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بحثي عن المطلقات
مشفوعا برسومات من وضع ساول ستاينبيرغ
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يشير تيليتش في هذا الكتاب إلى السمة المطلقة للواجب الأخلاقي، مدركا ومبينا، في الآن ذاته، تمظهرها النسبي في كل فعل يقوم به الإنسان وفي كل قرار يأخذه، ويواجه القارئ لدى تتبعه المادة السيرية التي تتصدر هذا النص، موهبة تيليتش المتفردة في تصوير التساكن البنيوي والقرابة بين التجربة الحسية والطبيعة المنطقية للعقل، فضلا عن تصوير توافقهما على الرغم من تجافيهما الظاهر، ذلك إن وطأة الوجود البشري، بمأزقه وعظمته، تكمن في جملة الإنسان من عهد لامتناه، كما تكمن، أيضا وبنوع من المفارقة، بمقدرته المتناهية لإنجاز هذا العهد والوفاء به، وهكذا، فإن البحث عن اللامتناهي في حياة كل إنسان، تاريخيا وروحيا، لا يدوم بسبب الطوارئ الوجودية للشرط الإنساني وإنما على الرغم منها، وتكمن في هذه العملية الطبيعة الغامضة للواقع كما للمثال، بما يمثل القبول النهائي والحاسم الذي يؤسس النضج الكامل للإنسان
ويتكون هذا الكتاب من المحاضرات التي ألقاها تيلتش في كلية القانون التابعة لجامعة شيكاغو، وقد أزمع، لو قدر له العيش أن يلقي المحاضرات ذاتها، في جامعة هارفارد ضمن البرنامج الذي يدعى هناك بمحاضرات نوبل، ويشع الصفاء النابض وغير الاعتيادي لعقل تيليتش وروحه عبر أنحاء النص، وقد ألهم هذا الصفاء رسومات شاؤول ستاينبرغ بالقوة والبصيرة ذاتيهما، ذلك إن تيلتش وستاينبرغ يمتلكان، كل بأسلوبه الخاص، تلك المقدرة الكارزمية المتعلقة، على نحو حميمي، بحاجة الإنسان العميقة للنظام
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يشير تيليتش في هذا الكتاب إلى السمة المطلقة للواجب الأخلاقي، مدركا ومبينا، في الآن ذاته، تمظهرها النسبي في كل فعل يقوم به الإنسان وفي كل قرار يأخذه، ويواجه القارئ لدى تتبعه المادة السيرية التي تتصدر هذا النص، موهبة تيليتش المتفردة في تصوير التساكن البنيوي والقرابة بين التجربة الحسية والطبيعة المنطقية للعقل، فضلا عن تصوير توافقهما على الرغم من تجافيهما الظاهر، ذلك إن وطأة الوجود البشري، بمأزقه وعظمته، تكمن في جملة الإنسان من عهد لامتناه، كما تكمن، أيضا وبنوع من المفارقة، بمقدرته المتناهية لإنجاز هذا العهد والوفاء به، وهكذا، فإن البحث عن اللامتناهي في حياة كل إنسان، تاريخيا وروحيا، لا يدوم بسبب الطوارئ الوجودية للشرط الإنساني وإنما على الرغم منها، وتكمن في هذه العملية الطبيعة الغامضة للواقع كما للمثال، بما يمثل القبول النهائي والحاسم الذي يؤسس النضج الكامل للإنسان
ويتكون هذا الكتاب من المحاضرات التي ألقاها تيلتش في كلية القانون التابعة لجامعة شيكاغو، وقد أزمع، لو قدر له العيش أن يلقي المحاضرات ذاتها، في جامعة هارفارد ضمن البرنامج الذي يدعى هناك بمحاضرات نوبل، ويشع الصفاء النابض وغير الاعتيادي لعقل تيليتش وروحه عبر أنحاء النص، وقد ألهم هذا الصفاء رسومات شاؤول ستاينبرغ بالقوة والبصيرة ذاتيهما، ذلك إن تيلتش وستاينبرغ يمتلكان، كل بأسلوبه الخاص، تلك المقدرة الكارزمية المتعلقة، على نحو حميمي، بحاجة الإنسان العميقة للنظام
184 pages, Unknown Binding
Published January 1, 2019
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About the author
Paul Tillich
278 books425 followersPaul Tillich was a German-American theologian and Christian existentialist philosopher. Tillich was – along with his contemporaries Rudolf Bultmann (Germany), Karl Barth (Switzerland), and Reinhold Niebuhr (United States) – one of the four most influential Protestant theologians of the 20th century. Among the general populace, he is best known for his works The Courage to Be (1952) and Dynamics of Faith (1957), which introduced issues of theology and modern culture to a general readership. Theologically, he is best known for his major three-volume work Systematic Theology (1951–63), in which he developed his "method of correlation": an approach of exploring the symbols of Christian revelation as answers to the problems of human existence raised by contemporary existential philosophical analysis.
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July 5, 2022
This past spring I joined in Peter Rollins’ Atheism for Lent reading group. Each day Rollins provided readings, videos, music and other such things for participants to reflect on and discuss. It was definitely one of my more profound spiritual experiences in the last few years.
Rollins also gave me lots of books to add to my reading list, including this one.
This is one of Tillich’s last books (maybe his last? I forget.) and in it he explores the sources of his own ideas. The first chapter is an autobiographical essay which was interesting in its own right. Following this are two chapters that describe Tillich’s concern for the relativity of humans as subjects and the relativity of our experience of reality. In this these two chapters examine absolutes on both subjective and objective sides of theology. The fourth and final chapter discusses the holy - the absolute and relative - in religion.
This was the chapter I found most compelling and worth the price of the book. The autobiographical stuff was interesting, as were the other two chapters, but nothing in here was particularly memorable. It was this fourth chapter where I broke out my pen to underline sentence after sentence. I’m not a professional philosopher or theologian, so I cannot offer much analysis of Tillich’s thought. But I can say what moves me and passages such as this do:
”In other words, we have shown by analytic description the presence of absolutes within the universe of relativities and have pointed to the ground of everything absolute - the Absolute itself. The method we have followed liberates us from thinking in terms of questions and arguments about the existence of an absolute being, whether it is called ‘God,’ or the One, or Brahman-Atman, Fate, Nature, or Life. That to which our analysis led us, the Absolute itself, is not an absolute being, which is a contradiction in terms. It is Being-Itself”
I loved Tillich’s discussion of religion. He asks, “is the encounter with the Absolute-itself restricted to experiences within what traditionally is called ‘religion’?” (130). His answer is “Certainly Not.” Tillich is echoing what I’ve read elsewhere, questioning our understanding of religion. We - modern or postmodern westerners - think of religion as something to choose to enter into or not. We see religions - Christianity, Judaism, Islam, etc - as monolithic structures which we either choose to be in or not. Just last week I saw someone ask, “Do you believe in Christianity?” What does it even mean to believe in Christianity?
For Tillich, and others, religion is a human phenomenon. He writes, “Religion in this basic and universal sense I have called ‘being grasped by ultimate concern” (131). It is not limited to a particular group of people nor is it something only a few of us do. It is an experience we all have for we are all, at some time, grasped with ultimate concern.
Tillich goes on:
“IN the case of religion, the deification of the relative and the ambiguous means that a particular religion claims to be identical with religious Absolute and rejects judgment against itself. This leads, internally, to demonic suppression of doubt, criticism, and honest search for truth within the particular religion itself; and it leads, externally, to the most demonic and destructive of all wars, religious wars” (133).
I’ve been a part of a religion my whole life and still believe in the basic doctrines of Christianity. Yet I have also come to see the divine - ultimate reality, being itself - is much greater than I can grasp. Spiritual experience, let alone high morals, are not limited to my co-religionists (honestly, we’re often lagging behind it seems). I would argue this recognition is close to a basic doctrine of Christianity, though that’s another story. Overall, this is a valuable book if you’re interested in getting into Tillich.
Rollins also gave me lots of books to add to my reading list, including this one.
This is one of Tillich’s last books (maybe his last? I forget.) and in it he explores the sources of his own ideas. The first chapter is an autobiographical essay which was interesting in its own right. Following this are two chapters that describe Tillich’s concern for the relativity of humans as subjects and the relativity of our experience of reality. In this these two chapters examine absolutes on both subjective and objective sides of theology. The fourth and final chapter discusses the holy - the absolute and relative - in religion.
This was the chapter I found most compelling and worth the price of the book. The autobiographical stuff was interesting, as were the other two chapters, but nothing in here was particularly memorable. It was this fourth chapter where I broke out my pen to underline sentence after sentence. I’m not a professional philosopher or theologian, so I cannot offer much analysis of Tillich’s thought. But I can say what moves me and passages such as this do:
”In other words, we have shown by analytic description the presence of absolutes within the universe of relativities and have pointed to the ground of everything absolute - the Absolute itself. The method we have followed liberates us from thinking in terms of questions and arguments about the existence of an absolute being, whether it is called ‘God,’ or the One, or Brahman-Atman, Fate, Nature, or Life. That to which our analysis led us, the Absolute itself, is not an absolute being, which is a contradiction in terms. It is Being-Itself”
I loved Tillich’s discussion of religion. He asks, “is the encounter with the Absolute-itself restricted to experiences within what traditionally is called ‘religion’?” (130). His answer is “Certainly Not.” Tillich is echoing what I’ve read elsewhere, questioning our understanding of religion. We - modern or postmodern westerners - think of religion as something to choose to enter into or not. We see religions - Christianity, Judaism, Islam, etc - as monolithic structures which we either choose to be in or not. Just last week I saw someone ask, “Do you believe in Christianity?” What does it even mean to believe in Christianity?
For Tillich, and others, religion is a human phenomenon. He writes, “Religion in this basic and universal sense I have called ‘being grasped by ultimate concern” (131). It is not limited to a particular group of people nor is it something only a few of us do. It is an experience we all have for we are all, at some time, grasped with ultimate concern.
Tillich goes on:
“IN the case of religion, the deification of the relative and the ambiguous means that a particular religion claims to be identical with religious Absolute and rejects judgment against itself. This leads, internally, to demonic suppression of doubt, criticism, and honest search for truth within the particular religion itself; and it leads, externally, to the most demonic and destructive of all wars, religious wars” (133).
I’ve been a part of a religion my whole life and still believe in the basic doctrines of Christianity. Yet I have also come to see the divine - ultimate reality, being itself - is much greater than I can grasp. Spiritual experience, let alone high morals, are not limited to my co-religionists (honestly, we’re often lagging behind it seems). I would argue this recognition is close to a basic doctrine of Christianity, though that’s another story. Overall, this is a valuable book if you’re interested in getting into Tillich.
July 21, 2014
In My Search for Absolutes, the late, great theologian, Paul Tillich shares part of his life-long struggle to reconcile the appeal of Continental Existentialism and cultural/ethical relativism with his sense of the holy as ultimate—absolute. He noted that “scientific relativism” as in atoms, molecules, energy, and movement were such that, “If you ask which model or concept is closest to reality you may receive the answer: none is; what we have is a ‘game.’” (p. 64) From noting this absence of an “absolute” handle on reality, he observes that this cannot mean the other polarity that everything is relative. He describes that polarity as “absolute relativism” and he proclaims that to be an oxymoron. “If one avoids this impossible combination of words, relativism itself becomes relative; therefore an element of absoluteness is not only a possibility, otherwise no assertion at all can be made.” (p. 65)
The irony, as Tillich expresses it, is that the relativist philosopher has no doubt about himself as a teacher of relativism, “Here he is caught against his will by something absolute that embraces both the absoluteness of sense impressions and the absoluteness of logical form.” (p. 69) Hence, beings are absolute in our sense of awareness, but they are immersed in the stream of relativities. They change, they are, “But this being is becoming (my emphasis—jlw), and their becoming is a process of mutual encounters.” (p. 71) In spite of this “stream of relativities,” however, there are several absolutes within the stream—absolutes that make language possible and absolutes which make understanding possible (p. 72). Interestingly, he uses Kafka’s Metamorphosis as an example: “The horrifying character of this story shows how deeply we are bound to the category of substance, which guarantees our identity.” (p. 72)
Tillich offers the example of “redness” as a counter to the relativists, pointing out the power of abstraction or “ideation.” This power “…makes us able to recognize ‘redness’ in all red objects, …liberates us from bondage to the particular by giving us the power to create universals.” (p. 73) In the same way, it “…gives us the power of language, language gives us freedom of choice.” (p. 74) Similarly, names of persons “…are all expressions of ‘individual essence,’ or of the individual’s essence as absolute over against his changing temporal existence…It sets a definite limit to the dominance of the category of becoming.” (p. 75)
Relativists deny the polarities of freedom and destiny, but if a relativist (for example) doesn’t feel forced by externals nor feel like he/she is making an arbitrary decision, that same relativist may deny those polarities, but upon making a decision is actually moving between the two poles (p. 79). “If, in order to escape having to admit this, he[/she] denies one of the poles—for instance, the pole of freedom, he[/she] ceased to be a relativist and has become a dogmatic adherent of determinism. But then his[/her] decision for determinism is itself determined, is merely a matter of his[/her] destiny, has no truth value and should claim none, for he[/she] had no alternative.” (pp. 79-80) In short, “Each of our statements about the absolutes is relative…” (p. 80)
So, Tillich expresses the idea of the absolute of being, once again. “One cannot imagine non-being; one can only experience its threat. Therefore philosophy can say metaphysically, and with good logic support, that being is the power of resisting non-being.” (p. 81) Being is a positive, “…an infinitely full, inexhaustible but definite absolute. It is the basis of truth, because it is the transcendence of subject-object.” (p. 82) Then, Tillich admits that he has not argued away the experience of relativism in cognitive awareness of reality, “But it shows that relativism is only possible in the basis of the structure of absolutes.” (p. 82)
Building on this argument, he asserts, “The fact that the contents of the moral imperative change according to one’s situation in time and space does not change the formal absoluteness of the moral imperative itself.” (p. 93) Moral choice is not between good and bad, Tillich argues, but “…between different possibilities offering themselves as morally good.” (p. 98) The problem is that “Fixed moral laws allow us to believe that we know what is good, whether we do it or not.” (p. 98) Yet, every concrete situation is open to different laws. Tillich describes the arising moral “dilemmas” as conflicts of duties (p. 100). Still, in going through these moral crises, “…it often happens that through many small decisions one great decision becomes real for us even before we realize that we’ve already decided.” (p. 104) Building off the Latin root of decision (decider = “to cut through” or “to cut off”), he concludes that, “Every decision necessarily is a cutting through something and a cutting off of other possibilities.” (p. 105)
I particularly liked his discussion of justice with relationship to moral choice. He rightly asserts that “justice” in the Old Testament is tied to “tsedeqah.” Usually translated as “righteousness,” it really means something more like “creative justice” because it changes the condition of the “the other.” Of course, in the New Testament, this has an additional element, “agape” or self-sacrificing love (pp. 107-8). That may seem to be a non sequitur in terms of his discussion of moral choice, but Tillich goes on to state that “listening love” takes the place of mechanical obedience to moral commandments (p. 109). “Moral commandments are the wisdom of the past as it has been embodied in laws and traditions, and anyone who does not follow them risks tragedy.” (p. 110) It is in this tension that he concludes, “The mixture of the absolute and the relative in moral decisions is what constitutes their danger and their greatness.” (p. 112)
Once the theologian deals with the issue of absolutes with regard to moral decision-making, he returns to the initial idea of the existence of the transcendent One. He shares about talking with Rudolf Otto about the idea of the holy and remembered that the philosopher suggested that the idea of the holy is “mystery” and cannot be derived from our finite experience, nor can it be grasped in its essence by finite minds at all (p. 129).
He also points out that mere relativism in terms of faith claims will not work. He notes that when Buddhists take Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed into their faith that “…they no longer have the meaning they had in their original setting.” He goes on to state that “Monotheism does not mean that one god is better than many; it means that the one is the Absolute, the Unconditional, the Ultimate.” (p. 139) Still: 1) a particular religion’s claim to the Absolute may be a relative witness; 2) religions, as a result, should not focus on conversions, but exchange, and, last but not least, 3) religions must affirm the right of all functions of the human spirit, including the arts and sciences, as well as the rights of the state, to be independent of religious control or interference (p. 141).
There was a time when I would have found myself in whole-hearted agreement on that last point, but times have changed. In an era where the state seems more and more inclined to interfere with the exercise of religion (whether using health care laws, zoning ordinances, or equal rights as alleged motivation), it is no longer as benign as presented by Tillich merely a few decades ago. Until reaching this point, I felt like this was going to become another of those books to which I return over and over. In spite of all the resonance I feel with the first portion of the book, I’m somewhat soured by this once possible, but now anachronistic, idea. Some will think that My Search for Absolutes itself is anachronistic because relativism is so much a “given” in the post-modern era, but it is definitely worth reading—even in this millennium.
The irony, as Tillich expresses it, is that the relativist philosopher has no doubt about himself as a teacher of relativism, “Here he is caught against his will by something absolute that embraces both the absoluteness of sense impressions and the absoluteness of logical form.” (p. 69) Hence, beings are absolute in our sense of awareness, but they are immersed in the stream of relativities. They change, they are, “But this being is becoming (my emphasis—jlw), and their becoming is a process of mutual encounters.” (p. 71) In spite of this “stream of relativities,” however, there are several absolutes within the stream—absolutes that make language possible and absolutes which make understanding possible (p. 72). Interestingly, he uses Kafka’s Metamorphosis as an example: “The horrifying character of this story shows how deeply we are bound to the category of substance, which guarantees our identity.” (p. 72)
Tillich offers the example of “redness” as a counter to the relativists, pointing out the power of abstraction or “ideation.” This power “…makes us able to recognize ‘redness’ in all red objects, …liberates us from bondage to the particular by giving us the power to create universals.” (p. 73) In the same way, it “…gives us the power of language, language gives us freedom of choice.” (p. 74) Similarly, names of persons “…are all expressions of ‘individual essence,’ or of the individual’s essence as absolute over against his changing temporal existence…It sets a definite limit to the dominance of the category of becoming.” (p. 75)
Relativists deny the polarities of freedom and destiny, but if a relativist (for example) doesn’t feel forced by externals nor feel like he/she is making an arbitrary decision, that same relativist may deny those polarities, but upon making a decision is actually moving between the two poles (p. 79). “If, in order to escape having to admit this, he[/she] denies one of the poles—for instance, the pole of freedom, he[/she] ceased to be a relativist and has become a dogmatic adherent of determinism. But then his[/her] decision for determinism is itself determined, is merely a matter of his[/her] destiny, has no truth value and should claim none, for he[/she] had no alternative.” (pp. 79-80) In short, “Each of our statements about the absolutes is relative…” (p. 80)
So, Tillich expresses the idea of the absolute of being, once again. “One cannot imagine non-being; one can only experience its threat. Therefore philosophy can say metaphysically, and with good logic support, that being is the power of resisting non-being.” (p. 81) Being is a positive, “…an infinitely full, inexhaustible but definite absolute. It is the basis of truth, because it is the transcendence of subject-object.” (p. 82) Then, Tillich admits that he has not argued away the experience of relativism in cognitive awareness of reality, “But it shows that relativism is only possible in the basis of the structure of absolutes.” (p. 82)
Building on this argument, he asserts, “The fact that the contents of the moral imperative change according to one’s situation in time and space does not change the formal absoluteness of the moral imperative itself.” (p. 93) Moral choice is not between good and bad, Tillich argues, but “…between different possibilities offering themselves as morally good.” (p. 98) The problem is that “Fixed moral laws allow us to believe that we know what is good, whether we do it or not.” (p. 98) Yet, every concrete situation is open to different laws. Tillich describes the arising moral “dilemmas” as conflicts of duties (p. 100). Still, in going through these moral crises, “…it often happens that through many small decisions one great decision becomes real for us even before we realize that we’ve already decided.” (p. 104) Building off the Latin root of decision (decider = “to cut through” or “to cut off”), he concludes that, “Every decision necessarily is a cutting through something and a cutting off of other possibilities.” (p. 105)
I particularly liked his discussion of justice with relationship to moral choice. He rightly asserts that “justice” in the Old Testament is tied to “tsedeqah.” Usually translated as “righteousness,” it really means something more like “creative justice” because it changes the condition of the “the other.” Of course, in the New Testament, this has an additional element, “agape” or self-sacrificing love (pp. 107-8). That may seem to be a non sequitur in terms of his discussion of moral choice, but Tillich goes on to state that “listening love” takes the place of mechanical obedience to moral commandments (p. 109). “Moral commandments are the wisdom of the past as it has been embodied in laws and traditions, and anyone who does not follow them risks tragedy.” (p. 110) It is in this tension that he concludes, “The mixture of the absolute and the relative in moral decisions is what constitutes their danger and their greatness.” (p. 112)
Once the theologian deals with the issue of absolutes with regard to moral decision-making, he returns to the initial idea of the existence of the transcendent One. He shares about talking with Rudolf Otto about the idea of the holy and remembered that the philosopher suggested that the idea of the holy is “mystery” and cannot be derived from our finite experience, nor can it be grasped in its essence by finite minds at all (p. 129).
He also points out that mere relativism in terms of faith claims will not work. He notes that when Buddhists take Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed into their faith that “…they no longer have the meaning they had in their original setting.” He goes on to state that “Monotheism does not mean that one god is better than many; it means that the one is the Absolute, the Unconditional, the Ultimate.” (p. 139) Still: 1) a particular religion’s claim to the Absolute may be a relative witness; 2) religions, as a result, should not focus on conversions, but exchange, and, last but not least, 3) religions must affirm the right of all functions of the human spirit, including the arts and sciences, as well as the rights of the state, to be independent of religious control or interference (p. 141).
There was a time when I would have found myself in whole-hearted agreement on that last point, but times have changed. In an era where the state seems more and more inclined to interfere with the exercise of religion (whether using health care laws, zoning ordinances, or equal rights as alleged motivation), it is no longer as benign as presented by Tillich merely a few decades ago. Until reaching this point, I felt like this was going to become another of those books to which I return over and over. In spite of all the resonance I feel with the first portion of the book, I’m somewhat soured by this once possible, but now anachronistic, idea. Some will think that My Search for Absolutes itself is anachronistic because relativism is so much a “given” in the post-modern era, but it is definitely worth reading—even in this millennium.
December 28, 2018
Advent Read #2 of 3: For Peter Rollins' excellent Find and You Will Seek study. I agree with an alarming amount of what Tillich has to say here. I don't think I've read a more lucid argument for how/why absolutes and relativism can and must coexist.
January 17, 2020
This little book by Paul Tillich is one of his later works and was a very rewarding read. It is quite concise so it can at times be rather difficult to fully grasp. Especially the second chapter "Absolutes in Human Knowledge", which is very philosophical in nature, requires a solid understanding of philosophical concepts. Gladly I was helped by theologian/philosopher Peter Rollins who has a seminar about this book in which he talks about each of the four chapters. This helped me to really get the most out of this book.
Now a bit about the content of the book. Tillich is concerned to see the manifestation of two extremes concerning the absolute in the world around him.
On the one side there are people claiming absolute knowledge. This is visible in totalitarianism, fascism and fundamentalism. What characterizes this position is a claim on a special access to reality and a certain knowledge that other people don't have.
The other extreme is a complete ignorance towards the absolute. This position could be called relativism or even nihilism. People holding this position maintain that it is impossible to argue about the nature of truth because, in the end, everyone is just the product of their influences (upbringing, education, desires, etc.) and there are no absolutes.
What Tillich does in the course of this book is demonstrating that there definitely are absolutes without which life would be incomprehensible and unimaginable for us. He identifies this absolutes in the realms of human thinking, morality and finally in religion. His concern is not just with disproving the relativists but also with strongly criticizing the absolutists.
What he finally argues for, in a dialectic way, is a path beyond these two extremes in which there is the possibility of knowing absolutes although their content is relative. This enables a confidence in truth alongside an uncertainty of our articulation of that truth, and there is the courageousness to act morally in the world walking hand in hand with a humility about the way we act.
This is what Tillich says about absolutes in human knowledge:
"Each of our statements about the absolutes in knowledge is relative, and this is true of my own statements here and now. But the absolutes themselves are not relative. One cannot escape them. Even if I had argued against them, I’d have had to use them to do so."
These absolutes themselves he is referring to here are for example sense impressions (you can doubt whether the color of the object you experience as blue is actually blue, but you cannot doubt the experience itself), logic (even arguing against logic presupposes a 'grounding logic' which can't be denied), selfhood ('I think therefore I am'), essences (transhistorical, universal and outside the realm of beings and becomings) and others like causality, substance, quantity, time and space.
The second chapter is about absolutes in morality. What I like is that Tillich is very honest here about the relative dimension of ethics which has to do mostly with the uniqueness of every concrete situation in which a moral decision is demanded. Still, where Tillich localizes the absolute in morality is what he calls the unconditional demand or unconditional call. This idea is rooted in Kant's categorical imperative:
"The fact that the contents of the moral imperative change according to one’s situation in time and space does not change the formal absoluteness of the moral imperative itself. In the moment in which we acknowledge something as our moral duty, under whatever conditions, this duty is unconditional. Whether we obey it or not is another question with which I shall deal later, but if we acknowledge it as a moral command it is unconditional and nothing should prevent us from fulfilling it. [...]
The term [categorical imperative] indicates that it is impossible to derive a moral imperative from other sources than its own intrinsic nature. If you could derive it from fear of punishment it would be a conditional imperative, involved with social conventions, with punishments and rewards, but it would not be unconditional and absolutely serious, and you might cleverly escape the punishments. If it were derived from calculation of what is most useful in the long or short run, as it was in some philosophical schools, it would be dependent on the cleverness of such calculation, but it would not be unconditional and absolutely serious. If it were derived from authorities, earthly or heavenly, which were not identical with the nature of the moral imperative itself, it would not be unconditional and we should have to reject it."
What Tillich emphasizes is that the burden of the moral decision must be carried by each person individually. Tradition (e.g. religious or secular laws) can help us and is to be studied and respected, but finally each generation must have the courage to face the limitations of existing laws and to adapt and reinterpret them. Only in this way can a tradition stay alive and vibrant. What should also guide us our moral decisions is (agape-) love and a deep and careful listening to the actual situation and the persons involved.
The final chapter addresses religion and the absolute in religion, which is also called the holy. Tillich works here with two different notions of religion and he also shows how they are related. There is religion in a concrete and narrow sense, which means particular religions with particular traditions, structures and content (e.g. Christianity, Islam, etc.).
Religion in a broader sense is the experience of absolutes or the holy but not necessarily in a way related to concrete religions. In a sense, something is holy to everyone, even to people who are unaware that they experienced the holy. Here is how he describes it:
"The larger concept of religion has appeared as the dimension of ultimate reality in the different realms of man’s encounter with reality. It is, to use a metaphor, the dimension of depth itself, the inexhaustible depth of being, but it appeared indirectly in these realms. What was experienced directly was knowledge, or the moral imperative, or social justice, or aesthetic expressiveness; but the holy was present in all these secular structures, although hidden in them. For this is how one experiences the holy, through secular structures. Religion in this basic and universal sense I have called 'being grasped by an ultimate concern.'”
What he also addresses in this chapter are demonic religions. For him, this is any particular religion that elevates its relative and ambiguous content to absoluteness:
"The ambiguous, in which positive and negative, creative and destructive elements are mingled, is considered sacred in itself, is deified. In the case of religion, the deification of the relative and the ambiguous means that a particular religion claims to be identical with the religious Absolute and rejects judgment against itself. This leads, internally, to demonic suppression of doubt, criticism, and honest search for truth within the particular religion itself; and it leads, externally, to the most demonic and destructive of all wars, religious wars. Such evils are unavoidable if a particular manifestation of the holy is identified with the holy itself."
This is why Tillich finds great value for example in the Jewish tradition. What can be found there, in the writings of the prophets, is a God that will even turn against God's people if they choose to turn against the absolute (love, mercy, justice). This notion of God is really revolutionary when compared to the God that was and is used so often to advance political or economical agendas, the God that is 'always on our side'. Thus Tillich judges the maturity of a religion in its capability to be self-critical, its ability to perceive its own relativity and ambiguity and to point beyond itself to the absolute which is not limited to one particular religion or even to religion at all.
Now a bit about the content of the book. Tillich is concerned to see the manifestation of two extremes concerning the absolute in the world around him.
On the one side there are people claiming absolute knowledge. This is visible in totalitarianism, fascism and fundamentalism. What characterizes this position is a claim on a special access to reality and a certain knowledge that other people don't have.
The other extreme is a complete ignorance towards the absolute. This position could be called relativism or even nihilism. People holding this position maintain that it is impossible to argue about the nature of truth because, in the end, everyone is just the product of their influences (upbringing, education, desires, etc.) and there are no absolutes.
What Tillich does in the course of this book is demonstrating that there definitely are absolutes without which life would be incomprehensible and unimaginable for us. He identifies this absolutes in the realms of human thinking, morality and finally in religion. His concern is not just with disproving the relativists but also with strongly criticizing the absolutists.
What he finally argues for, in a dialectic way, is a path beyond these two extremes in which there is the possibility of knowing absolutes although their content is relative. This enables a confidence in truth alongside an uncertainty of our articulation of that truth, and there is the courageousness to act morally in the world walking hand in hand with a humility about the way we act.
This is what Tillich says about absolutes in human knowledge:
"Each of our statements about the absolutes in knowledge is relative, and this is true of my own statements here and now. But the absolutes themselves are not relative. One cannot escape them. Even if I had argued against them, I’d have had to use them to do so."
These absolutes themselves he is referring to here are for example sense impressions (you can doubt whether the color of the object you experience as blue is actually blue, but you cannot doubt the experience itself), logic (even arguing against logic presupposes a 'grounding logic' which can't be denied), selfhood ('I think therefore I am'), essences (transhistorical, universal and outside the realm of beings and becomings) and others like causality, substance, quantity, time and space.
The second chapter is about absolutes in morality. What I like is that Tillich is very honest here about the relative dimension of ethics which has to do mostly with the uniqueness of every concrete situation in which a moral decision is demanded. Still, where Tillich localizes the absolute in morality is what he calls the unconditional demand or unconditional call. This idea is rooted in Kant's categorical imperative:
"The fact that the contents of the moral imperative change according to one’s situation in time and space does not change the formal absoluteness of the moral imperative itself. In the moment in which we acknowledge something as our moral duty, under whatever conditions, this duty is unconditional. Whether we obey it or not is another question with which I shall deal later, but if we acknowledge it as a moral command it is unconditional and nothing should prevent us from fulfilling it. [...]
The term [categorical imperative] indicates that it is impossible to derive a moral imperative from other sources than its own intrinsic nature. If you could derive it from fear of punishment it would be a conditional imperative, involved with social conventions, with punishments and rewards, but it would not be unconditional and absolutely serious, and you might cleverly escape the punishments. If it were derived from calculation of what is most useful in the long or short run, as it was in some philosophical schools, it would be dependent on the cleverness of such calculation, but it would not be unconditional and absolutely serious. If it were derived from authorities, earthly or heavenly, which were not identical with the nature of the moral imperative itself, it would not be unconditional and we should have to reject it."
What Tillich emphasizes is that the burden of the moral decision must be carried by each person individually. Tradition (e.g. religious or secular laws) can help us and is to be studied and respected, but finally each generation must have the courage to face the limitations of existing laws and to adapt and reinterpret them. Only in this way can a tradition stay alive and vibrant. What should also guide us our moral decisions is (agape-) love and a deep and careful listening to the actual situation and the persons involved.
The final chapter addresses religion and the absolute in religion, which is also called the holy. Tillich works here with two different notions of religion and he also shows how they are related. There is religion in a concrete and narrow sense, which means particular religions with particular traditions, structures and content (e.g. Christianity, Islam, etc.).
Religion in a broader sense is the experience of absolutes or the holy but not necessarily in a way related to concrete religions. In a sense, something is holy to everyone, even to people who are unaware that they experienced the holy. Here is how he describes it:
"The larger concept of religion has appeared as the dimension of ultimate reality in the different realms of man’s encounter with reality. It is, to use a metaphor, the dimension of depth itself, the inexhaustible depth of being, but it appeared indirectly in these realms. What was experienced directly was knowledge, or the moral imperative, or social justice, or aesthetic expressiveness; but the holy was present in all these secular structures, although hidden in them. For this is how one experiences the holy, through secular structures. Religion in this basic and universal sense I have called 'being grasped by an ultimate concern.'”
What he also addresses in this chapter are demonic religions. For him, this is any particular religion that elevates its relative and ambiguous content to absoluteness:
"The ambiguous, in which positive and negative, creative and destructive elements are mingled, is considered sacred in itself, is deified. In the case of religion, the deification of the relative and the ambiguous means that a particular religion claims to be identical with the religious Absolute and rejects judgment against itself. This leads, internally, to demonic suppression of doubt, criticism, and honest search for truth within the particular religion itself; and it leads, externally, to the most demonic and destructive of all wars, religious wars. Such evils are unavoidable if a particular manifestation of the holy is identified with the holy itself."
This is why Tillich finds great value for example in the Jewish tradition. What can be found there, in the writings of the prophets, is a God that will even turn against God's people if they choose to turn against the absolute (love, mercy, justice). This notion of God is really revolutionary when compared to the God that was and is used so often to advance political or economical agendas, the God that is 'always on our side'. Thus Tillich judges the maturity of a religion in its capability to be self-critical, its ability to perceive its own relativity and ambiguity and to point beyond itself to the absolute which is not limited to one particular religion or even to religion at all.
December 29, 2012
Famed theologian Paul Tillich is described by the series editor as “the contemporary Philo” who combines Platonism, Biblical discourse and philosophy. This short book holds Tillich’s last lectures, an autobiographical reflection and a bunch of bizarre drawings by Saul Steinberg. The sketches are laughably out of place. Delivered in 1965, the three lectures are Tillich at his not-best: superficial, contradictory and irrelevant. The alleged problem is pervasive relativism. Tillich’s solution is to assert absolutes in form—being, imperative, the holy—while noting the ever-changing content, i.e. matter, morals, religious expression. Very simple, very easy. A strawman problem, a paper-thin solution. What is valuable is the autobiographical piece—Tillich-trivia for dedicated fans about his education, his publications and his admiration for America, his home after fleeing Nazi Germany in ‘33. Why was Tillich changing German universities every few years in the 1920s? Sexual harassment charges?
July 7, 2012
A good and short philosophic read. Tillich first sketches out a narrative of his life, then proceeds to give his definitions of what is "absolute". He delineates these thoughts in a simple but profound way, which at once is easy to read but challenging to understand. So slow down a bit when you read haha. The last chapter is bound to piss off modern conservative evangelicals, but what doesn't these days?
June 28, 2008
This book was published after the death of Paul Tillich and is a good look at the theologian's quest for absolute truth. This book is like a summary of Tillich's work and the ideals that shaped his search for truth. Its a bit weighty, compared to other of Tillich's works, but I recommend it to anyone who is embarking upon a study of his work and ideas.
July 12, 2013
The autobiographical essay was the best. This book eerily does not sound like Tillich. Sure, some of his best-known themes are touched on, but the voice is less his than that of an editor (Credo's perhaps?)
August 2, 2007
End of life autobiographical sketch by perhaps the greatest contemporary Protestant theologian.
May 12, 2009
Reading Tillich was part of my college reading and was also required in seminary. Oddly, Tillich was not actually a Christian.
January 13, 2014
Meh. Had some good points, but nothing that hasn't been said better and more usefully by others. The illustrations were cool, though.
October 25, 2016
Short but insightful and profound at times. You get a feel for Tillich's unique use of Christian vocabulary and his philosophical applications of that vocabulary to very real parts of life.
September 16, 2017
Intersting lecture by a brilliant Christian thinker.
April 20, 2022
يمنحنا التجريد المقدرة على إنتاج اللغة، وتمنحنا اللغة، بدورها، حرية الاختيار، وتمنحتا هذه الأخيرة إمكانية الإنتاج التقني اللانهائي.
July 19, 2024
TILLICH SUMMARIZES HIS LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY
Paul Tillich (1886-1965) was a German-American theologian and Christian existentialist philosopher. He wrote many books, such as 'Systematic Theology,' 'The Courage to Be,' 'The Shaking Of The Foundations,' 'The New Being,' 'Eternal Now.'.
This volume was published in 1967, after Tillich's death. The first essay is, "An Autobiographical Essay: Early Years." In this essay, he refers to his "predominantly aesthetic-meditative attitude toward nature as distinguished from a scientific-analytical or technical-controlling relation... It is theologically formulated in my doctrine of the participation of nature in the process of fall and salvation." (Pg. 25) He summarizes his "positive" philosophical discussions with his conservative Lutheran father, which ultimately "made me immune against any system of thought or life which demands the surrender of autonomy." (Pg. 32) After mentioning an "early polemic" between himself and Karl Barth, he refers to the "balancing" of the romantic and revolutionary motives, which "has remained the basic problem of my thought and of my life ever since." (Pg. 33)
In the other (non-autobiographical) essays, he notes that the term "absolute" is difficult to use because many people associate it with the image of an "absolute thing" often identified with God; "This, of course, is not what I mean... I prefer to use the term 'ultimate' ... I should like to emphasize that there is no such thing as absolute knowledge, an impossibility." (Pg. 66-67) He summarizes, "Each of our statements about the absolutes in knowledge is relative, and this is true of my own statements here and now." (Pg. 80)
He describes as the "most fundamental of all absolutes" that being is the power of resisting non-being. (Pg. 81) He suggests that the reason why we should not destroy our dignity as a person is that, "From the point of view of the holy, we do not belong to ourselves but to that from which we come and to which we return---the eternal ground of everything that is." (Pg. 96)
This is a relatively "personal," more "inside" view of Tillich, and is of great interest for anyone interested in his philosophy.
Paul Tillich (1886-1965) was a German-American theologian and Christian existentialist philosopher. He wrote many books, such as 'Systematic Theology,' 'The Courage to Be,' 'The Shaking Of The Foundations,' 'The New Being,' 'Eternal Now.'.
This volume was published in 1967, after Tillich's death. The first essay is, "An Autobiographical Essay: Early Years." In this essay, he refers to his "predominantly aesthetic-meditative attitude toward nature as distinguished from a scientific-analytical or technical-controlling relation... It is theologically formulated in my doctrine of the participation of nature in the process of fall and salvation." (Pg. 25) He summarizes his "positive" philosophical discussions with his conservative Lutheran father, which ultimately "made me immune against any system of thought or life which demands the surrender of autonomy." (Pg. 32) After mentioning an "early polemic" between himself and Karl Barth, he refers to the "balancing" of the romantic and revolutionary motives, which "has remained the basic problem of my thought and of my life ever since." (Pg. 33)
In the other (non-autobiographical) essays, he notes that the term "absolute" is difficult to use because many people associate it with the image of an "absolute thing" often identified with God; "This, of course, is not what I mean... I prefer to use the term 'ultimate' ... I should like to emphasize that there is no such thing as absolute knowledge, an impossibility." (Pg. 66-67) He summarizes, "Each of our statements about the absolutes in knowledge is relative, and this is true of my own statements here and now." (Pg. 80)
He describes as the "most fundamental of all absolutes" that being is the power of resisting non-being. (Pg. 81) He suggests that the reason why we should not destroy our dignity as a person is that, "From the point of view of the holy, we do not belong to ourselves but to that from which we come and to which we return---the eternal ground of everything that is." (Pg. 96)
This is a relatively "personal," more "inside" view of Tillich, and is of great interest for anyone interested in his philosophy.
August 18, 2018
I really liked this book. Because this is both a philosophical autobiography and a work on where absolutes can be found in the midst of the ocean of relativities we all swim in everyday, it made it both relatable and challenging. I would recommend it to my friends who maybe have an impression of Tillich more informed by Neo-orthodoxy and his exchanges with Karl Barth. This might help with seeing where he comes from with his move toward natural theology/existentialist philosophy of religion. I'm on board 100%.
October 7, 2019
A great introduction to Tillich's theology and philosophy of life. One that should appeal to both believers and atheists.
November 26, 2019
Emad Hamdan
June 10, 2023
Section 3 hits
July 3, 2019
This little book, first published two years after Tillich's death and now out of print, popped up via Pete Rollins on my Facebook feed recently. I managed to find the text of the book online, and enjoyed it a lot.
The book consists of four essays: 'What Am I: An Autobiographical Essay', 'Absolutes in Human Knowledge and the Idea of Truth', 'The Absolute and the Relative Element in Moral Decisions', 'The Holy - the Absolute and the Relative in Religion'.
The first essay is fascinating - an insight on what formed the man's intellectual life. I was hankering for more info about his experiences in WWI (when he served as a chaplain for the German army) and the atmosphere of the rise of Hitler. But one remarkable detail is the fact that when he was dismissed from his position as professor of philosophy at the University of Frankfurt in 1933, when Hitler became the German Chancellor, and fled Germany to take up a position at Union Theological Seminary in New York at the invitation of Reinhold Niebuhr, he was already 47 years of age and had no English.
The book hits its thematic stride in the second essay. I won't try to summarise each essay - the arguments unfold cleverly in each and to attempt a retelling would be to do them an injustice.
But the personal impact of this second essay was quite strong for me - it came at a good moment. My take-away, in my own words, was the idea that while relativism exists and can be observed (it is evident in cognitive encounters with reality), it is a surface observation - the cosmos is not relativistic 'all the way down', as it were. Relativistic aspects (or 'the flux of knowledge' as Tillich terms it) exist and are real but they are like a sea held within a container. There is an absolute structure that holds the flux.
This idea can be a significant balm for the post-modern mind - it was for mine at least. A tonic for existential angst. Quite a relief.
As the essays unfold, Tillich goes on to define what these absolutes might be.
To state it (though each point probably needs the elucidation of the full essays): "These absolutes [are]: the structure of the mind that makes sense impressions possible, and the logical and semantic structure of the mind; the universals that make language possible; the categories and polarities that make understanding of reality possible. Others were the unconditional character of the moral imperative, regardless of its contents, and the principle of justice — acknowledgment of every person as a person. Finally, there was agape, love, which contains and transcends justice and unites the absolute and the relative by adapting itself to every concrete situation."
This last move, the one regarding agape in the moral life, was the most lovely I thought.
"Agape is the absolute moral principle, the 'star' above the chaos of relativism. ... A second [absolute] is the concrete situation to which love turns in a way I like to call 'listening love'. Listening love is a listening to and looking at the concrete situation in all its concreteness, which includes the deepest motives of the other person."
"... I want to say two things about those who dare to make genuine moral decisions. In making such decisions courageously, guided by the principle of agape, looking with 'listening love' into the concrete situation, helped by the wisdom of the ages, they do something not only for themselves and for those in relation to whom they decide. They actualize possibilities of spiritual life which had remained hidden until then; therefore they participate creatively in shaping the future ethical consciousness. This is the creative excitement of moral life..."
In the final essay...
"We found [in the two previous essays] that all the absolutes pointed beyond themselves to the most basic absolute of all, to being-itself beyond the split of subject and object. In finding being-itself, our search has reached the ground of truth and of the good, the source of all the other absolutes in our encounter with reality. This source is the Absolute-itself, and the experience of the Absolute-itself is experience of the holy, the sacred."
While I don't think I agree with where he lands (he deliberately avoids equating the Absolute-itself with a personalised God), there is so much worth thinking about in this essay.
Tillich's work always has an existential drive and impact - so the work as a whole contains a number of challenges to the reader, particularly to young generations, and to religion.
The book consists of four essays: 'What Am I: An Autobiographical Essay', 'Absolutes in Human Knowledge and the Idea of Truth', 'The Absolute and the Relative Element in Moral Decisions', 'The Holy - the Absolute and the Relative in Religion'.
The first essay is fascinating - an insight on what formed the man's intellectual life. I was hankering for more info about his experiences in WWI (when he served as a chaplain for the German army) and the atmosphere of the rise of Hitler. But one remarkable detail is the fact that when he was dismissed from his position as professor of philosophy at the University of Frankfurt in 1933, when Hitler became the German Chancellor, and fled Germany to take up a position at Union Theological Seminary in New York at the invitation of Reinhold Niebuhr, he was already 47 years of age and had no English.
The book hits its thematic stride in the second essay. I won't try to summarise each essay - the arguments unfold cleverly in each and to attempt a retelling would be to do them an injustice.
But the personal impact of this second essay was quite strong for me - it came at a good moment. My take-away, in my own words, was the idea that while relativism exists and can be observed (it is evident in cognitive encounters with reality), it is a surface observation - the cosmos is not relativistic 'all the way down', as it were. Relativistic aspects (or 'the flux of knowledge' as Tillich terms it) exist and are real but they are like a sea held within a container. There is an absolute structure that holds the flux.
This idea can be a significant balm for the post-modern mind - it was for mine at least. A tonic for existential angst. Quite a relief.
As the essays unfold, Tillich goes on to define what these absolutes might be.
To state it (though each point probably needs the elucidation of the full essays): "These absolutes [are]: the structure of the mind that makes sense impressions possible, and the logical and semantic structure of the mind; the universals that make language possible; the categories and polarities that make understanding of reality possible. Others were the unconditional character of the moral imperative, regardless of its contents, and the principle of justice — acknowledgment of every person as a person. Finally, there was agape, love, which contains and transcends justice and unites the absolute and the relative by adapting itself to every concrete situation."
This last move, the one regarding agape in the moral life, was the most lovely I thought.
"Agape is the absolute moral principle, the 'star' above the chaos of relativism. ... A second [absolute] is the concrete situation to which love turns in a way I like to call 'listening love'. Listening love is a listening to and looking at the concrete situation in all its concreteness, which includes the deepest motives of the other person."
"... I want to say two things about those who dare to make genuine moral decisions. In making such decisions courageously, guided by the principle of agape, looking with 'listening love' into the concrete situation, helped by the wisdom of the ages, they do something not only for themselves and for those in relation to whom they decide. They actualize possibilities of spiritual life which had remained hidden until then; therefore they participate creatively in shaping the future ethical consciousness. This is the creative excitement of moral life..."
In the final essay...
"We found [in the two previous essays] that all the absolutes pointed beyond themselves to the most basic absolute of all, to being-itself beyond the split of subject and object. In finding being-itself, our search has reached the ground of truth and of the good, the source of all the other absolutes in our encounter with reality. This source is the Absolute-itself, and the experience of the Absolute-itself is experience of the holy, the sacred."
While I don't think I agree with where he lands (he deliberately avoids equating the Absolute-itself with a personalised God), there is so much worth thinking about in this essay.
Tillich's work always has an existential drive and impact - so the work as a whole contains a number of challenges to the reader, particularly to young generations, and to religion.
October 16, 2025
3.5
The illustrations by Saul Steinberg were laughably out of place, but I enjoyed Tillich's short autobiography as well as his later attempt to reconcile the absolute and the relative. Not Tillich's best, certainly. But still an interesting book.
The illustrations by Saul Steinberg were laughably out of place, but I enjoyed Tillich's short autobiography as well as his later attempt to reconcile the absolute and the relative. Not Tillich's best, certainly. But still an interesting book.
April 24, 2015
Simply language with profoundity. One should note the priority of existential experience and how that exiential experience in their own being has set their own diverse paths of quests before they try to learn from the condensed and abstract lessons from others. Like Otto, "I started with the experiences of the holy and advanced to the idea of God and not the reverse way. Equally importantly existentially as well as theologically were the mystical, sacramental, and aesthetic implications of the idea of the holy, whereby the ethical and logical elements of religion were derived from the experience of the presence of the divine and not conversely." (p28) (Of course, this starting point is very different from Camus who the contemporaries are often more familiar with, who also begins with an existential experience, which, however, is absurd absurdity.)
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