Generally regarded as the most important of the Civil War campaigns conducted in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, that of 1864 lasted more than four months and claimed more than 25,000 casualties. The armies of Philip H. Sheridan and Jubal A. Early contended for immense stakes. Beyond the agricultural bounty and the boost in morale a victory would bring, events in the Valley also would affect Abraham Lincoln's chances for reelection in the November 1864 presidential canvass.
The eleven original essays in this volume reexamine common assumptions about the campaign, its major figures, and its significance. Taking advantage of the most recent scholarship and a wide range of primary sources, contributors examine strategy and tactics, the performances of key commanders on each side, the campaign's political repercussions, and the experiences of civilians caught in the path of the armies. The authors do not always agree with one another, yet, taken together, their essays highlight important connections between the home front and the battlefield, as well as ways in which military affairs, civilian experiences, and politics played off one another during the campaign.
William W. Bergen, Charlottesville, Virginia Keith S. Bohannon, State University of West Georgia Andre M. Fleche, University of Virginia Gary W. Gallagher, University of Virginia Joseph T. Glatthaar, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Robert E. L. Krick, Richmond, Virginia Robert K. Krick, Fredericksburg, Virginia William J. Miller, Churchville, Virginia Aaron Sheehan-Dean, University of North Florida William G. Thomas, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Joan Waugh, University of California, Los Angeles
<!--copy for pb Generally regarded as the most important Civil War military operation conducted in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, the campaign of 1864 lasted more than four months and claimed more than 25,000 casualties. Beyond the loss of agricultural bounty to the Confederacy and the boost in Union morale a victory would bring, events in the Valley also would affect Abraham Lincoln's chances for reelection in the November 1864 presidential canvass.
The eleven original essays in this volume reexamine common assumptions about the campaign, its major figures, and its significance. Taking advantage of the most recent scholarship and a wide range of primary sources, contributors consider strategy and tactics, the performances of key commanders on each side, the campaign's political repercussions, and the experiences of civilians caught in the path of the armies.
The contributors are William W. Bergen, Keith S. Bohannon, Andre M. Fleche, Gary W. Gallagher, Joseph T. Glatthaar, Robert E. L. Krick, Robert K. Krick, William J. Miller, Aaron Sheehan-Dean, William G. Thomas, and Joan Waugh. The editor is Gary W. Gallagher. -->
Gary W. Gallagher, the John L. Nau III Professor of History at the University of Virginia, is the author or editor of many books in the field of Civil War history, including The Confederate War; Causes Won, Lost, and Forgotten: How Hollywood and Popular Art Shape What We Know about the Civil War; and The Union War.
This is an interesting collection of essays on the Shenandoah Campaign of 1864. Gary Gallagher has pulled together a set of essays that, even if they sometimes contend with one another, helps the reader get a better understanding of the 1864 conflict.
The dramatic personae in this action include Lee's "bad old boy," Jubal Early, the combative but capable Confederate commander, versus Phil Sheridan, the hyperactive cavalry commander given charge of the Union forces in the Valley. Key players on the Union side: John Crook, leader of the "Army of West Virginia," William Emory of Sheridan's army, the cavalry (Torbert as head, with Merritt and Custer, and Devin as key subordinates). On the Confederate side: infantry commanders such as Gordon, Rodes and Ramseur and cavalry leaders Lomax, Munford, and Rosser. There was a lot of talent on each side, but Early's army was heavily outnumbered (maybe 40,000 troops under Sheridan and 14,000 or so under Early). Such numbers presaged an almost inevitable defeat of Early, with as combative a Union general as Sheridan on the other side (it can safely be said that prior Valley commanders such as Patterson, Hunter, Sigel, and so on may well have wasted such an advantage; Sheridan, despite his flaws as a combat commander, was unlikely to lose under such conditions).
What is nice about this volume is that the authors of the individuals chapters try to assess what actually happened and how good (or bad) commanders actually were, rather than repeating commonly understood judgments. What about the "Woodstock Races" after the Confederate cavalry's disastrous defeat at Tom's Brook? Confederate ineptitude? Or Union overwhelming force? What about Early versus Sheridan as commander of an army? Gallagher's chapter addresses this in a sensitive manner.
At Cedar Creek, what happened? Did Early's so-called "fatal halt" lose the day? Or were the Confederates so outnumbered and outgunned that--aside from total incompetence in Union leadership--they simply could not triumph? Another essay explores the generalship of the 6th Corps commander, Horatio Wright. The conclusions is that he did a good job as commander after the surprise attack while Sheridan was absent and may not have received the credit due him. Still, his performance in other venues in the Civil War was uneven. Here, however, he probably deserves good grades.
And so on. The essays in this volume provoke some thinking about the Valley Campaign of 1864. This is a good work to look at. The chapters are somewhat uneven (as to be expected from an edited volume), but--all in all--this is a useful examination of the subject.
Like the other books in the series, this is an interesting collection of essays, when they focus on the 1864 Valley campaign. Unfortunately, it also strays off topic, such as Robert K. Krick's essay on the Patton family; it covers every family member in the Confederate army, not just George S. Patton, and his role in the 1864 campaign is restricted to only two paragraphs.