This is an absolutely wild ride of a book. Academia in the first part of the twentieth century, especially if you were a white man, must have simply been a time. Not that Frye is embodying any particular negative -ism in this book; I only mean that he didn’t feel in any way inhibited in the way he thought or how he expressed it. And he’s kind of a bitch. I love that in my Modernist academics.
His undergirding thesis is that art criticism is an art in its own right, with which I wholeheartedly concur. This book is – I think! – an attempt to provide a framework for the serious critic about the ‘universal’ nature of stories, tropes, and characters, stretching all the way back to earliest civilization. It’s an impressive project and Frye mostly gets there.
He starts out by saying that art contains multitudes of which even the artist themself is unaware:
‘It is the critic whose wide reading reveals literature’s deeper truths, of which the individual authors are dimly aware at best.’
(Related: Theodor Adorno: ‘Art is magic delivered from the lie of being truth.’)
In the Polemical Introduction, he points out that there’s no direct relationship between art’s merit and its public reception, and that the only way to stop criticism is to censor it. Which, no.
‘On this [parasitic] theory critics are intellectuals who have a taste for art but lack both the power to produce it and the money to patronise it, and thus form a class of cultural middlemen, distributing culture to society at a profit to themselves while exploiting the artist and increasing the strain on his public.’
‘Art for art’s sake is a retreat from criticism which ends in an impoverishment of civilised life itself. The only way to forestall the work of criticism is through censorship, which has the same relation to criticism as lynching has to justice.’
This hilarious quote refers back to the idea that the artist might not be the best authority on their own work, actually:
‘While Ibsen maintains that Emperor and Galilean is his greatest play and that certain episodes in Peer Gynt are not allegorical, one can only say that Ibsen is an indifferent critic of Ibsen.’
As Frye says, critics aren’t obliged to stick with ‘getting out’ what the artist ‘put in’.
‘What critics have now is a mystery-religion without a gospel, and they are initiates who can communicate, or quarrel, only with one another.’
He says that every literary hierarchy of values is based on concealed moral, social, and intellectual analogies.
‘It is still possible for a critic to define as authentic art whatever he happens to like, and to go on to assert that what he happens not to like is, in terms of that definition, not authentic art.’
ARGH I LOVE YOU.
In the First Essay, he talks about the grand divisions of stories into high mimetic, low mimetic, ironic, and comic. I found it telling that ‘the imitation of nature produces plausibility’ – not truth or reality.
These are the basic forms as Frye divides them, using a lot of academic language. There’s a huge and – in 2022 – kind of hilarious assumption that the reader of this text will have a working knowledge of Greek and Latin as well as a few European language. Hilarious, sad? I’m sad I don’t.
There’s the mythical plane, romance, high mimetic – which revolves around royal courts and quests, low mimetic – involving an extraordinary person in panthestic rapport with nature, and ironic, which focuses on craft.
You can critique art as a product, using catharsis as aesthetic distance, or as a process, in which ‘ecstasis’ (new word for me!) is a state of identification.
In The Second Essay, Frye laments that there’s no technical word for a work of ‘literary art’, aside from ‘poem’, which doesn’t capture enough.
In the Middle Ages, the critical schema was literal, allegorical, moral, and anagogic (spirtual) meanings. Now, Frye says – now being the 1950s, of course – you must accept multiple meanings.
‘The student must either admit the principle of polysemous meaning, or choose one of these groups and then try to prove that all the others are less legitimate. The former is the way of scholarship, and leads to the advancement of learning; the latter is the way of pedantry, and gives us a wide choice of goals, the most conspicuous today being fantastical learning, or myth criticism, contentious learning, or historical criticism, and delicate learning, or “new” criticism.’
There are also two ways of reading: inward, where you make sense of the verbal pattern, and outward, where you go from words to what they mean. In outward reading, the correspondence between phenomena and a verbal sign is what constitutes ‘truth’. In inward reading, meaning comes from the responses of pleasure, beauty, interest. Poetic ‘truth’ doesn’t depend on descriptive truth but on conformity with hypothetical postulates (something I feel a lot of current writers don’t grasp). These postulates are ones agreed in advance with the reader and constitute ‘conventions’.
‘A reader who quarrels with postulates, who dislikes Hamlet because he does not believe that there are ghosts or that people speak in pentameters, clearly has no business in literature. He cannot distinguish fiction from fact, and belongs in the same category as the people who send cheques to radio stations for the relief of suffering heroines in soap operas.’
LOL
And! If you do accept these archetypes or postulates, you must accept the idea of a self-contained literary universe containing universal symbols –! Literature, then, exists in its own verbal universe, where everything is identical to everything else. It speaks not to uniformity, but unity – the way you are unified with your childhood self.
Also, he calls an intentional fallacy the idea that a writer has the primary intention of conveying meaning, and the critic has the primary duty of capturing said meaning.
‘One has to assume, as an essential heuristic axiom, that the work as produced constitutes a definitive record of the writer’s intention.’
‘[...] Milton, who asked for nothing better than to steal as much as possible out of the Bible.’
Hee hee.
‘The fact that revision is possible, that a poet can make changes in a poem not because he likes them better but because they are better, shows clearly that the poet has to give birth to the poem as it passes through his mind. He is responsible for delivering it in as uninjured a state as possible, and if the poem is alive, it is equally anxious to be rid of him, and screams to be cut loose from all the navel-strings and feeding-tubes of his ego.’
THIS IS SO ACCURATE
He points out that you can, as a critic, examine a poem as an imitation of nature but also as an imitation of another poem … and that, in liberal education, something ought to be liberated.
‘Beauty in art is like happiness in morals: it may accompany the act, but it cannot be the goal of the act, just as one cannot “pursue happiness”, but only something else that may give happiness.’
‘It is inadvisable to assume that an Adonis or Oedipus myth is universal, or that certain associations, such as the serpent with the phallus, are universal, because when we discover a group of people who know nothing of such matters we must assume that they did know and have forgotten, or do know and won’t tell, or are not members of the human race. On the other hand, they may be confidently excluded from the human race if they cannot understand the conception of food, and so any symbolism founded on food is universal in the sense of having an indefinitely extensive scope. That is, there are no limits to its intelligibility.’
Imagination transcends the limits of the naturally possible and the morally acceptable. Between religion’s ‘there is’ and poetry’s ‘what if this is’, there’s always tension.
In The Third Essay, Frye does a deep dive into the structures of comedy, romance, tragedy, and irony/satire. He says they all track to myths, which are ‘the limitations of actions at the conceivable limit of desire’. Turning a literal act into eg a play is ‘liberalising’ life by releasing fact into imagination.
‘The possession of originality cannot make an artist unconventional; it drives him further into convention, obeying the law of the art itself, which seeks constantly to reshape itself from its own depths, and which works through its geniuses for metamorphosis, as it works through minor talents for mutation.’
He claims sheep form the basis of original religious myths.
‘Perhaps the use of this particular convention is due to the fact that, being stupid, affectionate, gregarious, and easily stampeded, the societies formed by sheep are most like human ones.’
‘Civilisation tends to try to make the desirable and the moral coincide. [...] how completely all the higher religions have limited their apocalyptic visions to morally acceptable ones.’
First, comedy. Comedy describes the movement from one society to another. The new society fors around the hero at the point of comic discovery or ‘anagnorisis’. This is marked by a ritual, usually a wedding. The ordeals are tests of the hero’s character and usually involve being pitted against an older man. The hero is a neutral figure, to allow for wish fulfillment. Happy endings are usually the result of manipulation: unlikely conversions, miraculous transformations, providential assistance. The action of a comedy is from law to liberty.
‘Even in Shakespeare there are startling outbreaks of baiting older men, and in contemporary movies the triumph of youth is so relentless that the moviemakers find some difficulty in getting anyone over the age of seventeen into their audiences.’
Then, romance. Romance is a wish fulfillment dream. It involves nostalgia for a golden age childhood. The characters generally go on a quest and maintain their integrity against the assault of experience. You can get a ‘pensoroso’ version of this in contemplative adventure stories, such as cozy groups or dystopian settings.
Then, tragedy. This centres the hero’s isolation. Fate is the strongest force here, often omnipotent. That’s one formula; the other is a violation of a moral law resulting in paradise lost. Hero tends to recognise what they’ve forsaken at some point. Frye points out that to turn sad into happy is easy, but it’s very hard to turn happy into sad.
Finally, irony/satire. This deals with the ambiguity of unidealised existence. Irony involves realism and tragedy, while satire deals with fantasy, an implicit moral standard, and a comic struggle between two societies. There’s two phases. The irony without displacement preaches that the world is awful and counsels pragmatism. The comedy of escape (eg picaresque) describes a successful rogue who makes conventional society look foolish.
‘One sometimes gets the impression that the audience of Plautus and Terence would have guffawed uproariously all through the Passion.’
I love this man.
The Fourth Essay deals with rhetorical criticism. This gets into the technicalities of grammar, logic, and writing itself.
In epic writing, Frye talks of the metre as the organising rhythm. I wish I’d been taught this in school properly. The four-stress line is dealt with in great and interesting detail.
Epics are intended to be read aloud. Poems, it’s more like you’re overhearing the poet. In plays, a speaking voice doesn’t necessarily signify direct address. Dialogue is a mimesis of conversation. The way it works is that poets get used to writing in certain metres and then they think that way when they write. Apparently Shaw thought it was easier to write a comic play in blank verse than prose! Frye says that ‘free verse’ is a revolt against epos and metre that doesn’t become prose, but articulates a ‘third’ rhythm. For poets, rhythm comes before the word selection.
‘[...] it is perhaps possible to describe Wagner’s operas as fermented oratorios.’
Oh Northrop.
‘Jung’s persona and anima and counsellor and shadow throw a great deal of light on the characterisation of modern allegorical, psychic, and expressionist dramas, with their circus barkers and wraith-like females and inscrutable sages and obsessed demons.’
Oh so THAT’S what that is.
Frye then deals with specific forms, which, to be honest, are a bit above my head as a non-literature student. Prayer, for example, imitates the ‘rhetoric of praxis’ by using short phrases and being close to free verse.
Then he talks above prose forms. The novel is extroverted and personal, dealing with the person in society; romance is introverted, personal, and subjective; confession is introverted and intellectual; and Menippean satire is extroverted and intellectual. There’s a fifth form of sacred texts and scripture.
‘The literary historian who identifies fiction with the novel is greatly embarrassed by the length of time that the world managed to get along without the novel, and until he reaches his great
deliverance in Defoe, his perspective is intolerably cramped.’
The Bible is the defining myth.
‘The tremendous cultural influence of the Bible is inexplicable by any criticism of it which stops where it begins to look like something with the literary form of a specialist’s stamp collection.’
LOL
‘[..] [The Iliad’s] theme is menis, a song of wrath. It is hardly possible to overestimate the importance for Western literature of the Iliad’s demonstration that the fall of an enemy, no less than a friend or leader, is tragic and not comic.’
Did you know that ‘katabasis’ was where – to gain information about the future – the hero descends into the underworld? I did not.
Then there’s the rhetoric of non-literary prose. Invective: sermons. Philippic: cancelling your enemies. Eulogy: advertising. Conceptual: remove emotion, philosophy. Dissociative: breaking down a habitual response in teaching. Legal: qualifying inclusiveness, ie, jargon.
‘Anything which makes a functional use of words will always be involved in the technical problem of words, including rhetorical problems. The only road from grammar to logic, then, runs through the intermediate territory of rhetoric.’
‘There is no reason why a poet should be a wise and good man, or even a tolerable human being, but there is every reason why his reader should be improved in his humanity as a result of reading him. Hence while the production of culture may be, like ritual, a half-involuntary imitation of organic rhythms or processes, the response to culture is, like myth, a revolutionary act of consciousness.’
In the beautifully-named Tentative Conclusion, Frye finishes on the point that we are hampered by the assumption that the explanation of what a myth IS is what the myth MEANS. Myths can mean an indefinite number of things.
‘Thus the question of whether a thing ‘is’ a work of art or not is one which cannot be settled by appealing to something in the nature of the thing itself.’
It’s all about the … CONTEXT.
Historical criticism relates culture only to the past, ethical criticism only to the future. A liberal education allows people to imagine society as one free, classless, and urbane, which is why it thinks about works of the imagination.
‘The imaginative element in works of art [...] lifts them clear of the bondage of history.’
Thanks Northrup. Reading this book was an excellent life choice for my own, self-directed liberal education.