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by Bertrand Russell, فاروق الحميد (Translator )

本书为二十世纪分析哲学的代表人物罗素（1872—1970）所著，是早期分析哲学史上的一部经典著作。这本书是罗素中立一元论思想的首次系统阐释，体现了罗素哲学思想的一次重要转变。作者认为世界的终极实在既非心，也非物，而是一种比二者都更基本的材料，即感觉。从这种中立一元论的立场出发，作者在本书中批评了布伦塔诺和迈农的观点，并探讨了哲学史上的一些重要问题，如意识、知觉、感觉、信念等。

Genres: Philosophy, Psychology, Nonfiction, Science, Classics, Neuroscience, British Literature

413 pages, Unknown Binding

First published January 1, 1921

About the author

Bertrand Arthur William Russell, 3rd Earl Russell, OM, FRS, was a Welsh philosopher, historian, logician, mathematician, advocate for social reform, pacifist, and prominent rationalist. Although he was usually regarded as English, as he spent the majority of his life in England, he was born in Wales, where he also died.

He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1950 "in recognition of his varied and significant writings in which he champions humanitarian ideals and freedom of thought."

Reviews

[Roy Lotz · Rating 3 out of 5]

When you drop a weight on your toe, and you say what you do say, the habit has been caused by imitation of your undesirable associates, whereas it is brought into play by the dropping of the weight.

It is a puzzle of our modern scientific worldview that we have been extremely successful in explaining things remote from our experience, and yet have made comparatively little headway in explaining our experience itself.

We begin with physics, the king of the sciences. Here we are dealing with things like force, time, mass, charge—abstract qualities which we can define precisely and measure accurately. Using these variables we can, and have, constructed theoretical edifices which continue to astound me and the rest of the world with their surpassing precision and elegance. Yet it is in physics that we have found that our everyday notions are most flawed. Seemingly solid objects like tables and people are, it turns out, mostly empty space. Under certain circumstances, time slows down, objects become foreshortened. Space itself is not wholly distinct from time, but forms a four-dimensional fabric that bends in response to matter. And even our basic logical notions, like that of identity, fail miserably when confronted with the probabilistic world of quantum mechanics.

Things get a bit more orderly when we move up the scale of complexity from physics to chemistry. No longer are we dealing with matter in the abstract, but specific types of matter, with their own specific, recognizable qualities—smell, hardness, color. Here we can at least picture specks of matter, arranged into three-dimensional structures, changing and rearranging like grains of sand on a storm-tossed shore. Our ability to predict and explain the universe on this scale is less precise, and perhaps less elegant, than in physics, but it is nonetheless impressive. Yet as we climb the rungs of complexity from hydrogen to organic chemistry, up through biochemistry, we somewhere reach the frontier that separates life from inanimate matter.

Where we draw the line is, in part, merely a question of semantics; but it is also a scientific question, since we are interested in explaining the origins of life—and we can’t decide when life arose without deciding what life is. Viruses seem to sit right on this troubling boundary; but let’s put them to the side. We arrive, then, at bacteria, organisms too small to sense, but which still form the majority of life on earth, both in mass and variety. These little bitty dots of life float to and fro, performing their limited array of behaviors; and yet, simple as they are, do we have equations that could tell us exactly when a specific bacteria will divide, or exactly what direction it will turn next? And is not our knowledge of what life is even now so limited that we are still surprised, year after year, at the strange and inhospitable places we find bacteria happily residing?

Once we arrive at things like trees, mushrooms, bison, and baboons, all bets are off as far as predictive precision is concerned. It is true, we do have Darwinian evolution, which admirably and elegantly unites all of these phenomena into an orderly framework. Nonetheless, our knowledge here is qualitative, not quantitative; and when dealing with something like, say, animal behavior, biology sometimes approaches what can be called “natural history”—the mere collection of facts. Unlike in physics and in chemistry, where nearly every new particle or element is predicted beforehand—not only its mere existence, but its precise qualities, too—in biology, every new species discovered is a surprise. And even when we have good evolutionary grounds for predicting an ancestral species, the exact qualities of said species cannot be simply deduced from a theory; they must be inferred from remains and analogs.

Finally, we get to our own behavior—and here things get really messy. Because we humans exhibit such behavioral flexibility, we can’t quite decide where genetic influence ends and environmental influence begins. Nor can we even make definitive statements about the limits of our behavioral flexibility, as shown by the Westerners who were continually flabbergasted at the discoveries of cultural anthropologists. Moreover, our dominant theories of human behavior in the social sciences contradict one another. The premises of economics run counter to those of anthropologists; evolutionary psychologists and sociologists make different assumptions and operate within incompatible paradigms. Thus we are left with the ironic result that we can predict the behavior of an electron, which nobody has ever seen, with enormous precision, and yet cannot predict the behavior of our spouses, who we see every day, despite our most valiant efforts.

This isn’t a pretty picture; but the next step in our journey is even uglier. When we arrive at the threshold between body and mind, we are stumped completely. How does consciousness arise from a blob of neural tissue? How do chemical signals and electric jolts, when arranged in a sufficiently complicated network, give rise to awareness? How on earth do we explain choice, will, fear, hope? We reach for science, but here our typical scientific approach encounters an obstacle. Science, which is a method for achieving objective results, is being asked to explain subjectivity; a technique for paring away our biases and partialities, leaving only the truth, is being applied to the very center of our biases and partialities. In short, the only indubitable evidence we have of our awareness is purely personal, and yet such evidence—namely, eyewitness testimony—is inadmissible in the scientific enterprise.

In these paradoxical territories, where we cannot yet achieve satisfactory results using empirical research, philosophy makes its home. And here is where Bertrand Russell enters. Published in 1921, The Analysis of Mind is Russell’s attempts to muster the greatest science and philosophy of his day to explain the human mind. Relying not only on his own techniques of logical analysis, Russell draws on David Hume’s empiricism, William James’s psychology, Freud’s psychoanalysis, and the recently-developed behaviorism, quoting scientific papers more often than other philosophers. It is a valiant effort, and I’m not sure how much better Russell could have done given the knowledge available at the time.

Nevertheless, from the perspective of our own day, this book is quite clearly outdated. The most general flaw is that Russell doesn’t posit nearly enough complexity in the mind to account for the richness of mental activity. Again, this is as much the fault of Russell’s influences as Russell himself. Hume thought the mind was merely a succession of sensations and images; William James mainly relied on habit to explain human behavior; Freud divided the mind into the conscious, the unconscious, and the censor, reducing all motivation to the sex drive; and behaviorism, of course, attempts to circumvent the mind completely, explaining everything through observable actions.

Russell more or less attempts to put these theories together, fiddling with one here, another there, trying to find the right combination to account for the human mind. The result is, I’m sorry to say, supremely unconvincing. For example, a ubiquitous feature of human behavior is language, which certainly cannot be accounted for by mere stimulus-and-response, as Russell attempts to do here. Language is not a mere habit, the way that biting your nails is. This has been evinced by the extraordinary difficulty in constructing translating programs—something which, of course, was far in the future when Russell wrote this. Also flat-footed was Russell’s attempt to built up all the contents of the mind with mere sensations and images (imagined sensations). For example, how could you build up something like happiness from sights, sounds, and tactile sensations? Could you construct despair out of moonlight, a minor chord, and the smell of mould?

Most troubling, though, was Russell’s attempt at monism. Now, to backtrack a little, in philosophy two approaches have been offered to supplant the mind-body problem. The first is materialism, which considers everything supposedly mental to be, at most, the mere byproduct of something physical; and the second is idealism, which takes the opposite approach—namely, considering everything in the universe to be really mental. Spinoza famously tried to steer a middle course, and proposed that matter and mind were two forms of the same thing, a doctrine which has been called “neutral monism.” This idea was much later taken up by William James, and is put forward here by Russell, under James’s influence. The problem, however, is that in positing something intermediary and more fundamental than matter and mind, Russell does violence to both.

Russell’s solutions is essentially to reduce everything to sensations. Physics deals with the behavior of sensations from every possible perspective, whereas psychology deals with the behavior of sensations from only one perspective. Thus, a table in physics is just a table seen from every possible angle, under every possible light, and so on; and a single person’s experience is a successions of sensations—a table, a chair, a pizza—seen from one vantage point. Note the advantage: if mind and matter are just two aspects of the same thing, the mind-body problem is solved. In keeping with this view, Russell suggests that matter is, in his words, a “logical fiction,” which physicists merely posit as the glue to hold the data of sensations together. In his words:

Instead of supposing that there is some unknown cause, the “real” table, behind the different sensations of those who are said to be looking at the table, we may take the whole set of these sensations (together possibly with certain other particulars) as actually being the table. That is to say, the table which is neutral as between different observers (actual and possible) is the set of all those particulars which would naturally be called “aspects” of the table from different point of view.

I have very little sympathy for this view, as perhaps do most other people nowadays. Making sensations fundamental puts humans at the very center of reality. The world was around a long time before life arose, and thus cannot be explained as a collection of sensations. Moreover, our current understanding of physics requires that certain things, far outside of our experience, be treated as fundamental; and even though these entities are merely deduced, never directly observed through our senses, by using them we can formulate predictions of extreme precision and accuracy, which is the goal of science.

Russell might respond that, in the interest of applying Occam’s razor, we should ideally have a science that rests on directly observable data (i.e. sensations), since every microscopic particle we posit is an extra, hypothetical entity. Nevertheless, such a thing doesn’t seem possible—which isn’t surprising, considering that, so far as we know, the way we perceive the universe is accidental, limited, and imprecise, the result of the needs of an ape species living on a small planet orbiting an ordinary star. But Francis Bacon, writing 400 years ago, might have said it best:

But by far the greatest hindrance and aberration of the human understanding proceeds from the dullness, incompetency, and deceptions of the senses; in that things which strike the sense outweigh things which do not immediately strike it, though they be more important. Hence it is that speculation commonly ceases where sight ceases; insomuch that of things invisible there is little or no observation.

In fact, the relationship of what we actually sense to modern physics is fairly tenuous. When we are, for example, running an experiment and using a detecting device, what matters is the information the device displays, not the sensations we experience. For example, the detector might display its readings in neon green lettering, in roman numerals, in Chaucerian English, in Egyptian hieroglyphics—in whatever language you want. These would all be quite different sensations, but would all signify the same thing. In short, it is what we deduce from our experience, rather than our experience itself, which is significant.

This, of course, brings us back to our initial paradox—namely, that we can deduce the origins of the universe from our experience, but we cannot explain how our experience arises from our brains. Well, at least Russell cannot; and if he can’t, what hope do I have?

[Jimmy Ele · Rating 5 out of 5]

Brilliant book, I thoroughly enjoyed it, and following it really made me think about the connection between mind (exemplified by psychology) and matter (exemplified by physics), and how Russell believes them to be made of the same neutral "stuff". The book made me really question and examine within a rational and logical perspective everything I have ever experienced. I highly recommend it for anyone interested in the connection between mind and matter and the varying viewpoints of different philosophers on these subjects.

[Xander · Rating 4 out of 5]

On my re-reading of The Analysis of Mind (1921) I was amazed by how much more I understood of Russell's lectures than on my first reading. Between my two reads I have read much of Russell's earlier work so perhaps this helped to appreciate his views on psychology much more.

Anyway, Russell's central thesis is pretty straightforward. He analyzes all the subjects of psychology, as the study of our mental life, and comes to the conclusion that all of this field can be reduced to sensations and images. Images themselves can be reduced to mnemetic causation (i.e. prior experience is stored and influences new experiences - images in this sense are stored copies of prototypical sensations). Mental occurrences like emotion, will, desire, belief and remembering are all complexes constructed out of sensations and/or images. Things like consciousness and mind are, for Russell, nothing but inferred entities and should be avoided as much as possible - at least when approaching psychology as a science.

In this regard psychology approaches reality nearer than physics, which deals with logical fictions such as matter and atoms, that are constructed out of systems of occurrences. A future, ideal physics should be construed out of particular occurrences and the causal laws guiding their dynamical development over time - as is already done in psychology.

Throughout the series of lectures one can see the contemporary scientific insights beaming through - behaviorism, psychoanalysis, pragmatism, William James' empiricism and realism, etc. Russell uses what he can but in the end builds his own theories of our mental life and all its aspects.

One of the more interesting parts of the book are the chapters on belief and truth and falsehood. This is because Russell has to offer a psychological explanation for his theory of knowledge. According to Russell, truth is a value of a propositional function, which itself is a complex deriving its meaning from the meaning of its elements and their relations. That is, all our beliefs are complex of a proposition and an accompanying feeling. The proposition contains an object and its relation to that object is its meaning. In other words, a proposition refers to some fact or system of facts outside the mind and is true or false in virtue of the existence or absence of this fact or system of facts. Ultimately, our beliefs (and thus our knowledge) consist of feelings and of words and/or images. And feelings, words and images are derived from sensations. In effect, Russell founds his theory of knowledge in sensations of particular occurences, as the ultimate constituents of reality.

Another very interesting part of the book is where Russell deals with the connection between psychology and physics. In physics similar particular events are grouped according to all the places where they appear; in psychology different particular events are grouped according to the place where they appear. That is, a physical object (say, a star) is the collection of all its appearances; and a psychological object (say, a sensation of that star) is the collection of all sensations simultaneously making up the perspective. Perspectives over time are called biographies and are what distinguish living from non-living matter. That is, organisms have a continuous series of perspectives.

This also illuminates Russell's critique of physics: a star is the system of all its appearances (whether they are observed or not), which means we are already dealing with a fiction, since the system itself is a construction out of the raw data that are the appearances. Ultimately, all there is is appearances (i.e. data) and psychology deals with data one datum at a time. In this sense, according to Russell, it approaches reality much nearer than physics. Causal laws are, for Russell, that which binds occurrences together through space and time and makes these occurrences appear as they appear. And this allows him to claim that in the future physical laws and psychological laws should approach one another ever closer. He is skeptical about whether a perfect unification will ever be possible, yet the ideal is good enough.

This book will be on my mind for a long time to come. So many gems of insights, so many unique perspectives, so much clear thinking. And notwithstanding the date of publication (1921) and the complexity of the subject matter it is perfectly readable still. Definitely recommended for anyone interested or occupied in psychology!

[Xander · Rating 2 out of 5]

A confusing book, originally a series of 15 lectures, in which analytic philosopher Bertrand Russell tries to do two things:

1. Establish his thesis of neutral monism, as applied to the mind.
2. Make his thesis plausible by incorporating all contemporary scientific theories within his framework.

As regards his neutral monism, Russell claims all psychic phenomena - from emotions, will and desire to thinking, reasoning and believing - are built up out of sensations and images alone. The ultimate stuff that these sensations and images come from is sense-data.

By reducing scientific psychology to sense-data, and by doing the same for matter (as he does in some of his other works), Russell is able to state - following American psychologist William James - that all existing things within the universe are, ultimately this neutral stuff. In other words, Russell claims mind and matter are both instances of sense-data.

This brings me to the second point: Russell allows that scientific psychology - then a relatively new field of study - was still far from reaching the status of physics. In physics, general laws account for all phenomena, yet psychology is much harder to reduce to general laws, yet he has grand visions (and hopes) for the future.

To illustrate his optimism, he walks through all psychological subjects - like desire, reasoning, language and emotion - showing how logical analysis teaches us most scientific and common-sense claims are mistaken. Russell does not refute the then-current theories like John B. Watson' behaviourism, James' empiricism or Wilhelm Wundt's introspection outright, but he does bend and twist these theories, leaving out the incompatible elements, to come up with one (sort of) integrated whole.

In sum: Russell analyses the mind, concludes that all faculties/functions that psychology studies can be reduced to sensations and images, and incorporates empiricism (James), psychoanalysis (Freud, Jung), behaviourism (Watson) and introspection (Wundt) into his own theory.

What this leaves us, modern day readers, is a very fragmented and inconsistent train of lectures. Each lecture starts with a logical analysis of the subject and current views, amends the flaws, and incorporates scientific observations - to show the theory of neutral monism is perfectly compatible with (then) contemporary science. But apart from this structure, the content of these lectures - especially the scientific theories - makes for a very disjointed reading. And this leaves out the fact that most of these theories are outdated by now. And since Russell stakes his own theory on those theories, the whole edifice is rather a ruin.

No, I cannot recommend reading this book. It's simply too fragmentary, too outdated, as well as too inaccessible.

[Sriram Sankaranarayanan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Building from the scratch on what is mind, thought, memory, perception etc he has gone in great detail in establishing the truth in various definitions of the same. a very heavy read, but worth its philosophical content.

[Seema Singh · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not easy to read...I'm going to have to read again sometime. It was interesting though.

[امیرمحمد حیدری · Rating 1 out of 5]

آب من با این تحلیلی‌ها در یک جوب نمی‌رود.

[Ali · Rating 5 out of 5]

فکر میکنم بهتره سه کتاب مسائل فلسفه، علم ما به عالم خارج و تحلیل ذهن به ترتیب خونده بشن. هر چند که من به کتاب دوم دسترسی نداشتم و فقط یک فصلش رو که به صورت مجازی تهیه شده بودم خوندم ولی به نظر میومد که همون یک فصل لب مطلب رو ادا میکرد. در مسائل فلسفه تقریبا تمام مطالب تعارضی با فهم متعارف نداره و به سادگی قابل فهمه. در علم ما به عالم خارج راسل نظرش رو راجع به ماهیت ماده عوض کرده و در تحلیل ذهن به این نتیجه رسیده که تمایز عین و ذهن اونقدرها هم که به نظر میاد نیست و مایه اصلی اونها یکسانه. متاسفانه اطلاعات روانشناسی من بسیار اندکه و نمیدونم که مطالب این کتاب که بیشتر از نود سال پیش نوشته شده هنوز هم قابل مدافعه هست یا نه ولی به هر حال مطالب راسل برای من تا حد زیادی قانع کننده بود. در این سه کتاب که طی 10 سال نوشته شده، بارزترین نکته ای که به نظر میاد عشق راسل به حقیقت و شجاعتش در بیان مسائلیه که به نظرش قرین حقیقتن هر چند که در تعارض کامل با مواضع قبلیش باشن

[T · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an excellent book that, as it claims, works to reconcile physics with psychology. I only have two complaints: a.) as with anything written concerning psychology prior to the advent of neuroscience, some of the content is severely dated--the sections on memory and emotion, for instance, and b.) the length, coming in at about 190 pages, seems a bit sparse to justify its high-reaching goal. That is not to say that Russell fails here in his attempt, because I believe he succeeds wholeheartedly, but it is clear that this is not his area of expertise (as he carefully notes more than once), and I don't think he was quite well-read enough in the current psychological literature of the day to allow him to flesh out some of the chapters.

[Sam Motes · Rating 4 out of 5]

A bit dry at times but full of deep thoughts on the workings of he mind. Favorite quote on evolving every day was "Any of us confronted by a forgotten letter written some years ago will be astonished to find how much more foolish our opinions were than we had remembered them as being".

[Y · Rating 3 out of 5]

Definitely felt like psychology written by a mathematician. Very dry, but did have some intriguing ideas, although I felt not explained convincingly.

Some of his major points are that both materialism (human intelligence/mental functions can be explained through only physical phenomena) and idealism (human intelligence are purely non-physical) are wrong. He agrees with William James that there is actually a third thing that is the basis of both, just that it is yet unidentified. Cool idea, but purely theory.

Another point was the consciousness does not exist. He argues when you think of a table, you just have the image of a table in your mind. There is verb of thinking is not a separable thing from the thought. You cannot be thinking without thinking of something. He says that means there are just a stream of experiences that has been misinterpreted as consciousness. Not sure what to make of this, but I don’t think it should be dismissed out of hand.

The book also went in length on topics of logic and the difference between belief and fact. This all seemed like a good example of “when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail”. Russel was a mathematician and logician. I don’t think human psychology can discern between facts and beliefs. I think it is more like humans have beliefs of varying strength, from flimsy to unshakable. It seemed like Russel was seeing in psychology what he was used to seeing in mathematics.

[Eva · Rating 3 out of 5]

Både lättläst (kräver inga förkunskaper) och tungrodd (akademiskt pedantisk). Skriven 1921, är den intressant som en tidig fråga, vad människans mentala sinne egentligen är. Han utgår från den då nya fysiken som visar att materia överhuvudtaget, mest är 'tomrum' - idag skulle vi säga energi.

Det materiella synsättet rådde, 'behaviorismen', var det då nya sättet att se på människan, mer som ett djur, eller maskin. Tacksamt nog vederlägger Russell boken igenom detta synsätt, som i det mesta ohållbart. Han dissar även logiken, samtidigt som han bryter ner varje tanke till sin minsta beståndsdel - vilket bitvis gör texten tråkig - innan vi kommer till de mer komplexa senare kapitlen (föreläsningar). Först är min känsla mest system-processande, något dator-industrin kunde ha haft nytta av. (AI har väl kommit längre?)

För mig som språkvetare intresserar jag mig mest för kapitlet om 'Ord och betydelse' och de följande, men tyvärr stannar vi på minsta möjliga beståndsdels-nivån. Men efter slutmeningarna, om att både fysik och psykologi har sina 'lagar' konstaterar han att eftersom fysikens lagar endast kan relatera till materia, så är "psychology nearer to what actually exists."

Kvantfysiken var väl redan på gång 1921?

[Sotiris Makrygiannis · Rating 4 out of 5]

His analytical thinking is superb. Reminds me the work of Pinker on mind and language as they reach same conclusion that grammar is the basis of metaphysics. Simplistic as the subject could be but elaborative as a philosopher should do. Brilliant work

[Allan Olley · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a book where Russell attempts to sketch how the properties of the human mind might be rendered in a largely behaviourist frame eschewing irreducible mental qualities. However this is ultimately in aid of arguing for neutral monism the idea that everything is ultimately composed of a substrate neither properly physical nor properly mental. This last part is only very briefly elaborated on and remains embryonic at best. Both Russell himself and many subsequent thinkers were influenced by the patterns suggested by this book. Russell displays continuing concerns with things like how the way modern physics with relativity theory and the physics of differential equations stands in contrast to the way causal and physical concepts are understood by philosophers.

The book is very readable even for the layman, Russell also manages some light humourous turns. It makes some reference to psychological literature and much of what it does is no doubt outdated and even if taken at face value might be viewed as inadequate to the sweeping use Russell makes of it. The arguments are interesting if not necessarily compelling and go some small way to elucidate some philosophical positions prior and subsequent that might be obscure without this sort of context.

I believe this the Unwin 1921 publication was the original publication of the book.

[Comptes Rendus de René Guénon]

Bertrand Russell. – Analyse de l’Esprit ; traduit de l’anglais par M. Lefèvre.

Ce livre, nous dit l’auteur, est né d’une tentative de concilier deux tendances différentes, celle de la psychologie qui devient de plus en plus dépendante de la physiologie, et celle de la physique qui, de son côté, rend la matière de moins en moins « matérielle ». On pourrait croire, à première vue, qu’il s’agit là d’un retour aux conceptions anciennes, dans lesquelles l’esprit et la matière n’étaient point radicalement séparés l’un de l’autre comme ils le sont depuis Descartes ; mais, en fait, il n’en est rien, car il s’agit d’un point de vue « empiriste » et « évolutionniste » qui est purement moderne, au plus fâcheux sens de ce mot, et dans lequel ce qui est appelé « esprit » nous apparaît comme quelque chose de peu « spirituel » en réalité, toute faculté supérieure à l’ordre sensible étant niée ou passée sous silence. Parmi les récentes théories psychologiques, « behaviouriste » ou autres, que M. Russell examine avec le plus grand sérieux, il en est d’ailleurs de fort divertissantes pour quiconque peut les envisager avec un complet désintéressement ; ne se rencontrera-t-il pas un Molière pour mettre à la scène ces pédantesques inepties ?
Vient de paraître, sept.-oct. 1928

[Carlos Alberto · Rating 3 out of 5]

The first chapters are incredibly helpful in defining the causes of our behavior, instincts, habits, and desires. You can get a different perspective of your character and find patterns, whether good or bad, and, maybe, modify them. It is another view of one's Self, with simple concepts in a friendly writing.
The second half of the book may be tedious, but useful, as well, to those involved in the study of psyque.
In a sort of synthesis, Russell states that reality yields not in matter nor in mind, but in a mixture of both. The study of that mix would allow us to see the true correlations (e.g. causal relations) between mind and matter. Russell appeals for a multidisciplinary approach in all sciences.

[Jan · Rating 4 out of 5]

A great one!

[Nika Mansouri Ghiasi]

آقا این سایت ستینگی نداره بگیم نصفه نیمه خوندیم فلان کتابو؟ریا می شه آخه اینطوری!من این کتاب را با امید و انگیزه ی فراوان شروع کردم ولی مخم نکشید ادامه بدم ،یعنی می شد بکشه ها ولی خیلی زمانبر بود

[Fatimah Mohammade · Rating 2 out of 5]

مجموعة من المحاضرات القاها براند راسل حول الغريزة والكلام واللاوعي والاعتقاد وغيرها من الموضوعات، لم يكن هناك موضوعية في الطرح والامثلة غير موفقة.

[Paul · Rating 2 out of 5]

babble

[Ahmed · Rating 3 out of 5]

الترجمة كانت سيئة للغاية افقدت الكتاب قيمته....

[John Gossman · Rating 3 out of 5]

Primarily of historic interest.

This is Russell's book on Psychology. It should be considered a pair with his later "Analysis of Matter" as both are about the relationship between Mind and Matter. This book draws heavily on James, Freud, Watson, Hume, and others and presents a largely uncontroversial philosophy of mind. The middle chapters (they were lectures originally) go to great (aka dull) lengths to define such terms as "sensation", "memory", "feelings", and "habit". At the end and the beginning, Russell talks about his philosophy of Neutral Monism--the belief that both Mind and Matter are made up of the same (neutral) substance.
Russell is always a good writer and this book contains much of his common-sense approach and logical exposition of arguments. However, it is not as well written as some of his other works, having neither the humor nor the quick pace of his best stuff, while not going deep like his more academic works.
I read this book primarily because his Neutral Monism is often cited by Panpsychists as prior art arguing that "consciousness" is fundamental to the universe. Russell thinks sensation is fundamental to both Psychology and Physics. Psychology is the study of a single Mind's perspective on things in the world; whereas Physics is what is common to all perspectives. "Matter is a fiction," he says, which allows us to correlate Physics theories with things in the world. He hardly mentions Kant, but clearly, this is something like Kant's concept of experiences vs things-in-themselves. Since both Matter and Mind are defined in terms of Sensation, this leads Russell to his intuition that they are based on similar rules and thus made up of similar, neutral fundamental parts.
One hundred years later, even with Quantum Theory giving Observers a special role, this definition of Matter seems suspect. Russell himself starts down the path of saying Matter is more fundamental than Mind, observing that Minds (Brains) are clearly made up of Matter (nerves, etc) whereas it is not clear that the reverse holds. But then in mid-argument he jumps to his definition of Matter as collections of perspectives. My understanding is that this Materialistic trend continued in later versions of Russell's theory.

Regarding Panpsychism (which is not mentioned in this book), Russell talks about Consciousness and Subjectivity in his conclusion, but by my reading, the modern Consciousness is closer to Russell's Subjectivity and his Consciousness is more like Active Attention. Using his definitions, Russell rejects Consciousness as fundamental because it is too complex (has parts). However, he then goes on to say that "Subjectivity" is likely to be fundamental. In the end, though he says his theory needs further development and awaits studies of the brain to support or refute his Neutral Monism. Clearly, the debate is not over but I can't recommend reading "Analysis of Mind" for advancing the case except as a historical curiosity.

[Luke · Rating 5 out of 5]

Bertrand Russel has a way of effortlessly balancing the more complex philosophy. Carrying the English language on his shoulders along with maybe C.S. Peirce and William James? English speakers have a hard time supporting their great philosophy when politics lines it up to shoot it down and disappear the truth.

“Philosophy” is comparable to “religion” when it comes to the kind credibility it has in English speaking countries. Which is ironic when folks like Bertrand Russell give the most impenetrable arguments against religious institutions and their exploitation by power. You know a form of knowledge is dangerous when it’s relevant to both sides of political debate. At that point the hegemonic apparatus is forced to bury it.

Analysis of mind is a good read alongside Bergson. We can focus on how Russell hasn’t fully understood Bergson by taking too much of a spatial phenomenological approach or we can get on with restoring credibility to the philological history of English.

Today the imperial order controls more temporally than spatially. A colonization of neuronal patterns. Philosophy like this is increasingly relevant. In our era algorithms spin representation. Corporations and governments use temporal orders to eventualize common sense by way of anthropological nodal lines. It’s important to be able to unearth the philosophy for ourselves.

[violet · Rating 4 out of 5]

I had trouble rating Russell the last time I read him, and I’m having similar struggles here. I absolutely love the way he writes - always clear and accessible, using lots of examples and little jargon, and most importantly (my pet peeve!!) he doesn’t needlessly invent new terms for what he’s describing. This was a fascinating take on psychology from the analytic side of 20th century thought, and the discussions of consciousness and the nature of mind as an entity were inspiring. Sections would definitely bring this to a 4.5. But, like his Problems of Philosophy, the discussion I felt became meandering and dogmatic in parts, as if Russell knew where he wanted to go (in his broader metaphysical system) but had to jump through several hoops of proof before he could get there. The analyses of desire, mnemic causation, habit, and will, for example, felt unduly prescriptive; and though detailed, lacked the necessary thoroughness and evidence for such detail in my opinion.

Parts deserve a 4.5, and some parts I wouldn’t give higher than a 3. So because it’s Russell, and because of the clarity and sharpness of his ideas and the general analytic rigor, this is getting a 3.75-4ishhh. Rating philosophy is hard at the best of times, hence the ‘ishhh’.

[Dominika · Rating 4 out of 5]

Nothing like the joy of Public Domain books.

I'll admit that I haven't read too much philosophy, but this was probably a good choice for me considering my background. I especially enjoyed the lecture on language and will probably look into more linguistic theory in the future. I am familiar with both Behaviorism and Introspection (being more of a Behaviorism fan due to its pragmatic uses), so I appreciate how he builds on, discuses, and refutes certain parts of their theories. I will say that for a book published in 2002, he is a bit more behind than what I would have expected. And I do enjoy the logical approach he has towards these things (which have more specific terms in cognitive psychology).

I also have to give props to Russell because he seems like a genuinely cool guy who's beliefs seem to coincide with mine. He seems to talk about every subject, and I like this quote from his Wikipedia "When Brand Blanshard asked Russell why he did not write on aesthetics, Russell replied that he did not know anything about it, 'but that is not a very good excuse, for my friends tell me it has not deterred me from writing on other subjects'"

[Atul Langdon · Rating 4 out of 5]

My friend gifted me this book back in 2005. The book is heavy and boring if you are a shallow reader.
I was one back then; It takes multiple attempts to finish the book. I've not yet. I go slow and read few passages at a time and try to understand things with guidance from Bertrand Russell himself, "Never let yourself be diverted either by what you wish to believe, or by what you think would have beneficent ...".
From my personal life experiences and how my own mind has behaved and behaves so far, I can say that life is not easy to grasp so is our own mind. Our own mind behaves differently and quite opposite to what once we believe we could never think so behave so.
I will just drop the review here and keep this as a placeholder and work in progress as my own perceptions will vary time to time reading this brilliant attempt and essay on Mind.
Thank you Bertrand Russell.

[Nujud Alaql · Rating 3 out of 5]

 إننا نشعر بعدم الرضى ثم نفكر أن الشيء الفلاني سيزيله بهذه الحالة تفكيرنا عبارة عن تنظير، لا مراقبة حقيقة جلية لحالتنا وحياتنا.
 التفكير هو ذاك الشكل من الوعي الذي يكمن في الأفكار باعتبارها ضد الانطباعات أو الذكريات المحض.
 هناك ثلاثة عناصر تتعلق بالتفكير بشيء ما: الفعل، المضمون والشيء.
 المعرفة تأتي عن طريق المضامين.
 المادة الخام التي تكون منها العالم هي نوعين: مادة وعقل.
 أنا أفكر إذا أنا موجود.
 الرغبة شأنها شأن المعرفة، ولكنها قابلة للمراقبة
 حين تكون لدينا رغبة نخجل منها، نلاحظ أنها لا تعود لدينا بصورة واعية.
 تنقسم الحركات البشرية إلى ثلاثة أصناف: ارادية، انعكاسية وآليه.
 الألم صفة حسية، الانزعاج هو حالة الشعور التي تقف عكس السرور.
 الذكريات تتكون من احدى السببين: الباعث الحالي، الواقعة الماضية.
 العواطف صنف من الوقائع الذهنية.
 العقل مسألة درجة تتجسد بصورة رئيسية في عدد العادات وتركيبتها.

[Grace · Rating 4 out of 5]

I'm honestly fascinated with this book. I recall having read bits of it for a psychology class and more bits for a philosophy class. However, I never read the entire thing ─ even though I actually have the book on my shelf.

I need to read the book, not listen to it, and take notes. This seems like it could be a great starting point for understanding metacognition and other neuroscience things that often relate to teaching, leadership, and working with people in any capacity.

[Maja · Rating 4 out of 5]

Not sure I can agree on everything he proposed, however, I find his approach to the various topics interesting. It is well written, some chapters are harder to follow than others but overall quite an interesting book. He does come off a bit silly to me at times, but that's okay, he's a philosopher afterall, that's how they are.

[Jayson Gonzalez · Rating 4 out of 5]

Complex, dense, and a little dry at times. Russell's ideas though on physics, psychology, philosophy of mind are profound, far-reaching, and still very relevant today. Mid to high level read for sure though.