There were several important theology texts that made quite the splash in the latter half of the twentieth century, John Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory (TST) being one of them. Although Milbank’s proposal in TST is dated now, it nevertheless remains an important work of theology, and it’s become a rite-of-passage every graduate student in theology takes on at some point. Yet as everyone here on Goodreads ritually repeats, this is a deeply challenging study and, at times, inaccessible. That said, I thought I’d try to give a relatively in-depth summary of TST for those interested in engaging it. I will focus on the central components of Milbank’s argument, hopefully not getting too far lost in the weeds.
Let’s begin with the title which is somewhat misleading. Milbank’s theological proposal does not attempt to employ social theory or explore methodologically how theology can borrow from the social sciences (e.g., liberation theology); Milbank is actually suggesting quite the opposite: theology or social theory–two rivals offering competing metanarratives of reality. In so doing, Milbank introduces a one-two-punch. First, he develops a genealogical argument that delegitimizes all social theory, and, secondly, supplants social theory’s metanarrative of modernity with Christianity’s own vision–its own metanarrative–of the social (i.e., all of reality).
Very briefly, Milbank’s argument is the following. Modernity’s thought and practice is ultimately reducible to an ontology of violence. That is, Modernity tells a fundamental story–a metanarrative–that assumes a cyclical downward spiral of violence that can only be managed and constrained (“the priority of force…managed and confined by counter-force” [TST, 4]), yet never resolved or redeemed. In contrast, Milbank proposes a Christian counter-narrative, one that is fundamentally predicated on an ontology of peace and harmony. Theologically, this peace and harmony (i.e., salvation) is proclaimed by the Christian Church in the realm of Christian praxis that embodies this counter-ontology of difference-in-harmony which is God’s own Triune self. Thus, Milbank is suspicious of modern Christian theologies that present in terms of social theory because in doing so, Christianity allows itself to be “positioned” (i.e., compromised) by modern secular reasoning, which, again, is fundamentally an ontology of violence and nihilism.
Now for the longer story of Milbank’s argument. Prior to Modernity, Milbank argues, “there was no ‘secular’” (TST, 9). Instead, the “secular,” that is the secularization of Western culture, had to be imagined or invented and then legitimated by both political theory and theology. The secular was politically legitimated because the body politic became radically redefined by social and political theory. It was theologically legitimated because this social and political theory was made possible by a re-definition of God and God’s relationship to humanity.
According to Milbank, therefore, the secular cannot be simply understood as a natural reality that remained once Modernity shucked off the sacred and transcendent. (This is what philosopher Charles Taylor refers to in A Secular Age as “subtraction stories.”) As a consequence of this, the social and political claimed the existence of an autonomous realm called “the secular” as a purely natural sphere. Modern political theory invented the secular as a field of “pure power” (TST, 10) that contained autonomous objects and selves living by natural law, oriented toward self-preservation–the latter of which was justified by early modern theologians who sought to articulate an ethic of human production as if God were absent from the world.
Once the secular as a natural reality was uncritically assumed, it thereby warranted a social theory to account for the autonomy of this realm. Milbank introduces four elements that generated this social theory, each rooted in the Renaissance period. (1) The retrieval of the concept of dominium from Roman law, which articulated unrestricted power and active right over self and others. (2) This conception of dominium became easily bound up with a form of voluntarism that was mediated through late-Medieval nominalism to form a new political anthropology, which was in turn theologically buttressed by an understanding of the imago Dei. In other words, with God now viewed as the simple divine essence characterized by sheer absolute power and arbitrary will, utterly extrinsic from creation, humanity–by way of the imago Dei–thereby organized a body politic on similar, distant terms. (3) The undermining of traditional authority of the Bible in the Church by the rise of historical criticism. (4) A redefinition of time, no longer seen in eschatological terms, but now in a secular Machiavellian framework of time that is cyclical, which now made possible the interruption of the “fortunate moment,” a type of moment to be seized upon by the politically shrewd actor who can bend and leverage that moment to their own advantage.
According to Milbank, the convergence of these four elements in early modernity engendered the paradoxical modern conception of society as a natural factum–a brute given–undergirded by an ontology of violence and as an autonomous human artifact governed by natural law. The history of western modernity and the metanarrative it tells as brute fact is merely an outgrowth of the contingencies of social theory.
Milbank’s next objective is to demonstrate how this social theory has developed. Modern political theory brooks the power and antagonism inherent in society through social contract, whereas modern economics argues that conflict can be managed through economic transaction, which replaces a theology of divine providence with the hidden hand of the marketplace. Modern sociology, exemplified in the theories of Durkheim and Weber, was simply wielded to “police the sublime,” by which religious belief was reduced to a functionalist explanation of the relations between an individual and the social. Durkheim socializes, and thereby secularizes, transcendence and ecclesiology to an immanent community bound by ritual, whereas Weber conceives of religious belief as secondary to societal value in that instrumental rationality becomes the primary driver, disenchanting the sacred over time. For Milbank, modern sociology’s functionalist explanation of religion is simply “narrative redescription”–a metanarrative–that betrays its own baseless presuppositions of the “secular”–an invented myth to begin with.
Two long chapters follow, one on Hegel and the other on Marx. In both chapters, Milbank argues that Hegel and Marx can be useful in critiquing secular reasoning, but prove equally dangerous in jeopardizing Christian orthodoxy. Milbank lauds Hegel’s rejection of the Enlightenment’s notion of neutral, autonomous reasoning, and his championing of reasoning as historically mediated. Moreover, Hegel does not allow a purely secular account of society, one that is simply socialized. For Hegel, Geist (or Spirit) indicates that all social life is grounded in transcendence and therefore requires theological discourse. Hegel’s dialectic also proves useful for Milbank in that it offers a way of thinking beyond dualisms (i.e., nature/grace, faith/reason, sacred/secular). But Milbank levels several charges against Hegel as well. Hegel’s totalizing philosophy in Spirit’s self-revelation absorbs theology, undercutting the necessity of revelation as something gratuitous. Relatedly, Hegel immanentizes God to such an extent that it becomes identified with the historical unfolding of Spirit, threatening to undermine transcendence. Hegel’s dialectic, while useful, seeks to resolve all contradictions which leaves no room for mystery, paradox, and gratuity, which for Milbank is central to Christian faith. Lastly, Milbank argues that Hegel’s dialectic also absorbs difference into sameness, which can be easily translated into a violent, coercive framework. The Christian vision of peace, on the other hand, respects difference as divine gift.
Marx additionally receives mixed reviews. For Milbank, Marx is at his best when he acts as the “deconstructor of the secular” (TST, 177) who unmasks the supposedly neutral marketplace that conceals relations of domination and exposes how ideologies and institutions are formed by hidden interests like class and economic exploitation. This parallels closely, for Milbank, a doctrine of sin that pervades all of social life. Yet Marx goes awry when he interprets all of history as class struggle which accepts violence as ontologically primary and substitutes the Kingdom of God for a social utopia (i.e., communism). This is for Milbank a politicized parody of Christian eschatology.
Milbank ends Part III of TST with an extended exploration of Maurice Blondel, the French Nouvelle Theologie (in contrast to Rahner’s German version), and their emphasis on “supernaturalizing the natural.” Before I explain why this is central to Milbank’s study, skipping ahead to Milbank’s analysis of Nietzsche and the later French Neo-Nietzscheans (Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze) will better foreground how the Nouvelle Theologie’s ressourcement plays into Milbank’s theological out-narration of Modernity’s own metanarrative.
First, Nietzsche and the ontological violence he so forcefully asserts. According to Milbank, Nietzsche’s historicizing genealogy is undergirded by a “differential ontology” of violence that best represents Nihilism and the postmodern Neo-Nietzscheans (TST, 278). For Nietzsche, the will-to-power is the only inherently natural given that claims transcendental status and is not subject to genealogical critique. In other words, power and violence, according to Nietzsche, are both taken to be the foundations of all reality and therefore escape historicist analysis. But Nietzsche’s thought also acts as a pivotal moment which marks the end of Modernity’s penchant for foundationalist epistemologies and the start of Postmodernity’s skepticism of ungrounded metanarratives buttressed by themes of power and ideological strategies. Milbank finds this especially useful for his critique of Nietzsche in that he argues the latter’s “unfounded hierarchy of values” and elevation of “heroic” violence cannot be undermined by liberalism’s response, but instead requires a narration of “an alternative mythos, equally unfounded, but nonetheless embodying an ‘ontology of peace’…” (TST, 279). Yet before articulating a Christian alternative mythos, Milbank takes on the French Neo-Nietzscheans.
Foucault unmasks the modern myth of neutrality by genealogically exposing that what passes as foundational truth-claims are always bound up with dynamic power-relations, which confirms Milbank’s contention that secular reason is not autonomous reasoning, but rather entangled with hidden theologies of coercion and violence. Yet Foucault’s genealogy, like Nietzsche’s, remains fundamentally predicated upon an ontology of violence in that all order emerges from conflict, and every truth claim is an effect of control and domination. Milbank accepts Derrida’s notion of différance which signals the impossibility of a final closure of discourse and demonstrates the instability of meaning through subconscious acts of “deconstruction,” in turn introducing an ethics of hospitality that gestures toward an openness to the “other.” But for Milbank, Derrida’s ethics can never allow for achieving a final justice because difference, according to Derrida, cannot be reconciled, and the endless deferral of language leaves no grounding in transcendence, which can only end in a repeated cycle of conflict and violence. Deleuze’s metaphysics of difference and becoming, for Milbank, is helpful in that it resists static notions of hierarchies, essences, and identity–all of which have been used to maintain social structures of oppression and marginalization. Yet because Deleuze grounds his “ontology of difference” in pure immanence, which is an endless field of flux, all that ensues is chaotic “becoming,” resulting in competition, struggle, and violence as basic to all of reality because diversity, according to Deleuze’s ontology, cannot be reconciled in a participatory divine plenitude of unifying peace.
Now for Milbank’s Christian counter-ontology to Modernity’s ontology of violence. Milbank argues that Christianity presents an anti-heroic story, one that is a refusal of violence and a narration of the “real social practice” of Augustine’s theology of the City of God, where “pure persuasion without violence” is offered as a counter-ontology (TST, 321). This is a Christian theology of the real and the social that does not need its own social theory to justify itself in the form of secular reasoning, be it through foundationalist apologetics, substance ontologies, and the desiring of competitive creativities that jockey for recognition. A theological metanarrative of this kind is fully grounded in the analogy of Being, a non-possessive desire founded in charity, and a Trinitarian ontology–all of which, for Milbank, presents the possibility of out-narration. He grounds this metanarrative in Maurice Blondel, the French Nouvelle Theologie, and in Augustine’s City of God.
The central move in Blondel’s L’Action that Milbank seizes upon is “that in concrete, historical humanity there is no such thing as a state of ‘pure nature’: rather, every person has always already been worked upon by divine grace” (TST, 206). What is, in fact, implicated in Blondel’s contention is a “supernaturalizing [of] the natural,” in which the finite is always mediated through, and participates in, the supernatural (TST, 209). In this way, there is an open-endedness to all of social and cultural life, undermining fixed notions of reality inherent in substance metaphysics. In other words, Blondel’s analysis introduces the following: action over substance, the incomplete nature of action, the experience of action which opens up a series of new syntheses that introduces new elements into reality, and the conclusion that the supernatural serves as the ground of every act deeming every action meaningful in the first place. The supernatural is the infinite ground that guarantees the character of meaningful action and discloses new reality. So what Blondel provides for Milbank is the claim that Christianity’s ungrounded-ness, so to speak, is purposeful because the eschatological character of journeying in via to God is a never ending pilgrimage, which is a more compelling story than Modernity’s metanarrative which hinges on strategies to manage and to control conflict and violence, be it the secular reasoning of liberalism or postmodernism.
Lastly is Milbank’s employment of Augustine’s City of God. Augustine argues that the city of God–the heavenly city–eschews the disordered loving and human standards of the earthly city. It is this model that Milbank believes serves as a postmodern counter-narrative, an out-narration, of Modernity’s metanarrative. Three elements from Augustine’s City of God are developed by Milbank in his counter-narrative: (1) creation is viewed as fostering differences-in-relation which thereby reflects a Trinitarian ontology–what Milbank argues is the Trinity rooted in charity-in-difference, a “‘musical’ harmony of infinity” (TST, 424). (2) the telos of creation is harmony, suggesting that difference and displacement, which constitute creation, all find their redemption not in violence but in peace and harmony. (3) Regarding moral judgement, categories of truth and error are surpassed, and all that remains is peace as the Good, Beautiful, and True, and evil as a privation of the Good. This framework of moral judgement, Milbank argues, truly encourages the desire for God and authentic harmony, relating all that does not live up to this vision as failing to properly relate to God’s ordering of a harmonic creation.
Thus, for Milbank, Christian theology is a social science that does not need to stoop to the level of secular reasoning, exemplified in modern apologetics, and should instead articulate a Christian narrative and embody a Christian praxis that out-narrates the metanarrative of Modernity. “It must articulate Christian difference in such a fashion as to make it strange” (TST, 381). Milbank presents four ways of achieving this task: (1) replacing the secular understanding of “reason” for a patristic understanding of logos. (2) Articulating a Christian ethic based not on social theory, but in the historically embedded practices facilitated by Christian community. (3) Presenting a re-narration of the Christian story in the context of creation, as Augustine managed to do. (4) Participating in Christian self-critique of the Church, recognizing where it has failed to embody and mediate this salvation and, instead, abetted the rise of secular Modernity.
I’ve likely misconstrued some of Milbank’s emphases, and I’ve undoubtably glossed over the subtleties that render this study so complex, but I hope this is a helpful starting point.