and the Raymond Ginger Professor of History Emeritus at Brandeis University. Raised in Europe and the United States, Jankowski attended Balliol College, Oxford for both his undergraduate and graduate degrees,[completing his doctoral dissertation on Simon Sabiani and the rise of fascism and the French Parti Populaire Français in Marseille. Jankowski specializes in the history of modern France and modern Europe, the history of war, and the history of international relations in the interwar period.
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Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews
December 9, 2020
I'll agree that this is "A narrative [ ], cinematic in scope, of a process." But a history it is not. A proper history is analytical - why and not just what happened. "Delusions of nationalism" is an assertion, not analysis. Overall, the text is merely descriptive, no more so than when he devotes a paragraph to actress Jeanette MacDonald's impression of the appearance of German delegate (and rabid nationalist) Alfred Hugenberg at the 1933 London World Economic Conference.
The narrative itself is crippled by the author's style, which employs a muddled grammar (notably far too many indefinite referents) and odd metaphors that leaves a turgid account, one that had me reading the same sentence or paragraph over and over again until I finally fished out his meaning - or, too often, gave up and moved on.
His discussions of diplomacy are ill-founded. He asserts that the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, a backdrop to the disarmament discussions a decade later in Geneva, resulted from an aspirational verging on delusional attachment to disarmament, and necessitated the concurrent agreement guaranteeing security in China. At no point does the author note that no naval power of the time could afford the fleets they had in being and far less the extravagant armadas being built, that naval disarmament was an economic imperative.
As with understanding of diplomatic motivations, his discussion of diplomatic process is lacking. On the World Economic Conference of 1933, Jankowski states that FDR “never sought authority” to discuss war debts and tariffs. That's not how it works: the US Executive does not need “Congressional Authority” to discuss an issue, or even enter into negotiations. Congress is involved if the resulting agreement requires legislation to implement, or takes the form of a treaty require Senate consent. Even here, the author later restates the obstacle as instructions to the US delegation to not “sign” agreements without "congressional scrutiny.” And indeed, the author turns to discussions led by the UK and US central banks, in which participated seven other countries, which did reach an agreement for referral to capitals.
The narrative itself is crippled by the author's style, which employs a muddled grammar (notably far too many indefinite referents) and odd metaphors that leaves a turgid account, one that had me reading the same sentence or paragraph over and over again until I finally fished out his meaning - or, too often, gave up and moved on.
His discussions of diplomacy are ill-founded. He asserts that the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, a backdrop to the disarmament discussions a decade later in Geneva, resulted from an aspirational verging on delusional attachment to disarmament, and necessitated the concurrent agreement guaranteeing security in China. At no point does the author note that no naval power of the time could afford the fleets they had in being and far less the extravagant armadas being built, that naval disarmament was an economic imperative.
As with understanding of diplomatic motivations, his discussion of diplomatic process is lacking. On the World Economic Conference of 1933, Jankowski states that FDR “never sought authority” to discuss war debts and tariffs. That's not how it works: the US Executive does not need “Congressional Authority” to discuss an issue, or even enter into negotiations. Congress is involved if the resulting agreement requires legislation to implement, or takes the form of a treaty require Senate consent. Even here, the author later restates the obstacle as instructions to the US delegation to not “sign” agreements without "congressional scrutiny.” And indeed, the author turns to discussions led by the UK and US central banks, in which participated seven other countries, which did reach an agreement for referral to capitals.
December 10, 2020
It earns its 3 star rating for the incredible amount of useful research...but thanks to a concentration of far too much minutiae, and far too rambling a writing style, I can't give it more than that. Useful, but not exactly pleasurable.
June 4, 2021
I thought this provided some good context about the decisions and the politics that may have led up to WWII. Some pretty good insights into the FDR attitudes and decisions. Really interesting to read about the Polish perspective. I recommend the book; just a bit light on the page turning materials. Not much to keep the reader enthralled, unless they are a history geek like me.
January 10, 2021
The writing in this book is awful. The author can't write a simple sentence. He has to embellish every sentence with multiple confusing phrases. I had to reread each sentence over again just to get the gist of what he was saying. It's tedious and confusing.
June 14, 2021
The word most often used to describe this book, "comprehensive," is apt. I can bear witness. Voluminous detail is as much a strategy as it is a methodology in Mr. Jankowski's analysis of what he believes is the pivotal two-year period, 1932 - 1933, that ushered out the Great War and ushered in the next. It is hard to imagine completing this book thinking that the author left any stone unturned.
By the onset of the 1930's, the Armistice has been in place for over a decade, the Soviet regime almost 20 years old, America is emerging as the great power but, it seems, recoiling as a player, The League of Nations, muddling along without US involvement, and the European countries, almost to a one, starving and in disarray internally, as the global economic depression lays waste to peoples not fully recovered from war. And right in the middle of this the Weimar Republic flounders and Hitler emerges from the depths, his will to power overcoming both his and his party's political failings and his rivals' presumptions and petty politics.
There is much to learn in this book, maybe too much. For as overwhelming is the evidence for his case that these two years were pivotal, the case is, unfortunately, not-all-to-well articulated. There is a lack of summary in this book that makes it a bit tedious to follow. It's not that Mr. Jankowski doesn't share his thoughts on what it is about these years that make them pivotal, it just seems - at least to me - that those things, those cassis belli, are few while the evidence he offers is smothering.
What were they, these causes? WWI devastated not only economies but trust among nations. Nations retreated into themselves. Global populations no longer wanted war but fear and mistrust led the political elite - who also didn't want war - to maneuver to protect or increase their war machines. Germany's leaders may have lost a war but they did not lose their desire for European conquest...and they held grudges. And the Soviets under Stalin were intent on getting there first. And America? Tired of war and slipping into the Great Depression, America had no interest in leading Europe back from war. On the contrary, Jankowski argues that America's insistence on reparations was, at the very least, nettlesome.
The ostensible downside of Jankowski's method is simply that he offers far more than necessary if he's just trying to prove the case for these being the cause for war, and he does so in a writing style that often does not do his case justice, filling clear lines of thought with parentheticals or references to events or intentions outside the scope of the book. And his diligence in informing the reader that for any single event or policy there were always and everywhere multiple, conflicting points of view in the press, among the people and in the halls of power is sometimes dizzying.
That being said, this last point, Jankowski's insistence on showing that while the French were split multiple ways on disarmament and the British on reparations and the Hungarians on whether to side with Hitler or Mussolini (or both), and offering multiple examples across each of these societies, was really enlightening to me. While I am convinced there's a better way to communicate your main points, this deep insight into the policy muddle that surrounds all major decisions was revelatory to me. And he does this over and over...and over...again, forcing you to pause and think about your own times and how policies do and don't get enacted.
When writing about Hitler's rise, Jankowski is his most direct and most effective. He explains the political situation, the personalities and political intrigue with remarkable clarity and insight. With the facts laid out so clearly, his descriptions of how the press, his adversaries, and the other European powers misread his intent, underestimated his abilities to consolidate power, and/or shaped their reading to fit their own intentions served not to overwhelm the facts but to enrich them. And, here, as an American, I couldn't help but notice the similarities between Hitler's ability to acquire and consolidate power and that of our previous President, Donald Trump.
So, where do we end up? Most people will not want to labor through this book to get insight into a brief but important period between the two great wars. Too much detail. Too many trees. But, if you do, there is much to learn and much to salute in Mr. Jankowski's effort.
What
By the onset of the 1930's, the Armistice has been in place for over a decade, the Soviet regime almost 20 years old, America is emerging as the great power but, it seems, recoiling as a player, The League of Nations, muddling along without US involvement, and the European countries, almost to a one, starving and in disarray internally, as the global economic depression lays waste to peoples not fully recovered from war. And right in the middle of this the Weimar Republic flounders and Hitler emerges from the depths, his will to power overcoming both his and his party's political failings and his rivals' presumptions and petty politics.
There is much to learn in this book, maybe too much. For as overwhelming is the evidence for his case that these two years were pivotal, the case is, unfortunately, not-all-to-well articulated. There is a lack of summary in this book that makes it a bit tedious to follow. It's not that Mr. Jankowski doesn't share his thoughts on what it is about these years that make them pivotal, it just seems - at least to me - that those things, those cassis belli, are few while the evidence he offers is smothering.
What were they, these causes? WWI devastated not only economies but trust among nations. Nations retreated into themselves. Global populations no longer wanted war but fear and mistrust led the political elite - who also didn't want war - to maneuver to protect or increase their war machines. Germany's leaders may have lost a war but they did not lose their desire for European conquest...and they held grudges. And the Soviets under Stalin were intent on getting there first. And America? Tired of war and slipping into the Great Depression, America had no interest in leading Europe back from war. On the contrary, Jankowski argues that America's insistence on reparations was, at the very least, nettlesome.
The ostensible downside of Jankowski's method is simply that he offers far more than necessary if he's just trying to prove the case for these being the cause for war, and he does so in a writing style that often does not do his case justice, filling clear lines of thought with parentheticals or references to events or intentions outside the scope of the book. And his diligence in informing the reader that for any single event or policy there were always and everywhere multiple, conflicting points of view in the press, among the people and in the halls of power is sometimes dizzying.
That being said, this last point, Jankowski's insistence on showing that while the French were split multiple ways on disarmament and the British on reparations and the Hungarians on whether to side with Hitler or Mussolini (or both), and offering multiple examples across each of these societies, was really enlightening to me. While I am convinced there's a better way to communicate your main points, this deep insight into the policy muddle that surrounds all major decisions was revelatory to me. And he does this over and over...and over...again, forcing you to pause and think about your own times and how policies do and don't get enacted.
When writing about Hitler's rise, Jankowski is his most direct and most effective. He explains the political situation, the personalities and political intrigue with remarkable clarity and insight. With the facts laid out so clearly, his descriptions of how the press, his adversaries, and the other European powers misread his intent, underestimated his abilities to consolidate power, and/or shaped their reading to fit their own intentions served not to overwhelm the facts but to enrich them. And, here, as an American, I couldn't help but notice the similarities between Hitler's ability to acquire and consolidate power and that of our previous President, Donald Trump.
So, where do we end up? Most people will not want to labor through this book to get insight into a brief but important period between the two great wars. Too much detail. Too many trees. But, if you do, there is much to learn and much to salute in Mr. Jankowski's effort.
What
November 13, 2020
The historian Paul Jankowski pulls the reader back to the 1930s and shows how the West had created their own fuel for destruction. The period called for nationalism, inward belief of one's only ability. It seemed that the scrabble to fix and only care about one's problem, and forgetting the world will lead to a dark path. This book is more relevant than ever.
February 7, 2022
Thesis: The transition from 1932 to 1933 was the breaking point between the post-WWI era and the beginning of WWII--a pivotal moment around the world.
Style: Baroque, in a painful way.
Thoughts: It was just OK, but I wouldn't recommend this book to others.
Style: Baroque, in a painful way.
Thoughts: It was just OK, but I wouldn't recommend this book to others.
February 5, 2025
Good information, bad style
I will say this book was very well researched for, with good information there is no doubt about that. I just found the writing style to be the equivalent of a high schooler rambling and spouting off quotes to get the required word count.
I would recommend if you do decide to read this book to keep a notebook and highlighter close by to take notes or mark to make the most sense of the information that stands out.
I don’t think this book is for everybody. There are many stones to turn, just so much information being thrown at the reader with really nothing to separate it, making the task of reading intently tedious at times. I must admit, this historical analysis was just not my cup of tea. I attempted many times to read intently, taking notes, highlighting lines and passages and tried to have fun with it. But, I found reading this a chore.
Overall I give this book 3 stars. The information is there, but that’s about all it has going for it. Good luck.
I will say this book was very well researched for, with good information there is no doubt about that. I just found the writing style to be the equivalent of a high schooler rambling and spouting off quotes to get the required word count.
I would recommend if you do decide to read this book to keep a notebook and highlighter close by to take notes or mark to make the most sense of the information that stands out.
I don’t think this book is for everybody. There are many stones to turn, just so much information being thrown at the reader with really nothing to separate it, making the task of reading intently tedious at times. I must admit, this historical analysis was just not my cup of tea. I attempted many times to read intently, taking notes, highlighting lines and passages and tried to have fun with it. But, I found reading this a chore.
Overall I give this book 3 stars. The information is there, but that’s about all it has going for it. Good luck.
August 29, 2022
An in-depth study of specific history, mainly concerning the abject failure of the league of nations over the years between the first and second world wars. The primary points of pressure which caused such fragmentation of internaitional cooperation and agreement were over disarmament and parity of offensive weapons, war reparations levied against the losers of WWI and the burden of debt repayments by the victors to the United States. Added to this, are the secondary factors of the great depression in North America, the economic problems around the gold standard (and inflation/deflation) and the geographic problems of Eastern European nations vying for legitimacy and recognition (especially Poland).
The problems presented are many and complex, any possible political or diplomatic solutions were stymied by self-interest and deception on a grand national scale. Jankowski presents the facts and an interpretaion in an interesting and entertaining book.
The problems presented are many and complex, any possible political or diplomatic solutions were stymied by self-interest and deception on a grand national scale. Jankowski presents the facts and an interpretaion in an interesting and entertaining book.
April 22, 2022
At times the prose style gets in the way, but this was a very interesting book.
The strength of this book is that it looks at different topics, such as HItler's rise to power, the Holodomor, FDR's First Hundred Days, and shows how they were all happening at the same time.
The problem is that it builds to the London Economic Conference, which everyone admits was not a shining moment for FDR. Indeed, FDR torpedoes the Conference, but the reader doesn't really understand why. Admittedly, this is one of those issues that there is no scholarly consensus about.
So this is a well-researched and interesting book, if somewhat frustrating.
The strength of this book is that it looks at different topics, such as HItler's rise to power, the Holodomor, FDR's First Hundred Days, and shows how they were all happening at the same time.
The problem is that it builds to the London Economic Conference, which everyone admits was not a shining moment for FDR. Indeed, FDR torpedoes the Conference, but the reader doesn't really understand why. Admittedly, this is one of those issues that there is no scholarly consensus about.
So this is a well-researched and interesting book, if somewhat frustrating.
January 7, 2022
A rather lengthy review of a short, yet important, period in world history. The narrative is global in scope and loaded with details. Took some time and effort to work through the book. Definitely NOT one I wouldn't put down at times (and for a while), but very informative for those interested in not just the particulars of that time, but how global events interacted or overlapped.
August 25, 2022
Many assertions, little convincing analysis. Perhaps better as a concise focused option piece than a drawn out book. The voice which was often used was passive. Difficult antecedents to track. Narrator struggled with his pacing but I think he earned his dime on this one. Disappointed bec the thesis intrigued me.
July 28, 2021
An awful book. Too much prose is used that doesn't confer any extra information or imagery. Don't waste your time with this book.
The narration of the book is very average
The narration of the book is very average
August 17, 2021
Agree with last reviewer. The writer wants the reader to be impressed with his vocabulary. Almost unreadable and I love the subject matter.
December 14, 2021
International Breakdown into Chaos and on to War
Maybe it is too much to say there some great consensus that broke down in 1932/3 but it certainly ended in a fragmented quagmire.
Maybe it is too much to say there some great consensus that broke down in 1932/3 but it certainly ended in a fragmented quagmire.
March 21, 2022
A fairly detailed book concerning the beginning of the second world war.
October 6, 2024
A detailed history describing the sequence of events that culminated in the decline of the League of Nations and start of preparation for the next military conflict.
October 19, 2021
Couldn't finish it. So badly written
Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews